China Has Much to Lose in Iran

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From the opinion pages of the Wall Street Journal,

this is Potomac Watch.

We've been covering the U.S. military action in Iran closely

and today we're diving back in to talk about the campaign

and how it's going, including what it might take to reopen

the Straits of Hormuz.

We'll also talk about a larger looming strategic question

in the background, which is, what does the Chinese Communist Party

make of the war in Iran?

Welcome to Potomac Watch.

I'm Kato Dell.

I'm filling in as your host today.

We're joined by one of our contributors, John Spencer.

John is the chairman of war studies at the Madison Policy Forum

and he's a particular expert on urban warfare.

He's the author of several books, including a manual

for Ukrainian civilians defending their home cities

against Russian invasion.

John has a piece of commentary in our pages this week

that I'd commend you all to read called China has a lot to lose

in the U.S. Israel War on Iran.

That's what we'll discuss today.

Thanks so much for joining the show, John.

Why don't we start by taking an inventory of where the war stands now

we're more than two weeks in.

We're recording Tuesday midday and how would you grade

the U.S. campaign on its stated objectives which I take to be

eliminate Iran's ability to spread terror across the region,

take out their ability to produce ballistic missiles

and one-way attack drones, and destroy their navy.

Is the U.S. succeeding in that front and how would you grade

the campaign so far?

I never thought I would be, although I taught strategy

at West Point being that in the business of giving grades

for not the first time that I've been asked to give it,

or really have to get deep into how do we assess this war.

I think you did a pretty accurate assessment of what the goals are

and we seem to be in this global,

almost popular media debate about what the goals are.

And I go to the President's speech on March 1st

when he announced Operation Epic Fury, again in March 9th,

on those goals.

I also am in the field of where tactical victories

don't lead to strategic success.

There is a difference between strategic element of this war,

Operation Epic Fury is a strategic policy driven,

political goal driven operation.

So you have to assess how's it going against

what are the stated political objectives,

which is the strategic levels.

Yes, you account for the tactical metrics, right?

So the metrics that the Sinkcom commander or the Secretary of War

or the Joint Chief of Staff provides us daily,

which is actually unique.

And a lot of people confuse it with like the body counts of Vietnam,

which weren't associated with a failed nation building operation there.

Those metrics, I believe, are showing that the United States is a high grade.

I don't want to give it a grade, you know, an A,

pursuing along the measurable metrics of doing all of those things,

continuing to refuse Iran's ability to have a nuclear weapon,

refusing their ballistic missile shield,

which is supportive of that objective to develop a nuclear weapon,

right, this threatening shield.

So the United States every day, you know,

now it's, if you combine Israel and the United States' targets

that have been to hit, it's over 14,000, 15,000 targets hit,

much of that being that ballistic missile launchers,

stockpile, manufacturing sites,

and I think people discount that.

Like their ability to just restart,

like they did after the 12-day war,

with China's help, and I know we'll talk about that,

try to restart that missile production,

because it wanted thousands of them,

beyond what they were left with,

after the 12-day war in June of 2025,

they wanted to put that on steroids

to just get more and more of these ballistic missiles.

The drone manufacturing plant, as a part of that,

you know, as you said,

this is about militarily Iran projecting power,

strategically Iran's behavior,

and pursuing behavior.

I think the United States military

and Israel, because the decapitation strikes,

about changing the regime's behavior,

to do all three of these things,

is really important in war, as well,

war is a contest of wills.

So if we measure really every bucket,

I don't see how many people would say,

you're not achieving the goals that you say the wars are.

Even that element, which I think is a strong man, really,

this is another forever war,

another regime change war,

another nation-building war.

When every time I hear the leaders talk,

they say, that's not what this is.

Yes, I mean, President Trump, I think,

strongly to include this off-the-cuff media interview,

says, this is about changing the regime's behavior.

It doesn't matter to, I think, the US administration,

what governance model,

whether it's a theocracy and Islamic Republic,

or whatever,

but the behavior that has been allowed to continue

will not, and that is part of the kind of larger picture, as well.

Right. Yeah.

And we'll get to the regime in a second,

but I want to stick on your distinction there,

which, you know, the air campaign is succeeding

at a tactical level, you know, retaliation strikes are down.

