Alastair Crooke: Iran's Strategy - Evict the U.S. from the Middle East

Welcome back. We are joined today by Alistair Kruch, a former British diplomat and negotiator

who worked for decades on conflicts in the Middle East. He's also the founder and director

of the conflicts forum. So make sure to read his sub-stack and I will leave that link

in the description. So thank you very much for coming back on.

It's always a pleasure. You don't have to do us.

Well we are now way into the third day of this war against Iran and Iran is retaliating in

a big way. If you look at Iran's strategy or structure, how do you read it? Do you see the retaliation

organized in faces or is it planned properly or how do you make sense of this?

Yes, I mean there are two sort of separate components to it but the first component

largely because of the array of missile that they have in their possession is was always going

to be first of all and I think I may have said this at times too but it was always going to be

the main focus was going to be on American bases in the Persian Gulf, in the Gulf area.

And why say it depends on the array is because they can be reached. They have a large stock of

drones with big stock of drones and short range missiles. Missiles they can't reach or easily reach

Israel. So it made sense if you like to focus to begin with on the Gulf, on the American basically.

Ali Larigami has emphasized again that this is not an attack on the Gulf's base per se but on

the American bases in CIA facilities that take advantage of Gulf space to pursue their conflict

against Iraq. So that was one element. The second element is likely related and does have three

bases. The second element which is more focused towards Israel of course the first component

to this is attacking the radar systems. The radar systems the iGs that allow America and Israel

to see into Iraq and they've done that taking out major radar bases in Gulf states in Qatar and in

other places in Qatar into I think I can't remember but they've taken a large number of

major radar sites belonging to the Americans in the Gulf states. So the first exercises is

focused on the radar which also in capacity or limit is not in capacity perhaps. Israel missiles

and they're attacked on the radar and the second phase is to continue to use

older missiles and drones to draw out and to deplete the Israeli

and defense intercepts capability to wear it down to reduce it to the minimum.

And you can see that I mean this is pretty obvious you've probably seen the videos or

anyway you can see the videos of Israeli strikes into Iran although now they move to the

faster into the higher most sophisticated missiles in some cases but you can see that I mean the

Israelis are using huge numbers of intercepts against each single inclusion. So I mean you

see easily 8 and 12 used against every arriving missile strike and missing mostly missing.

So where we are now is at this sort of stage, stage 3, the Gulf states have almost exhausted entirely

their admins system. So I mean there are signs you can see Iranian drones say fly freely over Dubai

and other sites they have used all their air defenses and so you know the the Iranians cannot

their leisure, destroy it, continue to destroy American bases and they are destroying American bases

through a very large extent. I think they're evacuating a number of bases. I don't know exactly

which ones but they're evacuating bases. Another particularly in Bahrain,

in Bahrain there's been huge damage done to the facilities of the Facebook, the US basically.

But going back then to their faces. So in with Israel the aim is to use older

or slower missiles again to defeat their intercept capabilities as engine. And then the next phase,

the next you know if you like, stage the plan is to move to the more modern and more sophisticated

and faster missiles. I think they say I'm not a military expert at all, not at all. But I mean they say

that you know the air defense system Israel can't cope with anything about Mac4. So anything that's

faster than Mac4, it is not likely to be intercepted. And of course, hydrasonics are moving

much faster at Mac, much then or much. So eliminating those, reducing those is the priority.

And then the third stage that the Israelis with the Iranians have and we don't know anything

about is that they say they have new new weapons. I think we have had a glimpse. I don't know,

it's all of the new weapons. But we have seen now hypersonic missile with multiple warheads

all right, certainly while I don't know it would be more Mac that being new weapons because we haven't

seen them with sort of cluster warheads before to mine on at least Zaitei. I don't, I'm not one,

I'm military nerd. I don't know what I may be wrong, but I think I'm pretty much right for that.

So that's essentially the plan. And so the objectives of it really ultimately I think are

to drive the United States out of the Middle East which is underway. I'm not sure that you know,

I think stand if it continues in this way that the United States will be able to keep their

presence, maintain their presence in the Gulf States. I mean, they all be hammered by by the

storms and I think the second element of course with Israel is to degrade the Israeli military

past such that it can no longer really threaten Iran as it has done to degrade it sufficiently

that it is no longer a threat to Iraq. I think the other objectives are to

impose a price on the United States and on Europe and the economic price. And the economic price

is the price that comes from the closing of the whole most straight.

