How Far Will Trump Go in Iran?

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From New York Times opinion, I'm Ross Douthet and this is interesting times.

So, is the United States winning its war against Iran?

They have no Navy and they have no Air Force and they have no nothing.

And if this is what success looks like.

The war in Iran has caused oil and gas prices to spike and it's not just affecting cars on the road.

Economists say American consumers can't get a break. What would failure look like?

If the Iranian regime stays in power, they win.

My guess this week is the CEO for the foundation for defense of democracies.

He's a long time Iran hawk who argues that victory is within our reach and that regime change is still a possibility.

Mark Dubowicz, welcome to interesting times.

Ross, thanks for having me, honor to be here.

So, we're talking, I'd say, about 24 hours or a little more after President Trump postponed his professed plan

to strike Iran's power plants if they did not reopen the strait of Hormuz.

And we're also talking in the background of conflicting reports about possible talks between the United States and the Iranian government

or elements of the Iranian government.

All of that seems very vague and nebulous at the moment.

But that's roughly where we are in the timeline right now.

So, given where we are, first question, very easy one, is the United States winning its war against the Islamic Republic of Iran?

Well, short answer is yes.

Longer answer is, depends what you mean by winning.

And if you mean based on what President Trump laid out as the objectives of the United States, then we are winning.

And those objectives, he was very clear.

It's essentially to destroy the war-making capabilities of the Islamic Republic, which includes its missile program, its navy, and its nuclear capabilities.

And I think with that in mind, it's only been three weeks in, think the US military, along with the Israelis, have done a pretty extraordinary job of severely degrading those capabilities across all lines of power projection.

I mean, the missile program has been severely degraded.

Ross gave you a sand, I mean, they had the largest missile infantry in the Middle East before the war started.

Their ballistic missile production rate is now zero.

Their launchers have been reduced by two-thirds.

The Iranian navy has been decimated.

The nuclear program, I think, is still to be determined.

But between the 12-day war, last year, and Israeli strikes against the nuclear facilities, during the past three weeks, the program has been set back even more severely.

But there's still the Battle of Hormuz to be won or lost.

And I think that's going to be a decisive battle that will determine whether President Trump can legitimately claim the end of all of this a major military success.

Yeah, well, we'll talk about the Battle of Hormuz.

Let's just stay with military degradation for a moment, in a scenario where this conflict ended soon, and those objectives were seen to have been met.

There's no world where you're going to eliminate completely the Iranian regime's capacity to have a military, unless you invade Iran and occupy it and so on.

Does that mean that this military operation in its limited form is just about buying time, so that we just don't have to attack Iran again for five years or something like that?

Yeah, I mean, I think what we're trying to do is severely degrade their war-making capability and also their repression apparatus.

That's actually been the Israeli piece of the military operation, but I think over the past three weeks we have now gotten enough evidence from Trump himself and from the White House that they're very much setting these objectives as missile Navy nuclear.

So it depends on the extent to which Iran can reconstitute its Navy, its missile capabilities and its nuclear capabilities.

It's difficult to know exactly how far we've set it back, and I think one should always be careful about those kinds of estimates.

And we also should remember that even if a U.S. president is not prepared to bomb again, as long as the U.S. president doesn't block the Israelis from striking again, if they just keep coming back and as they call mowing the grass, you can keep setting back those capabilities and degrading them over and over again.

So now let's talk about the regime because you already gestured at this by mentioning Israeli attempts to degrade the regime's capacities.

A week ago you co-wrote an essay for the Atlantic entitled glimpsing victory in Iran.

I think it's fair to say that you have a broader definition of what victory looks like than the military objectives laid out by the Trump administration.

So tell me what your vision of victory in the war is.

Well, I think as we wrote in the piece, you know, our vision of total victory is the end of the regime in Iran.

And I've, you know, that's been my longstanding position for now 20 years. I've been working on this issue because I believe that to permanently solve this problem, you have to replace the regime in Iran.

And I've been a longstanding supporter of boots on the ground to do that, but Iranian boots on the ground, not American boots on the ground, which I really believe that

across broad swaths of Iranian society, that the level of enmity for this regime amongst Iranians is deep and profound and has gotten even more deeper and more profound since January of this year when the Iranian regime killed Iranians on January 8th and 9th in the face of a huge protest movement.

So I've long believed that providing maximum pressure on the regime, maximum support for the Iranian people and using a variety of overt and covert means to fracture the regime support base will ultimately lead to the end of this regime. That's total victory.

That's what I would define it.