But there are larger strategic questions looming,

and I think the most pressing one is Iran is trying to flip the script

by taking the straight-of-form-use hostage

and realizes it, you know, can't compete with the US air campaign,

but it can try to put this tremendous pressure on a global shipping lane

and kind of, you know, pressure the president politically

not to do anything about it.

And I think the public looks at that and wonders, you know,

what's the hold-up to us opening up the straight, you know,

why is this continued to go on?

And so it would be helpful if you could give us a sense of

what militarily will be required to do that,

and is it in your estimation that we didn't plan well enough for this,

or is it really that it is part of our campaign going through

some of those anti-ship missiles and drone capability

that we need to do first before we can open the straight?

I mean, what really needs to happen to be able to open up the straight?

So absolutely, and you mentioned it too.

That's why from the beginning, the Navy was called out as one of the objectives,

and that is because of the Iranian Navy's past threats and actions,

whether it's at the end of the Iraq-Iran War, the tanker wars,

which some people had forgotten about how Iran had disrupted global commerce

and how President Reagan created a whole operation to escort ships

through the Straits of Promoos for over a year,

and when one U.S. ship was struck, they did Operation Premium Antis,

which is a variation of what you see now.

Of course, the nature of war doesn't change.

The character of war changes.

So even in this aspect of, okay, what has been going on with meeting this objective

of destroying Iran's Navy and more importantly,

that ability to project power and use the Straits as this threatening course of power

against not just the United States, but the world,

because that's part of the goal, too,

is to other people that depend on this strait,

which controls 20% of really global petrol export,

although it's 90% of Iran's exports,

so it's almost shooting itself into foot,

but strategically there is some rationale behind that.

What has taken the United States so long?

One, as a former Army guy, a land power guy,

this is a joint operation from space, naval, air,

down to the ground forces that are actually doing amazing work.

We had the first Army ground-based system sink a Iranian naval sub,

which we'll take into the Army Navy game next year as a point of pride.

But what's taking so long is that it's really risk, right?

So there hasn't been a ship attack as we're talking since March 12th.

In the attacks that did happen,

we're from either drone or these unmanned guided naval things

that we saw even in Ukraine being used in their operations.

So it's actually been very minimal, the attacks that have happened,

but they're considerable enough to scare the ships

and to reduce that risk.

Israel has been focused on certain targets as of this morning.

The United States has really been focused on expanding

that naval component, right, destroying over 100 ships,

destroying the mine lane,

and the estimates of what Iran was able to lay already

was literally like 10 or more,

not that that's not a threat.

There are under water, basically mines,

but the United States has also measurably been very effective

at destroying the Navy, the fast boats,

the mine layers, the drones nearer on the shore.

Of course, that is something new.

There's always something new.

Just as the U.S. and Israel's ability to destroy

as in to decapitate every echelon of the military

and political leadership,

which is about attacking the will, is new.

Like we've never had that capability.

The drone element of securing the Straits, right?

So, of course, we know that one of the potentials

is to escort commercial vehicles through the Straits

as such as we did during Operation Ernest Will

during the late 1980s when this happened before.

The drones are a new factor because you can launch those

from way farther away,

but as of right now, 90 plus percent

of the ballistic missiles have been stopped,

95 percent of the drones,

I would say they're measurably effective.

I know everybody wants this to happen quickly,

but for the sake of not inability,

but for the sake of continuing to lower the risk,

even the boats that would be used,

like destroyers and the agents systems

and all that to provide this kind of security bubble

around the commercial ships that might be escorted

if necessary.

And I think the energy secretary said

that once it's military feasible, that will begin.

Then you have the insurance question.

So, I see really measurable efforts,

although I know a lot of people say that,

well, since they say they can stop it,

then that's showing their power,

I don't see any Iranian strength,

even in that threat,

as of I think this morning,

which really gets to the China losses in Iran,

Iranian officials,

whoever that is right now,

who'd brave enough to say,

they'll let tankers through only if they've bought the oil

in the wand,

which is really interesting as a data point.

I think that the U.S. military

is strongly on course to reopen the straight,

but you want to reduce that risk,

because the worst thing you can happen is,

even one tanker gets hit in a bottle.

