544: Why the Sahm Rule Matters — and Why the Big Picture Matters More

This week’s episode of Wealth Formula features an interview with Claudia Sahm, and I want to share a quick takeaway before you listen — because she’s often misunderstood in the headlines.

First, a quick explanation of the Sahm Rule, in plain English.

The rule looks at unemployment and asks a very simple question:
Has the unemployment rate started rising meaningfully from its recent low?

Specifically, if the three-month average unemployment rate rises by 0.5% or more above its lowest level over the past year, the Sahm Rule is triggered. Historically, that has happened early in every U.S. recession since World War II.

That’s why it gets cited so much.

And to be clear — it’s cited a lot.

The Sahm Rule is tracked by the Federal Reserve, Treasury economists, Wall Street banks, macro funds, and economic research shops globally. When it triggers, it shows up everywhere. That’s not by accident. Claudia built one of the cleanest early-warning indicators we have.

But here’s the part that often gets lost.

The Sahm Rule is not a market-timing tool and it’s not a prediction machine. Claudia emphasized this repeatedly. It was designed as a policy signal — a way to say, “Hey, if unemployment is rising this fast, waiting too long to respond makes things worse.”

In other words, it’s a call to action for policymakers, not a command for investors to panic.

What makes this cycle unusual — and why talking to Claudia directly was so helpful — is what’s actually driving the data.

We’re not seeing mass layoffs. Layoffs remain low by historical standards. What we’re seeing instead is very weak hiring. Companies aren’t firing people — they’re just not expanding.

That distinction matters.

And this is where I think the big picture comes in — not just for understanding the economy, but for investing in general.

When you step back, the big picture includes a government with massive debt loads that needs interest rates to come down over time. It includes fiscal pressures that make prolonged high rates politically and economically painful. And it includes the reality that if the current Fed leadership won’t ease fast enough, future leadership will.

History tells us that governments eventually get the monetary conditions they need — even if it takes time, even if it takes new appointments, and even if it takes a shift toward a more dovish Federal Reserve.

That doesn’t mean reckless money printing tomorrow. But it does mean that structurally high rates are unlikely to be permanent.

And when you combine that with investing, the question becomes less about this month’s headline and more about what’s positioned to benefit when the environment normalizes.

That’s why I continue to focus on real assets that are already deeply discounted — things like multifamily real estate — assets that were repriced brutally during the rate shock, but still sit at the center of a growing, rent-dependent economy.

This conversation with Claudia reinforced something I’ve been talking about for a long time:
The biggest investing mistakes usually happen when people zoom in too far and forget to zoom back out. I’ve made this mistake myself.

If you want a thoughtful, non-sensational, data-driven discussion about where we actually are in this cycle — and what the indicators really mean — I think you’ll get a lot out of this episode.

Transcript

Disclaimer: This transcript was generated by AI and may not be 100% accurate. If you notice any errors or corrections, please email us at [email protected].

Welcome everybody. This is Buck Joffrey with the Well Formula Podcast coming to you from Montecito, California. Before we begin today, I wanna remind you, uh, listen, we’re back in, uh, back in the saddle in here in, uh, 2026. I know it’s takes some time to get used to it, but we’re, gosh, we’re at the end of the month actually by the time this plays.

I think we’re in February. It’s time again to start thinking about investing. And so if you are interested in potentially using this year, which I believe and which many believe to potentially be the last year, uh, big discounts, uh, in real estate and, uh, various other types of offerings. Make sure. To sign up for the Accredit Investor group, our investor club, as we call it wealthformula.com.

You do need to be an accredit investor and then you get onboarded. An accredit investor is just defined by who you are. If you make over $300,000 per year filing jointly, or 200 by yourself, every reasonable expectation to do so in the future. Or you have a net worth of a million dollars outta your personal, outside of your personal residence, you’re an accredit investor.

Congratulations. Join the club wealthformula.com. Interesting podcast. Today we have, uh, Claudia Sahm She’s a Big Deal, Claudia Sahm. You may recognize that last name som, for this som rule. And what is a som rule in plain English. You actually have heard of the som rule multiple times from other economists who’ve been on the show.

The som rule looks at unemployment. And asks a very simple question. Now, has the unemployment rate started rising meaningfully from its recent low? So specifically, if the three month average unemployment rate rises 0.5% or more above its lowest level, over the past year, this som rule is triggered. Now, historically, that has happened early in every US recession since the World War ii.

That’s why it gets cited so much. It gets cited a lot. By the way, the sum rule is tracked by the Fed treasury economists, wall Street Banks, macro funds, economic research shops globally, and when it triggers, it shows up everywhere, and that’s not by accident. Uh, Claudia has built one of the cleanest early warning indicators we have, but here’s the part that often gets lost.

The som rule is not a market timing tool, and it’s not a prediction machine. Claudia, uh, emphasized that repeatedly. It was designed as a policy signal, a way to say, Hey, if unemployment’s rising this fast, wait, waiting too long to respond makes things worse. In other words, it’s call to action for policy makers, not a command for investors to panic per se.