And that in that essay and elsewhere, you've talked about what you described as a kind of three phase process of getting there from where we are now, where the first phase is the kind of military campaign that the US has embarked on degradation of the Iranian military, just talk through briefly what do you think each phase would look like again in a best case scenario that ends in regime change.

Yeah, so phase one is major military operations, you know, the Islamic Republic of Iran has been at war with America for 47 years. We've been fighting back against them for three weeks.

So in the span of three weeks, I think there's been some extraordinary military accomplishments. I could see this campaign lasting for another three weeks. I think it would be a big mistake to pull the plight right now, but it also be a mistake to continue this war for months in phase one.

In phase two, yeah, phase two is very much what these rallies are ready embarking on right now, which is severely degrading the repression apparatus of the regime that they began that on February 28th with that initial strike that took out the former Supreme Leader Ali Hamine and his top IRGC commanders, generals and advisors, and they have been systematically, methodically, patiently taking out the repression apparatus day by day.

And this is the IRGC, the besiege, the police forces, the intelligence services, the people that are responsible for crushing Iranian opposition and did so in January, they have been eliminating those people.

I would see that from a military point of view, continuing in sequence with phase one, when major military operations are over, that the strike summaries still you're still going to have essentially decapitation strikes against a wide range of Iranian military and political leaders.

Yeah, now it depends on what happens on the negotiations, which I'm sure we're going to talk about if there is some deal where Trump has now negotiated an agreement with this regime.

There's an open question about whether Trump would then green light continued Israeli military strikes, air strikes on the regime, or would he say, okay, those strikes are over, but then green light, these rallies to continue to do what they would do covertly.

And then phase three is really what I call this maximum support campaign where you're actually providing serious support to the opposition so that the next time they come to the streets and they're coming to the streets again, but this time unlike in January, you have changed the equation and you strengthen the opposition so it's not defenseless in the face of that repression apparatus as it was in January and you've given Iranians perhaps a fighting chance to take back their country as President Trump said.

Once in a generation opportunity, okay, I think that's a good overview. Let's go back to where we are now in phase one. There's no question, as you've said, that we have degraded Iran's military.

However, it's also clear that at the moment the Iranians are still quite capable of firing missiles and rockets at their neighbors, menacing the infrastructure that the entire Persian Gulf depends upon, meaning not just oil and gas, but the salinization plants and power plants, the number of missiles fired has gone way down, but it hasn't dropped to zero.

And then, more importantly, the Iranians have essentially closed the state of foremost throwing global energy markets into turmoil. What do we do about that?

Yeah, so before I answer the question about what we do about it, I just want to touch upon something that I think gets lost in the current debate, right? Because I think we all are moving so quickly, things are changing so quickly.

It's worth a little bit of sort of historical perspective on this, and that is that if you could imagine today's regime not severely degraded militarily, not having lost its missile launchers and ballistic missile production capability and had its nuclear program severely degraded and lost its Navy.

Imagine this regime even under the Obama nuclear deal, a regime that had pocketed trillion dollars in the lifespan of that agreement, a regime that starting this year, the restrictions on the nuclear program would begin to sunset.

Iran would emerge with an industrial size nuclear program. So imagine this regime with nuclear armed ICBMs, tens of thousands of missiles, a trillion dollars, its proxy still intact, his Bala Hamas, the Houthis, Shi'ike militias, this regime threatening the Strait of Hormuz, threatening the Gulf allies, threatening US bases, US embassies, Israel and the US home.

I just think it's good to imagine that. I don't want to get too deep into the deeper justification for war yet, but I just want to say we're not in the Obama timeline, we're in a timeline where the US and Israel successfully delivered some significant blows to Iranian power.

And now we've decided to deliver another more profound one, and it is that blow that has yielded the Iranian closure of the Straits. So that's where we are now. So it's not that the counterfactual is important, but so is the reality that we delivered a set of blows successfully.

We chose to go further that has activated a really substantial Iranian response that threatens global energy markets, the global economy, and just sort of the core economic and civilizational functioning of the Persian Gulf. And so with that said, what do we do about it?

Yeah, I make the point Ross only to say that it was inevitable that the Islamic Republic was going to close the Strait of Hormuz. And the only question was, were they going to close it with nuclear weapons, ICBMs, a massive missile inventory, teraproxies that were intact and growing and becoming more deadly and a trillion dollars in order to fortify their economy and find their nefarious attack activities, or were they going to close it as they have when they've been severely degraded along all of those lines that you've said.