I mean, this straight is only,

it is a global choke point

that I think should be reduced,

actually,

and a lot of the countries in the region

actually have built pipes to reduce

this choke point of 20 miles wide,

the shipping lanes only two miles wide.

It's a issue,

it has been a historical issue.

I think that the U.S. military

has been really effective on reducing the risk

to get to a point where it's reopened.

And before we turn to the larger

looming question of China,

I just want to ask two about

Karg Island.

We've seen that there is some

amphibious marine combat power

flowing into the region,

and our mutual friend,

retired General Jack Keen,

described an action on Karg Island as,

you know, a checkmate against the Iranian regime.

And so I'm curious,

is an action on Karg Island,

likely in your estimation,

it would also

boost on the ground,

has a place in American psychology

that changes the dynamics a little bit.

But I'm curious of your opinion of whether

taking Karg Island is a realistic option

that you expect to happen,

and how that might look.

I definitely think it's a realistic potential

for the U.S. military,

and in war,

you never want to tell your enemy

what you're going to do

or what you're not willing to do.

So that's a big factor.

I firmly agree with General Keen's analysis

that would be a significant checkmate.

I mean, it's 90% of Iran's export,

50% of its GDP,

60% of its revenue.

It is the oil blood,

or whatever you want to call it,

lifeline to the regime's ability

to do the things that it's doing.

And taking that away,

would align with the goals of this operation, right?

The changing the behavior.

The January,

2026 protests were really aligned

to the economic failures of this regime,

again, going back to this is not a regime change.

But the regime's economic decisions

to squander billions of dollars every year

in pursuit of nuclear,

ballistic,

the proxy terrorism.

It transferred a billion dollars to Hezbollah,

who I think is signed as deficit,

just last year.

Carg Island is a key,

what we call center of gravity,

in the enemy's strategy

to continue what it's doing,

what it would look like,

we've already done massive,

never before done military strikes

on the military installations on Carg Base,

and one of the options

that the president would have

would be to use these,

what, I mean,

it's really in the Marine Corps history,

island seizing operation,

think Iwo Jima,

to be able to seize that island,

and then change the calculus

that the regime thinks it's going to continue to survive

and continue to do the things it's doing

because it has this such a big amount of money,

primarily coming from China,

that has always been its kind of foundation of its strategy.

No matter what happens,

we can rebuild,

we get billions of dollars per day,

like, from this one gas station

of Carg Island that it has.

Yeah, that's a great point too,

about the Marines who are trying to return

to their amphibious roots in a reorganization now anyway,

in the Pacific.

Hang tight, we're going to take a quick break,

and we'll be right back with more Potomac Watch.

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Welcome back.

I'm chatting with John Spencer

about the US military campaign in Iran,

which brings us to the larger

looming question here,

which is the Chinese Communist Party,

and how are they reading the US involvement

in a war in Iran?

I mean, there's kind of different two competing schools on this,

and one of them basically says,

war in Iran is a distraction from larger and more media

that threats that we're facing from China.

So it would be helpful if you would start.

First of all, just helping connect some dots for us

on both the economic and military relationship

between Iran and China and their efforts

to develop what some have called

a kind of a joint industrial base in some sense.

So walk us through China's bet on Iran

over the past 10 years

and what their cooperation has been.

This is really what you have to talk about.

The grand strategy of great powers

versus the strategy within this moment

that we're talking about in Operation Epic Fury.

From the operational level,

I mean, China is the biggest loser

outside of the Islamic regime in Iran.

The ability for Iran to do the things

that's done in the last decades,

the development of nuclear weapons, right?

Who gave Iran the centrifuge manufacturing capabilities?

China.

Who gave them the precursor elements

to develop the missiles

and other elements of its nuclear

and ballistic missile program, China?

We were sanctioning China firms

and this is the way China operates.

Like you said, the CCP has private businesses

that are mostly state-owned.

So we were sanctioning Chinese firms

that were providing Iran with things

to even develop intercontinental ballistic missiles

just last year.

The oil revenue, of course,

is Iran's 90% of Iran's oil is bought

by China, of course, larger picture.

That's the only fraction of what China imports.