So what makes this cycle unusual and why talking to Claudia directly was so helpful? Well, it’s what’s actually driving the data. We’re not seeing mass layoffs. Layoffs remain low by historical standards. Um, what we’re seeing instead is very weak. Hiring companies aren’t firing people, they’re just not expanding, and that distinction matters.

This is where the big picture comes in, not just for understanding the economy. For investing in general and when you step back, the big picture includes a government with massive debt loads that need interest rates to come down over time. It includes fiscal pressures that make prolonged high rates politically and economically painful.

I’ve mentioned this before and it includes the reality that have to fed, fed, uh, if the current Fed leadership won’t ease fast enough. I am likely the case that future leadership appointed by. Donald Trump himself, uh, will, so history tells us that governments eventually get the monetary conditions they need, even if it takes time, even if it takes new appointments.

And even if it takes a shift towards a more dovish federal reserve. Uh, that doesn’t mean, uh, reckless money printing tomorrow, but it does mean that structurally. High interest rates are unlikely to be permanent. Okay? And when you combine that with investing, the question becomes less about this month’s headline and more about what’s positioned to benefit when the environment normalizes.

Okay? That’s really, really important, and that’s why I continue to focus on things like real estate, right? Real estate is currently. Not for long, in my opinion, but deeply discounted things like multifamily real estate, um, that were repriced brutally during the rate shot, uh, but are still at the center of a growing and, and rent dependent economy.

And again, uh, this conversation with Claudia reinforced something that I’ve been talking about a long time, which is the biggest investing mistakes usually happen when people zoom in too far and forget to zoom back out. I’ve made that mistake myself. I am not immune. I have made lots of mistakes, and that’s one of them.

So this is a great conversation. Hopefully you’ll enjoy it, especially if you want a thoughtful, nons sensational data-driven discussion. Where we are actually at in this cycle and what these indicators really mean. I think you’ll get a lot of this episode and we will have this conversation for you right after these messages.

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Welcome back to the show, everyone. Today my guest on Wealth Formula podcast is Dr.

Claudia Sahm. Uh, she’s an American, uh, macroeconomic expert, uh, known for her work, uh, on monetary and fiscal policy and real-time economic indicators. She developed this som rule, which I think, uh, people have mentioned on this show before, so this is a great opportunity to talk to her about that. Uh, it’s a widely, uh, followed recession signal based on unemployment.

She’s also a former Federal Reserve economist and senior policy advisor in government. Um, so welcome, uh, Dr. Sahm.

Great. Happy to be here. Thank you.

Well, let’s, let’s kind of start out with this som rule because, uh, you know, it’s funny, we, we have had a few different people, uh, at various times bring up the SOM rule, and I think one had actually said that it was triggered, but I don’t don’t think it was at any rate, let’s, let’s start with that.

What is the som rule?

Lemme start with why is there a som rule, and then we’ll then we’ll get to specifically what the, what the rule is itself. So when I started out on the project, it wasn’t so much about. Calling a recession, like there are some really fancy technical ways that economists like look at the tea leaves and the data and either try to forecast a recession, which is incredibly hard, or even just say we’re in a recession in real time.

So like that’s a useful endeavor. But what actually was behind the development of my recession indicator was more of a call to action. How do we develop policies that, that the Congress can put into place very quickly if a recession comes? So these kind of what are referred to as automatic stabilizers, so they’re decided upon ahead of time, but then you do need a trigger that says a recession is here.

So now that enhance the unemployment benefits, send out the stimulus checks, whatever it is that we kind of have as our typical tools that are used in recessions, we could have those ready to go as kind of guardrails. Then like you, you turn the policy on. So that was really my emphasis was on how do we do better policy and recessions, get the support out quickly.

’cause that’s the best chance of kind of stabilizing the situation. And then it’s like, well it was in a, it was in a policy volume that they asked for, like a really concrete proposal. So if I’m gonna say an automatic stabilizer, I need to have a proposal for what a trigger could be. So that’s really where the som rule came.

So I think it is important. It’s definitely important to me to, I always remember like what the kind of reason for it’s sure. Now that also guided what the indicator itself looks like. So again, it was gonna be in, in fiscal policy. It needs to be simple, it needs to be something that we track it and it needs to, I felt it was important that it capture the reason that we.

Fight recessions, why there’s such a bad, uh, you know, outcome. And so it looks at the, the unemployment rate. I use the national unemployment rate, take a three month average. ’cause we wanna smooth out, like there’s bumps and wiggles in the data from month to month. So you kind of, you know, three month average.

One way to smooth it out. So you take that series of three month averages, you look at the current value, you compare to the lowest value over the prior 12 months, if you’ve seen an increase of a half, a percentage point or more. Which is really pretty modest, but half a percentage point or more.

Historically, we have been in the early months of a recession, so it’s not a forecast. It’s supposed to be like we’re in it. Let’s go. It’s an empirical pattern. It’s one that’s worked in the United States. It reflects kind of our labor market institutions, the way unemployment rate moves and recessions. It historically is the case that once you get past a certain threshold of increased unemployment rate, it tends to build on itself.

