387. The Baltic Blitz: Dismantling Putin’s War Chest

Hello and welcome to Battleground your Crane with me, Roger Morehouse and Patrick Bishop.

In a moment we'll hear from Patrick interviewing Julian Evans about his book, Underfeetable,

a Dessa in Love and War, which appears in paperback next week, but first let's have a round

up of the latest news from the battlefield and beyond.

First of all an update on Ukraine's strikes against Russian oil infrastructure in the Baltic

region this last week. You will recall that we mentioned in last week's pod, Ukraine's

strike against the oil export terminal at Primorsk on the Baltic north of St Petersburg,

a terminal that ordinarily is responsible for the export of over a million barrels of

oil per day. Well that attack far from being a one-off proved to be the prelude to a

concerted defensive against the region's oil infrastructure, with the export terminal

Ustluga and the refinery at Kirishi both being hit. In fact all three were hit repeatedly

over the last week, with Ustluga being hit five times in ten days, and Primorsk also

being targeted leaving fires burning out of control at all three sites for days on

end and causing smoke plumes to spread hundreds of miles into Russia.

All of this is not only symbolic of course, it has real world consequences for Russia.

Now we've talked here Patrick about the boon that Russia was supposed to be enjoying

from the leap in the oil price that has resulted from President Trump's adventure in the Persian

Gulf. The oil price, key to Russia's fighting potential, stood at around $80 per barrel

before the attack on Iran, above Putin's breakeven figure, and has since jumped to over

$100 per barrel, thanks to the chaos in the Middle East. At that new price Putin was

making an estimated $750 million per day from his oil exports, but the attacks on the

Baltic infrastructure, which previously handled around 40% of the Russian export capacity,

has dented that significantly, reducing that income according to some experts by some

$300 million per day, as long as the port facilities are out of service, and more than

wiping out the financial benefit that Russia would have accrued from the Iran war, it's

really quite a remarkable development, isn't it Patrick?

It is another example I suppose, for the Ukrainian's ability to rise to a challenge and

devise the means to overcome a new threat. On the ground, meanwhile, things are pretty

much, as they were last week, Ukrainian forces are continuing their counteroffensive. The

ISWs reporting that nine villages were liberated in the south of the region of Oleksandr

Fukha, while the village of Berizovey near Huniapole in Dnieper Petrovsk oblast was also

reported as clear to enemy troops. Now, these are small evalces, but they've caused problems

for the Russians. They've forced them to move elite troops from Donetsk to this area in

an effort to shore up the line. Now, these are worth mentioning here, Roger, that the Russians'

manpower problems are clear and ongoing. Now, we've seen indications of this before, they're

kind of increasingly having to spread the net wider to get the manpower necessary to make

up for the massive losses they're sustaining. But there's further evidence of this, which

I was really about this week. I don't want to overstate this because we have tended to

be a bit premature, haven't we? Seeing dawns, rosy dawns on the horizon, but I must say,

I was intrigued by these reports that Putin's press gangs now have Russian university students

in their sites. Now, I've just been getting on for a while, I think, but it's only just

emerged. So the picture is that since the start of the year, there's been a nationwide

campaign with a directive going out from the Russian Ministry of Science and Higher Education,

saying that leading universities have to provide 2% of their student population for military

service. So all the big universities, reptiles of these universities, were told that, okay, hence,

fourth, 2% of your undergraduates are going to have to sign contracts with the Defense Ministry.

Now, this comes from inside Russia from reputable sources. And as a result, they're now kind of

trawling through the universities to pick up the quota, which amounts to about 44,000 students.

