How the Soviet Union Started World War 2 - Complete - w/ Thomas777

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I want to welcome everyone back to the Piken-Yuna show Thomas's back, and we're still taking

a break from the Continental Philosophy series, we'll be getting back into that soon.

But I asked Thomas to cover a topic that I've been wanting to cover for a while.

And yeah, I told them he can take as many episodes as he wants to cover this, because I think

this is real important for from the revisionist perspective when World War, according to World

War II.

And it's also from podcasts I've heard in the past talking about it, it's quite controversial.

And maybe I'll ask you some questions about that at the end, Thomas.

I've been controversial amongst our guys, and I have a reason why I think it is, but

why don't you tell us what we're going to talk about today?

Well, in broad causal terms, we're going to talk about the role of the Soviet Union

and the Second World War.

That's nature that's mischaracterized.

The main minority viewpoint is presented by Victor Suvorov's icebreaker.

Suvorov is a pseudonym for that Soviet defector who was deeply situated in the GRU, which

was the military's, or the Red Army's counterpart to KGB, KGB was technically a branch of the

Soviet military, but GRU was literally army intelligence.

As it may, Suvorov insisted, well, most people in addressing Suvorov, they've got

of discrete and narrow focus.

Essentially, they begin their analysis on the eve of Operation Barbarossa and they get

bogged down in the minutia of what were Soviet deployments, how were they arrayed, were

they offensively arrayed, what were the comparative force levels and capabilities of the Vermocht

and the Red Army.

Now, these things are relevant, and I'll address those things, but that's not an adequate

analysis, and Suvorov didn't begin his analysis there either.

Suvorov's claim is that the Soviet Union literally started World War II, and I accept

that, and it's not a strictly military analysis.

Everything about the Second World War was in dialogue with Soviet power and the Soviet Union.

The entire 20th century was in dialogue with the Soviet Union, and its existence, and

the ideology that animated its structure, activity, decision-making, and every imperative related

to power-political activity they ran.

Other people, there's a subset of people who don't really understand the issues presented,

and they essentially accept what court historians claim, but then they diverge, or they think

that the question is, should there be a deeper analysis at this key juncture in the

summer of 1941, they're looking at it the wrong way, either out of ignorance or because

they're powed by what they view as a political consensus among academia, and they don't

have to be availed a punitive scrutiny, and I'll get into what I mean by that.

If you accept Suvorov's perspective, which was also shared by Yakum Hoffman, was a military

historian. He was, when he was alive, he died in middle age in the 1990s, really 2000s, but

he wrote this exhaustive book called Stalin's War of Extermination, and he was essentially a

Bundeswehr archivist, and he wrote this exhaustive book about the origins of the Second World War,

and about half of it is dedicated to the political conditions that gave rise to the conflict,

and about half of it deals with a hard and fast military subject matter, but I think that's

the best book written on the topic, and he agreed very much with Suvorov's analysis.

But also myself, especially being somebody who favors direct evidence and the testimony of

parties to the events in question, you know, if you look at what Stalin said, and if you examine

the sort of ontological aspects, the putagontology of Marxist-Leninism,

it should be something of a no-brainer. You know, this idea that the Soviet Union didn't have

ambitions of an imperialistic nature that had no interest in exporting its ideology to the rest

of the developed world, that it wasn't possessive and expansionist sensibility that's laughable.

I mean, it's laughable because the only thing that sustains a revolutionary

political culture, such as that, that was

characteristic of the Soviet Union, is this kind of dynamic revolutionary violence that's

got to be exported once the revolution's been solidated within, but also, you know, the Soviet Union

between 1922 and 1939, it conquered a landmass of, that was equivalent to the size of the German

Reich in 1919, something like 400,000 square kilometers. This was a massively aggressive expansion

burdening superpower, you know, that's indisputable, and this idea that the world,

what you're talking about, the United Kingdom, which had conquered 23 percent of this planet,

and loaded over 500 million people, you got the Soviet Union, which constitutes one-sixth of this

planet, and it's animated by this revolutionary imperative that calls for the

bolsterization of the entire developed world. You have the United States, which

is in control as of 1939 of fully half of this planet's remaining resources. The idea that

the world was terrified of this comparatively tiny country in Germany, that's laughable.

You know, I mean, that's that's ridiculous. I don't know how else to characterize it,

and the fact that, you know, people suggest that is, you know, is insane. I say it's

conical, but there's nothing funny about it, because this kind of garbage-informed decision-making,

and it, you know, it's a cause who's a kind of mass delusion of

in the public mind. But, you know, first and foremost, it often makes this point

really at the beginning of his study. You know, the imperialistic, I don't mean imperialist,

in the sense Lenin has talked about it. I mean, the Soviet Union was an empire in the

ideological sense, made on a stake. And this sort of violent imperialistic, power-political

sensibility, it was, it was, it was this kind of revolutionary practice, it was baked into every

aspect of the Soviet political system. Even the heraldic standard of the Soviet Union,

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term supply. It was literally the globe with overlaid on the planet Earth. Is this giant hammered

sickle? That was the Soviet code of arms. The symbolism is obvious. Communism will

encircle the whole world, and the motto of the Soviet Union, similarly until the end,

translates to proletarians of all countries unite. It can't really be more on the nose than that.

But again, intrinsic to the Marxist Leninist ethos is a globalist perspective. That's one of

the reasons why the 20th century belongs so much to the communists. Because it was in ideology,

it was uniquely suited to the then present. It was fundamentally forward-looking. They can't be denied.

It's obsolescence. It's the fact that it became a state forum of organization. It became

an obsolescent, psychological artifact. It was very much astride. This is like that,

so they can't be denied. It was animated by uniquely expansionist sensibility. But even had it not

been, everybody who was participating in velled politics at scale had a global perspective.

That was the reality. The 20th century decided what configuration globalism would take.

This idea of an insular communism that was never really status and it were looking. That's ridiculous.

Beyond that, Stalin's self came to characterize ideological culture of Marxist Leninism

for an entire generation. It's not accidental that he reigned for over 30 years.

I believe he was the single most powerful man on earth. That is incredible.

He very much set the tenor of the revolutionary culture,

the characteristic of the socialist community and nations as it was called. He was a confrante of

Lenin and Lenin said repeatedly and often. But most notably, Lenin's famous December 6,

1920 speech, which was dedicated to communist praxis and the vision for velled politics,

a Soviet velled politics. He said that to incite the capitalist states against each other is the

main strategy of communism. In his words, he said, quote, of using the knives of scoundrels,

like the capitalist thieves against each other, on grounds that when quote, when two thieves fall

out and fight the honest man laughs. As soon as we are strong enough to overthrow capitalism

completely, we will grab them by the throat. Victory of the communist revolution in all countries is inevitable.

And that encapsulates Marxist Leninist velled politics.

And that defined it until the very end. This was still the ambition when even a

mess, this strategic nuclear stalemate, you know, in the late 80s, there were still challenging

in Latin America to try and rectify the strategic imbalance, owing the, you know, the advantage

conferred the United States and their, and its allies, you know, by the inner German border.

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21 plus terms and conditions apply. You know, again, this shouldn't be,

this shouldn't be mysterious or controversial rather. Now,

what I think of as literally the Stalin doctrine,

this was presented and articulated.

During a speech Stalin made to the Central Committee of the All Communist Party

in July 1925. And for the Soviets denied that this speech happened

for decades and it was authenticated that

that this speech was made. And I'll get into how this came about as we continue, but we're not there yet.

But what Stalin declared at this speech was, quote, should the war begin, we will not stand

by in actively. We will enter the war, but we will enter as the last belligerent.

We will throw a weight on the scales that should be decisive.

The story is named Alexander Neckridge.

He characterized this as the Stalin doctrine. You know, and he insisted that this was never abandoned

and that's true. And subsequent events and Stalin's decision-making

in a command role, as well as this, you know, in war and peace terms, as well as in his role in

general secretary bear that out. You know, Stalin's last power political act was

you know, giving Mao and Kimmel Song a green light to assault on the Korean Peninsula.

Okay. And this led to the crisis on order of the Cuba crisis, you know, less than a decade later.

This is a tangent, but I about every decade subsequent, 1950, 1962, 1973, 1983,

there was a general crisis brought by the traversing of a conflict diet.

And what was a peripheral theater, but that, you know, nonetheless,

had the potential for escalation to the general nuclear war. And by my point being that,

it's not as if, you know, Stalin literally at the end of his life was still making decisions

pursuant to this sort of dark and air, you know, program.

And it just became a fixation of Stalin's as a situation in Europe

became characterized by punctuated crises, you know, for the next decade and a half subsequent,

culminating obviously in 1939. And throughout the 1930s, Stalin undertook a massive aromance program

that was unprecedented. You know, and based on his rhetoric, not just to, you know, the poet girl,

and to the assembled Namakletra, the al-Qaunist party, but also these public speeches that he made

for the consumption, not just of the Soviet people, but, you know, as a way of signaling to the rest

of the world, it was clear that he was convinced that a general crisis had arrived, you know,

and global capitalism was, well, it was on its way out, you know, and it was in 1939, early 1939,

the British ambassador to the Soviet Union, their staffed crypts, and the American ambassador,

Lawrence Steinhart, they both were adamant that Stalin intended to bring about a war, not only in

Europe, but in East Asia, and that this was a great threat facing the British Empire and the United

States of America. And this is important, especially the fact of Stalin's attention to the developing

situation in the Far East. I'd argue that this was an essential aspect of what became his

strategic vision, and we'll get into what I mean by that in a moment.

When around between about 1990, 1995, a lot of documents briefly became available

from the Soviet archives, that's how David Irving, the microfilm, the Gerbels Diaries,

that wouldn't be possible anymore, obviously, today. And now, if you, even if the Russian

government viewed you as basically friendly, your view as a dissident from the United States,

they're not going to give you access to anything the FSB has, and I mean, even something

exclusively historical interest from the warriors, they're not going to let anybody see that

from without. But there was this brief period of openness in the 1990s, and during that period,

a bunch of documents that have been corralled by the people's commissary for foreign affairs.

In the form of internal memorandum, as well as literally directives from the desk of Stalin,

obviously, it's not indicated as such, but reading between the lines, these are obviously statements

from the general secretary. Most notably, the people's commissariat delegation to Japan,

the telegram from Moscow, that suggests that the Soviet diplomatic mission in Japan

should agree to any treaty that tends to bring about hostility between Japan and the United States.

It's very undisguised, all of these communications are throughout the 1930s that

anything that brings about a Japanese-American war should be cultivated, and this is imperative

to Soviet ambitions. The way it was described by one of the archivists who was involved in

this NGO, which I think still exists, there was this NGO that was corralled or incorporated

rather in January 1989, the months before the end of the border fell, like, well, it wasn't a year.

That was dedicated to documenting human rights abuses as they called it, and other things

during the Stalin era, and there's interesting data relating to the power of political situation

in the years prior to 1939, that they corralled as well, and a particular significance.

There was this transcribed memo from years subsequent by a manage served in the Chinese or Japanese

diplomatic mission, Soviet diplomatic mission, in the 1930s, and he said, quote,

the Soviet Union for its part was interested in distracting British and American attention from

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And in Japanese neutrality during the period of the destruction of Germany and the liberation

of Europe from capitalism, and then of course it became clear that Japan was not going to remain

neutral or America was not going to allow it to strike a position in neutrality. You know,

it became imperative to do everything possible, to bring the United States and Japan into

collision, which once it became clear what the new dealers ambitions were, that sort of resolved

itself from the Soviet perspective. But nevertheless, Japan was at the top of Stalin's mind,

and we'll get into what I mean by that in a minute. Now, this is really what's critical to

Subaru of the hypothesis, and my own as well as what Subaru of posited.

