139. Trump vs Iran: Saddam Hussein and the Nuclear Bomb (Ep 2)

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So how do we get to Operation Epic Fury, and what does the US and Israel stand to gain

from a weakened Iran, and what does the future hold for the Iranian people?

Well, welcome to therestisclassified, I'm Gordon Carrera, and I'm David Maclaski,

and this is the second of two episodes where we're looking at the roots of epic fury at the

hostility between the US and Iran, particularly, and last time we looked at from the 50s onwards

up to the 1979 revolution, and a replacement of this US client state, to some extent, under

the Shah, with a revolutionary Islamist regime, which is going to take a very different position

when it comes to the US. And we're joined once again by Arash Azizir, our traveling companion

through this secret history of the conflict between US and Iran. Welcome, Arash.

It's great to be with you. So I guess, David, we should try and pick up on this idea of what

happens after 79, and the extent to which this is the justification, isn't it, for epic fury,

and in the language of Donald Trump, that it's what the Islamic regime has done to the Americans

in his view, and what it's done in the region, which justifies this action, and that's what we're

going to look at this time. That's right. And I think, you know, one of the themes,

Gordon, that that Trump and his advisors have returned to frequently, both I think in the

justification for it now, the conduct of Operation Epic Fury, is that the Islamic Republic

is a menace to its neighbors, and kind of the broader region. They're the number one state

supporter of terrorism, a regime that has American blood on its hands, from Lebanon to Saudi Arabia

to Iraq, because its partners and proxies have killed thousands of Americans. There's, of course,

the famous George W. Bush reference to Iran as a member of the axis of evil at seeking their

weapons. And so I think in the last episode, we looked at the cauldron, the sort of melting pot

of this enmity that stretches all the way back to 1953 and 1979 with the revolution.

And today we're going to look at the external piece of this. How does the conflict between

US, the West, and Iran kind of spill beyond Iran's borders after the revolution occurs?

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Seltzer works. Chicago, Illinois. Yeah, and Arashi, you set this up a bit at the end of the

last episode. The idea that this was a new regime, which was intrinsically opposed to the United

States and to capitalism and to the West because of its very nature. But also, I think what's

important is it seeks to export its revolution, doesn't it? That's one of the core

proponents of the 1979 revolution is that it wants to spread the revolution internationally and

beyond its borders. Yes, so the Islamic Republic is militant and revolutionary from the beginning,

opposed to capitalism, opposed to communism. And it does want to export it. Although,

what does this exporting actually means? And how do you do that while being a state that is a member

of the community of nations and a member of the United Nations? This becomes a contradiction

that the Islamic Republic has to deal with in its entire life. In fact, I would say

this, that it's important to remember these dualities that is Islamic Republic. Islamic

Republic is never a simple story. It's because from the very beginning, it's really driven by a

lot of internal disagreements. Are we following Iranian national interests or not? Especially

diplomats who have, a lot of them have actually come from the Shah's regime, but even the new

diplomats, they come to adopt some visions of Iran and Iranian national interests. Is our economy

more socialist or more capitalist? Because what is Islamic economy doesn't mean anything. And also,

why are we having such a beef with the United States or should we have this beef or should we

work with it? So in reality, none of this turns out to be so neat. In the 1980s, of course, Iran,

the first country that attacks Iran, in 1980, is Saddam Hussein's Iraq. And that's not a U.S.

ally. It's kind of a Soviet ally, but it's also kind of anti-communist of its own. So in many

ways, Saddam Hussein's Iraq was more similar to Iran than many other regimes in the world,

but the attack said, and Iran has to defend itself, for a few years, the war goes on for eight

years, because Iran really pursue it even after kicking Iraq is out of Iran in territory.

And who do you think sells arms to Iran secretly, of course, in this period, Israel and the United

States? This becomes the Iran-Contra affair. So I guess what I'm trying to say is that this regime

is very noxious from the very beginning to its neighbors and to the world, because it wants to

spread communism and this revolution, and there are a lot of internal fights. Let me just say,

for example, that there are elements of the regime who immediately they try to organize a queen

back reign. They try to destabilize the Saudi regime and the system sort of reigns them in.

Actually, the system reigns them in, but it does pursue other forms of durable transnational

activity. And I guess this kind of conversion of a potentially amenable downtrodden

Shia community and a geopolitical opening, which occurs through the Israeli invasion of Lebanon

in 1982, is that these new sort of intelligence organizations, security organizations of the Islamic

Republic step into that chaos in Lebanon and begin to create or kind of stitch these Shia

groups together into what will eventually become his bola. Absolutely. And that kind of even predates

the invasion. Iranian Shia revolutionists have helped organize the Lebanese Shia, and the 1970s

they helped fund Amal, which is a Shia party, but Hezbollah comes to be after the Iranian revolution

by the initiative of what is called the Islamic Revolutionary Guard's Corps, this militia that is

founded in 1979 to guard the revolution, and different Lebanese Shia groups. So some who are

supporters of the Dava party, which is a Shia party founded in Iraq, some who are more sort of

clerical, some actually who have some links to the Palestinian movement. And these all of these are

open to all sorts of different divisions because Lebanon has been in a civil war since 1975,

right? In this civil war, Shia and the Palestinians are not really on the same side necessarily.