Now, you know, this being Russia, they're all sorts of underhand methods being used. I mean,

one way of, of course, the students are termication to get into uniform. And so one technique they're

using is to say, okay, and you won't be allowed to take your exams if you haven't passed your exam,

you're allowed to retake normally, but that won't happen unless you actually sign up. Now,

having said that, it's unlike you, these guys are actually going to be fed into the meek rider,

I think most of them are being deployed to the drone forces. But that tells you something,

it doesn't make much of it. It seems that, you know, those drone operators who think would be

relatively safe jobs are also suffering too. So they're being drafted into replace casualties,

it would seem among those drone operators. The big message from all this is that the student

population that these universities, you know, Moscow University apparently is in the frame. These

are the people that were meant to be shielded from the effects of the war. And now it seems that

they are also feeding what is the negative effects of the Ukrainian excursion as a Donald Trump would

say. And of course, you know, just remember what we were talking about last week that internet blackout

is ongoing. And now this is really apparently causing concern, frustration, irritation among the

general population who have largely been insulated from the effects of the war. Indeed, haven't you

shown any great interest in the progress of it. But apparently there was a call for protests

last weekend. And there's lots of kind of for internet ridicule and anger being expressed. So

it's all, you know, heading in a positive direction. I mean, the domestic political picture

I would have thought from Ukraine's point of view of the moment. Yeah, I mean, I think it's

very significant in the sense of mindful of, as you said, sort of proclaiming false dawns. But

I think it is significant in the sense that I remember seeing an infographic a few years ago relating

to this, which showed very clearly how the conscription effort particularly was loaded towards

what we might call, I suppose, populations in Russia that don't have any political capital.

So particularly rural populations east of the Urals, you know, non-Russian population,

Buriats, for example, you know, from Siberia and so on. They were much

disproportionately affected by the conscription effort. And what was clear from that, conversely,

is that the urban populations in the West, the likes of, you know, Moscow, St. Petersburg,

and so on, were being comparatively protected. And that, of course, is because they have political

capital. So if those populations start being lost in huge numbers, or in the same numbers that

Buriats populations have been lost, then that's going to have a political knock-on effect that's

going to be, you know, much more of a challenge than a few disaffected Buriats mothers.

So, I mean, this is an interesting development, as you say, because it does potentially bring

that negative political capital, but home to roost, in due course, when a proportion of those

students don't come back from the front lines. Well, looking further afield, that gradual

intertwining of the war in Ukraine with the war in the Middle East continued this week,

with President Zelensky traveling to Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar to attend high-level

meetings with his counterparts, and agree a 10-year military cooperation agreement to assist

in combating Iranian drone attacks. He even offered to help President Trump to reopen the

Straits of Hormuz. As we've discussed here, Ukraine is, of course, a world leader in both

drone development and anti-dron measures. And Zelensky is willing to share that expertise to

earn hard currency, military aid, perhaps some of the region's patriot batteries,

and to gain allies who might be willing in due course to put economic and diplomatic pressure

on the Kremlin. All part, it seems, of that intertwining, which has caused some commentators to claim

that we are already in what has become in effect the Third World War, but also proof of Ukraine's

unlikely rise. I mean, who would have predicted in February 2022 when Russian tanks rolled across

the frontier in their special military operation, that four years on it would be President Zelensky,

who would be glad handing the emirs of the Middle East, offering his countryman's expertise.

In an op-ed in the telegraph this week indeed, Peter Kadek Adams esteemed military historian,

of course, claimed, and I think with some justification, that Ukraine was thus far the unlikely winner

from Trump's war in Iran, and might be set to benefit further from the conflict as it

develops. It's an interesting view, isn't it, Patrick? How do you see it? How do you see that

intertwining of the two wars? Is it caused for wider concern? Yeah, and that's Kadek Adams' article,

basically, saying that because Ukraine is a drone superpower, it's now basically in a position

to dispense its knowledge and reap the benefits from the Great Four recipient. So, of course,

they're the Gulf nations who try to get cheap countermeasures come back, those who