And again, I echo this sentiment. I, the Soviet Union started World War II in August 1939.

When they launched a massive surprise attack at Kalkin Gold and knocked out the Japanese imperial army,

okay, and that changed everything, and that also was literally the start of World War II.

If you look at hostilities between 1939 and 1945 as a singular conflict,

which I think in broad conceptual terms is, is useful, you know, especially because that's

court history claims that World War II began, you know, in September of 1939, and

bizarrely they claim that, you know, Polish aborders were somehow inviolable, and any,

any traversing of them was an act of global war. But if we examine the ambitions and strategic

orientations and objectives of why the Soviet Union assaulted Japan, it becomes clear that this

was the start of the Second World War. And what this, the reasons why they did that, what this set in

motion, it was truly an aspect of a global campaign of revolutionary conquest.

But, and the days before that, and this is important too, because like the 1925 speech,

the Soviet Union later claimed this never happened. And it's interesting how the allies dealt with

it in subsequent years, but on August 19th, 1939, Stalin called a surprise secret meeting

of the Central Committee of the Polet Bureau. During the meeting,

Stalin announced that the time had now come to quote, apply the torch of war to the European

Potter kid. Now, of course, this was also as the non-aggression pact was being, you know,

negotiated with the German Reich, which Stalin said to the Assembled Central Committee, quote,

if we accept the German proposal of the conclusion of a non-aggression pact with them,

they would naturally attack Poland. And the intervention of France and England in this war

would be inevitable. The resulting unrest in disorder will lead to the destabilization of Western Europe.

Without us, us being the Soviet Union, being initially drawn into the conflict.

And again, you know, since 1925, this had been what the Soviet Union was waiting for,

according to the Stalin doctrine, as a catalyst for, you know, exporting the revolution to Western

Europe, you know, Stalin continued saying, quote, we can hope for an advantageous entry into the war.

And it's typical Stalin, you've missed the language. You said, quote, a broad field of activity,

a broad field of activity was now opening to the development of the world revolution.

In other words, for the accomplishments, which had never, you know, been abandoned

for the Sovietization of Europe and communist domination, he concluded this speech

by saying comrades in the interest of the Soviet Union, the homeland of the workers,

get busy in war, so war me break out between the Reich and the capitalistic Anglo-French bloc.

Now, this was the first stage of the plan for Bolshevik domination. And, you know,

then the non-aggression pact, of course, was finalized for the subsequent.

And it becomes clear, you know, I don't want to take us down another tangent, but it was really

garing, who pushed really hard for a firm alliance with the Japanese. I mean, Hitler was already sort of

disposed that way anyway. Garing respected the Japanese a lot. And garing was something of a terrible

snob, and he thought that Japan was like a high culture, I mean, which is true. But beyond the

aesthetic attraction, you know, the understanding was that Japan was a great power in its own right,

and they smashed the Imperial Russian Navy in 1905, and, you know, Japan was just, you know,

the ideal hedge to have against the Soviet Union the East. So when the Red Army launched this

blitz assault of the Japanese army in the Far East and utterly annihilated them, this terrified

people. And it also, it really meant that, you know, the Reich had no choice but to sue for temporary

peace with the Soviet Union, because then they had no head, you know, and it was clear that

any move westward, you know, and Hitler was confident that the war, a war with France wouldn't

be a quagmire, but just the same, you know, he knew there weren't the forces in being to fight off

a Soviet assault through Poland, as the Reich was, you know, fighting in France. So this was a,

this was very much a conspiratorial master's joke of Stalin. I mean, not going to be wrong,

Stalin wanted to conquer the Far East anyway, but that timing was a deal, you know, and there

was the forces in being arrayed such that it was sort of a perfect opportunity, not just to humiliate

the Japanese Imperial Army, but to telegraph a message of the world about Soviet military might.

You know, and it was highly effective in that regard. Now, this speech that Stalin made

where he outlined his plan of the conquest of Europe in the midst of, you know, a Western European

Civil War, the French National News Agency, Havas, they obtained a copy of this by

way of Geneva, presumably from, you know, their own spies are from a friendly intelligence service,

and it was published in early 1939 throughout France, and Moscow claimed it was fake,

and it was a forgery. And right up to the present day, incredibly, you'll find these dummy court

historians and their apologists. When you really need care, you need 24-7 access to a care team,

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Claiming that this, this, this was somehow a, a forgery by

the French Havas agency and French intelligence by, by anti-communists. I mean, it's ridiculous.

In the official party paper, I know November 30th, 1939, Stalin himself finally came out and

officially denied that the speech was made and reiterated this preposterous claim that it was

some forgery by, by fascists. You know, this was demonstrated, it was, confirmed to have

been a real speech by Stalin's official biographer who died only around 1995. And in 1993,

he gave an interview where he confirmed for all time that this speech happened. The language of it

was in fact, transcribed perfectly in the, you know, a document that was rendered by

French Havas. And that should have settled it for all time. But like I said,

regime historians will, will simply argue by assertion and repeat lies,

over and over and over again. And they'll simply deny the evidence in rebuttal.

But that's, this is important because this became a major, this gave, there's a major stumbling

block for the new dealers, obviously, as well as the war party in the UK. You know, it was beyond

an embarrassment. It stood to represent a real crisis with regards to their mandate.

But it goes to show you what kind of bully pulpit had been devised and

directed in the US and the UK. I mean, part of it was because it was the, it was a French news release.

But even so, it, the ability to lock out and discredit

conflicting information and facts that had a tendency to impeach official narratives is,

is pretty remarkable. And in the case of the, in the case of the focus in the UK and the New

New Deal in America, but, you know, and suvorov to his credit took up the issue of the August 19th

speech, but it was a vocogunov, vocogunov was the biographer in question who attested

at the end of his life to the veracity of the speech. But, um,

you know, the, it was on January 16, 1993. And again, this, this was that period of

approximately summer or fall 1991 until probably very early 1996, where there was open access to

Stalin era archives and data in the Soviet Union. Can we address something right there? Yeah,

go ahead. Yeah, a lot of people will say that like the, um, the girl, the gobbles draw diaries or

forgeries. So, you know, why is it all of this forgeries as well? Because it's a not argument.

And it's like saying, well, who forged the girl's diary? So what the Soviets did was they went to

Berlin. They, they forged a bunch of documents. They put it in a Berlin bank vault. They pretended

to discover it. They took it back to the Soviet Union. Um, the NKVD later the KGB, they continued

to pretend that gobbles had written dreams of, when you really need care, you need 24-7 access

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Diary material, for 50 years, they lied about this for no reason. Then David Irving also lied

about this that he could capture clouds, like what? There's, there's this kind of stocking

trade of simple tins and idiots to just go around saying things are fake. You know, Hitler's

second book is fake. General Patton's personal diaries are fake. Gervals diaries are fake.

Everything is fake. Okay, I mean, I, it's like me saying Donald Trump is actually of Jewish

parentage. I can't prove that. There's no evidence to that. There's no reason to believe that,

but I'm just going to keep saying that over and over again. See, Donald Trump is Jewish.

Oh, you don't think so. Yeah, well, you don't know anything. He's Jewish. I say so. I mean,

I can do that too. Okay. You know, the honest is on the declaring. You know, and again, I,

so the Soviets in the business of just pretending that Gervals wrote these diaries. I,

you know, I don't accept that because it's stupid. But look, Koganov, he was Stalin's official biographer.

He confirmed in his vestia, which was an organ of that constellation of NGOs as I indicated a

moment ago, dedicated to, you know, kind of truth and reconciliation about the Stalin era.

He went public in Russian and European media. And he was adamant that the minutes of the

August 19, 1939 speech that had been published in France were legitimate. That speech happened.

And, you know, and again, I'm sure, I'm sure these same defectors are going to claim, well, that's fake.

Okay. Fine. Everything is fake. I'm an adult, and I'm a white person. I'm not, I'm not,

I'm not a white inward or like developmentally disabled. So I don't entertain that kind of stuff.

But, you know, the, and there's a historian, this lady historian, Russian historian,

T.S. Bussueva. She undertook this broad scholarly evaluation of Suvorov's books.

Not just icebreaker, but kind of his entire body of work. And her account of his work product was

mixed. She was somewhat critical in a punitive way. She praised other stuff, but she was adamant that

the August 19, 1939 speech was legitimate. And she claimed that copies of the speech were known

to exist in the special archives of the Central Committee and the USSR. And she made excerpts of it,

available to the public in December 1994. And there was this big deal. The publication was a big deal.

And it was unveiled at this conference of the quote memorial society. That's the,

that's the umbrella name of that constellation of NGOs I was talking about. And this was on

August 16, 1995, that was this kind of grand unveiling. You know, but they, they, and this,

this might seem silly to make such a big deal about the release of historical documents.

But if you know about the Soviet system, I mean that it's, it was, this is a special case, you know,

it's, it wasn't an ordinary political system. And this, this document changed everything.

Or it should have in the public mind, you know, because it's essentially a standing

rebuttal to the entire court narrative of the war and its origins.

You know, so there's that too. So I mean, again, I, where, where, where's the evidence that all this

is being fake? Like, I guarantee you the Russian government wasn't happy about this. You know,

I mean, I, and that they still aren't anybody who is fluent in Russian. I, they're, they're

welcome to proper evidence that this is all lectured main and it's fake. But obviously that won't,

before it's coming. You know, I know it's getting to the kind of meat of the acid of hostilities.

You know, again, the Suvorovs, the core of his theory, you know, again, it's not just a matter of

a discrete revisionist analysis of Operation Barbarossa and which party combatants were,

you know, the aggressor. It's far more of a broad spectrum analysis than that. And

Yaka Hoffman agreed with this perspective and I, I agree with it too.

Um, not only was Stalin the progenitor of World War II, but

World War II began on August 19, 1939, because that's the date when Stalin ordered the assault

on Calcan gold. Um, Japanese Sixth Army was deployed there. Um,

um, Stalin ordered a massive assault. Um, the Japanese were

soundly defeated and eroded. Marshall Zoukov, um, stated on August 23rd, 1939.

You know, in reference to the Calcan gold assault, as well as the non-aggression pact with the

Reich, which had just been, you know, signed Zoukov, uh, said, quote, Stalin was convinced that

the non-aggression pact would enable him to wrap Hitler around his little finger.

Quote, we have trick Hitler for the moment and quote, which Stalin's opinion, according to Nikita

Khrushchev. Um, Suvorov's take, which should be obvious to those familiar with the historical

record, the non-aggression pact on the heels of Japan being crushed on land in the far east

Hitler believed then that he had to attack Poland to protect the front here, the German right.