Well, they're not entirely close to the force. I mean, because what they're doing is allowing

vessels from states that are not have not been complicit in the attack on Iran. They can pass

but in Chinese, for example, vessels pass without hindrance but not ones of the United States or

not ones from states that are associated with a large American basis in the area. So the economic

costs are important element. And I think there's more to it. I mean, this is my own speculation.

I have not noticed forward but in a sense, in the bigger geopolitical picture, we have seen

how the United States is taking control, trying to take control of choke points.

If you like sea-borne choke points and to try and control the passage of tankers

reaching both China and Russia by attacking and seizing tankers which they say a part of

the shadow fleet of Russia or of China or that are sanctioned in connection with Venezuela,

Chinese vessels, tensions in connection. I mean, what the legal position of that is is

beyond, I mean, there's no security council resolution. I mean, you know, this is just, again,

you know, the United States just stating it and doing it. We're really nearly without

any sort of legal basis. I can't see how on what basis America can claim, you know, the legal

right to seize Chinese vessels at sea, but they do. So I think in this context, what we're seeing

actually is perhaps retaking of some of the, if you like, the energy infrastructure. That is

the energy infrastructure of the Persian Gulf and perhaps also that whole of you like that

West Asian area. I'm taking it back, first of all, on the Iranian control of more broadly under

bricks control. So I think it is an element also in sort of maneuvering and reorganizing the

encountering the American attempt to dominate oil and gas corridors itself by sharing that

issues. The bricks are going to dominate some of its corridors, of course, only in that in the

geography. So I think, yeah, pain is going to be a very important element and you can see it

already gas prices because of course it's not just oil. I mean, gas from LNG from

Qatar and so on has been a star. And so gas prices for Europe is already, I don't know what they

are at this very moment, but they shut up already by 14% overnight, whether the weekend and the

dead. Oil prices, there are the substantially unmarked suppression, quite likely. So there is

a big economic cost, as well as a political cost of losing the basis that I do think whole stuff.

I don't know quite how you tell me it and what you how you use for a cost on it, but I don't think

the Gulf states will ever be the same again. You know, they had a certain, shall we call it a

certain Gulf brand, which was, you know, markets, AI hotels, tourism, bum hotels, you know, the easy

layer and airlines and revenue from airline, airline, major contribution to Gulf prosperity.

I think that this is a change. I don't see, we will see, because we haven't elephant cause

from reaching us from people and you buy them. I know we get out, we want to get out,

and kind of take axes across the six desert, dry, to a demand catch up like, I don't know, see,

got their flight, but anyway, that is, I mean, you know, some people will stay of course, but a lot of

security conscious Europeans, I think will probably move on or a component when somewhere else

that they can. So I think that's change. I think also, you know, the question is what happens

to the, to the well and how they are going to look at the future. I mean, the Iranians have said

to them, you have been attacked because you chose to facilitate Israel and the United States

and to have bases and CIA officers on your territory, case of Dubai, which has been attacked.

So, you know, to very then shift and move and decide they would like to have a different

relationship with Iran and, you know, they will not have American bases in the future.

We'll have to see. I know it's even the British have been warned

by Greece that, you know, if you're not allowed to use your base or anything but humanitarian

reasons, you can't join in providing the fence for the Israel and the United States for my

criteria base or your other base inside place. So I mean, I think that's just not in itself here,

but it's a harbinger than, you know, the change might come and people would say, well, you know,

if you're going to be here, it's not going to be for military purposes or things eligible purposes.

And so all of that, sorry, a long answer, but all of that seems to me to the deaf, you know,

a geopolitical shift, potentially, it is unfolding and it is the attention. And of course then,

we look at what might be the case what will happen with Israel and of course it's too early

to door any, any, any rail conclusions from that at that point. Then we look at the United

States and we can draw a few early conclusions, I think, that and from the headlines in the U.S.,

even today, say, you know, that the end of them is in the atomic mode and they are very worried,

they think, you know, that the whole thing is, there's a risk of the whole of this exercise

getting out of control. It is out of control, actually. It is definitely out of control.

They say there's a risk of they're getting out of control. They don't want to see, you know,

dead Americans coming back and, you know, what are they going to do? And it seems, you know,

that American officials are scrambling around to sort of change again, you know, what was the

justification for this war and who started it? And was it Iran started it? Was it Israel?