Iranian-made drones in particular. So, you know, Ukrainian expertise in interceptor drones

becomes a big thing. Either the corollary of that, according to Kadek Adams, is that

you know, Kadek will now have stronger ties with, you know, big rich or other rich nations,

and not big nations, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, who before, you know, were kind of neutral

really in the Russo-Ukrainian conflict. And so, there's talk of, you know, financial and

energy support for Ukraine in exchange for this military technical assistance. Well, that's all

to the good, you know, obviously, that's good news, but it's, I don't think it really

significantly shifts the picture. I think these, you know, unexpected boons of the war for Ukraine

are overshadowed by other likely outcomes, which are not so good for Ukraine. I mean, one

obviously is, I think that Trump's hostility to Ukraine seems certain to increase,

but in regards to the war, really, as a European problem, and his animus against the UK in particular

Europe in general, for what he sees as their preloading on the US down the years, as intensified

greatly as a result of the very unhelpful attitude that was shown towards him in this conflict,

and one way of demonstrating this anger is to further cut support for Ukraine. And I think,

despite what we've been saying about Russia's current difficulties, there is a benefit,

I think, potentially in the Iranian conflict for that, in that even though Russia's clearly

been helping itself ally Iran, that doesn't seem to bother Trump. So any hope that this might turn

him against Putin, I think his principal, and indeed he might actually feel he needs Putin to use

his good offices with Tehran to bring them to the negotiating table. So, yep, it's good that

Ukraine has a potential new partnership with the Gulf States, but it won't make it, I think,

a net winner, necessarily, in the conflict, in my view. But one thing I would say, actually,

is slightly after Ukrainian point, but I think it's very important is that I think there'll be

a major shift in the global pictures, a result of a war, and that is that the Gulf States will feel

they need to re-insure security wise, given that the US has demonstrated this extraordinary

recklessness by launching this war against their wishes with no clear plan, as we all know,

and leaving them to bear the brunt of the Iranian response. So where will the Gulf States

look to? Well, of course, the other great global superpower, which is capable of underwriting

their defence, and that is China, which, as we've already seen, is increasingly making itself

felt in the affairs of the region. Well, it's joined peace initiative the other day,

alongside Pakistan. So I think that's one to watch. Yeah, vaccinating stuff. I mean, it's all

seeming to, you know, almost foreshadow a sort of a shake down of the kaleidoscope, as it were,

that international relations are being sort of reshaped almost as we speak. Another strand of that

potential intertwining that I was talking about is the Hungarian election, of course, which is

coming on the 12th of April, which could see the incumbent Victor Orban, of course, a major obstacle

to the EU's efforts to assist Ukraine being removed from office. And just this week, it was

revealed that the Hungarian foreign minister, Peter Solato, was in regular contact with his

Russian counterparts, Sergey Lavrov, with the two regularly in contact, both before and after

high-level EU meetings. This, of course, has previously been denounced as fake news by the Orban

government, but it has now been forced to acknowledge the contacts. And of course,

Solato is free to call whoever he wants, but one has to wonder whether such contacts

amount in effect to a betrayal of EU confidences to a hostile power. Now, some EU leaders,

most notably Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, reacted without rage, calling the development

deeply disturbing. Kaya Kalas said that EU officials should work for the EU, not Russia.

And for his part, Solato merely complained that the fact that its security service has been

listening to his conversations was a scandal. Hungary, you recall, has been a constant thorn

in Brussels side over Ukraine and is currently blocking the latest EU aid package for Kiev

at worth some 90 million euros. A last point worth mentioning is that we've just seen this week

the fourth anniversary and reports of the Bucher massacre, one of the most notorious atrocities

committed by Russian forces in the opening days of the invasion. Evidence of the massacre in which

some 500 civilians were murdered during the Russian invasion first emerged after Ukrainian forces

retook the town, north west of Kiev, on 1 April 2022. Survivor testimony revealed that Russian

forces routinely targeted civilians there, firing at passing cars and at people on the street.

In addition, many of the bodies were found with their hands bound, showing signs of torture.

Women and girls as young as 14 were raped. Among the additional testimony that emerged this week

was one story that I found especially moving, posted by the journalist Ilia Ponomerenko on X.

