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A brief history of the petite bourgeoisie by Ryan MacMacon.
Inflation, bailouts, and ultra-low interest rates
have widened the wealth gap in the United States.
This is no natural market phenomenon,
but is driven largely by monetary inflation,
which always benefits some groups at the expense of others.
This has become more apparent during our current age
of cronyist interventionism, which accelerated following
the global financial crisis of 2008.
The trend was, again, solidified during the COVID panic
when forced business closures and 40-year highs
in price inflation put further stress
on the more marginal businesses.
Since then, many observers have increasingly noted
mounting evidence of a so-called K-shaped economy
in which higher income households see greater gains
in wealth and income than do lower income households.
Through it all, government policy has had a key role
in the redistribution of wealth.
This is hardly a new phenomenon, however,
and we can find many insights into how it all works
thanks to classical liberal exploitation theory.
Decades before the Marxist came along,
the classical liberals exposed how some classes
exploit other classes.
Through taxes and inflation, government regimes,
transfer wealth from the more productive members of society
to the less productive ones.
Class warfare is real.
For at least two centuries, political theorists
have attempted to identify and understand
the ways that various social and economic classes
have interacted within the system of state exploitation.
In the writings of the liberal theorists
who explored the system of legal plunder,
that is, Frederick Bastia, William Leggett,
Alfredo Parato, and John Taylor of Caroline, among others,
we often find the familiar terminology of class
and economic interests.
There are the bourgeoisie, the stock jobbers,
the industrialists, the landowners,
and the forces of big business.
Some groups we are told are more inclined toward production,
while others are more often found among the exploiters
and parasites.
Among these classes, we also find a group
that is often ignored, or at least it is infrequently mentioned.
It is the class small enterprise,
the owners of small factories, the artisans,
and the shopkeepers, or to use a term
more frequently found outside the United States,
the petite bourgeoisie.
In this essay, I'll take a closer look at the petite bourgeoisie
and the various ways that political theorists
have attempted to describe it and classify it.
The petite bourgeoisie has often been placed
among the more productive economic classes,
and this group has been romanticized to an extent
that other social classes have not,
with the exception of the workers.
Ironically though, the petite bourgeoisie
in the United States is rarely among the groups
driving significant changes in policy or public debate.
When it comes down to actually creating government policy,
the interests of small enterprise are often ignored.
Rather, we end up with a political debate
with a populist focus on wage earners on the one hand,
with too big to fail mega businesses on the other.
Who are the petite bourgeoisie?
Small enterprise has long been central
to national economies, including industrialized economies.
Even after more than a century of accelerating industrialization
and growing economies of scale,
the small business economy in the United States
contributes more than 40% of all GDP
and small businesses employ more than 45%
of all private sector employees.
Even into the mid 20th century,
as big business greatly increased its role
in national economies, small enterprise
remained the primary driver of employment and production.
These sorts of statistics however,
raise the problem of defining what exactly is small business
and what is the class of people involved in small enterprise.
The US government generally defines small business
as firms with fewer than 500 employees.
This however, tells us very little
about the broader social characteristics
of the world of small enterprise
or put another way what sets this group apart
from other economic groups such as the bourgeoisie,
the working class, the proletariat, or the rich.
The answer in part is found in the terminology used to describe
what sort of work is done by people
in the world of small enterprise.
However, terms like petite bourgeoisie imply
that this is a group of people
who have specific social and cultural characteristics
and are not just the people involved
in certain lines of work.
One thing that is important to note
is that the petite bourgeoisie
is not at all synonymous with the term middle class.
Is is not the case that everyone
who is generally considered to be middle class
is also engaged in small enterprise
or holds to the value system of the petite bourgeoisie.
For example, in many times in places,
especially in 18th and 19th century Western Europe,
work in the civil service was often considered
a gateway to the middle class.
Yet government bureaucrats are clearly not working
in small business, nor would the values
of the typical civil servant reflect
those of the petite bourgeoisie.
Moreover, someone who is a middle manager
at a huge corporation can also be part of the middle class,
but is obviously not someone engaged in small enterprise.
Rather to be in small enterprise
means to be engaged in work that is combined
the ownership of productive private property
with skilled labor performed by the property owner himself
or by those close to him.
These owners often work alongside their employees
in workshops, small factories, and offices.
This is in contrast to larger enterprises
where managers often oversee workers
through highly hierarchical structures
that tend to physically distance the owners
from the workers.
In many cases, but not all cases,
the petite bourgeois property owner adopts a role
as an entrepreneur investing capital into efforts
to adapt to changes in the marketplace
and to address unmet wants among consumers,
artisans, shopkeepers, family farmers, and mechanics.
What are the specific lines of work
that are common among the property owners
of small enterprise?
One of the earliest theorists to explore the effects
of state redistribution on wealth
was John Taylor of Carolyn.
In some of his earlier works, such as found in Arritor 1818,
Taylor repeatedly refers to farmers and mechanics
as the foundation of a free economy.
In this context, mechanic means a small-scale skilled labor
that is an artisan who likely owns his own tools
and may even have a physical workshop.
Taylor routinely places the mechanics alongside agriculturalists
as the primary examples of the productive classes.
In Taylor's view, the productive classes
also appear to include smaller merchants, lawyers,
and others we would today call professionals
and practitioners of the trades.
These productive classes are then contrasted by Taylor
with those that rely more on a protecting duty monopoly
or bounties and other government subsidies
that advantage the parasitic classes
that benefit from pecuniary privileges
provided by government protection.