It wasn't us. Anyway, we didn't do it. So, you know, you can see that already this is the problem

and the second one. So one is public relations problem, presentation problem. And the second big

is how long will Israel's intersect capacity last? And my guess is it will, by Friday, they may

be in trouble. Well, the American side of the strategy appears to not be going, well, I said

hope. I was wondering how interpret the... That's the landscape.

I understand. Yeah. Well, the killing of Komenei was, I was wondering how you see the significance

here, because it appears in the American calculation that they would, you know, kill the highest

religious authority in Iran and somehow the people would then be liberated and take to the

streets and celebrate their American liberators. I'm not sure exactly why this would trigger

a regime change or what the calculations were, but how do you assess the killing of Komenei,

what it was, what they hoped it would achieve, but also what is actually happening?

An incredible era. If you take it almost on the merits of what it was supposed to do, a completely

error of judgment, which shows, you know, how the huge cognitive dissonance or non-understanding

who he was or what he meant at all, and just seeing him in these sort of crude terms of front

calling him and his colleagues, but others in murderous. And so it's what it has done. I mean,

his two things, it started a fast run around the reach, a real fast run around the reach. I'm sure

being seen in all the massive protests, the weekend against the American Embassy in Baghdad,

the grease on as being stormed by protesters. There were protesters attacking the

consulate in Pakistan, in Bahrain. There may be the first regime change of this whole operation,

you know, between 1780 percent of Bahrain is Shia, and the ruling

Amir is Sunni and the Yusurand of himself with a Sunni protective defense force,

and they'll be massive protests, and they're trying to imprison green leaders and stop it, but they

are being, they've been really, you know, again, besieging the, besieging Bahrain as the state

by the protests already, very what. And then you have this in Iraq with the Iraqis attacking the

American air defenses in Abdel and elsewhere. It is really

far enough to be everywhere, because he was either the first or the second, it depends

for you Earth, most importantly, she majah in it, in the Middle East, hugely significant.

As a religious leader, as the scholar, I mean religious leader, and they killed him, murdered him.

He was killed in his office at work, instead of day morning, and is pretty clear to me that he

actually deliberately chose this. I mean, of course, he could have been in some protective

rights somewhere else, but as he himself said, you know, he is, I majestic, I'm semi crippled.

He said, I have the only thing I profess, what is my dignity, and that comes to you.

And so my life is more significant in those. So I think he just stayed working, and he must

remember clearly, given the sort of mentality of the Americans and the Americans that are supporting

Israel and of Israel, that they were shouldly come and want to kill it. And he saw maybe that was

the best in the best in question we're on. So I do think they completely misunderstood.

You open up a very important question, but one, which really probably beyond this program to get

into, which is, I mean, what are the roots of the, the, the, the hatred that exists amongst

those elements that would determine to, to, to, with the, the supreme reggaard would be killed?

The, why did they, why do they, I mean, why did they, why were they so vicious and

mutually against them? And, and dancing in the streets that he's there, not in terror,

but in Tel Aviv. You know, this is something to do with psychology and western ways of thinking that,

you know, would have to be explored a bit further. But there was enormous, you know, there is something

very deep about it. Even you've learned there was a, a, a journal, a journal, and it's really

generous working on the 972 magazine. Well, and she was writing about how she would have put up

a post about, um, beginning of all those school bells, um, with biobarm attack, um, killed many,

many school bells, um, in Iran. And how many, she was inundated with hate messages. Okay, good.

You know, with these, I mean, it was, it's really, you know, there is a sort of ugly sight,

just on, just sort of, relationships, um, and embossed it, not saying that, you know, that,

that isn't in other parts of the world and other places too, but it's very pronounced,

the moment in, in the geography between Israel and Iran. Anyway, you know, they have made,

I mean, this, what, one of the things messages that comes out of this, I think most clearly,

is that we all have been old, how wonderful Israeli intelligence is, the mosques, so clever.