So the Battle of Hormuz was a battle that was inevitable and the only question was, were we going to fight it in a way where we were stronger and they were weaker or they were stronger and we had very limited options in order to open the Strait.

But why was it inevitable if we were able to again substantially degrade both their teraproxy networks and their nuclear program Iran was not going to close the Strait of Hormuz six months ago.

It didn't close the Strait of Hormuz in response to our bombing of Fort Al. It only closed the Strait when we went all in and more than going all in on military elements when we went all in in targeting regime leadership and I'm just going to use the US and Israel interchangeably here for this campaign because I think that that that is accurate to what is practically going on in a world where we didn't target the Iranian regime leadership where we didn't attempt to force regime change.

Where we just carried out periodic bombings of their military and so on. It's not clear to me that you can say definitely, oh, well, of course, eventually Iran would have closed the Strait.

They closed the Strait in response to our attempted regime change. Isn't that fair?

No, I think that the Iranian strategy which would and by the way, this was always the smart strategy for common and he'd still be alive to execute the strategy if he had done this, which is I'm going to reconstitute so after the 12 day or I'm going to reconstitute my missile program and I'm my nuclear program and it was only 12 days and it wasn't obliterated despite what person Trump said.

I'm just going to work with the Chinese. The Chinese are going to send in Chinese air defenses. I'm going to rebuild my terror proxies and I'm going to wake President Trump out and in January 2029 Trump's not going to be in office and it's a pretty good guess who's ever president at that time unless it's perhaps Marco Rubio, but on the Republican side and on the Democratic side, you're not going to find a president willing to confront Iran militarily.

So at that point, I'm home free and I would have if I were common, I would have done a deal with Trump a two and a half year deal. I would have gotten hundreds of billions of dollars in sanctions relief and Trump said make Iran great again and I would talk it at all that money. I would have reconstituted slowly and then once Trump was gone, I'd be off to the races and I rebuild all those capabilities that I described earlier and then I'd be guessing, but it's a pretty good calculation that there's no way.

A president, Newsom or AOC or Vance is going to support an Israeli strike on Iran's nuclear missile program. And at that point, I'm in a position I now control or moves. I don't have to launch one drone, Ron rocket or one missile. I just have the mere threat of using all those deadly capabilities and I have now deterred the United States. I now own the Gulf.

I have a stranglehold over the over the world's energy. I become a superpower. That is the Iranian trajectory. That's where we're heading.

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From serial productions and The New York Times, I'm Em Gesson and this is The Idiot.

Listen, wherever you get your podcasts.

So essentially what has happened is in your view, Donald Trump was the only American president capable of confronting Iran in any meaningful way,

allowing it's real to confront its proxies.

And so in fact, it is that we have chosen to fight an inevitable battle of Hormuz now because we don't trust our own political system to restrain Iran without an epic battle right now.

We have chosen this because we saw the Iranians moving towards the end state that I described to prevent them from moving to that end state.

We would have to fight a major war.

But again, I don't think by your own account we would have to fight a major war.

We would just need the next president to continue giving Israel permission to degrade Hamas and Hezbollah and continue to do periodic strikes.

And you're saying you don't think any president would have extended even that permission.

I'm doubtful that any president would have extended that permission, but that permission is not enough because Israelis don't have the capabilities to destroy deeply buried missile cities.

They don't have massive orange penetrators.

They don't have strategic bombers.

They don't have Tomahawk missiles.

They don't have the capabilities that we have to do severe damage to Iran's missile capabilities.

It's not enough for a future US president to allow Israel to conduct these raids.

We also have to be involved in them.

And that's fair.

But again, it just seems to me that the evidence of the last few years is that you can do a lot of damage to Iran without having a full scale battle of the Hormuz Straits.

But I don't want to harp on this.

Let's get back to the war itself.

So we're here and we're going to fight the battle of Hormuz.

Do we use ground troops?

Well, by the way, it's not inevitable that we're going to fight the battle of Hormuz.

I mean, we saw President Trump now do a 90 degree U-turn and start to talk about negotiations.

He actually had a comment, which I found really disturbing.

He said something to the effect of, well, maybe in the United States and the Ayatollah, we just share the gulf.

We share Hormuz.

He likes to talk like that.

Yeah.

Now, I don't know. He's serious and he's just doing his usual Trumpian faint.

But that's obviously something that would terrify our gulf Arab neighbors.

And certainly should terrify the Japanese, the South Koreans, the Indians, our European allies, anyone who depends on Middle East and oil and natural gas.