Um, he would not have acted without a guarantee of non-aggression, because Germany wasn't in a

position to go to war with the Soviet Union at that moment. Um, people were terrified of the

Soviet Union after it had just crushed the mighty Japanese army. So again, I mean, this is laughable,

this idea that, this idea that Stalin, who had, who had just crushed the Japanese army,

who was sitting on, uh, the throne of a burgundy superpower,

that constituted one-six of this planet, the idea that Stalin was terrified of Hitler

in comparatively tiny Germany, that's preposterous. You know, um,

Molotov, uh, you know, obviously was, you know, chief diplomat, uh, is a

official title with chairman of the council of people's commissars. Molotov spoke for the supreme

Soviet on October 31, 1939. He said, quote, a single blow against Poland first by the Germans

and then by the red army and nothing room, nothing will remain of this misbegotten little child

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sponsored by chumbacaceno, which owed its existence to the repression of non-polished

nationalities. You know, so again, to the Soviet non-clature and especially Stalin,

they wanted to crush Poland. You know, among other things, the Polish movement was

ethically cleansing russians. You know, the russians hated the polls. You know, interestingly,

you know, again, this supposedly sacrosanct-polished democracy, it didn't bother the UK when

when the Soviets assaulted. That said, this thing isn't it, but so

and then of course, two within months, the Soviet Union assaulted Finland.

You know, so if Stalin was this isolationist, and of course, meanwhile too,

you know, the Soviet Union was funding, equipping, arming, and facilitating the communist

revolution in Spain, which obviously had profound US strategic significance. You know,

in the same period, the Soviets had assaulted and conquered Poland. You know, they had assaulted

Finland and conquered Archangel. You know, and through the waging of these aggressive wars against

Poland and Finland, and then essentially the extortionate annexation of the Baltic,

you know, and threatening to assault Romania, which all of which gained territorial concessions

out of shopping fired, because again, every the Soviet Union's neighbors were incapable of

standing up to its might. You know, so by this time, by the eve of barbarosa,

the Soviet Union had expanded its territory by 426,000 square kilometers.

That was equivalent to the service of the entire German Reich in 1919. And in so doing,

as Yaga Hoffman points out, Stalin had ripped away any and all buffer states

on Germany's frontier. So I mean, Europe was defenseless,

you know, in the east, you know, and obviously the time was nigh for an assault on Europe.

And where Germany was as of 1940, despite Germany's initial military successes,

you know, there wasn't anything Germany had done that Moscow considered particularly impressive

or critical, you know, that would have changed or altered Stalin's ambition. It's quite the contrary.

There was no longer a chance at decisive victory against the UK, because, you know,

it's sea lion was a strategic ruse. The purpose of which was to deceive Stalin, by the way,

not Churchill, which I mean, that's interesting in its own right, but the, you know, and Stalin,

who was already, by that time, had hundreds of spies in the Roosevelt administration. He knew

exactly what America was thinking, and he knew that the United States was going to stand behind

the UK. German forces were scattered, peace me all over Europe. The German army was still

dependent on, you know, on horse-drawn transportation. Germany wasn't even close to

being able to realize a full mobilization on the order of, you know, 1914, 1915, even if

there'd been a political will to do so. You know, the minute Germany was cut off from Romania,

their army would have stopped in its tracks, because that was, you know, their only source of

vital petroleum. I mean, that what would even a layman looking at all relevant criteria and

variables as of, you know, 1940, 1941, sees Germany in a position of catastrophic vulnerability.

So, I mean, the idea that, you know, again, the idea that Stalin was afraid of Germany

and afraid of its armed forces, I mean, that's preposterous beyond belief, you know, and just for,

just for comparative purposes, between November 1940 and the day of Barbarossa,

June 22, 1941, there'd been a massive arms buildup underway since 1925, but this year and a half,

or this half a year, I mean, between, you know, the winter in 1940 and summer 1941,

this was an unprecedented military buildup in terms of scale, scope, and rapidity.

On June 22, 1941, the Soviet army possessed 24,000 tanks, almost 2,000 of which were T-34s,

which were technically clashed as a medium tank, but they were probably the best overall

tank of the entire war.

The Air Force of the Red Army, since 1938, had acquired 23,000, the 245 military aircraft,

including 3,700 that were of the most recent design. The Red Army had 148,000 artillery pieces and

mortars. The inventory of the Royal Navy, in addition to its surface fleet, it had 291 submarines,

which were an exclusively offensive platform. This meant that the Soviet Union

had more submarines than any other country on this planet.

They had more than four times the number of submarines that the Royal Navy did, which was the

world's leading maritime state. I mean, this is utterly insane, you know, and it's unprecedented.

Like, nothing approaching this sort of scope, scale, and character of mobilization

had ever been contemplated, let alone implemented. So, you know, again, Germany, which is

over-committed, overstretched, outnumbered, engaged in a quagmire, not mobilized for war.

Like, the idea that the Soviet Union, which, again, had just succeeded in stripping away

Germany's buffer states in the east, and it's successfully conquered Poland and

you know, the territory had coveted in the Arctic after, you know,

an unprovoked assault on Finland. This idea that the Soviet Union was afraid of Hitler,

I mean, like, it's so stupid, it almost doesn't war and rebuttal because it's an exclusively

bad faith argument. But what time we got? Yeah, I'm going to wrap up there because I was about to

get into the, some of the testimony, some of the commissars about the ideological culture of

the Red Army itself. But yeah, I hope this was instructive to people. Sure, yeah, can't wait for

part two. One thing that I would say is, I think one of the reasons that the narrative on Spain

had to be controlled after the war is because if the Republicans would have won,

Spain belongs to the Soviet Union. And, you know, you could make the argument Germany should

have never left after victory. But the Soviet Union in no way, shape, or form would have left.

That would have been a Soviet satellite state and they would have had Gibraltar.

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21 plus terms and conditions apply. Oh yeah. What's just like the, it's just like when

the ideological descendants of these, of the, of the traders who fought for the communist

in Spain, it's like when they support Islamic, it's like when they support al-Qaeda in Syria,

they're like, oh, that's not al-Qaeda. That's these other guys who don't actually exist,

stored Democrats. It's like this, it's like this infantile level of delusion.

I mean, I don't even think they actually believe that. They're just insulting the intelligence

of everybody else. Like, you know, the, oh, those weren't the communists. There was these imaginary

other guys in Spain. Who? Like, what are you talking about? There was this, there was this

unusual coalition of syndicalists, fascists, phalanches, carolists, you know, reactionary

mighter just types. I'm kind of secular nationalist. You know, that was who are, you know,

referred to as the nationalist side. I mean, in front of me, this is kind of the umbrella term

that's favored. And there was the common turn and the Soviet Union and their proxies.

Like, there wasn't this other element there that were like gay feminist liberals or

like artist Hemingway's buddies who just love freedom or whatever delusion

normies have. You know, it was a bunch, it was a bunch of communists like Eric Milke who were busy

shooting priests and nuns in the face and torturing fascists to death and, you know,

preparing to categorically exterminate anybody who wasn't

edgicable just like they'd done in the Soviet Union and just like

Bellacoon's brief tyranny did in Hungary and just like the communist did everywhere that,

you know, they were victorious in theater.

All right. Well, I'll do your plugs for you. Go to Thomas' sub-stack,

it's real, Thomas777.com, dot substack.com. Go to his website, that's Thomas

Thomas777.com, but the T is a seven, right? The first T is a seven.

And yeah, you can you can find them sometimes on X under under his government name.

Yeah, you can link all that stuff from my, you can read all those links around my website. So,

and I'll have the links in the in the show notes as well. So, um, thank you until part two.

I really appreciate you doing this. This is, I think this is important.

Yeah, likewise. Thanks for hosting me. Thank you.

I want to welcome everyone back to the Pikenianos show. This is going to be part two of Thomas

talking about Victor Suvorov and Hikin Hoffman's work. So, Thomas, I hand it over to you.

Yeah, thanks for hosting me. I, I think I remember where we left off, but forgive me if this is

redundant. It's something that's fundamentally important. As of the date of Barbarossa's commencement

June 22nd, 1941, it's important to understand the strategic situatedness of Estonia and the Soviet

Union. Key was the waging of aggressive war against Poland and Finland. Obviously,

Stalin's plan, and this was confirmed by Khrushchev, was, you know, in the immediate aftermath of

the assault on the Japanese at Kalkin Gold, which in the opinion of Hoffman, and I agree with this,

that's what started World War II. And Suvorov, without saying it, abides that perspective.

The Molotov Ribbentrop Pact, which Stalin confided to the Polet Bureau, as well as the Khrushchev,

was that that would embolden Hitler to Suvorov with Poland, which he wouldn't have done

had to have been the risk of a two-front war. Yet, Germany's position was precarious,

overextended. Stalin didn't think that, you know, Germany could truly stand up

to the UK and France. He grossly underestimated the Vermacht's offensive power,

but even in the event of a German victory. His reasoning was that, you know,

the French army would have its back broken. Germany would be on this footing of permanent hostility

catch of the United Kingdom, and Europe would be the communists for the taking.

You know, this was, in Stalin's words, to Khrushchev, Hitler was now wrapped around our little

finger. And one of the reasons for this confidence, or overconfidence, you know,

as I think I mentioned before, as of Barbarossa, Stalin had increased, expanded the territory

of the Soviet Union by 426,000 square kilometers. That's equivalent to the service area

of the German Reich, because it stood in 1919. And especially a particular significance,

the aggressive war, the Soviets waged against Poland and Finland, and would amount it to the

extortionate annexation of the Baltics with waiting in Estonia, pressuring Romania into further

territorial concessions. You know, the Soviet Union really

on September 3rd, 1939, it was in the strongest position out of all major powers.

And the Soviet Union became a combatant on September 17th, when the Soviets also assaulted Poland.

And of course, there was a deafening silence emanating from London

in the wake of that deployment, which is telling in and of itself.

But, you know, this myth that Stalin was somehow afraid of Hitler as preposterous

for the reasons it's just enumerated. And it's essential to understand, I mean,

the monster of this is the posture of the Soviet Union diplomatically and militarily towards the

German Reich. And secondly, the pattern of military deployment. And I'll get into that in a moment,

but in terms of the former November 12th and 13th, 1940, you know, the view from Moscow was that

the war was going very badly for Germany. Italy was not performing well in the relevant

battle theaters, which was compromising Germany's position in the Mediterranean, which Hitler

accounted on as a hedge, you know, against the British Empire. There was no indication of a

resolution of the war with the United Kingdom. You know, Germany's sphere of influence was

totally static. You know, Operation Siwayan was a strategic ruse. And even were it not,

it would have been a bloodbath. You know, so in November 12th and 13th, Stalin directed Molotov

in Berlin to transmit to Hitler through Ribbentrop a demand for the expansion of the Soviet sphere of

influence. Basically, Stalin said that he demanded freedom of the deploy in Bulgaria, Romania,

Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Greece, as well as Finland. And he also said that, you know,

the Soviet Union had a right to deploy on the Swedish frontier. This is incredibly belligerent.

Essentially, all of Southeastern Europe, plus Finland and a piece of Scandinavia proper,

Stalin just declared that this is now my sphere of influence. And if you meet this challenge with

the hostile deployment, it's war. I mean, does that sound like a man who's afraid of

either Hitler or the German Reich? You know, in Stalin's mind, there is absolutely no possibility of

the very mocked assaulting the Soviet Union, even in terms of parity, let alone from a position of

strategic superiority, which is somewhat fascinating because this idea that, oh, the Germans underestimated

the Soviet Union, they didn't at all. And still, if we get into that, Halder's report on the

eve of Barbarossa and Halder had actually written an assessment in 1937 of Soviet forces and

being in capabilities. It was remarkably accurate. And von Manstein and Guderian, their assessments

quite literally in the month before Barbarossa, they, the Soviet forces in being were exactly what

they estimated them to be. In reality, there was Stalin who was looking west and saying that,

you know, Germany has no meaningful offensive capability and the mighty Soviet Union has nothing to

fear. And this is the key to why the Soviets took such horrific attrition during Barbarossa.