And in a typical recession, we see increases of. Two, three or more percentage points in the unemployment rate. Uh, so that’s, that’s what the summer rule is. And in fact, it did trigger in the summer of 2024. At that time I had said like, look around, we are not in a recession. GP is still expanding. Job creation is still happening.

We don’t see the other hallmarks of a recession. And pointed to the fact that we’d had a very disrupted labor market after the pandemic in particular. You know, there had been a lot of immigration at that point. The unemployment rate is the total number of unemployed. So people who don’t have a job but are actively looking for one out of the labor force, right?

And so these people that have to either be employed or looking for jobs, and so we actually saw from the pandemic. Both with the pandemic and then later with the surge and now the reversal in immigration. We’ve seen a lot of movement in the, in the labor force, which makes unemployment rate a little tricky to interpret.

And then I’d also argue, we saw early in the pandemic, the unemployment rate dropped very rapidly. We even had labor shortages. So in some ways unemployment rate rising and it has risen over. I mean, it continued to rise last year in 2025. A lot of that’s also normalization. We’d had a very low unemployment rate.

So I think the, the pandemic recession has a lot of features that were very unusual. We’ll talk probably more about the labor market continued to be kind of unusual. So the, you know, the somal was not the only recession indicator to fall flat on its face in the cycle. Um, but I think it’s still a useful, useful guide and I, and.

You know, even if it’s not a recession, the, the unemployment rate is a full percentage point above, its low in 2023. So, I mean, that, that could, that could be a reason for policymakers to respond, even if it’s not responding to a recession.

Right. That was the first time that it, that triggered and, and actually didn’t.

End up in a recession, right?

There’s some back in the 1950s, earlier, but it’s, it’s the first time where there’ve been some false positives in the past or, or near false positives. Like in 2003. It was kind of close, uh, is like the unemployment rate rises a little bit and then it falls back down. What we saw after it triggered in 2024 is it stabilized.

Then last year it continued to rise. So this the pattern that we’ve seen since the pandemic of rapid recovery dropping unemployment rate and then it’s like gradually rising and yet has risen a full percentage point that you go all the way back in the post World War II period. We don’t see anything that looks like that.

So that is a very unusual. Paris. So something’s more is going on in the labor market than just our typical business cycle, boom, bust, recession type dynamics.

So what is that? What is the thing that’s happening that’s unusual right now in the labor market?

Right? So the thing that is driving the unemployment rate up, I think this is a good lesson, a reminder to all of us.

It’s not about layoffs. The rate of layoffs in the United States is really quite low. You look at unemployment insurance claims, they’re also quite low. What’s been pushing the unemployment rate up over the last two and a half years has been a very low rate of hiring and, and it’s, and it is something that over time will at least gradually put upward pressure on the unemployment rate and frankly.

Until hiring picks up and we really don’t have many signs of it. Even as we enter 2026 unemployment rate’s gonna probably keep drifting up ’cause we’re not keeping job creation’s, not keeping up with, you know, people coming into the, into the labor market and, and that what’s, I think the puzzle right now is that hiring has been very low.

But what we’ve seen in terms of consumer spending, business investment, so the kind of the big pieces of GDP, they’ve really held up pretty well, so. Business. It’s not, again, not that recession of the customers have disappeared. And so we’re not hiring, or we may even be firing workers. The customers are there for the businesses, but they’re choosing in this environment not to add, uh, to their payrolls.

And that’s slowly pushing up down point rate.

Yeah. Um, you know, it, it’s interesting what you’re, you’re talking about, but essentially you’re, people aren’t getting fired. They’re just, when they retire or leave, they’re just not replacing those. Individuals, you know, makes me think a little bit about what’s going on in the big, you know, in the tech push with artificial intelligence and that kind of thing, and increased in efficiency.

Certainly you see that in the larger companies like Amazon and all that, where they’re just becoming massively more productive and cutting expenses essentially by, you know, using tech. Do you think that this is sort of an early indication, potentially of that kind of movement?

So it. It’s possible, but I think we’re at the very front end of AI disrupting the labor market.

This low hiring rate that we’ve talked about. You see this across all kinds of industries, including ones that don’t show high levels of AI adoption, and frankly, a AI adoption is pretty low. I mean, there are some sectors like tech and increasingly finance and some professional services have higher adoption rates.

Uh, but in terms of it being able to explain the low hiring. I think it’s pretty tough ’cause the low hiring is such a, such a broad based, um, phenomenon. Now, AI might be, I think, indirectly contributing in that one of, one of the hypotheses about why, um, businesses have been, uh, not hiring despite, you know, economic activity.

Continuing to push ahead could be that there’s a lot of uncertainty. Now there is a long list that we could draw of, of factors that might be causing businesses to be uncertain and hesitant to add to their payrolls. Uh, a lot of times you talk about things with tariffs or, you know, economic policy, regulations changing, you know, so there’s a lot going on there.