The notion that Trump would do a deal where we're going to share Hormuz with the Iranians, with the Ayatollah, I think should be terrifying.

Because if that is the case, and again, I just want to get back to this.

I think it's worth harping on.

If Trump has gone in two and a half years, and the next president is not willing to confront the Iranians,

and the Israelis don't have the capabilities to do enough damage to their war-making capabilities, then Iran ends up not...

We don't end up sharing the straight of Hormuz with Iran.

They end up owning it.

And they end up owning it because they've created deterrence, because we don't have the ability to confront them

when they have nuclear weapons capability, ICBMs, tens of thousands of missiles, a large navy and a dominant position in the gulf.

We have to fight that.

Well, wait a minute.

I mean, they're not going to reconstitute that in two years, if the military campaign has been as successful as you've suggested.

Not in two, not in two.

But over a longer time horizon.

Over six, over eight.

I'm talking about the first two terms of president, you know, AOC.

AOC.

Yeah.

Okay, but in a world where Trump stays the course, and we do essentially try and find a military solution to the Straits of Hormuz, does that involve ground troops?

Well, Trump hasn't excluded that, and depends on what it means by doesn't involve ground troops.

Well, to me, as a, you know, extremely amateur student of military matters at the moment, it seems very, very difficult to render the Straits safe for passage as long as the Iranian regime exercises full control over the literal physical territory on their side of the Straits.

And so in, if that's the case, could be wrong, but if that's the case, then seems like to open the Straits, you have to seize that territory.

Does that seem like something that could happen?

I don't want to get into details on a public podcast, but I would just say that there are other ways to control the three key provinces that are important to the, to the Straits and are also critical to Iran's energy industry.

There's lots of ways in which you can, not even through military means, but through financial warfare and cyber, where you could do severe damage to Iran's ability to control its own energy industry, pay its own workers, and have effective control over that territory.

Why haven't we done that yet?

Well, again, it's week three, Ross. There's a lot ahead of us, and there's a lot of things we can do besides dropping bonds or sending in the Marines, right?

Which is not to suggest that Trump may not do that, but I think there's just a lot of ways we can take away Iran's control of its energy industry and essentially strangle it economically.

Everybody's talked about Carg Island, seizing Carg, obviously Carg is an important part of this energy industry.

You know, 95% of the oil exports go through Carg, it's 50% state budget, it's $78 million a year, represents three years of budget for the IRGC, the Ministry of Intelligence, the Security apparatus, and the proxies.

So even if you're like Block Carg, now that could be through Marines or the US Navy, quarantining it, but that is just actually one piece of an overall strategy where you literally could take away Iran's entire energy industry.

And you don't need to do it necessarily with Marines, you can do it with some innovative financial warfare tools, which I'm not going to get into on an open podcast.

That's, that's, that's fine. Okay. Yeah. What do you make of Iran's capacity to do something apocalyptic to its neighbors using whatever kind of missiles and rockets remain to it?

Because this is, you know, part of what's been going on is the president has sort of threatened various forms of escalation, and then there have been sort of exchanges of fire that have involved natural gas, desalinization, different things.

And then there's been a kind of walk back and a sense at least to some observers that Iran is willing to sort of go further up that escalatory ladder than we are.

Do you think that that's a danger where Iran, where it's not just Tormuz, but it's Iran saying the regime saying if we're going down, no one's going to be able to drink fresh water in the Gulf for the next six months or something like that.

Yeah. I mean, again, I think it's important to say, number one, I don't think it's President Trump's objective to bring the regime down. I mean, he's made it very clear is, you know, he wants to do a deal.

And we can talk about what the elements of that deal should look like. But you're right. I mean, I think in an apocalyptic situation, yes, the Iranians will strike. And with whatever capabilities they have left that haven't been destroyed by the United States and Israel, they will fire whatever they have left at the Saudis, the Emirates, the Bahrainis, they'll go over pipelines.

Salination plans, electrical grids, try to wipe out all the energy infrastructure.

They'll have the will to do that. There'll be an open question about whether they'll have the capabilities. And that was what to my point earlier about will and capability, right?

The fact that we would ever let Iran have both the will and the capability to do that would be very, very dangerous. They now have the will, but they don't necessarily the capabilities.

But again, they have the will right now because whether or not Trump himself is fully committed to regime change, we in collaboration with the Israelis have embarked on a policy of killing their leaders, right?

Like that's where the will comes from. If you existentially threaten the regime, you do give them more reasons to go higher on the escalation ladder.