He recalled that when he went to Bucher after its liberation, he saw a man still dazed,

walking around in circles on a basketball court. Approaching him, Ponomerenko asked if he could help.

I tried to talk to him, he said, to ask if he needed anything, and he just raised his eyes to me and

said, do you know why they hate us so much? He started to sob, wiping away the tears. Do you know,

tell me why? Why? Why? What did we do to them? Now atrocities against civilians and others are

of course commonplace in war, but there's still something I think especially shocked

shocking about. Bucher wasn't their Patrick, how do you recall it?

Well, it was a sign of the savagery to come, and there was plenty more of that. There has been

down the years, hasn't there? Udo Russia's complete disregard for the rules of war, which as you

say, don't really get much respect anywhere these days. I'm thinking of the current news. It's

really targeting of medics and journalists in Lebanon and their plans to drive the entire population

of southern Lebanon south of the Italy river, that's 600,000 people from their homes, but I

suppose the good news is that for all their brutality, the Russians are no closer to victory, in fact,

far from it as we've just been saying, and there are genuine signs so they can be defeated,

which as we'll be hearing from Julian Evans is all the more reason the Europe with or without the

US to stand firm and give the extra push that might result in victory. So bring stuff Patrick,

yes, I will take a break here and we'll be back after the break to hear Patrick talking to Julian

Evans. Well, it's a great pleasure to welcome Julian Evans to the show,

with Julian's writer, Mike Boosty, because I suppose travel books, but they're much, much more

than that. They combine autobiography and reflections on the culture of the places he's lived in,

but there's also a lot of acute political analysis, and all these were magnificently on the show

in undefeatable the desert in love and war. He's book about his long association with a desert,

which we spoke to Julian about when it first came out in 2024, where he's now updated it to take

what's happened since and particularly under the Donald Trump presidency. So first of all,

welcome back Julian, it's great to have you on again. Thanks for inviting me, Patrick, it's nice

to be here. So first of all, how do you think overall Trump's behavior has impacted Ukraine's

chances in this struggle? Would you write me characterise as something of a kind of, you know,

epoch making contest? Well, I think it's got two sides, that question, because on the one hand,

I think it's very dismaying to see how he has sided with Russia, sided with Putin,

refused to call Russia the aggressor, insulted his NATO allies, those in Europe who are trying

to help Ukraine cut off any to Ukraine, promised vaguely to sell European powers, the arms that

they can then give to Ukraine, but I don't think he's even kept that promise. And then on the other

side, there's Ukraine's reaction to this. And to a certain extent, Europe's reaction to it,

I still think Europe isn't showing enough leadership, enough grit determination to defeat Russia.

Kyav Talos is probably the only person in Europe who regularly says Russia must be defeated,

but Ukraine itself has, I think, reacted extraordinarily well to the sort of, well, let's put it

politely, so the loosening of ties with the US as its ally and supporter, and has really

beefed up its efforts at ingenious technological advances, training, new equipment,

Zelensky's traveling and advocacy for the country, and for what it means in terms of

geopolitics, because I think at the centre of this, you know, with what's happening in the

Middle East at the moment, there's an extraordinary amount of forgetfulness about Ukraine.

As there is forgetfulness about other things, such as the Epstein files, you know, and perhaps

that was part of Trump's game plan, but Ukraine is at the centre of this whole collapse of

the old order, the so-called rules-based order. And I think, well, I say it in my new afterward,

I think if we could only concentrate on Ukraine and fit the Ukraine problem, which basically

means defeating Russia, then you will start to fix everything else.

Yeah, well, come on to that, Julian, but I was just intrigued by what you said about Epstein,

so you see a clear link between Epstein and Putin, don't you? Can you tell us more about that,

and what evidence you've got from it, and what it actually means more in the Ukrainian context?