But it could also be, there’s a lot of uncertainty about what this technology means for the future. Maybe you don’t need to bring on more workers because your ability to kind of use and adapt this technologies coming online. And so like that could be part of it. I think there’s another piece, you know, we have a lot of discussion about ai, but I do think that there’s, there could be a, a technology angle to this that’s, that is.

Not in the AI technologies, but maybe just some of the more basic kind of automation is again, right after, you know, the, the pandemic recession as we came out of a, you know, very rapid recovery, uh, there was, there was a lot of hiring or that, ’cause businesses had done a lot of firing and they needed to bring back workers really rapidly and we actually had a period of labor shortages.

There were workers moving around a lot and there were, that also put a lot of pressure on some employers, particularly in service sector, to automate more ’cause they just couldn’t get the workers, so they needed to bring technology. Online to help, you know, fill the gap. And over time, you know, businesses though, they haven’t done as much hiring, they have been firing.

So the workers, they have longer tenures, have more experience, they’re probably more productive. So maybe businesses can kind of, you know, get away with not doing more hiring. ’cause the people they have there can kind of keep up with it. Um, and they’ve done some more automation. I don’t think those are sustainable.

I think we’re going to need to see hiring pickup in terms of, of staying with, um, you know, as expanding, uh, demand from customers. But I won’t pretend to know what AI means for the future of the labor force. Right. So like there could be, I think that’s a big conversation about we’re headed, where we’re headed.

I think it’s probably a pretty small slice of explaining. Where we’re at right now.

You know, it’s interesting because obviously there was a lot of concerns about rising inflation, and particularly in the context of, you know, tariffs and, and among those types of things that were, were, um, coming down the pipe.

And as it turns out, inflation seems to be coming down. How do you explain that from where you sit? Because it, it, it seems sort of to contradict a lot of what, you know, many economists believe to be likely.

So when thinking about the effects of tariffs on inflation and this, this idea that it didn’t end up being as much of a factors we had really feared, uh, you know, a year ago.

I think there’s a few things to keep in mind. One, the announced tariffs, uh. Didn’t come to pass fully. Right? So there’s a big difference between some of the, the, the initial announcements, whether it was on Liberation Day, April 2nd, or the initial kind of retaliation tit for tat with China, where we ended up with some triple digit, uh, tariff numbers.

Those didn’t end up being where we, we ended now tariff, the effect of tariff rate. Is much higher than it was before. Right.

Uh, president Trump came into office for the second time, so like, I don’t

wanna minimize the, the, the increase in tariffs and the US government collected about $200 billion last year in, in additional tariffs.

But there is a, there’s a good bit of daylight between what was announced and where we actually ended up. Businesses also proved very capable of trying to avoid those tariffs and not in like a. Illegal kind of way of avoiding them, but, but using inventories like trying to get ahead of them. We know the tariffs are tariffs.

There’s been some evidence that, that it’s businesses are gonna start passing on the tariff cost increase when it’s actually tied to the inventories that they’re putting out in front of customers. And for some of our goods, like say apparel or things that have long seasons or come from, you know, all across the world, it actually takes quite a bit of time from the inventories being what actually shows up in front of customers.

So there’s been the ability to. Kind of get around the tariffs ’cause they were rolling in. And so do be smart in terms of your inventories. And then it just takes time for those inventories to be, you know, um, to come down.

Mm-hmm.

By, there’s been several studies at this place, at this point that, that demonstrate that the, the tariffs, the cost of the tariffs is coming into the us.

So the, it’s always the importer that pays the tariff, like literally writes the check to the US government. But it’s possible that the foreign producer could say, reduce their prices on what they’re, you know, paying or what they’re asking to be paid for that, uh, imported good. And then that would be a way of the foreign producer sharing the cost of the tariff.

But everything that we see from the M Court data suggests that a very small fraction, probably less than 10%. Of the total tariff burden is being born by, at least at this point, born by the foreign producers. So it’s coming into the us. It’s sitting with either US businesses that are importing the goods or have the goods at some point in their, you know, in their supply chains and, and with us customers, the consumers we have, we’ve seen.

I think you can really look at the inflation data. You can see the goods prices, which often are kind of a drag on inflation that they did turn around. They’re, they’re putting upward pressure on inflation. It’s not massive. It doesn’t explain all of these, you know, 200 billion in tariff costs, but then it is, it’s sitting with businesses.

The effects still, it’s still just not that long enough to really understand. You know what, what the implications.

It’s possible. I, I think that’s true with any, with any big policy change. Like it doesn’t happen overnight. I think that’s one thing that a lot of, a lot of economic models that, like, they’re, they’re very sensitive, right?

Like as soon as a policy change happens, the models will kind of tell us something pretty dramatic in terms of adjustments. But this last year was a reminder, like when there’s, when there’s a big cost, there’s gonna be a lot of attempts to adjust around it to try to minimize that cost and then. It takes time, like in the real world, like the interactions are much more complex.

You know, inventory lags all of the, like, it takes time to move its way through. So I think we’re not done with the pass through. I think we’ll probably still see more come to consumers, but businesses could decide to bear that cost. They, they could, you know, with profit margins. I mean some of, some of the inflationary environment in the pandemic did allow.