Not that they would never have escalated before. Not that they weren't interested in destroying Israel or being America's enemies before.

But things like what we were just talking about, these sort of attempted like a total destruction of the functional architecture of civilization around the Persian Gulf, right?

That's something that is more plausible to them today because we, the Israelis, however you want to cut it, have been killing their leadership.

Right? That's just surely that just obviously changes their escalation calculus, like as just as just as an inevitable matter. And then we have to figure out what to do about it.

Well, my point is that they have been escalating against us and against Israel and against their neighbors for decades. You're right, they continue to go up the escalation curve as they prepare to take more and more risks against us.

It's often with the Iranians that they back down when they believe that the United States of America is committed to taking down their regime.

Now, that was under Hamine. That was always his calculus because he always understood that the only country in the world was not Israel. It was the United States who could bring down his regime.

I can give you lots of examples how Hamine made that decision to back down when the United States of America even sent a hint that they were willing to take down his regime.

But I think the current leadership and I think Kalibov is the kind of man who understands that after losing Hamine and losing Larinjani and losing many of his closest commanders and friends and colleagues for over many, many years has a choice.

He has a fundamental choice with President Trump. And the choice is either to do a deal and end this or the United States of America is going to adopt the Israeli strategy of regime change.

And when America, when America intervenes and adopts that strategy, I think then of the day we will bring down that regime.

And I think for that reason they have to be very careful about going way up the escalation curve. By the way, as they go up the escalation curve, not only are we on the Israelis going up it, but so are the Saudis and the Emirates.

So I think they have to be thinking after this war is over, did they go so far at the escalation curve that they risk regime change?

They also risk ending up in a permanent state of hostilities with their Gulf Arab allies. And that is, that is, that is not a position this regime wants to end up in going forward.

Okay, but, but meanwhile we, there are some risks to the United States as well here, right? There are risks associated with having the straight to fore moves closed.

And there are risks involved in, again, I know you're not explicitly calling for this, but sending in ground troops and getting involved in a ground war in Iran, right?

So all of those risks from a, let's just say from a domestic American political perspective seem incredibly substantial. And they all, to me, seem like reasons why I completely expect the president to want to cut a deal.

Isn't a deal here just absolutely the Trumpian thing to do.

Absolutely, absolutely. And again, I mean, I've said one, all the risks that you outlined are risks I acknowledge. Those are risks that I would also put up against the risks of inaction.

My view is the risks of not doing something were much greater than risk of doing something. However, the risks that you've outlined are substantial. And I completely agree with you that Trump wants to deal.

By the way, Trump has wanted to deal since he's first term with the Iranians. Trump always wants to deal. I agree that that's probably where we're heading. If the Iranians are smart, they'll take a deal.

And if they do, then I think we move to phase two and phase three of what I described earlier. And I think phase two and phase three of maximum pressure on the regime, maximum support for the Iranian people and continued fracturing the support base is something that can be done.

The Israelis can lead with American support. And much of it, not all of it can be done, not from the air by dropping bombs, but by through other instruments of American and Israeli power, which I'm happy that you and I can talk about.

I think that is the strategy.

But why would, but why would, why would Iran make a deal at a moment when, again, they have closed the straits.

The global economy is beginning to freak out. And again, their own leadership class is being killed. I think they keep the straits closed and invite us to send in the Marines.

Again, because I think if your professed goal is not a deal, but killing their leadership and replacing their regime, why aren't they going to go apocalyptic?

I just, I just struggle, I just struggle with this. That's my calculus.

Ross, that's my ultimate goal. And there's a difference in may not sound like there is, but there's a difference between me and President Trump.

No, I know, no, I know, I know there is. I know, I know. But, but it still seems to me that, again, by allying with Israel in a campaign of decapitation, we have already committed to regime change. That's what we've done.

What would be different about a world where Iran keeps the straits closed and Trump says, all right, that's it. Now we're going for full regime change. Okay, what would we do?

What would the US be doing differently?

Well, the first thing is we too would be bombing the regime, not just taking out its military capabilities. We too would be doing that.

We would be joining Israel in that. We would be committing to do that over a sustained period of time.

And we would basically say, we are not going to finish this until the regime goes down.

And then we can do other things, which I think are things we should do anyway, and I'm not sure we will, and I'm not sure the next president would.

And that is actually join the Israelis in this maximum support, maximum fracturing campaign, where ultimately the goal is to get millions of Iranians on the streets.

And we arm them, and we provide them with weapons. And we're not just arming the Kurds, the northwest of Iran, but we're arming all ethnic groups and the Persians.