These include bankers, speculators, and large merchants.
Large manufacturing enterprises
protected as they were by protective tariffs
were also counted by Taylor among the unproductive classes
of courtiers.
During the 1830s, the Jacksonians further built upon this idea
of productive classes contrasted with the exploiter classes
of large enterprises that were protected
and their positions by subsidies, tariffs,
government contracts, and other policies
that tended to benefit bankers and the largest firms.
As Ashworth puts it,
Jacksonian social theory looked to and hailed the independent farmer.
The independent laborer or mechanic was also approved of,
but there was little respect for manufacturers.
Merchants were recognized as indispensable
to an agrarian economy.
As we can see, while farmers may have had pride of place,
they were certainly not alone among those considered
to be productive and essential.
Similarly, in Europe, shopkeepers and artisans
were believed to be among the productive classes
forming the core of the Petite bourgeoisie.
The Petite bourgeoisie as a political and social class,
these are not just economic differences
and there are distinctions here
from a sociological standpoint as well.
As Jeffrey Crossick notes, for example,
the combination of the owner's labor and capital
within family-centered enterprises
creates a distinct position for the Petite bourgeoisie
within the social structure,
or as observed by Jeffrey Faire,
the fusion of property, family, neighborhood,
and enterprise differentiated the Petite bourgeoisie
experience from both working-class households
and the upper bourgeoisie.
The cluster of value centering on family,
local neighborhoods, work traditions,
and property formed a distinctive Petite bourgeoisie identity.
Crossick also notes that the frequent presence
of family-based businesses among Petite bourgeois
enterprises further contributed to the romanticization
of small enterprise efforts as being especially good
for family cohesion and society overall.
Later in the 19th century, the Petite bourgeois lifestyle
was further touted as providing more flexibility
and opportunity for women who could enjoy
greater leadership roles within the family business.
This idealized version of the Petite bourgeois
would prove to be important to a variety
of political coalitions in France, Germany,
the United States, and in other areas
where there was considerable public respect
for property owners who were viewed as hardworking and frugal
and as contributing to the economic well-being
of the community.
Thus, not even the Marxists committed as they were
to a focus on a conflict between the proletariat
and the bourgeoisie could deny the existence
of the Petite bourgeoisie.
In the early 1850s, Marx put the Petite bourgeoisie
alongside the classes opposed to the proletariat,
writing in response to the 1851 French coup.
The bourgeoisie public was victorious.
There rallied to its support the financial aristocracy,
the industrial bourgeoisie, the middle class,
the Petite bourgeoisie, the army, the intellectuals,
the clergy, and the rural population.
The Parisian proletariat stood alone.
This reflects Marx's view later expressed in capital
that the small burger and the middle ranks of society
constitute an important class in every modern body politic.
For Marx, this was nonetheless a class
that stood opposed to the interests of the workers.
This idea continued well into the 20th century
when Murray Rothbard, in a note on modern egalitarianism,
suggested that the complexity of modern grievance politics
means one almost longs for the good old days
of classic Marxism.
When there was only one oppressed class, the proletariat,
and one or at most a very few classes of oppressors,
the capitalist or bourgeois, plus sometimes the feudal landlords,
or perhaps the Petite bourgeoisie.
Marx's recognition of the Petite bourgeoisie
as an important class reflects what historian Ralph Rayco
calls Marx's shrewd abilities in historical analysis.
While Marx was a terrible economist,
he did not necessarily lack keen observational powers
on other areas.
And while his third rate economic skills
placed the Petite bourgeoisie as an enemy of propertyless workers,
he also did correctly see that the Petite bourgeoisie
was politically at a disadvantage
when compared to the great or oat bourgeoisie.
Marx writes in Dedeucia ideology, trade and commerce
create the great bourgeoisie.
The small burger, who no longer has earlier rules the town,
but must submit to the mastery of the great merchants
and manufacturers, is concentrated in the handicraft trades.
Marx is not wrong here as far as he goes,
but he lacks the proper analytical tools,
which are provided by classical liberal exploitation theory.
This theory tells us that if the Petite bourgeoisie
are at a disadvantage, it is not due to any iron law
of economics, but is due to the presence
of the sovereign state, which taxes, regulates and inflates
to the advantage of certain favored classes.
It is in its ability to influence state action
that the great bourgeoisie is able to exercise its mastery
over the small burger and the handicraft trades.
Indeed, the reality of this political battle
between small enterprise on the one hand
and some sectors of big business
and the growing financial sector, on the other hand,
come through in the work of many keen observers
among classical liberals.
So we find in the work of John Taylor
and in the work of later Jacksonians like William Leggett,
denunciations of the paper aristocracy
and calls for the separation of bank and state
in their efforts to rein in the power of large state
connected enterprises.
Taylor and Leggett and the Jacksonian movement overall
saw in the Petite bourgeoisie a group
they identified without using the phrase,
a benign social and economic class that was more dedicated
to free markets, virtuous competition,
and more decentralized political power.
This was far from the Marxist view that the Petite bourgeoisie
were among the oppressor classes benefiting
from the exploitation of the workers
while allying with the Oat bourgeoisie
in turning the state against the propertyless masses.
Rather, experience suggested to many in the 19th century
a more likely scenario in which small enterprise
found itself at the mercy of large national interests
that routinely turned state policy in favor
of a select few industries and firms.
In the current age of too big to fail,
this would seem to be timely analysis even today.
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