There were very broad base increases in prices. You did see some companies be profitable from that because it was, there was a, you know, some of the costs were more targeted, but the, you know, the, the price increases were broad. So it could be a time where businesses see that, you know, consumers are more price sensitive now than they were in 21, 20 21, 20 22, so they’re not passing as much on it.

Could be that that’s part of where. Like the cost businesses are dealing with that cost by maybe doing less hiring as opposed to passing it on to consumers. Uh, you know, they could be taking a hit with their profits. They, you know, so like, it doesn’t have to go all the way through to consumers. There are different levers that can be pulled.

I do think we’ll still see some pass through in the, in probably the first half of this year, and that’s assuming that our whole tariff regime. Sit still, right? It looks like once again we might be, uh, increasing those tariffs, but, um, so yeah, I think it’s just tracing, you know, the tariffs through the system is really complicated.

And one last thing I’ll say about the tariffs is they’re not just tariffs on goods that go to consumers. These tariffs have been broad enough that we’re also taring imported goods that are used by our manufacturers used for our, by our businesses in their production. So then it can take a really long time for that to end up with the, you know, the end customer could be a business to start with, and then it moves its way down.

So I think these are just, you know, the costs are real. We can see the tariffs have been collected, the costs are there. We can see in the import data, there haven’t been import price data, there haven’t been a lot of adjustments by the foreign suppliers. So then it’s just a question of, we have these costs.

Where did the cost go?

I believe the last GEP was 4.3% and, uh, inflation was around 2.6, 2.7, or at least core. You’ve obviously, uh, worked at the Fed. Um, give us a sense of the situation that the Fed is trying to figure out here. Like what do they do with these numbers and, you know, all of the issues that surround them.

The work at the Fed, I mean, it, it’s laser focused on the, the response, the mandates that the Fed has. So with maximum employment and price stability and with maximum employment, that’s not something that can be easily defined. It’s not like

it’s a particular unemployment rate, it’s not a particular payroll number.

But I mean, broadly speaking, it’s, you know, do,

are, you know, the people who wanna work, are they working? In such a way that it’s not putting pressure on inflation, right? Like labor shortages that end up with wage increases that just, you know, end up with inflation. Like that would be a situation where the Fed would actually want to kind of help restrain some of the.

Uh, employment growth. And we, we saw that in this cycle. I mean, the Fed raised rates a lot in 2022 and 2023. Uh, so that’s the maximum employment on the stable prices. The Fed has set a target of the 2%, uh, year over year PCE inflation. So a little different than the CPI inflation, but very much related. And, and it’s one, I mean, that’s, that’s the goal, right?

And it, uh. So it starts with those two pieces and, and what’s been, I think what’s been challenging in say the last year as the Fed was, you know, trying to figure out what it was gonna do with interest rates was the fact that it, there was pressure on both sides of the mandate.

Mm-hmm.

Um, and not necessarily the, well, I mean, inflation itself has, was above the 2%.

It continues to be above the 2%. Target has been. Since 2021. Now the Fed’s policy doesn’t have a look back, but I mean, they do worry that the longer inflation stays closer to three than two businesses. Consumers are gonna start to kind of embed three into their actions, their expectations. Then you kind of get stuck there.

So like that, that both, you know, they were missing on the inflation mandate and there were, there were concerns that the, that we might see inflation get stuck above the mandate and the way you dislodge it if it gets stuck. Could end up risking a recession, right? So the Fed doesn’t want that to happen.

So that’s a real concern. But then on the employment side, you know, we started out talking about the small

rule, the rising unemployment rate. We’ve seen the unemployment

rate rising. And then last year in particular, it wasn’t just the unemployment rate rising, we saw job creation just really take a leg down.

Um. Some of that probably is less

immigration population aging, so less supply of workers, which isn’t something the Fed would react to. ’cause that, I mean, if you don’t have as many people that wanna work, you don’t need to create as many jobs. But the unemployment rate was rising, so it’s clear, like there just wasn’t, there wasn’t enough job creation to keep up with, um, the workers who were there, uh, to work.

And, and there was a concern that this could, could spiral out. Those small increased unemployment rate that, that very low level of job creation. And frankly, if you look at, I mean the, I mean, we have multiple months and probably more after revisions of declines in payroll employment. Mm-hmm. Like if you looked at the labor market data, you’d be like, aren’t we in a recession or like on the edge of one?

Again, that’s not where we’re at, but it, it certainly gave that, that risk. Things could be slowing down. And, and the, the last piece that was really important in the Fed’s decisions was where, where’s the federal funds rate? Where are the interest rate, the policy interest rate they control? And it was still relatively high.

For, for recent history, right. Not in the long history of the Fed, but mm-hmm. And so, like the Fed had raised, they’d raised interest rates quite aggressively to fight the inflation in 2022. They’d very gradually lowered it. Some was taken out in 2023 because made some pro, made quite a bit of progress on inflation in, or in 2024, they lowered the rates in 2025, the 75 basis points of cuts that the Fed did.