And we're going after 20 major cities, and we're flooding in weapons, and we are ultimately going to back the Iranian people to bring down the regime, and we're going to do it to the Hilt.

The United States of America has not made that commitment.

Israelis want to go there, but they have certain capabilities to do it, but they can't go all the way without American support.

So if I'm in Iran, but I just don't understand the realism of this vision.

And again, I understand that you're not speaking for President Trump, and this is not what he personally wants to do.

But this is, I just want to say that honestly, I have been somewhat confused from the beginning by the administration's stated justifications for the war, which have had the military component that you've described, but have also sort of shifted around.

And sometimes have involved regime change, sometimes have not. I don't think that there has been a sort of certain through line in the administration's arguments.

And I'm actually in certain ways, almost more confused by your articulation of your vision, because it seems like in some moments you're saying, well, it is all going according to plan.

And then in other moments, you're saying, well, it's going according to plan, except that the president might change the plan completely and make an unwise deal.

Is there from your perspective any kind of planning inside the administration that is close to your own views?

How do you think your vision fits together with what the administration is actually thinks it's doing?

Yeah, Ross, maybe again, I haven't articulated this well enough and shame on me, but I don't think there's no shame in podcasting.

There's no shame in podcasting. There's no shame.

Well, let me just try to do a slightly better job, I hope, of doing this. I mean, I think that I have a vision for success, I have a vision for significant success, and I have a vision for total success.

And I think that my vision for success is consistent with the administration's articulation of their military objectives.

If we do severe damage to the war making capabilities of the Islamic Republic as defined by nuclear, missile, and military, then I think we have succeeded.

And that holds true even if Trump makes a political deal now in order to reopen the straits and bring military operations to an end.

You would say it's a success, but it's just a limited success.

Well, it depends on the deal. If it's a good deal that strips Iran, if it's remaining war making capabilities, then yes, that's a success.

Because then through military means and negotiations, we have stripped Iran of its ability to wage war against the United States and our allies.

That's the success to me. There would be a greater success and a total success.

If we then move to the next stages that we've discussed through phase two and phase three, and that we're able to do severe damage to the repression apparatus, open up space, and one day there are millions of Iranians who come to the streets.

And we've provided them with support, and they take back the country, and we have Iran that is peaceful and stable and not at war with the United States and our allies.

That's total success.

But I would be happy with partial success, I would be happy with significant success, and I would be elated with total success.

In the administration, President Trump is not a disciplined speaker. He certainly didn't do an address to the nation, which maybe he should have.

He couldn't do it before, but he should have done it after, where he really laid out very clearly.

But I think that he is not committed to regime change, and even when he says, well, Iranians can then take back their country.

It's a once in a generation opportunity.

He means what I essentially have articulated, which is over time providing support to Iranians to come back to the streets.

I think he has defined the military objectives in a limited way, and I think that military is on its way to achieving that.

It has only been three weeks.

My sense, and again, I'm I'm not being read into briefing spite by the Pentagon.

I don't know exactly what they need, but there is talk about three more weeks, and having this thing end in April 9th or something.

And I guess at that point, the United States and Israel have done in their assessment, severe damage to these capabilities.

If that happens with then a deal, and then a deal continues to defang these capabilities, I think that the president can then rightly declare victory.

I think the United States can't afford to lose the battle for who moves.

We can talk we've talked about what losing means.

But that I think the president would rightly be able to defend as we had a six week war.

We had weeks and months of diplomacy, but at the end of the day, I am leaving to my successor a severely weakened Islamic Republic that will take years to reconstitute its nuclear missile and military capability.

And no longer represents a threat to the United States, our interests and our allies.

I think that would be a good ending for President Trump, and it's certainly an ending that I would consider to be a significant yet partial success.

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I think people listening to this conversation can tell that I find the entire strategic approach of both the Trump administration and people like yourself who support the Trump administration up to a point but wanted to go further.

I'm confused by it. I'm also confused by the state of U.S. Israel alignment right now.

Is it a problem that there is some kind of difference between what the United States is committed to and what its military partner is committed to?

Does that matter?

I think it could matter unless the Americans and Israelis were not coordinated.

If they were not well coordinated, then you could see problems emerging.

But I think they are very well coordinated.

And I think for President Trump, the Israelis are very useful points of leverage against the Iranians.

And any negotiation President Trump could essentially say, like, I got this mad pit bull on a leash.

And I can let it go.

And if I let it go, they will continue to do what they've been doing to you.