Anyway, it's not to get bogged down too much to talk about the Hezbollah. Hezbollah really is the

jewel in the crown of Iran's, what later becomes known as Iran's axis of resistance, and he can

say it's Iran's transnational activity, because it sort of hits the right spot, because it's a party

that really comes to represent the Lebanese Shia for a period. After the Israel invasion of Lebanon

in 1982, it's fighting an active invasion, so it has the legitimacy of a national resistance movement.

It's a very, it's a success story, basically. And Iran does it because Iranians have this

authority amongst the Shia. They're seen as the big Shia country and who has just led a successful

Islamic revolution, so they know what they're talking about. So they're looked up to and

and Hezbollah builds itself up during the 1980s, and it starts a new, of course,

chapter in Iranian-American enmity by a dramatic attack on the US Marines.

Yeah, we should say. I mean, that really is one of the kind of defining events for the 80s,

isn't it? The attacks on the US Embassy and the US Marine barracks in Beirut by Hezbollah,

where you've got these suicide truck bombs effectively killing, I mean, hundreds of American

servicemen, I mean, it's incredibly deadly, isn't it, David? So in April of 83, a suicide bomber,

Hezbollah suicide bomber drives a truck pack of the explosives into the US Embassy, and they

root that kill 63 people, and then just six months later, or so in October of 83, another truck

bomb is driven into the Marine barracks at Beirut Airport. And of course, the US, that's a whole

separate story of why the US has gotten involved in Lebanon, and 241 American servicemen are killed.

It's actually the deadliest day for the US Marines since the Battle of Iwo Jima

against the Japanese and the Second World War. So to take this back to some of the justifications

for the for Operation Epic Fury, I mean, this this period is sort of front and center because we have

we have Iranian back supported, directed, financed, armed, Hezbollah terrorists who

are killing killing American servicemen and women and civilians at the at the Embassy in Beirut.

So I think a lot of the enmity can be traced back not just to what's going on in Iran,

but of course, to the way the Iranians have kind of exported this revolutionary brand of

anti-American shia Islam into Lebanon. And Hezbollah does several elections in the US. They arrest

and severely torture and kill the station chief of the CIA in Beirut. And they take hostage

tons of people, Europeans and Americans, and Iran openly uses these hostages in negotiations

in Americans. And of course, President Reagan's withdraws from Lebanon, right? In response to the

bombing, that's part of the story. I should also say here that my good friend and someone who

I was looked up to, Kim Ghatas has a beautiful new book from what I understand coming over the 80s.

And yeah, Kim has an excellent book called Black Wave about the region post-1979,

but her name is an exceptional book. It really is an exceptional book. I agree with you 100%

and her noble book, I think it's going to be very illuminating for a lot of us as they're looking

to Lebanon in the 80s and all that is happening there. Obviously, a lot of that is directed against

Israel, and that's where Hezbollah's main activities in Lebanon. I mean, it is this idea that

it's intrinsic to Iran that it wants Israel wiped off the map. Is that actually an accurate

reflection of the policy or is it kind of bluster? Is it talk? How should we understand that

position? Well, it's a it's a it's a fascinating point to talk about. The Islamic Republic

sets itself the cause of destroying Israel from early on. And is there clear what it means?

It means that Israel shouldn't be there. It's a legitimate colonial entity,

you're serving Muslim lands, and it shouldn't be there. And they really do believe this.

It believes that it's common across, you know, much of the global left at the time and now,

but they take it seriously. And anyways, so this is this is the ethos of the Islamic Republic.

Now, it definitely goes toward it. First of all, commits to it, to primatically, I

oppose it to a state solution and repeatedly estates it. It supports armed militias who will

take armed action against the Israel. In fact, since the 1980s, the only estate in the world

that really takes action against Israel is Iran. The only estate to actually fires bullets at Israel

is Iran. Estate. I mean, you know, I don't count the hooties because they're not official to

stay, right? So there are there are a couple of complications. So first of all, they're not a

stupid. They know that Israel is a nuclear armed estate. They know it's not a goal that they can

achieve immediately. But it's never the less a goal that they follow. And as I said, they

arm all this groups about it. They take actions against it. They have, you know, they have this

positions. Secondly, like everything else in the Islamic Republic, this is not uncontested.

And from early on, and certainly later from the 90s, elements inside the Islamic Republic say,

look, this is silly. We're sacrificing all we have on this quest to destroy Israel. We should

give this up. And we should be like other countries say, accept it to a state solution effectively.

If the Palestinians come to an agreement with the Israelis, Iran won't be more Catholic than the

Pope and would accept it. And they've come to say that. So it is true, but they have these two

caveats, if you will. Well, you know, certainly in the the 80s and 90s, I think you could characterize

it as a period of kind of freewheeling, almost revolutionary adventurers of the part of the

Iranians to some degree. I accept the point that there's there are constraints, but you know,

there's there's the support for Hezbollah, which turns kind of over this period. It is you get

into the 2000s from a kind of proxy into maybe more of a partner as his ballad becomes more established

with Lebanon, particularly when the Israelis withdraw in 2000. And on the terrorism side, though,

is fascinating to me that I mean, you have these pretty significant attacks that occur like,

for example, Kobar Towers bombing in Daran Saudi Arabia in 1996, 92 US Air Force personnel are

killed. That's done with Iranians, sort of direction and patronage through Saudi Hezbollah.