It was out of concern. Of the labor market unraveling a risk, not a, not saying, hey, the labor market is unraveling, but saying the risk that the downside risk to employment are larger and more worrisome than the upside risk to inflation. So this inflation getting stuck,

is that still the case as a going into 2026 here?

So, you know, even, even last year we saw, we listened to Fed officials, there’s quite a bit of disagreement. Because it was a tough situation to read. There are some Fed officials that were more focused on inflation, some that were more focused on the employment side. Uh, and it really was just a matter of kind of reading the economy and trying to figure out this, a very unusual situation, like where, where was this headed?

What did the Fed need to do? In the end, the consensus on the Fed was to do the rate cuts, kind of front load them. They talked a lot about it as insurance. They’re taking out insurance against the labor market deteriorating. And I think with that approach, in all likelihood, and there’s been certainly signaling of this, that when they meet at the end of January, it’ll, they’re unlikely to move again.

That this is, this will be an opportunity to hold steady, be patient the Fed has, has taken out their restriction. So they don’t have the higher rates, so they’ve pulled rates down. We also know that early this year there’s various kinds of fiscal support that are coming online or tax cuts to households and to businesses that should give a little extra lift, uh, to the economy.

So I think it’s a period of the Fed waiting to see what the effects of their policy changes are, seeing what the effects of the fiscal policy with the expectation this will be enough to stabilize the labor market. Even help get it back on track and really what the Fed would like. I mean, we’ll see what they get, but they’d really like the next cut to be a good news cut.

Like inflation. Oh look, it’s moving back down again. We’re making clear progress back to 2%. I think that’s probably gonna take maybe even till the middle of this year to build that case. A strong case for the disinflation. Mm-hmm.

But that’s, that’s what they would, would like to do. But they’re gonna keep an eye on the labor market.

But nothing we’ve seen in

the most recent data suggests that they gotta get moving like that. There’s some, you know, real pressure building. Um, in fact, the labor market looks a little bit better probably than when they met in December and inflation. Showing some signs of progress, but it, it’s pretty bumpy in terms of, there’s a lot of noise in the data at the moment.

You mentioned, um, the Fed’s mandate and you know, certainly that’s something, um, that, uh, you know, that, that we know the Fed looks at these unemployment numbers that look at inflation. I’m curious though, that there’s, you know, there is this push and pull with the treasury. In particular, you know, looking at the amount of, of, of, of bonds that need to be refinanced, that kind of thing.

I mean, presumably that’s one of the reasons why the Trump administration is pushing so hard, uh, on the Fed to reduce, um, you know, to reduce rates so that you know, this sovereign debt can be refinanced at a, something a little bit more palatable. How much of that actually. I know it’s not supposed to play a part in the Federal Reserve’s actions, but in reality is there, is there that kind of, you know, thinking that, you know, they have to, they, they may try to play ball a little bit with the, with the situation, with the debt.

Yeah.

There, the, the Fed is not playing ball right now with the administration. Uh, but, but there have been, there have been times in our past. So during World War II, there was an explicit cooperation between the Fed and the Treasury. The Fed kept interest rates low. Both the federal funds rates, so the short term interest rates, they also did, uh, some purchases of longer term to help keep longer term rates down.

Right. So I mean, the, the Fed really, they, their policy was oriented exactly on this objective, keeping the borrowing cost of the US government low because it was financing the war effort. So, so there have been times where the Fed has cooperated with treasury. Now, when they came out of World War ii. What happened is, you know, treasury wants to keep interest rates low.

This is good for, you know, the economy, good for growth, but it was, it really was creating a lot of inflationary pressures and it took until the early 1950s for the Fed to kind of regain its kind of operational independence from treasury and then go back to pursuing, you know, inflation as a key goal.

And then also in the late seventies and maximum employment was added as an explicit goal. So we’re in a place now where. It’s employment, it’s inflation, it, there was quite, um, I mean, president Trump and some other officials have been, you know, very open about saying rates should be low to help with the deficit, with funding the gov.

So like, it’s, it’s been in the discussion in the air. But that’s not, that’s not a mandate that Congress has given the Fed. That’s not what they’re pursuing. It does, you know, but things can change at the Fed. We’re gonna see a change in leadership this year with a new Fed chair. Um, the Fed always, I mean, Congress created the Federal Reserve.

It’s changed its abilities, its responsibilities over time. I don’t wanna say that we’ll never get back to a place where the Fed thinks about. Its effect on the deficit. I mean, they’re watching it, they know, right? They’re tracking all these aspects of the economy. But in terms of what’s driving the Fed’s decisions about what the, the federal funds rate should be, that’s not part of the calculus right now.

Yeah. Um, you know, another, just another question is for clarity. You know, the, the, um, officially right now there’s, there’s no quantitative easing. However, there is. Uh, you know, I’ve been reading, uh, about even, I think even today, there was a, a fair amount of liquidity, uh, being injected in by the Fed. Can you, for people who don’t understand the mechanics of this and what the difference in terminology is, can you explain to us maybe what the difference is between quantitative easing and what’s being done right now?