And I will just let them do it.

Or you can negotiate with me and hear my terms.

And I mean, we haven't even talked about what the terms that the President has laid out.

Because they actually are, I mean, from an Iranian perspective, they should be pretty reasonable terms.

I mean, I don't think they're reasonable because I don't think they're enough.

But the President has laid them out.

And the President has said, here are my terms.

No enrichment capability.

You don't need enrichment.

The only reason you've ever wanted enrichment is to build nuclear weapons.

I'm not going to give you enrichment capability.

The H.E.U. give it back to me.

He said something about missiles, which I wasn't clear.

He was not that articulate on it, but it was sort of like, he said they should be low key on missiles.

No key on missiles, quote unquote.

I don't know what that means.

It's a great, great Trumpian phrase.

I also want the world to be low key on missiles.

Yes.

So low key on missiles.

I don't know what that means.

But presumably, there's a certain amount of flexibility there for the Iranians to retain a missile program.

But be low key.

Not be high key.

And then, and then a few other demands about sharing hormones with the Ayatollah and some other things.

If that's the list of demands, then he's looking for a deal.

But again, you just said that you don't think that's a good deal.

Israel doesn't think that's a good deal.

Israel has more maximalist war aims, which is why it is its actions are geared more towards regime change.

Israel a pit bull on a leash.

Like, is Israel actually on the American leash?

Is it just the case that if the U.S. says we're done, we're done fighting Iran.

And then, you know, some future president Gavin Newsom sort of becomes even more conciliatory towards Iran that Israel just accepts that?

Well, I think under President Trump for two and a half years they're very much on President Trump's leash.

Yes.

Yes.

Okay.

Yes.

I think they're absolutely.

June more demonstrated as soon as Trump said 12 days it's over and ordered Netanyahu to order the Israeli Air Force back through its bases.

Just as the Israeli Air Force was about to drop bombs and kill a thousand members of the besiege.

Of course, the prime minister is going to listen to President Trump.

Now, what happens in two and a half years time with an anti-Israel president or a president who's more conciliatory towards Iran?

Do I think they'll be on that leash?

Certainly, that leash will not be as tight and will not be as effective.

Two and a half years, absolutely.

And from a negotiating perspective, it really helps President Trump to have the pit bull on the leash, to say to the Iranians, look, you have a choice.

You agree or I'm going to unleash them.

And by the way, I'm not going to just unleash them, I'm going to join them.

And therefore, take your pick.

And when I join them and they're unleashed, there is a risk that we're going to bring down your regime.

Do you think Israel just takes it for granted that this will be the last pro-Israel president that the United States is likely to have?

No, I don't think they take it for granted.

I mean, I think that, you know, there's a possibility that Marco Rubio becomes President of the United States.

There's a possibility.

I'm not sure.

I'm not a political analyst.

Maybe Josh Shapiro wins the Democratic nomination or that a sort of normal, like normal President emerges who says, look, we have a complicated relationship with our Israeli ally.

You know, they're a difficult ally, but not only do we believe in their right to exist, but we believe that they're an important partner and we're going to work with them.

And we have disagreements with them on the West Bank and settlers and we have disagreements on this and that.

I think we can get a normal President who has that kind of relationship with Israel.

Because, you know, we've had those kinds of Presidents in modern American history and I think there's a possibility we still will.

I do think the Israelis are deeply worried that we are going to get a President in the White House who was hostile to them, who either doesn't believe in their right to exist or believes they are more of an adversary that an ally.

Do you think there's any risk of this being essentially a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy?

Because again, it just seems to me that the world we were in a few months ago was a world where Israel had achieved a lot of political and military objectives at some real cost in terms of public opinion in the United States, especially around the Gaza war.

And what's happening now is a much bigger gamble and if it's perceived in the United States as essentially a failed war.

And I think that could happen under conditions where Trump cuts bait and makes a deal could also happen, I think, under the scenarios that you're outlining of a longer commitment with sort of substantial economic pain.

In both of those scenarios, it seems to me and I am a political analyst of some kind, right?

It seems to me that there's a world where Israel is already more unpopular than it's been at any point in my lifetime in the United States or certainly my adult lifetime.

I think there's very easy to see a world where the fruits of this war are a profound American alienation from Israel and maybe it's the end of the alliance.

And I just wanted to put that scenario to you and get your thoughts on it.

I think you're right. I think there is absolutely that risk. I think if the war goes very badly, I think that yes, there will be people on the left and right who blame Israel.