The long version is probably quite well-covered in books by other people, such as Luke Harding,

who's written rather brilliantly about Russia's intervention in US politics, his interference in

Europe, and so on. But I think that there is a clear, if you like, circumstantial connection between

Epstein and Russia and Trump, and that is, it does fit in with the Russian honey trap playbook

of entrapment and blackmail, and so on. I think, circumstantially, we can assume that there's

a connection, or we can imagine, likeably with a fair degree of

rightness, that is a connection between what Epstein was doing, and whether the Russians

used him or assisted him, pushed him in the direction that they wanted to by gifts and loans and

supplying the girls and so on. It's very hard to prove at this stage, but I think that there's

a lot of circumstantial evidence. Yeah, I mean, surely it can't have been in Russia's interest for

Trump to declare war on Iran. You're not going that far, man. No, I don't think so, but I do think

that Putin, as I suppose as an agent of chaos, is probably in a way as glad as Trump is to see

attention deflected away from his own problems by chaos elsewhere, and the Western allies being

caught up in yet another big geopolitical challenge. Yeah, certainly play that well for Putin,

on all sorts of fronts. I mean, initially, of course, we saw the energy win for oil and gas

win for that was, I think, the fairly short move, but I think in the longer term, the damage this

is done to NATO and to America's relationship with Europe is, of course, an enormously beneficial

to Putin. But beyond that, I think the chaos that that's been created does create in parallel

an opportunity, which is something I think that you see as well, in that perforce,

Ukraine has had to learn how to defend itself, that it's had to make its own way in the technological

fields, and it's done so brilliantly. So there is a kind of glimmer of light on the horizon here,

isn't there, in the sense that Europe cannot dilute itself, that America has got its back at any time.

Even our post-Trump, I think, there's a situation that has changed once and for all, and we're

going to see a much less benign America, whoever is in the White House. But tell us your thoughts

about Putin's investments in this war, because this is another, I think, area where we can draw

a bit of comfort, which is that he has basically made it his life's work, hasn't he? I mean, he will

stand or fall on what happens in Ukraine. That makes him enormously vulnerable if the right things

are done on our side. So have we got that right? And if so, can you tell us how you see that in a

little bit? There's an old saying, isn't there, that in Russia, nothing happens for decades, and then

decades happen within a week. And I think that with Putin's, as you say, making the Ukraine war,

his kind of supposed crowning achievement, and then his miscalculations, one after another,

about the Ukrainians, about Russia's own capabilities, we may be reaching some sort of endgame.

Wasn't there recently one of the most pro-war bloggers on Telegram, a man called Rameslo, I think,

who is well known, that's a Kremlin apologist, very much on the level of Salovyev, who's on the news

every night. And there he was saying that we're being led into a trap. This war is unwinnable,

basically saying everything that the Kremlin didn't want to hear. And he hasn't fallen out of a

window. He hasn't been given poison tea. He's got a fairly comfortable bed in the psychiatric hospital

right now. And I just wonder whether there are power shifts within Moscow, within the Kremlin,

that are kind of allowing those statements to be uttered, and then using them as a way of

maneuvering to push Putin aside, or at least at the very least to gauge what the support

might be among other groups, once those sentiments have been aired. And people feel more confident

to say what they're really thinking, because I think that the Russian elite must by now

have tweaked that this war is unwinnable, that it's it's costum personally and nationally,

a massive amount in economically manpower, loss of one and a half million soldiers and so on.

And they must be entirely fed up with every aspect of it, including their international ostracism.

What do we we can do to help this process along? I think we could do a lot in terms of

getting the money to Ukraine that Hungary has so far blocked this 90 billion loan. I think we

should be pursuing that shadow tank of fleet. I think we could do a lot more. If we could raise a

bit more money, it seems that Britain is at the moment, sadly, broken than it should be,

and that we're not in a position to offer more hardware, but I think we should certainly be giving

them everything we possibly can. And we should stop saying as long as it takes. I think we should

simply say we will give them whatever we possibly can to help them defeat Russia.

You also have to advocate putting European soldiers into theatre, boots on the ground, European

boots on the ground. You talk about before the conflict as they were until now,

it's just notions that this will be some kind of peacekeeping force when a ceasefire arrives,

but are you actually advocating for a military intervention by European armies?

