00 Preface - Pragmatism - William James

Pragmatism, a new name for some old ways of thinking, to the memory of John Stuart Mill,

from whom I first learned the pragmatic openness of mind and whom my fancy likes to picture

as our leader where he alive today.

Preface

The lectures that follow were delivered at the Lowell Institute in Boston in November and

December 1906, and in January 1907 at Columbia University in New York.

They are printed as delivered without developments or notes.

The pragmatic movement, so-called, I do not like the name, but apparently it is too

late to change it, seems to have rather suddenly precipitated itself out of the air.

A number of tendencies that have always existed in philosophy have all at once become conscious

of themselves collectively and of their combined mission.

And this has occurred in so many countries, and from so many different points of view,

that much unconcerted statement has resulted.

I have sought to unify the picture as it presents itself to my own eyes, dealing in broad strokes

and avoiding minute controversy.

Much futile controversy might have been avoided, I believe, if our critics had been willing

to wait until we got our message fairly out.

If my lectures interest any reader in the general subject, he will doubtless wish to read

further.

I therefore give him a few references.

In America, John Jewess studies in logical theory or the foundation.

Read also by Jewy the articles in the philosophical review, volume 15, page 113, and 465, in mind

volume 15, page 293, and in the journal of philosophy, volume 4, page 197.

Probably the best statements to begin with, however, are FCS chillers in his studies in

humanism, especially the essays numbered 1567, 18, and 19.

His previous essays, and in general the polemic literature of the subject, are fully referred

to in his footnotes.

Furthermore, C. G. Milhaud, l'Arachinelle, 1898, and the fine articles by Leroy in the

Revie de Metaphysic, volumes 7, 8, and 9.

Also articles by Blondelle and Desali in the anal de philosophy Cretienne, 4th series,

volumes 2 and 3.

Papine announces a book on pragmatism in the French language to be published very soon.

To avoid any misunderstandings at least, let me say that there is no logical connection

between pragmatism as I understand it, and a doctrine which I have recently set forth

as radical empiricism.

The latter stands on its own feet, one may entirely reject it, and still be a pragmatist.

Harvard University, April 1907.

End of Preface