Technically, you know, when it comes to exploding pages, maybe they are. But when it comes to

understanding the region, how diabetes they have done, three times in the last period, they assume

that, you know, that the whole of Iran was just waiting to erupt, um, against the, uh, the state

to take it over and to turn it into a pro-western, um, the polar-based, uh, government. And, you know,

oh, that's, I mean, do they not do little intelligence on their analysis? I mean,

it's so, it was so obvious, you'd be in terror, you know, I mean, you, I don't think you experienced

this sort of vicious anger against the Supreme Leader while you were there. I said,

me didn't happen either way as I've been in Iran at all. In fact, mostly, they loved them

and Rubiyah, and he was a highly respected person. He's, uh, you know, he's very humble.

As he knew, I went to stay his house at one point. No, they're on. I think it's the one he would

probably kill him. I just look to show. Very simple, very, very, very, very basic, very simple,

clean empty house. I mean, he, he, he was not a man of, um, um, potentially.

Well, you mentioned now that, um, it seems to mean Iranian strategy is to push the United States

out of the Middle East. Uh, of course, hitting its bases, um, you know, posing some casualties,

weakening the Gulf States, uh, opposing a cost for hosting American bases,

going after economic interests, uh, of course, degrading Israel would be a key aspect.

But I was wondering, to what extent might there be an unintentional, well, let's call it achievement,

that is, how do you see this war impacting the relationship between the United States and

Israel? Because this seems to be more, then what seems to be more attention is relationship

than has been, well, at least in my lifetime. Oh, you, you make a very important, correct point.

I mean, it is going to change the sole question. I mean, first of all, you know, um, the

miscalculations that I'll just be describing, the idea that, you know, that regime change was

likely. And, you know, this was the third time, Mark, who was a decapitation strike festival

in June, then there were the protests that were supposed to wear a, a, a, a, no militant frame

instead, the insurgents were putting to, to give the impression of a, uh, a state that was

collapsing, uh, in January. And then now, again, they've killed and tried to do a second decapitation

strike, not quite as extensive, but a, a, a, a decapitation strike, including, excuse me,

to, in the supposition that this change, the whole state and that will become a pro is, uh,

some of the ally of Israel. I mean, you know, really, really is really part of this unbelievable

what you see, you know, gosh, the data was to about how, you know, a new world has opened

me up before us with the United States on our side. And that very soon we will be have a new

coalition working with Israel, Israel, a new westernized Iran, and in India, taking on all the

radical slammers from both she and Sunni. Uh, I mean, anteceded, really fantasy. So, I mean, uh,

yes, you know, it is going to affect, you know, I think Trump is not going to recover from

the list of the state. I mean, even if he finds, I think it'll be very hard for him to find

an exit, uh, a quick exit as he usually likes, you know, okay, I'll just say I'm not

the Iranians are not open to negotiation. I think our economies may back here. No friend, no, no, no.

So he'll find it hard to get on. And already, I think if you look at the American press, you see

uh, many of those in the panic and now sort of trying to say, well, you know, we warned, we,

you know, avoiding blame or the, you know, the, the, the retribution that might come back,

well, what will be humiliating, you know, exit from the dark. Um, they, they're already sort of,

you know, throwing a leadership under the bus and say, well, we should tell him, we told him,

we told him that we couldn't guarantee, you know, there would be raging change. We told him,

we couldn't guarantee there'd be no, um, uh, at casualties, we told him, we can't guarantee

it quick in our type of, you know, in boo of the conflict. And we told him it wasn't going to be

like Maduro and Venezuela. So already, this is still going to come out. And so yes, I think

when we political consequences, and I think if you look at the mega reaction, they are strongly

against the Israeli First Policy and the betrayal by, by Trump, of his repeated promises,

he was not here, the start was, he was here, the stock was, and there would be no more forever

and the era, you know, it was only in, he was May, he was in Saudi Arabia, um,

was in March, May or March, but area was this, yeah, he was in Saudi Arabia, proclaiming

the end to um, raging change. He said, there'll be no more that's over that era, it failed,

it wasn't successful, there will be no more. And he said that in reality, there will be no more

regime change. So I think there's going to be quite profound consequences in, in the United