So just as for context, where quantitative easing even came from. So if we go back to the global financial crisis in 2008, the Federal Reserve, in response to that recession, pulled the federal funds rate all the way to zero. Cut rates to zero And as sure many of us remember that that recession was a very deep and long recession.

So, and the unemployment rate was, you know, 10% and inflation was not a problem. So the, the Fed would want in that environment to do more to support the economy. But when the federal funds rate is at zero, that’s, its, that has been its primary tool. Well, that’s, that’s. Stepped out. So then as a question of, well, what else could we do to help support the economy?

And, and there, there were.

Different possibilities. Uh, some European central banks looked at, you know, they actually did negative interest rates or tried to pull their policy rates, and that’s not what the US did. What was done was to do purchases of, uh, treasuries. Uh, there’s also been purchases of mortgage backed securities, and this is where the Fed is.

I mean, and, and they’re creating reserves. So the fed, I guess, secretary, uh. Treasury doesn’t refer to it as magic money. Um, you know, they create reserves and then they’re going out and they’re buying tr so they’re pushing that liquidity, that demand into markets. And if you’re, if there’s a lot more demand for treasuries, well, the price of the treasuries will go up.

The yield comes down. Interest rates go down. Yep. Interest rates go down. So they. They were, the Fed wanted to support the economy more. That was the tool that they used to do it. So when, when the Fed talks about quantitative easing, it’s not just the tool, the asset purchases, it’s also the intent, right?

They wouldn’t do quantitative easing right now. ’cause if the Fed thought they really need to stimulate the economy more, they’ve still got like. More than three percentage points they could cut from the federal funds rate. Like if the issue were right now, we need to like get the economy going, they’re gonna like cut the funds rate and do it that way.

They wouldn’t be pur like purchasing assets, purchasing treasuries to do that. But what what happened is between the global financial crisis, the Great recession, so all the asset purchases done then. There was some, some runoff of the balance sheet, but then again, in the pandemic there were a lot of asset purchases.

Uh, the Fed has a really big balance sheet, and it has, uh, it, it kind of changes the way that the Fed can even just move around the federal funds rate. Like, I don’t wanna get too much into the, the technicals, but it’s, it’s just, you know, when the Fed says, well, we wanna lower the, the funds rate to 3.5%. In the old days, they could kind of do, you know, with the bank reserves and they could like, make these small purchases and it would, it would make that stick.

Now with, there’s, uh, banks have a lot of reserves, so they’re not as responsive. And so just to kind of, there’s like the, the technical, the tools, the Fed has to just make it happen. In terms of operationally, it means that they have to do some purchases now and then they call their, I mean the new name they have for these are reserve management.

Purchases. So it’s really about operations. It’s not about, but it does mean they’re purchasing assets. So if you’re just focused on like the Fed’s purchasing assets, they’re putting liquidity into the system. Yes, they are doing that, but it’s not with the intent to kind of push the economy to run harder.

It’s just enough liquidity to keep. The federal funds rate stable at the level that they wanted to be at, to just make sure that all these operations are short in the very short term lending markets amongst banks, that it’s all kind of working as mm-hmm. As it should be. So it’s more about operations and it’s about stimulus policy.

Right.

A lot of our, um, a lot of our listeners are real estate owners, investors, and they’re, you know, they think about, um. Mortgage rates and that kind of thing. There was recently a, a pretty significant, well, I don’t know how significant it really was. I think it was about, was it maybe $250 billion worth of mortgage backed securities purchased by Fannie Mae.

Um, that ca can you talk about the purpose of that and really the, you know, what kind of effect that would actually, we could actually expect from that.

It’s certainly been, I mean it’s, it is clear. You know, we talked about one reason that the administration would want interest rates down. It’d be like financing the deficit.

Right. Another reason that very much pulls into kind of the affordability debate is we want interest rates lower, one of them lower for consumers. Now the White House has put a lot of pressure on the Fed for them to lower rates even faster than they have. Has not played ball with that. But then the Fed has lowered its rates.

The Feds rates are very short term rates, and the federal funds rate is like an overnight rate with between banks. Right. So it, and it has an effect on, you know. Credit card rates, short term rates, but it’s not one, it, it has an effect, but it’s really not like driving necessarily 30 year mortgage rates or you know, some of the longer term rates.

There’s a lot of other factors that go into that, and so in this kind of, you know, push for lower mortgage rates. Pushing on the Fed is not the only lever to pull, right? The administration has other levers that they could potentially pull, um, in trying to influence mortgage rates. Now, there, I’d argue the administration’s tools here, like the, the $200 billion, Fannie and Freddie purchase that you mentioned.

That really is about trying to reduce the spread. Between mortgages and treasuries. So in some ways it sounds similar, like, oh, fed and Franny, which are, you know, GSEs. So part, part of the, you know, government right now, at least they were privatized during the global financial crisis. You think, oh, they’re going out and purchasing this Sounds a lot like the Fed going out and purchasing.