But getting to that straw man,

which I want to address,

that straw man that, of course,

China would be fine

if the United States got bogged down

in another forever nation-building war

in the Middle East.

I think that's a misread

of the grander strategy of one China

and two of the United States.

If we look at China,

of course, it loses all of that revenue aspect

of and its proxy in Iran.

It loses, it's really, I think,

in multiple cases,

its global arms sales.

I mean, all of Chinese radars,

missiles, everything that is supposedly

gave the Iran to help in its security, right?

China's security to nations

is really being checkmated as well,

because it doesn't give military assurances,

although it signed a $400 billion

25-year plan with Iran in 2021

that involved infrastructure,

industry, and, of course, energy,

but you can guarantee that was a military,

kind of, in this kind of global arms exporting,

Chinese systems have been shown to be inefficient

lacking inferior to US systems,

not just in Iran,

but also in Pakistan,

when India and Pakistan had their four-day operation

in Venezuela,

but that more grand strategy, right?

If you believe China has in this road

and belt grand strategy

to rewrite the world

through economic warfare,

I think a lot of people were surprised to understand

Panama Canal,

where actually my first duty station

that Chinese firms had bought the control

over the canal and the ports,

but then we get to Venezuela,

the Venezuelan investment by China

and what was trying to change the petrol dollar, right?

That's going back to the Iran statement about

only if you buy and want,

which is really the economic warfare

that China has been waging

and investing in over, in decades,

to change the dominance of the dollar

as the kind of the global currency

and to make it that start with the petrol dollar

and reduce its value and transfer it into the one,

but also in investments like in Venezuela,

Panama, really the global south

that was aligning themselves through China

through economic assurances

and in some belief in some type of military aid

which China doesn't do.

This is an unraveling

of not just China's interest in the Middle East,

but its grand strategy through the road

and belt to rework the world.

And I think this is the Trump administration's

execution of what it wrote down

in national security strategy

that China is this greater threat.

Of course, Iran's nuclear pursuit

and its terrorism and everything

is a, I think, an existential threat

to not just its neighbors,

but in what it wanted to do,

what its missiles can arrange Europe right now

and development of longer regime

and eventually nuclear capabilities,

but China is the biggest loser in all of this.

And do you think China is the biggest loser

even if the regime doesn't change?

Because that's usually just to take the other side

of the argument what I usually get back,

which is just, well, you know,

the regime is not going to change

and eventually China will regroup.

It would be helpful on that point.

If you have any specific examples of where

we've seen Russian military equipment underperforming

and what we have learned from that,

but my basic question is just,

regime, have to change for that to be true.

No. So again, I don't think

this is a regime change war.

This is a regime behavior change

and the United States,

from lessons learned,

not just Afghanistan, Iraq, Vietnam,

that's not this.

And I think when we do analysis

of military campaigns,

going back to judging it by the objective set,

not inferring through just lazy analogies

what it is,

the regime does not have to change,

although that would of course be a best case scenario

for the people of Iran.

Right.

But the regime does not have to change

to have this change in how close we are

to not being able to affect the change, right?

That's the whole nuclear weapon.

Once they get a bomb,

then the calculations change.

That's why it has the missile ballistic shield,

all of this.

But from the where does Russian or Chinese systems underperform?

Which I really think for me,

as a military analyst,

is one of the bigger lessons of the last

four years is,

do not buy,

or I guess if we want to,

yes, continue to buy Russian air defense

and Chinese air defense systems,

because starting in Ukraine, right?

Most of Russian systems,

whether it's the S-300,

even S-400,

they're radar systems of cyber warfare system,

they're commanders,

even little,

little Ukraine capabilities,

with of course,

United States intelligence,

and other things,

those kind of,

we're sold as the cornerstones

of air defense capabilities,

both Russian air defense missiles,

like the S-300,

and Chinese radar,

Chinese certain even spoofing

and other capabilities.

In Ukraine,

it's the Russian systems.

In Pakistan,

when India started responding

to a terrorist attack

in Operation Sendoor of last year,

in May of 2025,

India with certain capabilities

was able to hit what it wanted,

what it wanted,

when it wanted,

despite Pakistan being a very strong,

like not 100%,

but like the biggest Chinese proxy,

if you really talk about

a redefining Asian security

of Pakistan as a Chinese military-based system,

and what India was able to do there.