States, on this, especially in my case, faith, and the consequences could be very serious

because, um, the popularity for this war was never high even before. We breached

on, it was only had something like 21% support, I believe, and it's which power,

of course, with the ones I saw was by 21%. Of course, higher support in the republicans

artists, but the, the, um, the end of it is, you know, he is right to lose the mid-term

connection. I mean, of course, mid-term, you know, a week in politics is a long time,

unless Putin told November that, um, his, his ratings and everything,

signal very scary, he could lose the house. But if he loses the house and the senate,

then I think he will risk impeachment or apron in prison. So it's very serious,

and it won't be, and he recognized, at least did that. Literally, I'm coaching, he said,

you know, if we lose the house, you know, I'm, I could be finished, but if we lose the house,

if we lose both houses, then I'll be in court, and I won't be pushing, that's what he did,

those ways, but so, you know, this is, carries. Now, people will say, oh yes,

but the democrats will come back and they'll, you know, make peace with the Israelis, and it will

be back to normal. I, I mean, the Soviets, but I see something different taking place. I see

something slightly different in that I think even in the democratic party, people are saying,

you know, what we have to have, we democrat, we have to have our discussion

about the future relationship of the United States and Israel and how they interact together.

I tell you that hasn't happened yet, you know, it will be wrong to sort of

try and guess what it's going to emerge, but I think even there, there is the thinking that, you know,

this will have to be radically, or would you do about exactly what is, how we relate as in the

United States, it is well. So yes, big changes. My last question is about how

if there's a possibility of getting, well, walking this back, or putting an early end to this war,

because, well, first of all, let me say in regards to what you said about the Pentagon,

I thought that was interesting because domestically, if Trump wants to make this legal,

I think he has to make the case that this was imminent, an imminent threat by Iran,

which he had to respond to, but when the Pentagon comes out and tells Congress, there was no

immediate or imminent threat from Iran, they are literally sprinkling hundreds of us here.

It's, well, but...

And by the way, sorry to interrupt you just quickly on that point because they've even come

gone further. Now, I can't remember who it was, but in, I think in the briefing to the gang of

eight briefing, I may be wrong, but I think it wasn't. And in this, when the question,

American officials said, no, there is no, we have no assessment that the Iran world would

will preemptively attack Israel. There's no assessment that they would preemptively,

of course, there was no assessment of that. I was in a threat to the United States,

but they specifically, I think, said in that briefing and has been reported,

they said there was no intelligence to suggest or assessment that they would attack us.

And quite clearly, you know, the attack by Israel has been talked about at the end of the year

and agreed. And even the timing of asking the group at that briefing in Maralaka on the 29th of

December. So, I mean, you know, to the legal basis, the action is on very, very shaking grass.

And, you know, the language coming out about how, from my perspective, was Rubio saying,

oh, you know, yes, it's absolutely right. I mean, they're building ICBNs, they've run

the threat in the United States. I mean, I don't think even in the sort of heightened atmosphere

of politics, they, the United States, they knew what needs that. And certainly, there's no evidence

of it, all of it can be produced. So, I think, yes, the legal grounds are indeed very shaken.

And that's why I say, you know, the difficult years he has not sought commissioning Congress.

And he has not sought commissioning Congress. And he has taken the initiative to kill a head of state.

We are congressional consultation. I mean, I think the I can't even be dragged down to the

things we can't be dragged down the week, or people who are viewing it, are the eight most

the key congressional leaders in the United States from both Congress and Senate from the House

and the Senate either in the leader of the House's and so on, the eight most sort of

senior institutional placeholders get special breeding, classified breeding, which is not

available to other members of the Senate or Congress. And it was out of that meeting,

I am stupid comments came. So, you know, so he is on on shitty grams, which could

easily provide the state on to find a better reason, could would find whether it was

seed or not, whether it be calm down or not, in another matter, there will be

pretty much faster the basis or an impeachment.

But it seems based on the previous conflicts over the past year that Trump's main approaches,

well, he sees the weakness of and relative decline of America because by weakness and he sees this

in leaders such as Biden and Obama. So, that is to, you know, have a show of strength go in,

don't get drawn in over too long period of time. So, a quick victory, ideally regime change in

Iran, but of course, if you can walk away with some other trophy to, you know, to give incredible

home, but also to, I guess, strike some fear into other adversaries on the international stage.

This would be ideal, but it's not playing out as he had hoped. And I think the longer this goes on,

the more the advantage shifts to Iran in terms of, you know, being able to absorb these different

blows and being able to dish it out. But I've heard some comments now that I, at least I expected

if Trump wanted to put an end to this, he would make statements that, well, the Iranians want to talk,

you know, they're coming to the table, you know, there's something along the lines to make a...