There's this bombings of the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires in 1992, a Jewish community center

there in 1994, kind of the same script of the Iranians directing this funding, it supporting it.

That was done, you know, those attacks in South America done by Hezbollah, but as you get to

9-11, I think this it's interesting because it's maybe one of the one of the only times in this

history where you could say there was potentially a different, is there a path forward here for the

US and Iran to go on a different, you know, have a different kind of relationship because it's

some of the, some of the openings that the Iranians suggested were there quite fascinated to look

back on. Yeah, I did a bit of reporting actually around this time of 9-11. And because the two

sides actually kind of cooperated a bit over Afghanistan, didn't they? A lot more than a bit. 9-11

attacks. Yeah, directed by Al Qaeda from Afghanistan where they're being sheltered by the Taliban. And

actually, they both the US and Iran have an interest in getting rid of the Taliban and changing

the regime there. So there's a really interesting period, isn't there? Where there are openings,

there's a bit of talks, there's some sign that perhaps, you know, there's the possibility of

rapprochement. And then Iran is labeled part of the axis of evil because I think my recollection

of looking at it was that there were hardliners on both sides in Washington and in Tehran who were

basically like, we do not want to move closer. We do not want to see that happen. Yes, definitely.

So the factional politics on both sides are important to understand. So in Iran, there are many who

from the 90s on want to push for Iran to become a normalist state basically to establish

relations with the US to become more normalist. And these are not the people who are doing Buenos

status. They're not the people who are doing the bombing in Tehran Saudi Arabia, which is a very

fascinating episode generally. Because there's also this fight over Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia

are neighbor or is it illegitimate, you know, kingdom we need to overthrow or something in between.

There are different fights about this. But in terms of 2001 and 2011, so following 1911,

US and Iran worked very closely in Afghanistan. I mean, they have the same goal. They want to overthrow

Taliban. Iran has an important role in the bond conference, which helps sort of bring about it,

establish a government in Afghanistan that could follow. And the axis of evil speech

leaves not only Iranians by surprise. This is a set of union by President Bush in January 2002.

It doesn't only lead Iranians by surprise. It leaves US diplomats who were conducting the talks

and working closely with Iran, basically military collaboration in surprise. This is the story

that you know, Qasim Soleimani and his people show up to talks to the Americans and they have

brought a map. You know, they were saying, oh, this is all the bases of Taliban. And the US side

sort of can't believe it that they've come to offer so much. And at some point, they're like,

oh, well, can we like copy this map? They're like, no, this is your copy. Like we made it for you.

You know, and they give it. So there was really close collaboration going on. And the

axis of evil speech doesn't immediately put an end to it. But it makes it clear that obviously

that's not a direction. And look, the Bush administration really flirts with the idea

that has been tempting ever since before and since of maybe we can just get rid of this guys.

Maybe instead of trying to figure out who's a little nicer more law and stuff, maybe we can just

get rid of this guys. And of course, they were on their high horse after Iraq. And they also

it's in this period, it's in this period that they reject the gold demand letter. It's a very

important document. Yeah, let's set this up because we have the axis of evil speech. Then March

2003, Iraq, which is of course Iran's long time adversary is removed from power, which I guess,

you know, the Iranians are pretty happy about. But equally, they can see the language in

Washington, which is first Baghdad and then Tehran, you know, a lot of the kind of hard call

Nioh Khan to saying they used to say boys go to Iraq, real men go to Iran. I mean, that was the

yeah, that was the language. Yeah, I do remember that. And so at that point, the Iranians reach

out, don't they in that period? And and and and basically offer to to they were back channel contacts

to say, let's let's do a deal. We can find somewhere of accommodating your worries and your demands.

This is the gold demand letter. So they send it to through the Swiss ambassador to Iran team gold

demand. And Swiss was the protector of US interests in Iran, right? And yeah, and they basically

offer to normalize ties with the US. They offer to give up on this anti-Israel line basically that

effectively adopt the more to a state disposition. And yeah, and give up the al-Qaeda members who

are in Iran. And the US isn't interested, is it? No, US rejects that basically. The US rejects

it. Yeah. The US rejects it. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. When was it sent? What year?

I think it's 2003. 2000. I think it's right after the invasion. It's it's. Yeah. May 2003.

May 2003. I was going to say May 2003. Yeah. They freak out. Yeah. They freak out. I mean,

they think, oh, wow, I mean, I was a young boy in Iran. I remember that, right? The idea was

the US came to Afghanistan. It came to Iraq. It's just, you know, it took over the whole region. And

they there was a sense that you were surrounded by the US. And they freak out.

So they give that letter. And the US says no, because they think they can overthrow the government

in Iran. Well, I think this this Iraq moment is an important one because it frames so much of the

the geopolitical story to come, which is from the Iranian standpoint, it's like massive

opportunity, but also massive risk, right? On the risk side, the US is just knocked out

Saddam and the Taliban. And it's done so relatively quickly, as seen from 2003, 2004.