I would say not on the front line, although it would only be making the conflict symmetrical if we

did since Russia has been using North Korean troops on the front line. I think and I'm not the only

person now to say this. A former Secretary General of NATO has also said that we should be putting

boots on the ground in supporting logistics role. I mean, the Ukrainians are carrying

such an enormous amount of baggage to try and survive this war, which I'm sure they will

survive, and it would just be enormously helpful in physical terms for there to be European troops,

British troops, on the ground in support roles simply to take some of the pressure off,

but it would also mean a huge amount in terms of our solidarity and their appreciation

that they are not alone, because psychologically their aloneness over the last four years has been

one of the most depressing and exhausting aspects of the whole thing for them.

Yes, absolutely. I think there's something in that. I mean, you do ask yourself, what is there

to lose at this point? I mean, you've got Russia's hostility towards has been demonstrated

over and over again. It certainly shows no signs of abating. So the timidity, I think, that we've

shown, it's only now that Britain is actually acting on the Chevere fleet problem, doesn't get us

anywhere. The caution hasn't brought any rewards. Ditto, I suppose, my relationship with Trump,

but maybe it is time to get pulled up. Okay, it was great talking to you. Good luck with the

book. So, this does go out and buy it. It's undefeatable, a desert in love and war, the new

addition, terrific read, thoroughly recommend it. Thanks again, Julian. We'll see you,

be speaking to you again soon, no doubt. Thanks very much, Patrick. Nice to talk to you.

Well, that was great to hear from Julian again. We're not going to move on to questions. The first

one comes from Mark Harris in Wellington, New Zealand. Kia ora. Is that Kia ora,

Thor, Patrick, and Roger, that's good that we're all included there.

Is there a response? Do you say something back when someone says Kia or probably, but we'll

have to look into that? And Mark says, fascinating to hear about the recent step change,

taken by the Ukrainians in terms of drone warfare. That was last week's, which was a

deed fascinating. I mean, that they, you know, it's giant advance, but they've worked out for

themselves. They've built the technology to do it and they've devised the tactics. It really

has an extraordinary achievement. Anyway, Mark is on it for us to continue to lose ground and

leave momentum going to just make the use of old technology more likely in terms of tactical

and battlefield nuclear weapons. He says, I appreciate this has always seemed like a line that

could never be crossed, but even the last 12 months, so many lines have all related to

disappeared behind us. It seems anything might be possible. Well, you'll recall, Roger,

this is the old tactical nukes question has popped up at various points throughout this conflict.

And we've discussed it pondering whether Russia would actually have a new tactical nukes.

In the pre-Trump era, when Moscow would periodically threaten to employ nukes if the West

increased military aid, that was just a kind of, you know, a kind of regular theme, wasn't it,

of the rhetoric month in month out. I mean, just one example, back in February March,

two years ago in 2024, when President Macron suggested that France might actually send troops

to Ukraine, Putin warned that this would risk a nuclear conflict that could mean,

quote, the destruction of our civilization. Now, either the workers were particularly under

the Biden administration, particularly sensitive about these threats and would actually, you know,

step back, they showed a remarkable lack of backbone, I have to say, because I didn't think,

this was very much one of source thoughts and a conviction, shall I say, that the Russians had

no intention of using tactical battery or nukes, call them what you will. And we're very

gratifying to see that it, the way it sort of sent a shiver down the spines of the Americans in

particular. Well, they didn't use them, then I don't think they're going to do so now. What

do you have to watch Roger? Now, I'm inclined to agree. I mean, simply because the argument always

was that sort of massive retaliation that would inevitably come. So I remember talking a few

years ago now to a military analyst at a dinner, and he was saying that, you know, if that were to,

I asked him the same question, and he said, if that were to happen, his opinion was that, you

know, all of the key coordinates of, you know, Russian military sites and so on were all keyed

in already in NATO and would be sort of, you know, destroyed within 48 hours sort of thing. So

it would be very much a surgical and overwhelmingly devastating strike in response.