Further relevant to context here, I can't remember if I got into this or not.

There was a discreet mobilization phase throughout the Soviet Union. Between November 1940,

when this demand that I just enumerated was issued to, we're having trouble to deliver the Hitler

by way of Molotov on order of Stalin. Between November 1940 and the day of Barbarossa,

a massive and unprecedented arms build up to place in the Soviet Union.

This included, as of the unsinvastilities, the Red Army possessed no less than 24,000 tanks

including close to 2,000 T-34s, which were technically a medium tank, but they were the all-around

best tank of the Second World War. I don't think that's arguable.

You know, the the Air Forces of the Red Army had over 23,000 aircraft or 3,700

which were considered to be cutting edge fighters. The Red Army had close to 150,000 artillery

pieces. The Red Navy, including a substantial fleet of surface ships of varying types,

they had close to 300 submarines and submarines are expressly offensive. There are no defensive

submarines and this man does Hoffman raises in his book. The Soviet is not only at a larger fleet

of submarines than any other country in the world, but they outnumbered the Royal Navy more than

fourfold in terms of their number of subs. I mean, this is the most powerful offensive military

element the world has ever seen. You know, so Stalin was essentially fearless and viewed

himself as the imminent master of this planet. In due strategic terms, as of Barbarossa,

as well as the ideological ones, and we're going to get into that too. Something essential

to understand about the Soviet culture, Stalin was keenly aware of what had befallen

the Jacobin revolution. He was also keenly aware of the changing dynamics of

ideological cultures within great powers. You know, he realized that, for example, Japan was on

the ascendancy. He realized that the German Reich had intense energies that it was drawing from,

even though he viewed them as geostrategically weak and compromised. He understood that the

United Kingdom was undergoing a terrible existential crisis, and that their empire,

a structure was essentially obsolescent. And this is one of the reasons why

there have been a series of revolts, you know, nascent as well as well developed and realized,

you know, in the years before the Great War and then in the inner war years up to the then

present, you know, and socialism in one country that there was something of a,

that there was something of a propaganda cliché, Stalin involved, the sort of a, give a branding to

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megacitle restructuring of Russian society and the Soviet state, which was becoming a super power

as well as do, you know, assuage the Western powers, which were very much doing as bidding at that

moment. Stalin was very much engaged with the common turn. That did not change. And

in the planning for what was to be the assault on Europe and the aftermath of the icebreaker

conflict, Stalin, he called back the Russian delegation to the common turn and he called the

common turn's representatives to Moscow to advise them of what was imminently going to happen.

You know, the Soviet Union needed to realize the world revolution to survive,

as well as to consolidate its super power status, which was not just burdening, but was being

actively realized. Also, and I realize it probably got a bias for testimonial evidence,

especially, they're not exclusively in discerning the motives of men and command roles.

But there's not direct testimonies is more reliable than

the circumstantial evidence unless it contradicts the manifest weight of

extrinsic material facts outside the parameters, those declarations. And

what Stalin said is a biographer, Colonel General Volkoganov.

He word-for-word bioaccount reproduced the speech that Stalin issued fourth on May 5, 1941.

And according to Volkoganov, the leader made it, quote, the leader made it unmistakably clear,

war is inevitable in the future. We must be ready for the unconditional destruction

of German fascism. The world be fought on enemy territory and victory will be achieved

with few casualties. And as we got into last week, and as I think we've raised before

in discussion of World War II, it was a matter of formal doctrine that the Red Army

was an offensive, purposed element. Its primary mission orientation was as the standard

bearer of the revolution. And it never struck a defensive posture as a matter of doctrine

by choice. You know, and I've made the point before, I believe Stalin is probably the

single most powerful man who ever lived. And the momentum that the communist in a national

had at this moment was a zenith, I'd argue. Stalin had to abide that rule, or he would have

been replaced by a man who would have, you know, it was a convergence of ideological imperatives and

geostrategic realities in a way that is very rare, but was sort of inextricably and splendidly

bound up at this juncture. And I think we talked before about this secret, I realize I'm

jumping around a bit, but I'm trying to corral the evidence in categorical capacities.

The secret meeting with the Polic Bureau, and this is when the common turn delegation was also

present in August 19, 1939. You know, in the, it concomitant with the assault on the Japanese

Imperial Army at Calc and Goal, this meeting that Stalin called the Polic Bureau and the

Russian section of the common turn, Stalin declared that the time had come to, quote,

apply the torch of war to the European powder keg. This is when Stalin declared if we accept

the German proposal for the non-aggression pact, you know, Hitler will naturally attack Poland

with the intervention of France and England will be inevitable. The resulting in Stalin's words

serious and arrest and disorder would lead to a punctuated destabilization of Western Europe,

yet without the Soviet Union being drawn into the conflicts until they

permissively opted to. And Stalin referred to what he declared in 1925 with respect to the

international strategy. You know, the moment is now that we can pursue the

Bolshevization of Europe by way of an advantageous entry into the war through a broad

spectrum field of activity, which had now, the potential which had now opened up for their

realization of the world revolution. And of course, when minutes from this meeting and the

speech were smuggled out and were obtained by the French news agency Havas, by way of Geneva,

you know, and it was published and then the Moscow immediately wanted to damage control.

And Stalin apologists and propaganda is particularly in London, but also in other states,

you know, they started immediately claiming that this is fascist propaganda, and this isn't true,

you know. So I mean, this is important also. When you read books by guys, Chris Bellamy comes to mind,

but their legion, these historians, they claim, oh, Stuvorov is a liar or there's no evidence

for these things. They're redacting a huge amount of evidence, or they're just not including it.

And when question they say, oh, that's just propaganda. They're just not addressing it. And

that's incredible. You know, I mean, to be like, like imagine,

somewhat more proximately, like, let's say I was writing a history of the American war in Iraq

from 2003 to 2011, and it'd be like if I was categorically redacting things that President Bush

and Rumsfeld said in conversations they had, and just declaring that, well, it's not important

or that that's just something liberal say or a lie. I mean, people would laugh at me, or they'd

say that's ridiculous. But in the case of, you know, Barbara Rosa and the icebreaker hypothesis,

that's exactly what they do. You know, and you're just supposed to accept it.

This is very abnormal. Even accounting for the fact that research standards and things are

often compromised for ideological and political reasons. But this seems tangential, but it's

essential to understanding super-obs and Hoffman's points. We've got to ask why Barbara Rosa was so

tactically successful for the very moment, and what that means, because this is sort of the key,

in my opinion. The Soviets were planning an assault on Romania in the auto in 1941.

And if you know how to interpret military deployments, this should be clear. But also,

if you're going to assault Germany from then-extant frontiers, you're going to do so from the Baltic,

and you're going to do so through Romania. And of course, Germany was totally dependent on

Romanian petroleum. That's one of the reasons Hitler cultivated the friendship event in this

so closely. Antonescu held the night's cross. There was very good offices between him and Germany

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He and Hitler, despite the linguistic barrier, they were very close friends too. Antonescu was

Hitler's strongest ally, I believe. In a close to a quarter million Romanians fought

for the Axis cause in the East, which were a country that size the Romania, that's remarkable.

But Army Group South deployed from Romania. And this was a very delicate issue because

Soviet intelligence, which was actually very good. The deployment to Romania, the way Hitler,

the rules Hitler was able to pull off was that the unstable situation in Yugoslavia was what

was drawing German forces at scale to be deployed there. But also obviously, through

ledgerd main and other things, OKW was effectively able to hide the scale at which forces were being

a mass there. But not only was it a staging ground for Barbarossa, but Hitler was react with anxiety

that the Soviets were in with salt Romania because they were. So these forces down there in a dual

role, they were purposed for an offensive mission, but they were also there as a bulwark against

a rarimi assault. You know, at least so that they, you know, there'd be enough time to reinforce

and not just, you know, endure a collapse of a critical front, which on top of the

geostrategic menace that also deprive Germany really of its only source of petroleum and

requisite quantities to fuel the war machine. But what this led do was there was massive Soviet deployments

in the Baltic and in Ukraine through the Romanian frontier. So when the Veramocht assaulted,

the road to Moscow was basically undefended. OK, that's one of the reasons why

Halder and Manstein, they were beside themselves because they were telling Hitler we need to move

on Moscow now. We can't wait, you know, we can't wait for the weather to turn and we can't wait for

the Soviets to reconstitute and affect a deployment in depth on the path of Moscow. You know, and

as the deployment schema in Ukraine, the army group south was exponentially outnumbered.

But the red army elements there, they were deployed in an offensive pattern. And if you know

anything about the way the Soviet Union fought and the way the armed forces and Russian

fights and everything was scaled down way to the obviously and with very different localized

combined arms platforms, deep battle is dependent upon a fixed deployment schema for it to work.

And the way the red army deployed offensively, and this is what they did when the tide turned

after curse. This is how they assaulted Berlin. The offensive deployment schema is by heavy use of

shock armies. The Soviet shock army, they were loaded with firepower and totally front loaded.

OK, so when army group south engaged the red army through the Kiev corridor,

they were engaging this forward element that was loaded down with firepower that was supposed

to break through the main line of resistance, but that had a limited operational capacity,

often of only a few days. Then they were to be rapidly reinforced by fresh elements

who would continually assault in waves. And then when that shock element was re-equipped and

refitted, they would smash through again. But obviously, if the Varmak dissolves with

mass-darmored columns, when you're deployed offensively with your front loaded shock army

as the Shfephunk, they're going to smash that shock army and then they're going to cut through

your reinforcement elements like butter. And as they break through wave after wave,

that front loaded element is going to be fighting on reversed fronts. And they're going to get

cut to pieces, which is exactly what happened. OK, so the Soviets were taking catastrophic casualties

in the north and in the south. Meanwhile, army group center was racing to Moscow, quite literally.

And Hitler didn't know quite what to make of this, because there were sort of two Hitler's,

and stoically makes this point. When Hitler felt confident, politically, and when he had a,

what he believed was a firm conceptual grasp of the battle space, Hitler was hyper-aggressive.

When fog of war questions or political uncertainty clouded that perspective,

Hitler developed a siege mentality. And that's exactly what happened.

And Hitler viewed Stalin as incredibly dangerous as he should have.

So Hitler essentially halted army group center. Well, army group south surrounded this massive

element, plus the reserves that the Kremlin had ordered like rush to the front immediately.

And Hitler was afraid to push the attack for a decisive victory at Moscow,

until this element was neutralized. And it was neutralized.

The only casualties the Soviets endured is utterly catastrophic and unprecedented.

And the Germans took something like three quarters of a million prisoners alone, OK?

But by the time the fear ordered the attack to be pushed on Moscow was too late.

OK, that's what happened. People misunderstand that it says,

you know, oh, the Germans were plotting to attack all along, because the Soviets were weak

in some ways. But then Stalin got it together. And you know, because the Germans underestimated

Soviet capabilities, you know, Hitler lost the war. It's not true at all. That doesn't make any sense.

And, you know, if Stalin was like, look at it like this, OK?