There are there, there’s some parallels, but we need to remember, Fannie and Freddie don’t create money. The Fed, when they start, when they start the process of their quantitative easing, they’re creating reserves like they’re actually creating liquidity and money supply. Fannie and Freddie have authorization to be able to make these purchases, but they’re not like the fed.

They’re not creating reserves, but they can, so I don’t wanna think about them like bringing down the whole set of interest rates, but they can affect this spread between mortgages and say treasuries. Right? And so, because again, if you’re, if the. If the GSEs are going out, they’re purchasing mortgage backed securities, well that’s increasing demand for those, and that can push down the rates, that can like squeeze that spread.

And, and while the announcement has been made, you know, I mean they’re, they’re in the early stages of putting that in place, but we even on the announcements, saw a response in financial markets and you’re seeing some movement down, uh, in mortgage rates now. It was. Pretty modest, right? And, and 200 billion while, you know, not nothing, uh, really pales in comparison to like the scale of say, the quantitative easing that the Fed did.

Um, and there are probably other, but the, you know, the administration’s not done. It doesn’t necessarily have to be that Fannie and Freddie do more purchases. The the spread between mortgage rates and treasuries is pretty substantial. There’s other places where, you know, the fees that go into getting a mortgage are quite a bit larger than they were before the, the global financial crisis.

So maybe they go in and try to chip away at the fees and, you know, so there’s, there’s different levers. And I fully expect, and I think we’re gonna get some announcements here again soon on the White Houses. Housing affordability agenda. So there may be other, other ways that they’re trying to, uh, influence, uh, the mortgage spreads.

But that’s, that’s what that is all about. And it, it should have, and it looks like, you know, it’s having some effect in terms of bringing rates down, but it likely, it’d be modest, like in the 10 basis points, maybe 20 if they ramp up the program some. But like, it, you know, it’s, it, it, you know, every, every bit counts.

But this is not a. Uh, this won’t be enough to, you know, move rates down, dramatic mortgage rates down dramatically,

uh, when you, when you look at the economy. Um, and I, I, I think just, you know, one last question. I mean, I just in terms of, you know, the people listening to this are. They’re, they’re people, you know, with jobs and who are trying to invest their money, and they’re trying to, you know, build long-term wealth, but they’re, you know, everybody’s worried about what’s happening with the economy.

What, what, what do you think, like, just as, um, um, you know, perspective for people to understand or try to have some framework for how to look at what’s going on in the economy. How they should judge it. Like what would you suggest, like just for mom and pop investors trying to, what is happening with the economy?

I’m not an economist. What, what are the, what are the things that you think they should consider studying up on, looking into a little bit? One

challenge for a lot of investors, I mean, frankly, it’s, it’s been a challenge that I try to deal with too. Uh, we’re, we’re in an environment where there’s just.

There’s so much news coming out of DC uh, with the White House

and policies and the Fed,

and you know, I mean, like, there’s just, there’s a lot. The headlines are big. And like I talked about with the tariffs, we had like really big tariff announcements. The really scary numbers were, and then it like dialed back and then we pushed through it and it’s like, and it’s this remembering that, um.

There’s always a tendency to have this idea that the, the president really runs the economy. I mean, that’s not just about this administration. That’s like a longstanding, you know, the president gets, uh, blame or credit for the economy when really, right. Like we have a over 33, $30 trillion economy, hundreds of millions of workers, tens of millions of businesses.

Like this is not about one administration. And so we always need to be careful about. Putting too much weight on the policies coming out of dc. Uh, and you know, last year if you really just listened to all the, you know, we’re cutting immigration, we’re raising tariffs, we’re doing, you know, all, there’s a lot of uncertainty in Doge.

Well then you might have missed, like, there’s a bunch of AI investment happening and we’ve got a lot of growth in the economy and while consumers are still pretty resilient, so you, it’s kind of like. Tuning down the volume, some coming out of Washington, especially the like every twist and turn. Uh, and then kind of focusing in on the fundamentals.

I will say, you know, you don’t wanna turn down DC too far because we, we do have some like big picture events that could play out over many years. Right. So kind of keeping an eye on it, but for the long game. As opposed to reacting to every twist and turn, every policy announcement, because a lot of this clearly is more of a negotiation than it is like, we’re gonna actually do this.

So, you know, as investors, you don’t wanna get whipped around by the latest headline, but you also can’t put your head in the sand. Like you gotta kind of try and find a way to pull the signal out of the noise. And it is really. It’s really hard. Yeah. Like this has been a challenging time and the, the US economy’s been doing things that are not typical.

We talked about some of the things with the labor market and we are running some policy experiments that haven’t been run in a long time, so things could change pretty dramatically. But I think it’s just trying to absorb the information, not get too wound up about it, but like also keep an eye on like what’s good for long-term growth.

Yeah. Because it’s good for long-term productivity.

Thank you so much Dr. Sahm. It’s uh, it’s been a pleasure talking to you on, uh, wealth Formula Podcast today.

Great. Thank you so much.

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