Now, that was the case, or that we assume was the case. And I think that's put that's partly what

sort of holds, holds Russia back in this respect, apart from, you know, basic decency. But nowadays,

with, you know, Trump being so erratic, as we've said, and talking about decoupling from NATO,

as he has been this week and so on, I think that response is perhaps a little bit less obvious and

less clear that that would happen. So I still think it's unlikely in response to Mark's question,

but I'm sort of less sure than maybe I was two or three years ago. And the key factor in that,

unfortunately, is, is Mr. Trump.

I've got a really interesting observation here from Jeremy in Somerset, who's on holiday in

Foucault, Vietnam. And he says, Vietnam appears to be heavily geared towards Russian tourists

to point where they seem to be in the majority compared to Western visitors. But I find

difficult to reconcile. He says, is the sense of normality. On the one hand, we're following a

brutal war in Ukraine and hearing daily about the actions of Putin's government. On the other,

here we are, holidaying alongside Russian families in what feels like a completely

disconnected reality. He goes on, it makes me wonder how Russian citizens traveling abroad currently

perceive them all. And whether there's any awareness, discomfort, or even discussion,

when they find themselves in close proximity to Western visitors, we're broadly speaking, opposed

to Russia's actions. Yeah, I mean, there isn't an interesting question. This is about how people

behave abroad, if they're a member of a nation that is involved in some controversial

episode, like a war. And I mean, I know you said myself actually in West Africa, I was there

earlier in the year. And there were quite a few Americans holidaying in the area. But what I found

was, you know, when you encountered them at the bar or in the restaurant or whatever,

they were very quick to identify themselves as anti-Trumpers. He thought it was assuming where,

rightly, that if they came across a bridge or a French village, there's very much a French

area of West Africa. There were going to be no fans of Donald Trump, I suppose, in the case.

So, yeah, I think it is, I remember being in Africa actually, and at the time of the IRA hunger

strikes, this is going back up, it was the early 1980s. And was it always about a support for these

IRA guys, in particular, the kind of main figure, the one that was all internationally,

known with Bobby Sanders. And so, when locals heard you're British accent, they would come over

and express their solidarity with Bobby Sanders and the hunger strike. It is a real thing.

I had to be sort of pretty opposed the IRA. I had to tread quite carefully now in order to

to make sure that my holiday carried off on leave and keel. So, have you had the experiences

like that, Roger? Not regarding Bobby Sanders. No, too young, I'm afraid, Patrick, but

I have encountered some Russians, yes. So, I had the very similar experience to what Jeremy's

describing there. In Thailand, a couple of years, I mean, while the Ukraine more was on,

which was kind of similar, and it did make me wonder. I mean, I hate to generalize so

gregiously, but I found that the general behavior of Russians abroad was never great,

particularly there on holiday. But even in London, I mean, I've heard Russian voices in London as

well, and it does make you wonder. So, what are they doing here? What's their view of what's

going on and so on? You sort of want to challenge it. Underline this. I mean, there's some voices

within the EU, I know, who are, you know, saying that why are we permitting, you know, Russian

tourism at all? And it's a good point. I mean, I think there's an argument there. I mean,

we certainly wouldn't have tolerated it, you know, go back to the great point of comparison

for Second World War. It certainly wouldn't have been tolerated that Germans would be able to

travel around, not least because of the security implications. So, I think those security

implications also apply, in this case. So, I feel the same instinct, I think, that comes across

from Jeremy's point, which is, you know, sort of a wonder of what are we doing? What are those

people doing here? And, you know, by extension, what attitude do they have to the war and to their

leader in the Kremlin, Mr. Putin? So, yeah, I kind of share the dismay a little bit.

Okay, that's it from us for this week. Oh, do you join us on Wednesday for another episode

in our Special Forces series, and we'll be back on Friday with all the latest from Ukraine. Goodbye.