The Germans were halted at Moscow, but they reached the gates of Moscow.

They reached Lenin Red. I didn't like it to siege. They reached Stalin Red.

The Germans, the very much reached all of its objectives in months. How long did it take

the Red Army to march on Berlin? It took them almost four years.

So why were there just plotting, grinding one bath if the Soviets were this grossly underestimated force?

You know, and the Germans didn't know what they were doing.

But the Germans killed the Red Army. You know,

obviously the Russians still had enough to hold Moscow, and they did. And that was incredibly

valiant. And the Russians are incredibly tough. And there's a simplicity to the way the

Ivan's fight, but it's a simplicity that works. You know, I think it's most guided when

people suggest otherwise. And especially today, because people are, you know,

they've adopted prejudice and stuff in this regard. It's really, really stupid things that

come out of the Pentagon in terms of their assessment of, um,

rushing to keep abilities and things. And

incidentally, Eric five Manstein's

book, it's called Lost Victories. It's for, I think it's fascinating, but it's kind of for

military hounds only. It's, you know, not like late Sunday reading. But what that book was,

as the U.S. War Department, back when there was a war department, there's not anymore. And no

matter what, like special needs, Higgseth says. But in the last months of the Department of War,

they debriefed Manstein on, basically on, you know, his experience over four years of fighting

the Soviet Union and a general officer's role. And the war department is soon to be the

defense department. They took this very seriously. An early NATO force structure wasn't a substantial,

on the infantry side, ground on the military armor side. It was substantial. You,

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Based around what Von Manstein had, it said, okay, so this book was sometime in the 50s,

the first edition. It was edited to make him more readable and it's literally Manstein's debriefing

with some added stuff, you know, so and that that was one of his core premises is that

fighting the Russians and Russian territory, they're unbelievably and savagely tough,

you know, and that's a force multiplier and it also makes up for some of their shortcomings.

And the Russians also, they know what they know the limits of their capabilities,

you know, and on the one hand and super off his book, Inside the Red Army, which is very much

worth reading too, especially if you got an interest in the late Cold War stuff because it's very

much a breakdown of, you know, the the version of era Soviet Army, you know, he makes the point

and Harold Coil made this point too, that doctrine in the Soviet Army was almost like regulation.

There were no mission oriented tactics and the whole ethos of the Soviet armies,

general staff was to eliminate uncertainty wherever and whenever and however possible,

so they didn't tolerate deviation from the battle plan as emergent from, you know, superior orders.

But nevertheless, the Russian, the Soviets and the Russians do very well with what they're good at,

you know, and deep battle was what they were good at.

Happy reliance on, on combined arms in a in a shock element capacity went on the offensive.

That tended towards a kind of inflexibility, which I think they later remedied somewhat during the

Cold War, but the ability to rapidly shift from an offensive posture to defending,

the Vermacht was very, very good at that and the British are pretty good at that too.

The Soviets were catastrophically bad at it and the French were bad at it.

But part of it too though is that Stalin had every reason to believe that the Vermacht wasn't

capable of what it was capable of as of June 1941. I mean, that was a blind spot, but at the same time,

you know, the Germans tend to surprise people on, I mean, there's a military affairs.

But that's key because it's not as internet guys and armchair goofballs who claim, well,

Subaru was an idiot who's a liar. Like, look at how bad the Soviets got involved. That's the whole point.

Like, that makes his point, not the opposite. So that's that's key. You know, I'm not

about just dwelling on minutiae to play kick. The you know, the the military homes among us are

something. But you know, it's also

you know, it was um, you know, the point too, that I think a lot of lay people don't understand

these days, you know, modern war resolves rapidly. You know, you don't you don't plan for quagmires

because then you're planning to lose a war. So, you know, within a ideally in about 10 weeks,

in the outer temporal limits, six months, you know, Moscow had to fall to the very

moct. And Stalin was overconfident, absolutely, but it stands to reason, it's kind of poor view

of the vermoct, not in terms of its quality of men or firepower, but the geostatic situation,

and what he viewed as its overextended commitments and things, you know, he reasoned that, you know,

even in the very unlikely event of an assault, you know, we can hold him in bay long enough to

reinforce and by then, you know, victory conditions will no longer be realizable. You know,

this all kind of falls into place is the totality of circumstances. You've got to look at this

so ideological culture. You've got to take Stalin's own statements. You've got to look at the

statements of his underlings, including Khrushchev. You've got to look at the pattern of deployment.

You've got to take in, if you know what to look for, but even, I mean, it's even more persuasive

or a more obvious rather, but, you know, taken in totality, I mean, it's clear that

Suvorov was telling the truth. You know, but also, I mean, it's not clear what the alternative was.

I mean, this unprecedented military buildup coupled with the

transformative, globally transformative aspects of the Bolshevik Revolution, the

heart and lungs of which proverbially were in the Soviet Union. I mean, what's the alternative?

Stalin was, he ordered this buildup for purely defensive purposes, which would inevitably,

at some point, provoke the West into attacking him. I mean, that doesn't make any sense. And,

generally, when you're talking about conditions of approximate parity with conventional combined

arms at scale, or when you're talking about near-peer strategic planning, you don't wait to be attacked.

You always push the assault. You know, then that's, I mean, this is very basic stuff.

Well, it also, it doesn't make sense to say, Stalin, was this

interested in this social, national version of socialism that would emerge out of the Bolsheviks.

When you send troops and you send advisers and you send tanks to Spain.

Yeah. You don't care about Spain. You don't care what's happening in Spain, if this is supposed

to be for Russia only. Well, that's also the Soviet Union, like talking to me wrong. You know,

one of the, one of the living people who I really find common ground with in terms of political

theory is an historical subject matter is Carrie Bolton. Like, he's just great. I don't know the

guy, unfortunately. He doesn't leave New Zealand much these days because he's elderly, you know.

And I think most people know of him because he wrote this really great exhaustive biography of

Francis Yaki, but he wrote a book on Stalin called Stalin the Enduring Legacy. And people

haven't read the book. They, they, they, they painted it some sort of, oh, he's some Eurasianist.

It's like, that's not what he's saying at all. He's saying Stalin's legacy was complicated. He,

he basically abides the same viewpoint that Paul Gottfried does, although for some of

different reasons about a substantial aspect of the Cold War deriving from the, the Stalin versus

Trotsky paradigm, you know, but that doesn't mean that Stalin was somehow not an internationalist.

And even, you know, the Soviet Union can need dozens of ethnicities, you know, a huge Muslim

population, you know, a huge eziatic population, you know, a, a huge number of Near Eastern people,

you know, it's spanned one fifth, where one six of this planets, like the Soviet Union was the

ultimate international superpower, you know, and the only way the Soviet Union survives.

And one of the reasons why the later Cold War was so dangerous is human, just, you know,

for technological reasons, and, and, um, historical ones, and the sidelining of human decision-makers

and misjuditions as strategic nuclear parian things. But the reason why I drop off, who was a

fascinating guy, and I mean, like I've said, I believe I'm not a Sovietologist, um, and I'm not

a Russian expert at all. But I do know something, and it's clear to me that, uh, post-Crucetjev,

there was a shadow trifecta of, uh, and drop off Ustanov and Gramego with a real Soviet executive.

Brezhnev was a frontman, which made sense, because before he became kind of elderly and

compromised, people liked Brezhnev, and he resonated with, with the people, even today, like he's

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As a man who was like a great steward of other Russian people and the nationalities, but

a drop-off, I mean, Brezhnev was very much a Stalinist. As was a drop-off, but a drop-off,

seminal speech in 82, right after he became a general secretary. This is when Project Rheon,

which a lot of people attribute as contributing substantially to the war scare of 83 in the

ablager era, I think people still don't misunderstand that aspect of it, but he doesn't. The reason

why the subject of the speech to the prosidium, he said we're going to lose the Cold War if we

don't take drastic measures to counter measures against Rheema, the Revolution of military affairs.

He was speaking specifically of computing power and command and control aspects, which was true.

There was something, there was something in Sam, there was only like 5,000 computers in the entire

Soviet Union in 1982. There was something insanely primitive state of affairs with regards

high tech. The risk of war based on the strategic paradigm as it's evolving is

well as these command and control aspects and the sideline of human decision-makers that

the risk of war is probably greater than it's ever been since the 40s, but also we're going to lose

that war if we don't find a way to develop meaningful counter measures that

are technologies of parity or unless we find a way out of the Cold War.

That was Gorbachev's old notion because Gorbachev was an endrop of produce. He wasn't some big

liberal. Shepard Narze, I think, was subverting things, but point being Gorbachev was very

much the anti-Yeltsin, quite literally, and Yeltsin was the Neokon's guy. Gorbachev's notion was

to reform the command economy with certain qualifications and basically do it with God's plan and

favor something else that could abide innovation in the high tech sector and bring about peace with

the United States, but surrendering to the United States or dismantling the Soviet Union,

that was not at all within the cards. One of the reasons why Gorbachev

was a head rapport with Bush and Baker, Bush and Baker assured him we're not going to

try and dismantle the Soviet Union and they weren't. For a very specific reason, Bush said

where until there's full nuclear disarmament, we're not even going to talk about a post-Soviet

future. Obviously, the Neokon perspective and their shoe-horning of Yeltsin was break the Soviet

Union to pieces now. One of the reasons why this crusading is Moscow is proceeding from Ukraine,

their notion was to break the Soviet Union into essentially three discrete client regimes,

the former Soviet Far East. In those days, especially too, because the Pentagon was still

looking at China as essentially friendly. Obviously, seed some of that territory to

pick King, but they'll be a Ukraine commissariat, they'll be the Moscow central commissariat,

they'll be the former Russian Far East. That's just kind of like a hyper-exploited

hinterland for the United States and adjacent finance capital and stuff. Bush and Baker

realized, we're not going to grind these people's faces into the concrete and we're not going to

destabilize the whole region and we're certainly not going to do anything until there's

full nuclear disarmament. That was a tangential discussion to give me to it, but Baker was a great

man and I've got a lot of respect for him and post-41, it was not a particularly likeable guy,

it'll be a dead, but he had a very serious and sophisticated view of geopolitics and political

affairs, so that administration looks better and better, in my opinion. I mean, I felt that way

at the time as a teenager. I realized this country, I realized something really, really bad was

underway when Clinton was elected. I mean, it would have been one thing, if it was like a 2020

steel, but the body politic was excited about this pig and that was insane, you know, and it's

not just because he was crushing our people, but I mean, I knew guys who got indicted and

with the prison under Clinton Reno for when they hadn't done anything, you know, I'm not just

speaking, I mean, as a matter of law, as well as a matter of fact or ethics or whatever, but

because it may, it's to bring it back a bit, you know, there's a brief moment,

really from about 92 to 96, and that's one of these historians for some other David Irving,

you know, he got access to the FSB archives and there was all this incredible stuff that came

to life that, you know, the old Soviet system had suppressed and kept from prying eyes.

But then, I mean, very quickly, things became even more opaque than in so much they had during

the Soviet era because the regime, I'll never tell the truth about what's going on with Russia.

I mean, over the year, but this is an issue of peculiar sensitivity for reasons that I don't

need to be elaborately explicated, but I realized I talked more about

Hoffman as well as the nuances of Barbara Rose that I did specifically Subaru. If you want to

know a part three, I'll remedy that and I'll speak specifically to Subaru and I'll include some

aspects of inside the Red Army. I've got a paper back on that and I take it on the road with me.