And now Iran,

and if you get to Venezuela,

and Iran heavily backed by this combination

of Russian S-300,

S-400,

many other systems,

variations,

or even versions,

and then Chinese backed assistance,

as we, of course,

I'm sure you reported on Russian

and Chinese supposed help

even for Iran

that doesn't look to be very helpful,

since the war began.

All of this is a bigger calculation,

not just for the arm sales,

so I guess we want people to keep buying this stuff,

because even in an advanced well-in situation,

which they were posting,

which is not a good look,

that I am here to come get me,

and despite Russian air defense systems,

being surrounding Maduro,

it wasn't able to stop the United States

from executing that law enforcement operation.

Just in every one of these cases,

that's the major theme,

which will impact that kind of arms exporting,

as much as it had in the past,

when something similar,

really convincing,

I say, and God, I trust,

all others bring data.

The data shows that the United States,

with Israel,

has the ability right now,

like this almost global dominance capability

to strike at Chinese or Russian-backed forces at will.

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Don't forget you can reach

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From the opinion pages

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this is Potomac Watch.

And now we'll dive back in

to my conversation with John Spencer.

Most of these arguments seem to draw on

the near-term military of balance of power

in the Pacific.

I am one of many who have been concerned

that the United States is in this decade

in a window of maximum danger in the Taiwan Strait

and that the United States needs to do

a lot more to deter that.

And so the argument has kind of been,

you know, we're taking assets out of the Pacific.

And I'm wondering if you could address that too

about why that is potentially an oversimplification

and that the CCP is going to draw the conclusions

from the outcome of the war that exists now,

which, you know,

so the United States should probably prevail in it.

But I'm curious if you can address that balance of power

argument and just what can the United States do now

that it's learned that perhaps it does need

more patriot interceptors,

it does need some more naval capacity.

What can be done about that in a reasonable amount of time?

It's a great question.

I mean, and it is a larger,

both the nature of war,

character of warfare,

what are the needs of the modern battlefield,

not misapplying lessons from different conflicts to others,

within the Chinese military,

what you talked about the Taiwan scenario,

you had to first start with that kind of deterrence theory, right?

So deterrence theory relies on capability

and the political will to use that capability.

So within China, you know,

they may have the will to do that operation that many people fear

and we don't want to see,

but through they have the capability,

I mean, the Chinese military hasn't been tested

really since, you know,

like 70 years, a long time.

And as Russia learned in Ukraine,

we can all have big ideals about what our military can do

until it's put to the test.

And Russia was found wanting.

I mean, I think Taiwan took a lot of lessons from Ukraine

and my research there on how do you just slow them down

because the scenario there is about not just,

you have the capability,

but can you do it quickly before things change?

There's only one superpower,

and not to be boastful,

but just by facts that can project power globally

within a certain number of hours,

you know, 18 hours or longer.

Yes, moving aircraft carriers does take time,

and that's people have woken up to that

in the Middle East scenario right now.

But it doesn't really, for me,

impact the deterrence theory.

If you're going to make such a big move,

are you weighing the political risks

versus benefit,

military capability, can they do it?

And I think really, again, going back to just the combination

of what the US administration has done

in the Chinese calculation, right?

That hard power is a lot different than that economic warfare

assault power element.

And what would the US administration do in that scenario,

which has to be completely reassessed with each administration

and I think that the Trump administration has signaled that

there would be a different response

than I think Chinese strategist figure.

But, you know, in the aspects of what you need,

like you said,

the lessons of the last four years

has also been a recheck on the military industrial base.

I know for Ukraine it was artillery rounds

and could the United States produce artillery rounds

at the need of any large-scale combat operation.

Now we're talking about interceptors,

which is this character of warfare is always changing.

This, you know, a new thing is developed

and there's a counter and a counter and a counter.

As I'm really happy to see Ukraine helping countries

with combating the slow-moving

but mass-produced one-way drones,

which the United States has now developed,

the Lucas drone and sent it back towards Iran,

who kind of fielded this,

which has been an evolution of drones in general

and the cost to shoot one down.