And to your point, the Americans are rejecting any sort of outreach from Iran and maybe we're next.

But the promise or so that the opportunity side of this is that Washington has also knocked out

the two other big boys on either literally on your on your eastern border and your western

border. And so you as the Iranians now have I think more space to sort of explore your neighborhood

and expand your interests and influence regionally, because the big boys Saddam in particular has

been has been knocked out. And I think this this Iraq experience really sets a new kind of

collision course for the US and Iran because we never square this to fundamental dilemma, which is

if Washington is trying to build a stable and more representative system of governance in Iraq,

it has to include factions, shia parties that are going to be in relationship with or under

the influence of Iran, right? Yeah. So it has to do that. And yet at the same time, the US is

trying to resist all manner of Iranian influence in Iraq. And those two things are sort of working

directly in contradiction to one another throughout the entirety of the US occupation.

That's right. Yeah. No, you put it very well. This is the contradiction that they have to deal with.

And I mean, it's worth saying as well that the the the Iranians and you know, particularly the

revolutionary guards as Bella, the consul also get very involved in supporting groups fighting the

Americans in Iraq. Exactly. This is another important moment. And I mean, it's something which

Americans I think I understand why Americans get incredibly angry about about this because you

know, their view is, you know, the the Iranians were supplying the weapons and the training and

giving the expertise to kill American troops. But from the Iranian point of view, you can absolutely

see the logic, which is you've got a country which has moved in next door to you and which is

threatening to attack you next. You want to bug it down and to cause as many problems for it to

stop it thinking it can take you next. So there is a kind of dark logic to that position as well,

but which claims, I think, many American lives. Yes, it claims many American lives. And the Iranians

helped build themselves in Iraq like that. So they, you know, this is Qasem Soleimani's life achievement

if you will, right? So he's the head of the goods force. From 1998, he's appointed as the head of

the goods force or the Jerusalem force has this called, which is basically the external operations

wings of the revolution regards. And the goods force that it's called Jerusalem force because,

of course, the ultimate goal is liberation of Jerusalem. The resource helps run Hezbollah in Lebanon.

It's first guy, by the way, the first leader of the goods force before Qasem Soleimani is a guy

called Ahmad Wahibi who is today the head of the IRGC. He was after the US just killed the last

head. Ahmad Wahibi is appointed as the head. And you know, he helped Hezbollah in the 80s. Again,

a kind of tough guy to use Trump in language. Qasem Soleimani is appointed in 1988. He's kind of led,

he's been a Iran's drug, so are effectively fighting the drugs in the in the late 80s and 90s. And

he's helped the anti Taliban forces in Afghanistan before that. And now in the late 90s,

in 1988, he's appointed as the head of the force force. And Iraq is going to be one of the five

years of the job, you know, he has his assignment effectively of leading the Shia forces in Iraq.

And he makes it his life's work and is able to build personal relationship with the Shia militias.

And Iran is really able to use precisely two things to effectively dominate Iraq. First,

the democratic system because actually it's a pretty good system for foreigners to use sometimes

because you know, you can all you need is to get people to vote for your candidates, right.

And the sectarian civil war that ends up happening between Shia and Sunnis and Iran helps,

Iran is both responding to it and helps exacerbate it, right. So out of this quagmire,

Iran comes to control and have a tight relationship with tons of Shia militias in Iraq.

And this becomes Iraq becomes a central theater of Iranian American confrontation.

And Qasim Soleimani is, is it fair to say that he's the architect of that strategy?

Or is he? No, he's definitely architecture of that strategy in Iraq, 100%. Yes. So he,

he, you know, especially on the military side, I mean, Khomeini is the mastermind also.

But Khome, Soleimani is the one who actually does it.

And I would say the, you know, just to round out the point on sort of, you know, again,

bringing this back to kind of the central exam question of the series, which is why the U.S.

at Iran is at such odds. And what does the secret history tell us about that? On the Iraq point,

you know, the the Iranians are probably responsible for one in six U.S. combat fatalities in Iraq.

So when you look at the Pentagon, they put out numbers in 2019 and tied back 603

deaths of U.S. personnel in Iraq to attacks conducted by Iranian-backed militants.

And a huge part of this was not all of it, but a huge part of it for these things called EFPs

or explosively foreign penetrators, which essentially weird kind of mixture of it's an

extremely cheap way to conduct attacks, but you also need state production capacity to build

these kind of metal tubes. And I should say listeners to our podcast will appreciate this.