No, that sounds good to me getting into the thing about reading Subaru off is it's just this

fire hose of just this date that what was dismantled on this date, what was put in this place

on this date, and it's just like just running down this whole list of things, just chapter after

chapter where it's mind boggling the the mountain of circumstantial evidence he is able to provide for

his thesis, which he took like a lot of Russians, particularly guys who were in intelligence roles

or military roles. He was a prolific documentarian and he wrote down a huge amount of things,

but also obviously English wasn't his first language and it's written kind of like a debriefing

but with like added extrinsic cognitive, which makes sense. I mean, he was a defector and he

spent literally years being debriefed by American and NATO military people. I mean, I get it. That's

not that it's not a fun life, like the defector actually sucks. What's your take on defectors?

I interviewed one once and he was a defector from Soviet Union like in early 1989 and I mean,

I just caught him not exactly lying. I caught him in not being willing to have certain conversations

that would just seem like, you know, it's like, oh, you know, well, tell me what Karl Marx got

right. It's one of the things I asked him, I said, tell me what Karl Marx got right. He's like nothing.

Absolutely nothing. And I'm like, I see these defectors come out of like North Korea and like

immediately they get debriefed by the State Department and then they get boob jobs and they're

driving brand new cars and they're in frigging condos. And I'm like, I think defectors were a lot

different back then than they are. That's what I have to say. Okay, some guy, some DDR guy or some Soviet

union like GRU officer who defected in like May 1989, totally different than a guy who defected in

1979 or 1969, night and day. Because the former is just like some dickhead like looking to get paid

and like looking for a way out of his life and a failing system. Guys like Suvorov,

first of all, they're taking a huge risk. You know, and secondly,

for regular people, man, like it's a peak cold war. You know, life wasn't that different than

the Soviet Union or America. It really wasn't. So I mean, it's not like you're some GRU big shot.

It's not like you're going to get great stuff in America. You can't back home. I mean, yeah,

you're going to be able to get like blue jeans for your mistress and like good scotch. But

there's not some like, there wasn't some like huge difference in quality of life or something.

Guys like Suvorov defected because they had ethical reasons for it and they developed a moral

concept for the system. I really like the book The Hunt for Red October. It's just like an awesome

book and I reread it lately because I forgot how good it was. But you know, the

the captain of the Red October, the whole deal, I mean, in parts of character, I mean, it's not,

it's a brilliant meditation on on a late cold war strategic nuclear platforms and the deep

parodies they're in. But it's another character study like the Soviet naval officer. You know,

he's this guy from the, he's this Lithuanian guy. He doesn't really relate to the Russian culture.

His wife needed an operation and the doctor who operated on her was drunk when he formed the

surgery. So he botched it and she died. But the doctor was the son of some polar girl big shots.

They're like, you know, you can't stop demanding like vengeance against this man.

So the, so the, this naval officer, he's just like, what the hell am I doing? You know, like I,

and also to it, he's like, deeply religious. He's like, so there's like this atheist

show of anistic Russian government that killed my wife and I am, I'm supposed to, I'm supposed to

kill 50 million people in about a world on behalf of it. Like, no, I'm not doing that.

I mean, there's a, there's a deeper moral quagmire too because the Red October,

it's a typhoon class sub, but it's got what's called a caterpillar drive.

So it's invisible to sauces and passive sonar. So basically, it's a splendid first strike weapon.

So he realizes like the Soviet Union can all do the strategic balance and basically bring America

to terms through the threat of, through the threat of nuclear assault. And like, I mean, he

used that as morally fucked also. You know, like, if we're going to win, like, let's win the cold

war clean, you know, not, not do it basically by like holding America hostage with the nuclear

trigger. I mean, that's kind of moralistic, but at the same time, I mean, I, I don't know, man. Like,

if it's no being a, being the captain of a typhoon class sub, that there was a counter value,

like mega death machine. You know, it's, it's, it's a role was to assault counter value targets

and kill millions of people. If you don't believe in the system, you serve, that's a pretty horrible

role to be in. You know, you've got to be a true believer to do that job. It's not like any other

job in the military in it. It's not like any other role in any other era. You know, I commanding

it, commanding a, a first strike platform that, that can, they can kill millions of people.

You know, so I, obviously, that's a fictional example, but what Clancy was drawing upon was the

real ethos of defectors in the Cold War. And on the other side, you know, guys, they came

with five. I think we're pretty disturbed guys, but they were true believers. That's totally

different than these days. Like some, I think Snowden is a, is a sincere guy, whatever problems

you might have. You know, he's basically, you know, he could never leave Russia now. Like,

it's not a happy life. You know, I, I think, uh, you can already, I mean, Snowden, I don't

want to get into a, a deep meditation on the ethics of what Snowden did, but I, my point is,

like, whatever his motives, I don't think we can say he did that for cloud, but, you know,

these people who come the other way, like some of these Chinese or North Koreans, they're,

they're just looking to get paid. It's obvious. But they think they're not being respected,

like they should be in, you know, whatever. When you really need care, you need 24-7 access

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in America's Healthcare. Tyler Reddick here from 2311 Racing. Another checkered flag for the books.

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JambaCasino. Roll there in. But the Cold War is a different world. I mean, literally.

All right. Well, we'll pick this up on Episode 3 when you get back from the travels of Thomas

on the road and everything. Yeah, yeah. I remind everybody about 36 hours. Yeah. I remind everybody

where they can find your work. Yeah. You should check out my sub-stack. It's

real time. It's 777-substack.com. Alternatively, go to the website. It's number 7HLMS777.com.

But that stuff on the show notes so people can find it easy. But my website

is a good one stop. And my sub-stack is where the podcast and other good stuff is added.

I've I've just got off the road from DC. Then we head to Halloween. All say it's a cemetery walk.

I'm trying to make progress. I got to make substantial progress on this main script by December.

Things have been very hectic. So it in good ways. And then I injured myself like a fucking idiot.

But it's the MindFaser pod. It's going to be another couple of weeks before a fresh episode

drop. So forgive me for that. But Jake Burden and I will continue to drop fresh stuff on his

plate forms and on Rio of Rishikago. So just bear with me. I promise we'll be back to

regular uploads when I get back from the road. All right. Until episode three. Thank you, Thomas.

Yeah. Thank you, man.

I want to welcome everyone back to the peak in your next show. We had a little bit of a hiatus

because you know, did a little traveling and everything. But Thomas is back and we're going

to finish up the series on who started World War II who's responsible. And yeah. So take it away,

Thomas. Yeah. Thanks for hosting me again. There's two issues here. And if memory serves

in the first episode of this little series, we addressed the issue of one exactly the

second world war started, which seems pedantic, but it's not. It's this is a real matter of

contention for anybody who's seriously engaged with the subject matter. There's a reason why

court historians claim the onset of hostilities was September 3rd, 1939, because that

represents a discreetly ideologically coded perspective. And obviously the intention is to

present the global strategic and geopolitical situation as being one of relative peace

until the German Reich violated that peace through make it aggression against the Polish state.

Okay. There's a problematic perspective for all kinds of reasons.

You know, some of which are political, some of which are purely historical and nature,

and factual. But what I think is irrebuttable, even if one accepts, you know, the mainstream view of

the onset of hostilities between the German Reich and Poland and the subsequent war declaration

on the German Reich by France and the United Kingdom. The fact of the matter is that weeks prior,

the Soviet Union assaulted the Japanese imperial army of talc and gold. This was a massive

engagement. This was a massive clash of forces. You know, and obviously it represented

the onset of a state of general hostilities between two great powers, the Soviet Union and the

Empire of Japan. So I don't really see how anybody who looks like to be taken seriously,

it can claim that this was some sort of insignificant event or somehow not related to the

broader nexus of causation that, you know, also precipitated the

end of hostilities in Europe. You know, either the Soviet Union going to war with Japan

in a scale capacity represented the onset of general hostilities at planetary scale or it didn't.

Okay, so there's that related to that, but more discreetly political in terms of

the significance of the subject matter, the vis-a-vis court history narratives and

the way that official authorities in the United States and the United Kingdom and the

Buddhist Republic continue to present, you know, and characterize the Second World War,

is the issue of Soviet intentions. And what exactly the state of power political relations was

between Moscow and Berlin as of, you know, June 22, 1941. And it's pretty clear to me,

you know, and I draw a lot in substantial measure on the late Yakum Hoffman's exhaustive study

of Barbarossa. It's pretty clear to me that the Soviet Union was

imminently going to assault Europe. And the German Reich, not just the Führer, but

okay, W, as well as, you know, various command elements within the party apparatus, the military,

and the secular state apparatus recognized this reality. As did Mariette head to state

who found themselves allied with the German Reich for various reasons. You know, this included

Croatia, Slovakia, Italy, you know, France, you know, again, there was no Vichy France, there was

the government of France, and it was absolutely on the side of the Axis powers. You know, there were

volunteers from Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Iceland, throughout the Central Asian Islamic countries,

you know, Romania contributed a quarter million men, which is a massive contribution for a country

of the size of Romania, you know, Hungary, Bulgaria, the Netherlands, you know, Belgium, Luxembourg,

you know, the list goes on and on and on, you know, and obviously the Spaniards that had

let in grad fought incredibly valiantly. But, you know, there's this, this wasn't as a matter of

design, guys, there are some sort of mass hysteria, or some sort of desire to sacrifice one's life

or some sort of a federal glory. The Soviet Union had, some of the fact that it was animated by

a revolutionary ideology that was truly global in territory. It, the Soviet Union had built a

military juggernaut, the likes of which the world had never seen. It was almost unfathomable,

and it was only growing larger and more powerful.

You know, and the, like I said, to me, this is obvious. Hoffman,

and Victor Suvorov, and a few other military historians. All right, so Stofli is another one.

They brought unique insight to the table, and Hoffman, in particular, his data points

were and are exhaustive. And Hoffman too, he, he, not that I, I mean, obviously I don't have any

prejudice against independent scholars, I am one, but such that people are prone to dismissing

this story and see who don't have what they view as adequate.

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Credential affiliation with reputable institutions. Well,

Hoffman, when he was alive, he was the employee of the official historical records division

of the Bundeswehr. You know, and he was considered to be probably the seminal German historian

on Barbarossa in terms of the military aspects. Okay. You can't say that he was a cranker,

that he was some aggrieved guy who was outside of the establishment of the Bundesrepublic.

He was very much insinuated into it. Okay. Not that that should make a difference,

but such that it does, you know, I, I don't see how people can impeach his credibility.

You know, and one of the issues that Hoffman takes up, because again,

Hoffman was very focused on the quantitative military aspects of Barbarossa.

One of the things that he addressed was a lot of lay people as well as

historians and military analysts who know better, but for cynical reasons,

bandwagon on this argument, they claim that, well, if the Soviet Union was so deeply mobilized

and had a raid such a massively scaled war machine, why did they absorb catastrophic casualties?

Well, that's exactly why they did, because they were deployed offensively.

And when you're talking about combined arms, even to this day, I mean, drones and localized autonomous

firepower are definitely changing things, most strategically and tactically, and knowers that

more undisplay than in those, than in various aspects of tactical deployment and depth,

but even to this day, this remains constant. If we're talking about

combined arms, modern warfare, you can't just call it a proverbial audible,

and the midst of hostilities, if your forces are arrayed to assault and switch to a defensive paradigm.