I think incorrectly, unfairly, but that doesn't matter because that'll be the narrative because I don't think President Trump was dragged into war with Iran by Israel.

I mean, if you've been listening to Trump, he's been obsessed with the threat from the Islamic Republic and the feckless American response for many, many years.

And he's talked about denying Iran a nuclear weapon for many, many years.

So the notion that BB Netanyahu somehow manipulated Donald Trump to go in a war with Iran, I think is fanciful, but I think you're right.

I think that'll be the conspiracy theory on both the left and the rights. I think these rallies took the risk.

Isn't it possible, not that Netanyahu manipulated Trump into war, but that Netanyahu, among others, not just him sold Trump on the idea that regime change could happen faster.

Again, you've given me a story of regime change happening as a result of this war over a two-year time horizon.

Doesn't it seem like Trump looked at Venezuela and thought, I punch Iran hard, and in six weeks there's a new regime.

And maybe the Israelis were happy to sort of flatter that delusion.

Well, I know there's been some reporting in your paper about this. I don't think these rallies told Donald Trump that the Iranians will be on the streets while we're dropping bombs on Iran and that they'll be regime change in a few weeks.

I think it's absurd to alleged that it happened because we know that Iranians would not come to the streets while bombs are dropping.

They didn't in June. It took them six months to come to the streets. And President Trump, in the first couple days of the war, maybe even the first day, told Iranians to stay home because bombs were dropping.

So I don't think the Israelis told them that. I think again, President Trump has made that decision. I think he believed that he could go to war with a very capable partner.

But I think you're right. I think that will be the narrative. And I think it'll be very difficult for Israel to defend against such a narrative.

And I think the only reason the Israelis decided to take that risk is when they looked at the past couple of years, when they looked at October 7th, I think they decided that leaving the Iranians with the kind of war-making capabilities and the possibility of developing nuclear weapons was an existential threat to the survival of the state of Israel.

And if October 7th was a not a wake-up call for them, nothing would be. And they had to within at least two to three years, while Trump was president, do as much damage to those capabilities that the regime has to destroy the state of Israel.

And then they would deal with the knock-on effects of this politically over the coming years.

But what you're saying, then, is that there is this fundamental gap, I think, between Israel's goals in the United States. Because Israel, in that description, Israel's goal has to be regime change at almost any cost.

And I live in the United States of America. I know what even very pro-Israel people think in the United States of America. And that's just not going to be the American position.

No, I agree with you. regime change in all costs. I agree with you. Of course, it's not the American position, nor should it. It should not be the American position.

We have oceans, we're superpower, we've got major commitments, we've got the Chinese, the Russians, we've got massive commitments that cannot be at all costs.

I mean, I think it could be at certain costs. I think we're week three. And already Americans are saying it's not worth it, because we're at week three in gasoline's gone up by 40%, so it's not worth it.

I don't want to speak to that. It's a difficult question for each individual American to have to assess.

But I think, President American, I am furious that the Islamic Republic of Iran has been killing, naming, torturing, kidnapping Americans in 1979.

And we have done very little about that, Ross. And it means Republicans losing the House or losing the Senate.

I mean, that's not for me up to, from me to decide. That's for the President to decide. That's his calculation politically.

And maybe he's made the calculation that it is worth it, and maybe he'll be proven right, and maybe he'll be proven wrong. But you're absolutely right.

I mean, I think we should be prepared to say, pay some price against an enemy that is an American enemy that would have developed nuclear warhead carrying into continental ballistic missiles that threaten the American homeland.

And with that, they would have had a stranglehold on her moves, not for three weeks, not for six weeks, but effectively forever.

And then we would have been susceptible to this regime, this nuclear armed regime, that had a stranglehold in the global economy.

I think it was worth preempting that, and stopping that, and weakening the regime, and not ever getting into that end state.

And by the way, we've spent a little time, but not enough time talking about the fact that there are 80% of Iranians, about 70 million Iranians who despise this regime, and have been on the streets repeatedly for year after year, and after year, who've been brutalized, tortured, killed, taken prisoner.

This regime, I'll say one other thing, because it's worth remembering, this regime launched chemical weapons attacks against Iranian schoolgirls in 2023 to break the back of the women life-free to movements.

So, you know, at some point, I'm not saying we go to war for the Iranian people, but the Iranian people are maybe prepared to go to war against their own regime.

Maybe the least we can do is provide them with material support to succeed.

All right, let's leave it there. Mark Dubowitz, thank you so much for joining me.

Great honor, thanks Ross.

Thank you very much.

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