That Gordon has edited out all of my detail on EFPs. That was a classic, classic Gordon

Khomeiro fashion. But essentially what it is is it's like a, it's like a metal tube that

sends like a cannon almost like this charge and explosively form charge. And it shoots it out

essentially into vehicles in a very sort of directed way very quickly. And these were devastating

against these kind of mind-resistant ambush protected vehicles that the U.S. was using in Iraq

to counter the threat from improvised explosive devices. The Iranians supplied a lot of the

the sort of piping, the fabricated piping that militants used. And it went to 600 U.S. personnel

deaths in Iraq. So you know that when I talk to colleagues of mine who worked the Iraq issue,

the Iran issue, you know, after the Iraq war, this is one of the more visceral kind of

charges against the Iranians that still gets people extremely with I think good reason,

extremely furious. Yeah, I think it's really interesting because it does in a way the hostage

crisis was for a previous generation. You know, what happened in Iraq, particularly I think for U.S.

military and intelligence for the new generation. But there was also another vector of attention

between the U.S. and Iran, which was Iran's nuclear program. So let's take a break. And then when

we'll come back, we'll have a look at that and bring it right up to Epic Fury today.

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required. Well, welcome back. We're looking at that growing tension between the US and Iran.

And another aspect of it was the nuclear program. I mean, there'd been a nuclear power program

back to the Shaz days. And I think after the revolution, I told her how many saw was initially

kind of resistant to the idea of nuclear weapons. It was the work of the devil. But of course,

you then have the war with Iraq. The question about whether Iraq is developing weapons of mass

destruction, as you call them chemical weapons, but also nuclear. And so Iran is looking to build

quite quietly the capacity for the bomb. And then in 2002, it goes public, doesn't it? Because

an intense program is exposed to the world by an Iranian opposition group. And then you have

from that period onwards, the growth of the tension. I mean, really, the story of the start of

the story, which takes us up today, which is, you know, what is going to be done about Iran's plans

for a bomb? Can it be slowed down? Can it be stopped? Can it be contained? Is it something the world

could live with? And clearly Israel feels like it can't, even though it's a nuclear state.

Arash, I guess on the bomb itself, maybe we should just briefly explain. They haven't

raced for a bomb itself, have they? They've raced for the potential to have a bomb,

but quite consistently through this period. Why is that so important? Well, Iran tries,

tries a nuclear program, like many other states do. And it looks like by the US estimates,

by 2003, it stops all weapons work. Before 2003, it had sort of toyed with that. But after that,

it insists on its nuclear program. And this is really one of the follies of a harmony,

again, the Supreme Leader of Iran. There's this terrible mistake that the Iranian regime obviously

makes, which is that they neither dart toward a bomb, which they haven't really done weapons

for 2003. Had they done it, you could say, okay, fail to complete. No, Iran has nuclear weapons,

no deal with it. But nor do they give it up fully enough to stave off all these sanctions and

all this pressure that's on them. So yes, Iran does sign a nuclear deal with the US and a group

of five other countries in 2015. And yes, it is the Iran signs this deal in 2015. It's the US

under-present Trump that leaves it in 2018. But Iran had ample opportunities to go back to a deal.

It had this under the Biden administration. It had it under the rest of Trump's first term,

and even in Trump's second term. And they never really, they never really do this. So because

Khamenei, it's very fascinating. Khamenei is very worried. He does not want Iran to become

normalized with the US. And so Khamenei's very genius tactical move was declared in a few years

ago that around 2019, I think he formalizes it, which says Iran who

not negotiate and they won't be a war, right? So he refuses to negotiate with the US, but they won't

be a war either. And of course, Iran both negotiated and there was a war and finally he was killed in that

war. So it's a folly of Iran. And the way Iran syncs all his resources into the nuclear program,

nuclear program becomes a locus of its problems with the world. Tons of sanctions by US,

by European countries and others on Iran because of its desire to because of its nuclear program.

Whereas had he given it, had he given it all up? I mean, you know, there was nothing that Iran could

gain by this nuclear program that was as important as all the sanctions and all the pressure

around faces. Did he see it as leverage? I mean, it was that what it was always intrinsic to the regime,

we must be allowed to develop nuclear power, straight nuclear weapons. No, I think you saw that

defiance. Defiance. You saw that defiance. And look, the point about this longer public is it

does not want to integrate into the regional and global order. It wants to be this defiant

fortress, right? So it was a Khomeini when he in 1988, when he accepts the ceasefire with a rock,

which was seen as given up on this quest to overthrow Saddam and march to Jerusalem and all that,

right? What does he do right after? He does a couple of crazy things just to remind the world that

he's still got it in the Valentine's Day of 1989, February 14, 1989. He does the fatwa against

Salman Rojdi, just out of the blue. This is British order who's written this book. No one's talking

about this book in Iran. I told Khomeini hasn't read it, but he says puts a fatwa in his head,

which follows Mr. Rojdi all his life and has, you know, led to finally led to an attack on him,

in the US, yeah, in which he almost lost his life. It's Chattako in New York. But so anyways,

the point is that why does it's, I think the Rojdi fatwa is very important. Understanding is not

a problem. Why does it all Khomeini give the fatwa? Like what estate policy is achieved by this,

the policy of showing to the world that Iran is defiant and that it won't play by your rules.

So the nuclear, so it's not about the nukes, it's not about the fatwa, it's not about the holocaust in

Iran. Why does it all Khomeini keep doing the holocaust in Iran? I mean, it doesn't help anybody.