So coming under assault, when not prepared to defend in depth,

you can lead the catastrophe, particularly when one's opponent is the Vermox.

And we're going to get into how exactly that plays out, but not only, again, does the

attrition rate, and specifically, the skewed nature of that attrition rate, not only does that not

tend to rebut the claim before us, it actually tends to substantiate it.

Now, I'll get into some of these data points, so that, you know,

to clarify what we're talking about here. I can't remember if I got into this or not in the

first episode, and please tell me if I'm repeating myself in order today to correct me. I'm not

going to be offended with the contrary, I'll be quite gracious. Between November 1940 and

literally the eve of Barbarossa in June 1941, the Soviets undertook a massive arms buildup.

Now, don't get me wrong, by the autumn of 1940, the Soviets enjoyed numeric and arguably technological

superiority pretty much across the entire spectrum of combined arms, but this punctuated buildup

of November 1940 to June 1941. When you really need care, you need 24-7 access to a care team,

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Can really only be interpreted as mobilization and anticipation of offensive operations.

On the outbreak of hostilities, June 22, 1941,

the Soviet Union had deployed no less than 24,000 tanks, close to 2,000 of which were T-34s,

which in those days there weren't main battle tanks, there was a light medium and heavy tanks,

arguably super heavy tanks. But the T-34 was, I think of it as kind of like the zero of armored forces,

it was probably the most effective armored platform of the entire war in all around terms.

Yeah, obviously, the Tiger was a superior machine, but that's not what we're talking about.

The ability of T-34s to be rolled off the assembly line rapidly,

almost like Model T-4s or something, Odin, that itself was a force multiplier.

You know, between 1938 and June 22, 1941,

the Red Air Force had acquired over 23,000 military aircraft, around 3,700 of which could

be considered cutting edge. Probably about half of those had night fighting capability.

The Red Army had close to 150,000 field artillery pieces and heavy mortars.

The Red Navy had over 200 submarines, which I can't remember if I mentioned or not,

but obviously the submarines are expressly offensive, there aren't defensive submarines,

you know, and to be clear, this alone, I mean, the Soviet Union wasn't known as any kind of

maritime power. I mean, if anything, you know, the Tsar's Navy had been sank by the Japanese

in 1905 and that had further compromised the prestige, actual potential of,

you know, the Russian Navy is a real force, but by June 22, 1941,

the Soviet Union by far had the largest submarine fleet in the world.

More than four times that of the Royal Navy, you know, in the UK, it was viewed as the foremost

naval power on this planet. You know, I mean, these data points speak for themselves, you know,

and on the political side, I know I've gotten into this in previous

series that we've done. I put a lot of emphasis on direct testimony,

owing, I'm sure in part to the fact that my background in part at least is that of a lawyer,

you know, but also, if we're talking about intent, particularly of wartime executives,

there's a tendency to be able to rely upon the statements of a wartime executive or an executive

who's preparing for war. There's a, there's incentivization to telling the truth

when the chief executive so situated is talking to his cabinet

or as general staff officers, okay, because what incentive would there be to lie? Number one,

and there's there's active disincentives to lie because that compromises the ability of

subordinate command elements to effectively execute orders and

wage war towards victory conditions. You know, and so I put a lot of stock in which Stalin said

and a lot of this testimony from Stalin himself, you know, that which isn't independently documented

by, you know, the minutes of his speeches or by audio recording,

you know, a lot of Stalin's intimates were the sources of these statements, including a

Colonel Vokuganov, who was a Stalin's official biographer, you know, and Stalin gave a series of speeches

in this, in the year preceding Barbarossa, but particularly the, the sex to eight months,

immediately proceeding on some of hostilities, which approximately reflects the final phase of

mobilization that we talked about just now from November 1940 to June 1941.

And Vokuganov mixed the point that Stalin was very taciturn, but he became quite candid.

And quite open within the cloister of, you know, these command element corridors

in his discussion of, you know, what was to be military doctrine in the next war,

which he increasingly discussed as if it was an imminent possibility. And Vokuganov's

own words in describing the speech Stalin made on May 5, 1941. He says, quote,

the leader made an unmistakably clear war is inevitable in the future. One must be ready

for the quote, unconditional destruction of German fascism. The war will be fought on enemy

territory, and victory will be achieved with few casualties. And again, this wasn't something that

Stalin merely devised as a polemical device to embolden forces under his command or to

overcome any potential or actual crises of confidence among a general staff by appealed to a

revolutionary further. Lenin made clear in identifying the core doctrinal elements of the

Red Army. You know, back in 1929, 1921, 1922, that the Red Army was an instrumentality of revolutionary

imperatives. It wasn't a defensive element, you know, and it was to be deployed offensively at

all times. You know, because the only rational for its existence within the paradigm of Marx's

historiography and Lenin's revolutionary doctrine was to facilitate the advance of history and the

victory in the proletariat against the class enemy. So there's really no, there's really no way to

interpret Soviet-battle doctrine as anything other than discreetly, ideologically coded and exche thematically

offensive. You know, and this is going on or this is relying upon the strictures of Marxist

Leninist ontology and the distinct Marxist view of military power and its utility and its

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philosophical and political system. Impoverished as it may have been intellectually in various

capacities and to be fair, it was sophisticated in others. What's irrebutable or indisputable is

that it was a total theory of political and social and philosophical ontology.

So the idea that the party state, which to be clear by 1941, had categorically annihilated

millions of people within the Soviet Union, owing to what was identified as their

ineducability, you know, the idea that Stalin or the Presidium or the Politburo Standing Committee,

or the surviving command elements in the Red Army, the idea that they would somehow hesitate

to see through these doctrinal imperatives is somewhat laughable.

You know, and we're not in the court of law, so it shouldn't be a problem to

invoke subsequent, as well as prior precedent to demonstrate persuasively what the doctrinal

character was of Marxist Leninist Revolutionary Military Elements. I invoke the case of Cambodia a lot.

You know, from 1975 to 1979, and I know of a fact, because I get a hate mail with some fact

and things, people suspect I only do that for the sake of a polemical

expediency, but that's not why. Paul Pot was not some simple-minded brute. He was actually a

very sophisticated political soldier. He had a very deep understanding of Marxist Leninism, far

more than Mao, and Democratic Kempuchia, as Paul Pot and his cadre branded the country during

their brief tenure, was a very pure Marxist Leninist state in some ways, and there was nothing,

there was nothing heterodox in ideological terms about the way they implemented the

class warfare, adjusting for the discrete conditions on the ground in Southeast Asia.

As of 1975, so what I'm getting at, and I'll move on here in a moment, I don't quite understand

of the same people who acknowledged that the Soviet Union was this outlier country,

and that was unusual in every conceivable sense, in terms of praxis and policy and theoretical

foundations and everything else, yet they insist that this didn't somehow impact military

decision-making, or that revolutionary ontology somehow stopped at the point of executive

decisionism when it came to the decision to spread the revolutionary cause to Europe,

and specifically to annihilate the dialectical enemy in the German Reich, but

you know, the Stalin had

spoken again and again as well to the Central Committee, most notably on January 8, 1941,

and there was two high-ranking Air Force officers in attendance,

and Stalin apparently spoke directly of the ratio and algorithm that was necessary to defeat

the German Reich, according to the general staff, as well as his own calculations as had been

explicated to him by authorities that he trusted. He spoke on this particular day to quote

twofold superiority. He said that as had been explained to him twofold superiority is a law

of military science, meaning a two-to-one ratio, um,

contrary to the enemy, in offensive operations, you know, whether you're talking about rod numbers,

or you know, force multipliers, and variables tending to act as force multipliers that

magnify the effectiveness of offensive elements, you know, and Stalin stated openly that quote,

this is not a game, the time is approaching for military operations, twofold superiority is

essential, but greater superiority is even better, and he said that he spoke specifically of

the difficulty of traversing the Carpathians, and the need to designate at least 5,000 attack aircraft

in order to neutralize defensive positions that infantry and armor aren't going to be able to

readily traverse or into the terrain. Now, this is hugely important for reasons I'm going to get into

in a moment, okay, but from January of 41, specifically January 8 until, uh, May, you know,

only weeks before Barbarossa, Stalin talks again and again about waging military operations in

the Balkans specifically across the Romanian frontier and discrete exigencies that are presented

by waging war in that theater, okay. Um, in a lecture given in the spring,

I believe March of 41, but so how neglected to design an exact date, he, uh, addressed the Soviet

plenipotentiary representative in Belgrade, which, uh, at that time was under the

rule, uh, briefly, of, uh, a Chetnik junta, which in turn led to the, uh, German intervention,

and ultimately the, you know, bifurcation of, uh, the kingdom of Kroats, Serbs, and Slovenes,

but, uh, in addressing the plenipotentiary representative in Belgrade,

and, uh, select members of the Politburo, he said, quote, the U.S. Assar will only react at the

proper time. The powers of scattering their forces more and more, the U.S. Assar is therefore waiting

to act unexpectedly against Germany, and doing so, the U.S. Assar will cross the Carpathians,

which will act as a signal for the revolution in Hungary. Soviet troops will penetrate Yugoslavia

from Hungary, advance the Adriatic Sea, and cut Germany off from the Balkans in the Middle East.

Okay, so, what does this mean in, uh, both immediate tactical terms and how this impacted

the battlefield situation and Operation Barbarossa, as well as in broader strategic terms? Well,

I'll take up the latter question first, the latter aspect first.

The Soviet Union planned to assault Europe through Romania. By capturing Romania,

it could deprive Germany of essential access to petroleum reserves,

and also, let's commensurate with Soviet deep battle doctrine, which presuming, uh,

forces and being ratios that Stalin described as being, uh, you know, at least a two-fold advantage

and preferably double or triple that. Stalin basically was planning a deep battle,

like, pincer flanking maneuver across the entirety of the continent,

in the north through Sweden, and then, uh, down to, uh, assault, uh, Germany from the north,

and in the south, the main, uh, spare punks would be through Romania, and I'll get into it

in a moment. This is why the Army Group Center, Army Group South faced savage resistance,

and Barbarossa, Army Group Center was moving so fast. It was basically, like, faced with no more

than token opposition on the road to Moscow, which doesn't make any sense unless you understand

the deployment schema of the Red Army, which was totally offensive and concentrated in the south,

in a way that, uh, wouldn't, uh, be rational in a defensive, uh, oriented schema.

It's, uh, most, uh, most significant,

and everyone's I'm jumping around a bit, but, um, so please stop me if I'm not being clear.

Most significant, the Subaru of hypothesis, in terms of Stalin's declared intentions,

was probably what's kind of being known as the secret meeting

with the Poled Barrow, and, and the Soviet representatives of the Comintern, who had been called back,

presumably, to be availed, for the specific purpose of being availed to this speech.

On, um, August 19th, 1939, which obviously coincided with the assault and the Japanese at

Kelkin Gold, but, um, this was a surprise secret meeting, um, and it was unprecedented for the

Russian delegation of the Comintern to be called back. And another thing, Stalin didn't have a

lot of, was, he didn't have a lot of respect for the Comintern, I mean, in part because the,

his, uh, rigid command doctrine, he didn't, I mean, he wasn't comfortable with, uh,

an ideologically coded cadre structure, whereby, um, independent of Moscow, just doing an

effect of distance and, you know, remoteness, you know, he didn't, he didn't want some cadre,

making decisions, even superficially, on behalf of the Soviet Union, without his direct oversights.