Yes, that fourth level of interceptors

the United States has been shown recently,

which is, I mean, war teaches everybody massive lessons

that even in that military industrial base,

we might have been lacking,

but I think the president signed a deal with the primes,

like Lockheed, to increase production by four

and it was possible.

So I don't point to one thing,

say, okay, globally our interceptors can't keep up with the pace

because there's always action and reaction

that high-end ballistic missiles.

A lot of these things kind of prove taking action

when a country was developing thousands of these high-end ballistic missiles

to overload your capability

and the cost imbalance for you to do anything about it,

which is the shield Iran was building

to have that nuclear capability.

But for China, lots of lessons,

we always want people to be, you know, 10-foot tall,

but we have to do the data analysis

not just on what they have.

War is not a contest of spreadsheets.

It's also about, you know, will to do something

and the ability to do it.

And here, I think the United States has shown that

it is willing to accept a certain amount of risk

to eliminate a threat, which matters

to that deterrence theory you're describing.

Since you brought up Ukraine,

I'd love to finish out here by asking

a little bit more about that.

Since Russia is also part of this threat

between China and Russia and Iran

and has in developing drones

and other types of systems that are on the battlefield.

How confident are you that the US military

is learning everything it can

from the battlefield in Ukraine?

It's hard to say from our seat today

how well our nascent air defense systems are performing,

but given how many attack drones are flying at US assets

in the Middle East, it looks to me as though

it's perhaps improving.

And by improving, I mean, we are learning how

to take down these cheaper projectiles

with cheaper interceptors and to get after that problem.

And so I'm curious how confident are you

that the US military is absorbing the lessons

of the battlefield in Ukraine?

I'm pretty confident having done my own research

in trips into Ukraine, you know, in trips

into Gaza, Azerbaijan, India, as tracking.

There is no all preparation.

There are uniqueness to the Ukraine battlefield

as in especially even air power, I mean,

the neither side.

I mean, it's incredible that Russia has been attacking Ukraine

for going into the fifth year,

it has never been able to achieve air superiority

or air supremacy, but air defense

is about an integrated air defense system.

And there are a lot of lessons being taken

from Ukraine for the US military within the context

of understanding our, this is why, you know,

Iran's not Ukraine.

There's so many differences.

I'm pretty confident there is a bureaucracy

having been in the US military and having

studied at that Pentagon level,

whether it's fast procurement,

changing the way we think about the scenarios

in which war will go and applying the right lessons.

Even the investments in laser, you know,

changing that cost implication that everybody

talks about, you know, $40,000, one-way drone,

slow moving, you can shoot it down with machine guns.

But if one of a thousand get through,

that's still a big deal as we've seen

and causing a lot of damage.

That's a lot different than a school bus

ballistic missile rain down on somebody.

But you have to have this integrated

because we're so expeditionary.

There are concerns about homeland defense is one thing

and we have the interests of the Golden Dome

and all that the United States has to protect,

whether it's the southern borders from drones

or like we saw the FBI kind of initial report

about the possibility of Iranian cargo vessel launch drone

on California.

There's a difference between integrated air defense

from homeland and a expeditionary mobile military.

I'm not concerned, but there's always interest in,

okay, we have this expeditionary force,

whether it's an Indo-Pacific or not,

and will they be deployed with this integrated air defense system

at the scale that it needs,

which is always the question, right?

Even if it's a laser-based system,

and Israel has been demonstrating what the Iranian being can do,

even in this operation, that we've been working in,

that they're on the naval vessels right, the rail gun,

and other aspects,

do we have the right capabilities for our military scenarios

to include the expeditionary element of that?

Is always a question that we always should be asking?

I'm not concerned, and I'm also on the outside, right?

So this is the whole idea that we didn't have a plan

for the Straits of Hormuz, like that's insanity.

We didn't have a plan for low-cost drones, that's insanity.

Of course, we had a plan.

War puts all plans to the test, of course,

but we should have a mindful eye on these things.

Yeah, no, it's encouraging to hear, especially since

President Trump has been sending some mixed messages

on the Ukrainians and whether we need their help,

and our view is that we should be glad to welcome their help

since there are our ally,

and they're on the front lines against our adversary, Russia.

But thank you for such an in-lifed-ing conversation.

Thanks for joining us on Fatimic Watch.

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