What it does help is to show that Iran will not play by rules, a genuine revolutionary defiant

estate. Yeah, so it's interesting. So it's the, it goes back to your point that it's intrinsic to

the regime, this defiance and this confrontational attitude. No, I don't really, I don't like the word

intrinsic usually because it because it can suggest that it cannot change. But right. And I do think

it's a choice. It's a choice. Yeah, it's a choice by the leaders. It's a choice by the excessive leaders.

Exactly. To pursue that policy. And the choice contested by many is a choice contested by many

in the regime. They just lose the power of us. So people like Hassan Rohani, the former president,

he clearly doesn't like these choices, but he loses the internal power battle to Khomeini.

And I think it's worth, you know, as we just are sort of bringing this thing forward at time and

getting closer to the start of epic fury. I mean, you know, this kind of this defiance,

this policy, this choice of defiance of resistance, you know, I kind of see this period around

the end of the nuclear deal. So when Trump, when Trump essentially unilaterally walks away from it

in 2018 is kind of the high watermark of this strategy. I'm curious what you think of this,

of this take a rash. But, you know, if you look at the kind of 2018, 2019 period,

when you look regionally, you know, you look at Iran has kind of stabilized Bashar al-Assibently,

stabilized Bashar al-Assad in Syria. So they have their Syrian ally. Hezbollah is looking pretty

strong after, you know, the 2006 war with the Israelis, where they've kind of claimed victory.

Iranian influence is growing in Iraq. There's a Baghdad Damascus Bayland quarter that's open

up. Gossam Soleimani has kind of overseen this architecture of building up these partners and

proxies all throughout the region. Again, at other point where Trump and the advisors around him

have kind of labeled the Iranian regional position as a menace. And then at home, it seems at

that point in time, like the strategy of kind of not quite giving on the new program, but also

using it as leverage with the U.S. with the international community as paying some dividends

for Khamenei and the people around him. And then it starts to tip. And I think we see a period

starting and I, you know, I kind of mark the turning point as the actual, the assassination of

Gossam Soleimani, which takes place in January of 2020. But around that period of time, it's

essentially a, it, it begins a string of, I would say, losses and setbacks for the regime

externally and internally that more or less bring us up to the point where we're at today.

And Arash, I mean, the Soleimani is killed by a U.S. drone strike under President Trump.

This huge figure, you've talked about his importance. It's, it's fascinating that there wasn't much

of a response from Iran. What's there? I always found that a little bit odd. Why that, what,

what, what does that tell us? It's a very excellent question. And I, you know, we'll talk

him six years later. It's because I told Khamenei has a contradiction, which is that he wants to

keep on defiance. He wants to keep on death to America. But he knows he doesn't want a war.

He doesn't want a war. He knows a direct confrontation with the U.S. will be suicidal for him.

Right? He understands that. So he does this, oh, he does what is done.

The public has made an art play here and there. Right? Attack Argentina when you can do terror

operations that can't be claiming back to you. Build these little militias in different countries

that you surround the U.S. and Israel with. But without getting into direct confrontation,

build a nuclear weapon, but build a nuclear program, but not a nuclear weapon.

Basically tease your way around these things, right? And President Trump obviously doesn't like that,

right? He doesn't play by those rules. So he, you know, he killed Soleimani, which went against

everything that they had taught possible. And Khamenei blinks effectively. He attacks a

new asset in Iraq. They also down the Iranian, down the Ukrainian airliner, which is an episode of

its own. Many people believe they did it on purpose in order to effectively prevent a war.

I mean, there are some sort of a strange theories there. But the fact of the matter is,

I just issued down a Ukraine airliner and killed all everybody in it. Now they said it was

a mistake, of course, but a lot of people don't believe that. Anyways, but the point is,

look, basically this strategy unravels and it unravels from that day. You're like, okay,

you can't get to just shout death to America for 40 years. What are you going to do about it now?

Their bluff is called. Their bluff is called a bi-Trump. So, you know, by the, in the first term,

and then in the second term. But it's interesting, because I think of October 7th, 2023, and the

attack on Israel by Hamas is another big turning point, because that is the point at which

Israel's risk calculus changes about what it's willing to tolerate in the region and what it's

willing to do and how aggressive it's willing to be. And of course, one of the things it does as well

as going into Gaza is it goes after Hezbollah and it goes after very hard and kills the leadership

of Hezbollah, the great Iranian proxy. This is all the beginning of what is leading us up today,

isn't it? Is partly Israel shifting its position? 100%. I mean, this is very clearly a post-October 7

world. I mean, it's clear that that is a very important turning point, because in response to

October 7th, which is this big calamity in Israel, it kills hundreds more than a thousand

Israeli civilians. It's a huge shock to Israel and Israel starts to devastating war on Gaza,

but it also starts going after the acts of resistance, dismantling it on one by one. So, effectively

degrades Hezbollah and degrading of Hezbollah also helps with the fall of Assad regime, the Assad

regime is of course attacked by the Syrian revolutionaries and created blanks to them by bringing it down.