Hello, he said that. You just said that. I mean, you know, the Iranians want to talk and they got,

you know, held to laugh all by the Iranians when they, the Italians broke their

pressure. We're also the person that sees thought. But what does this mean? And if Trump wants to put

it into this war, do you, is it possible? Do you, do you think the Iranians would let that happen

or do they have other objectives? They want to achieve before they're willing to let Trump walk

this on back? No, they won't. They won't, they won't help them out. I mean, first of all, you know,

they, he's, you know, he's deced some twice. And this is a long history of deceptions,

because the killing of Qasim Soleimani was a deception too. You know, he was coming to,

he'd been invited, being all set up. And of course, the Americans knew about it for a discussion

by these four relations. The Iranians knew Saudi Arabia was something, but they was going to be,

and he was there on an official visit coming on a commercial airline. And he was, he was,

he was shot down with a missile as the Iranian official delegation was standing in its meeting.

So, I mean, you know, deception after deception, I've, you know,

I made it into Iran's thinking, maybe, about how they should behave. And I think, you know,

they know that they are in the drive-ins. I mean, there are, you know, actually things are

going to go important to perhaps people are not seeing very much. But it is not going well.

I mean, I talked about, you know, interceptors. But there are only a limited number of tomahooks.

You know, we keep hearing to talk about, oh,

Tehran has been bombed badly. It's nice. Well, when people talk about being bombed,

they imagine aircraft going over and dropping bombs. That's not what's been happening. There are no,

there's no evidence of Israeli aircraft in the Iranian airspace at all. And in fact, what we've

seen, actually, is signs of aircraft being shot down. One could have been in an, in, in,

Iranian airspace. But three may have been taking off from Kuwait and were locked down by

Iranians, F-15s, and were shot down. They say it's friendly far, but friendly far for three

aircraft taking off at the same time when they don't have much aircraft. I don't know. Anyway,

look, there are no signs, visible signs up to now, despite the defense minister's cast saying,

we're going to have a corridor. We've got air superiors, the dominance of the skies across

Tehran, we from Shlyward want. And there's actually all of the evidence points to the opposite

that they cannot but because they are frightened. And obviously, things have changed

in the last seven months because Iran seems, I mean, you just take the evidence of drones.

All 22 drones that have been flown over piloted drones, of course,

flown over into the Iranian airspace, or a means shot down. Thank you to be destroyed by the

Iranians. So something is working. Something is working quite well. This is for some of the most

advanced countries that the United States in this world has. So these things means, you know,

Iran is, feels very confident with the position. Yes, of course, it's paying a certain price.

But then so is it. And so they are quite confident. They're changing the geopolitics of the

West Asia of the Gulf States. And so if you say to me, is it what would it, you know,

just to stop diplomacy again? Come on. You know, they're being through this and what,

in 20s, you know, as they sat down with, or about to sit down with Americans, they get attacked.

I think, you know, and you know, this is going to have a wider retouchions on Russia and

Ukraine too. I mean, about, you know, what is the fun to talking with being crumpled?

I'm not saying that wasn't happened, but I'm just saying it is going to make people reflect

carefully about the whole approach there. What would they take? Well, I have no idea. And I'm not

saying that in the basis of some, you know, information I've got, but I would say anything less than

a complete lifting of sanctions tariffs in the return of all the Iranian frozen swans.

In total, all at once, now, they might consider.

Yeah, well, I can understand why the Iranians wouldn't want to simply put an end to the fighting and

wait a few more months for the next attack or the next, you know, stage revolution. So I guess

shifting realities on the ground in terms of pushing the Americans back or ideally out of the region

or get some proper diplomatic victory. It's just that's going to be very hard for the Americans to

to swallow, though, after 35 years of it will hedge money and being able to dictate all outcomes

and yet to simply accept this. It's, yeah, I'm curious. So that it is, you know, there is just a

nervous canvas. I mean, because, you know, I don't think they'd anticipated what happened in the

I don't think beforehand, they saw this was not possibility, so they are sure. And, you know,

people can do dangerous things or unwife actions in when they're desperate and in those circumstances

and feeling they will otherwise be humiliated. So, of course, but what we're talking about then

we're sticking a course into a creative one which is not really sensible to speculate because

it's not possible to speculate sincerely. Well, thank you for taking time out of your

business schedule. I appreciate sharing your insights. My pleasure. Thank you for inviting me