But of course, Israel's degrading of Hezbollah has helped. And I believe Iran was not consulted

on October 7th. I don't think they knew it was happening. How many would have never approved

such a thing? I think because he's much more risk-averse. So yeah, but what follows is that Israel

helps decimate the acts of resistance. But actually, look, we have to think about the fall of the

axis in several ways. Inside Lebanon and Iraq, there's also rising Shia constitutions that are

unhappy with the system. They're unhappy that their religious is not represented by a sort of

clique linked to Tehran, their whole political system. You know, Iraq and Lebanon are not

fun places to leave as a result of this, basically. The political system is unresponsive to

citizens demands. The state is ineffective and divided. So there's in 2019, there are important

mass movements in Iraq and in Lebanon against the sectarian system in these countries, which is

effectively against Iran's role. This is very important and often forgotten actually. In 2019,

in Iraq, the three leads to the appointment of the first non-Islamist prime minister of Iraq since

2003, and that's Mustafa Qazami, a guy who wants to heal Iraq closer to Saudi Arabia, to Jordan,

to Egypt, to Arab countries, and not to Iran. And I would say Iraq has never gone back, basically,

under Qazami's successor, much Shia Sudan, even though there's a long history of how Sudan

came to be. And he was basically considered to be a pro-Iran candidate compared to the previous

compared to Qazami and compared to the fact that Makhta the Sadr, this Shia cleric who really came

out against Iran, had tried to organize a government that he had tried to organize a government that

was more explicitly anti-Iran. But even Sudan continues the path of Qadami. So you have this

development in Iraq. You have the degrading of Hezbollah. You have the most important fall of the

Assad regime in Syria. So Iran effectively sees the fall of its axis,

and of course, you also have repeated Israeli attacks on Iran, which are massive intelligence

failure on part of the regime. Israelis would show the weakness. Yes, Israelis steal the Iranian

nuclear archives, all of it. They literally, with two guys on a motorbike, they put the entire

nuclear archives on the back of two motorbikes and a storm out of Iran. They kill Fakhrizadeh,

who is really father of Iranian nuclear program, and they kill him in his very safe compound.

They kill a smile hanging at the head of Hamas as he is visiting Iran, which is a huge

humiliation. Of course, in Lebanon, by hitting Hezbollah, they also kill Hezbollah, the leader of Hezbollah.

So all of this really degrades Iran, and leaves it much more defenseless when it comes to

the current war. Which I think really does bring us up to epic fury. I mean, where we are today.

I think, Arashemind, this is the, I threatened in the first episode that I was going to do this.

So I'm going to, I'm going to follow through on my, my threat, which is to look you in the eye and

ask you, where do you think this is headed? And maybe I'll break it into maybe two questions.

I think the first is, you know, of all of the different reasons that have been given for

epic fury. What do you think is the most compelling? Why, why are the U.S. and Israel doing this right?

Oh, I think that, that one, that was an easy answer. I think, I think it's not about the nuclear

weapons. I think it's not about Iran's missiles. I think it's not about, you know, the proxies.

It is about regime change. I mean, they wanted to get rid of the Islamic Republic. They believe

the Islamic Republic is a torn on their side since 1979. And they want to finally do something

with it, finally do something that has evaded every president since president Carter. I think

that's how Trump looks at it. And that's how Israel is look at it. They think if you're on a role,

we hit all over the axis. Let's go to what people used to call the head of the snake, right?

And they thought this is possible because there was also a massive domestic movement against,

against the regime that had battered it, come out time and time against it. Of course,

it appears very foolish to me as a sort of goal. Because how are you going to achieve it?

Well, what's the plan exactly here? What do you think is going to happen?

Maybe we'll know in a few months that I was wrong and they had a plan. Unless, unfortunately,

I think for many Israelis and even many in the Israeli regime, in the Israeli government,

and maybe perhaps some in the US, they don't mind, they don't want a democracy in Iran,

or sort of the transition to something else. And Iran that is degraded, disintegrated,

weak, and therefore not a threat is also acceptable. I think it's very clearly Israelis don't mind

that. And some in the US might also, the president has unfortunately an alarming,

for example, said that maybe the map of Iran would probably not look the same after. Although you

also can't, you know, the statements he makes off the cuff to the press are, it's not always

clear to their expression of a state policy, let's say. Anyways, so I think they wanted to do this.

And I think the president, I think President Trump, I think he loved what happened in Venezuela,

the Venezuelan transition. It's a very neat thing when you look at it from his goals.

He went in, he took the president out, they had probably behind the scene worked to the

desert, a person from inside the Jindel Cirodriguez, who came out and said, great, we'll walk

with the US, everything is great now. And you know, we'll sell oil and basically we're friends now.

I mean, it's remarkable that they established diplomatic relations already two months later, right?

And I think President Trump loved that. And he thought, well, great, I can do that. And I think

they, the thinking was, well, if he killed it, well, surely the next leader is going to be like,

well, I don't want to be killed. So I'll, I'll play ball with the US. And of course, it's going

to be much more complicated in the case of Iran. And that's, you know, that's why things are

not looking great for the, for, for the US of our effort at the moment. They, they will the end,

which is getting rid of the regime, but not the means to get there. But I also think this point

about the history and the hostility is interesting, isn't it? Because Trump himself, you know, I think

taught, did some interviews around 1980 about the hostage crisis saying, why don't we just attack

them? I can't believe they've taken our people hostage. He is someone because of his age,

who's lived through this history of enmity between the two countries, including back to the hostage

crisis. And therefore, I think, you know, would love his legacy to be, I'm the one who dealt with the

Iranian problem in a way, none of these previous presidents did. So I think the history, and that's

why he references the history, kind of that we've been talking about, defines him and what he wants.

But as you said, that doesn't mean he's going to get it. I mean, I think any US president, I think

anybody who was becoming US president, right? US has this presidential cult, right? It's very

important. Like, you know, presidents are very defined. They're defined by their achievements.

You have, I said, presidential cult, because I mean, it's not necessarily the same in other

systems, right? That everything is attributed to the president. They're defined by their

achievements and their failures. So every president, I think, will have a bucket list of things. Like,

what are the things I can do to, like, risk to put my place in history? And of course,

I think Iran has been one of it since President Clinton at least, right? Like, you know,

what if I am the person who can solve this Persian puzzle, you know, who can solve the Iranian

problem, basically? So I think it's, it's a temptation for any president. I think anybody who wants

to become president, I mean, a temptation for them. Of course, it's, and you know, it was the

president Obama, obviously, and he has spent so much diplomatic effort to so much effort.

It's kind of crazy. If you remember how much of the effort that the US government went to the

Iranian file during the Obama administration, much less, for example, went to the Israeli

Palestinian file, which the US, which he also tried to crack. So yes, I think it's not surprising

at all that someone like President Trump would, would want to solve it. And he's been

right or obsessed with it since his first term. But, but can I also say there's a consistency to

the president Trump that he's always basically his whole since his first term, he said, look,

I don't care who's in charge of Iran. I don't care if it's democracy or not. All I want is that

they play by this, you know, they play by this rules and they stop these things against the US.

Don't have a nuclear weapon and all that. So he was ready to negotiate in the first time.

They didn't negotiate with him. In the second, them, he negotiated it and he veys the water at the

same time. And now here we are. And I think he's now come to the conclusion that, okay, no,

actually, I'm convinced by the Israelis, we can and must get rid of the regime. But I think in

his mind, getting out the regime can still mean, as I said, even as well as the transition,

in which power passes to someone else inside the regime. Yeah. Arash, last question to close out

this, I think the series, we've been obviously talking about the history of the conflict, the

secret conflict between the US and Iran. Do you see a scenario, a plausible scenario at the end

of epic fury that leads to a better relationship between the US and Iran? The short answer is yes.

I am, I was opposed to this war and I am opposed to it for the huge

civilian casualties and lack of a clear plan and many other reasons to be skeptical of this war.

But of course, all my life I've believed that it is possible for Iran and the

America to reconciliationate. They're kind of my two countries, so I would love to see that

personally as well. But I also just an a pure, cold-headed, analytical person. I do believe it's

possible because I believe Iran has no other choice. Even though, no,

Adol Khamenei has killed his replaced by his son who is injured and over to be seen. So we are

in this situation in which the revolutionary guards are kind of running the country. The new

Supreme Leader is nowhere to be seen. It appears that they are on a roll that they feel like

they've really resisted against America so far and and frankly, if the war right now,

things don't look so bad, March 11th, from the perspective of the Islamic Republic.

In a way, because they can say you killed our leader, you destroyed all of these things,

but we are staying in power. We had orderly succession and it's you who are kind of freaking out

and blinking first and wanting to leave. Because survival is victory. Exactly. And the U.S.

has a democratic system, which means that when all prices go up, the president gets worried,

there's a domestic sort of scene here. None of that. Iran doesn't have to, the Iranian leadership

doesn't have to worry about that. The Iranian guards are going on TV every day saying,

we're going to shoot anyone who comes to the streets. Very openly saying it, by the way. They're not

even coaching. The head of the Iranian police went on TV and said, if you come on the streets,

we'll shoot you. That's almost like a direct call. That's what Iran does, right?

President Trump can't say that. He has to still win elections. He doesn't have to win

with his party has to win elections. Hopefully, he doesn't have to win elections anymore.

But anyway, but the point is that survival is victory, so they're under high horse there.

But ultimately, they realize that they need to come to some sort of an understanding with the U.S.

that they need to end this long enemy with the U.S. in order to, because on the day after

of this war, Iran will be a ruined place, economically ruined in a terrible condition.

I think the kind of leaders that will be able to come to power and hold power in Iran won't be

the kind of crazy extremist who don't want to do anything with the U.S. I think that end up

having enough of pragmatic elements in there who will go toward the establishment of the U.S. So,

I think in five years from now, Iran and the United States will have diplomatic relationship.

I'm not sure it will be Islamic Republic, which is in Iran. I'm not sure who will be the leaders

in Iran, but I think the resumption of diplomatic ties between Iran and the U.S.

is something that will happen in the next few years.

Well, Erash, thank you so much. I think that's a good place to bring to end this series looking

at how we got where we are. Thank you so much for joining us to the two books by Erash, our

shadow commander and what Iranians want, both essential reading now. And of course, if you are a

club member, you can hear more because we've got a special Q&A with Erash for members of the

classified club. Can join at therestisclassified.com. But thank you very much Erash and thank you

all for joining us. We'll see you next time. We'll see you next time.