Okay, but nonetheless, you know, the Comintern still had tremendous clout in 1939,

and especially coming off of, uh, the defeat in Spain.

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There was a real danger of a fracturing of, uh, you know, the, the broad international front,

red front. So this is highly significant. You know, uh, I guess what I'm getting at is that

Stalin wouldn't have called the Russian delegation back just for, you know,

they say, putting on airs or to stand on ceremony or something.

And this is when, I think I, excuse me, I think I briefly addressed this last episode.

It was in this, it was in this secret meeting or secret speech that, uh, Stalin declared that,

uh, you know, getting, uh, the Germans to a, getting the right foreign ministry to agree to,

a non-aggression pact, you know, that would embolden them to act against Poland.

You know, because there before the Berlin and specifically Hitler felt that his hands were tied

in resolving, uh, the Polish issue, because in assault on Poland, even in the wake of a gross

provocation or violation of Germany's territorial integrity on the frontier, you know,

what would lead to a Soviet counter strike that would be devastating. Um, so Stalin's reasoning was,

you know, we, we'll, uh, we'll allow Germany with this non-aggression pact,

which, you know, absolutely guarantees that they will assault Poland, which will then, you know,

lead to a war declaration by the UK and France. Uh, Germany will, uh, will probably be victorious

on the western front, but only at pirate cost, you know, and then, uh, you know, and this,

thus, this is the icebreaker, um, that, uh, will, uh, soften, uh, what would be Europe's defensive

cordon and allow the Red Army to, you know, just bowl over and annihilate resistance in the west.

Then, you know, thus, uh, reverse the, reverse the defeat, handed to them in Iberia and,

you know, conquer the continent in a, uh, rapid, uh, and devastating operation.

And I mean, Stalin, this is probably consistent as far back as 1925, you know, when he was less than

three years into his formal ascendancy as General Secretary, he spoke openly about

the need to act militarily against, uh, Europe as soon as possible, but,

not until the political climate and the, you know, the, the myriad,

it ever sort of changing alliance structure in the west, uh, was, uh, such that, uh, what,

what Stalin called a broad field of activity would be realizable in order to, uh,

you know, pursue the imperative of world revolution. And to be clear, you know, not only was, uh,

Europe, uh, along with America and Japan, you know, the kind of,

productive core of this planet, but, you know, the understanding was that,

Europe was still the, in conceptual terms, you know, the political center of human affairs,

you know, conceptually, you know, every, every, every ideological schema, you know, came from Europe and

even, even things like the anti-colonial movement were fully locked into dialectical, um,

engagement, you know, with, with, with European thought. So,

Stalin's notion was that, you know, first, last and always,

Europe needs to be overrun and annihilated and the revolution has to, has to

be implemented there. You know, it's a waste of time and it's self-defeating to pursue, uh,

such a comparison of periphery. Let me know my state, you know, wherever revolutionary activity

jumped off, that had historical momentum and forces in being, Stalin absolutely was in favor of

supporting that and seeing that through, but the, uh, but the core mission orientation of the

Soviet Union had to be, you know, the, the, you know, that implementing the world revolution in

Europe, you know, first and foremost. And, um, and that's also why the Spanish war was so important.

You know, it wasn't just, uh, I've read some court historians claim that Stalin somehow

like reluctantly forced into the Spanish war, it is for the sake of appeasing the common

turn. I mean, that's, that's laughable. We're all kinds of reasons, but it also,

you know, Stalin wasn't as heterodox of, uh, of a marvellous readiness that he's often portrayed.

I mean, Stalin was complicated, you know, like I said, I, it's a lean volume, but it's a great book,

Kerry Bolton's book, Stalin, the Enduring Legacy, you know, Stalin's a complicated figure,

and there were heterodox aspects to his, um, world view on his, his own veiled politic,

but it wasn't a radical divergence or something, you know, and, um, that's important,

especially because these days, even, even some fairly heterodox, political theorists, and, um,

um, even some revisionists seem to abide that, um, fiction. Um,

but yeah, the, you can't, in other words, this, you can't, you can't extricate the ambition of

the Sovietization of Europe from the, uh, existence of the Soviet Union itself.

You know, these, these, these ambitions were sent out on this, and that's, that's also why

the Cold War developed the way that it did in, in, in, in, fraudulent strategic terms.

But, um, you know, and I think, I can't remember if I mentioned or not, this speech and question,

you know, the August 19th, 1939 speech, it was obtained by, uh, the French, uh, news agency,

of us. And, uh, the, uh, the French were, uh, kind of notorious for getting a hold of

these kinds of, uh, documents and records. You know, um, and when, uh,

when the Havas agency, um, by way of, uh, Geneva, when, when, when they went public with it,

it was published, uh, in, uh, some international journal, and then in many of the major French

language newspapers, but Moscow's propaganda is immediately wanting to overdrive, you know,

and claiming, you know, this is a, this is a forgery, you know, this, this is, confedulated by the,

the enemies of Russia and the Soviet Union, you know, it's fascist propaganda. And, uh,

it did not make as nearly as big of an impact as one might think, you know, um, which is really

interesting, because it goes to show you, too, how, you know, and a lot of that, too, had to do with, uh,

this kind of deafening silence, um, from American news agencies, you know, and other than,

all the major papers in America, I mean, other than, those brands held by McCormick,

were basically, uh, mouthpieces for the New Deal regime, you know, but it's still, I mean,

obviously, too, I mean, this, there's a kind of nascent, low-tech globalism emerging,

at least between America and, um, year up by way of, you know, the UK, but even,

um, you know, I mean, it's just, it's, it's storming, it's remarkable that,

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There is basically no impact in, in terms of the global opinion. And, uh, I've looked to

to see if, uh, this pops up in any America first literature. And I haven't found anything,

this positive on that question. But that again goes to show you, too, the degree to which

the psychological environment was being actively manipulated,

you know, long before the onset of formal hostility, which might seem like an obvious point

to you or myself, but people are inundated in this country with this idea that, you know,

somehow the New Dealers had no interest in these goings on and the European war.

And, uh, the interest from the Soviet Union, the German Reich, you know, until Pearl Harbor,

when America was attacked, then they changed everything. I mean, that could not be more false.

From, uh, the first, uh, months of the New Deal regime, which again, coincided almost

precisely with, uh, the National Socialist Revolution, which was a totally legal revolution,

again, you know, and, um, Roosevelt from the first days of the administration

was pursuing a, uh, an absolutely radical, anti-fascist imperative as the core mandate of, uh,

in the ambition of his administration. You know, when they can't, uh, they can't be denied,

you know, in the, I don't want to spin this off too, um, tangentially. And I know that a lot of people

criticized me for my sources. Well, we, uh, they have, yet to directly bought, rebut any of these

data points that I've derived from these sources, namely, Robert Conquest, and, um,

Ernst Knowlty, and as well as the Black Book of Communism, which is a great resource,

I might add, but, uh, it's indistutable at the Soviet Union exterminated millions of people

between 1917 and 1941, and there was a massive series of death camps, actual death camps,

that, uh, were employed towards this incredibly gruesome task,

and the degree to which there was an information blackout about this reality can't be overstated.

You know, um, and people who raised this issue, you know, not just, not just America firsters, but,

um, Joseph Schumpeter's wife, interestingly, she spoke Japanese, and she was a big advocate for

Japanese people. She was kind of a human rights type, but of a genuine sort, not like the 21st century

sort. And, uh, she raised the issue of Soviet annihilation therapy, as Knowlty called it,

and she was, uh, Schumpeter were hassled by the FBI, both for, you know, sympathies for the

access vis-a-vis her, you know, uh, dealings with, with, with Japanese people and stuff,

and particularly Japanese people were being persecuted by the New Dealers, but also, uh, you know,

propagandizing against the Soviet Union in their view, was this big, um, subversive act.

You know, which seems kind of an incredible, I, I imagine, to people today, but

they don't, I mean, but it's, I mean, it only seems incredible if one doesn't accept the,

the true nature of, uh, of their regime, but that aside is remarkable, uh,

that agree to which these things could, in fact, be, um,

couldn't, in fact, be hidden, you know, um, but that also raised, I mean, there's also

oblique, and obliquely, and conversely. It also, it also begs the question,

and, you know, if, if there was this, uh, mass murder conspiracy,

hashed in, uh, the German Reich, Advonsi in 1942, like, why, why wasn't anybody, you know,

publicizing that? I mean, that one would think that would be a guy sent to the New Dealers,

and a, uh, perfect way to portray, uh, the Germans as, as, uh, these horrific villains.

And especially became imperative, you know, by, uh, 1944, as, uh, the US Army was quite

literally near mutiny, you know, which we've talked about. That was the real catalyst for the

execution of poor Eddie Slavik, you know, it's, um, people, so, uh, you know, the,

Walter Winchill and, uh, the Office of War Information, and all these myriad, uh,

Anglophone news agencies, they just decided not to report on the fact that,

the German Reich only existed to exterminate Jewish people, because they didn't think it was

important, you know, they didn't think it was a useful way to code propaganda. I mean,

that's like a bit tangential, but, um, moving on real quick, so we're running out of time.

I mentioned, uh, a moment ago, something that's often erased is, okay, so why, why was Barbarossa so

tactically, so tactically successful? And why was the attrition rate so algorithmically skewed

against the Soviet Union? If, in fact, the Soviet Union is mobilized for war and plan to attack,

but that's exactly why these things did develop that way. The Soviet for planning to assault

Romania by autumn of 41. Um, and that's exactly why, like I said, um,

Army Group South encountered comparatively savage resistance, and that's also why, uh,

that's also why there was a, there was powerful reserve at women's in Ukraine,

because essentially, uh, they were there rapidly reinforced the shock element that was going

to assault the Balkans. So there was this awkwardly unbalanced deployment schema of Soviet fuel

guarantees. Um, where, Soviet forces blocking the corridor to the Moscow letting grad deployment

space, they were exponentially weaker than those deployed to Ukraine, which doesn't make any sense,

unless you account for the fact that they were deployed in an offensive posture,

the spare point of which was, you know, in the south to assault Romania, do the Carpathians, um,

now don't be wrong. The Soviets were sensitive to the fact that

Moscow was being left relatively undefended, but, uh, you know, it doesn't, um, like, it doesn't

track any other way, other than to accept what it is to acknowledge. And it's also, you know,

again, this idea that's endlessly bandied to this day, that Stalin was afraid of Hitler,

or that the Soviet Union was afraid of the Vermok, it's like, well, I mean, okay, that's

preposterous anyway, but so Stalin was so afraid of the Vermok that he,

their base, he was a token deployment, um, on the, uh, path to Moscow.

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You know, I mean, how is that work? Any interpretation

is, you can only result in a conclusion that

the Soviets were poised for exclusive, we all offensive operations.

I mean, unless he can, it's a tortured panologic. I mean, I guess he could claim that

the Soviets wanted to draw the Germans in and funnel the main line of

the funnel into the main line of resistance at the gates of Moscow and stop them to triaxmen.

I mean, Moscow practically felt, you know, that doesn't make any sense. I've read

people who try to make some variation of that argument, but it's so preposterous. I don't

really think it warrants the kind of blow-by-blow rebuttal. But

that's really, you know, an example of extant conditions

speaking of itself. And the resistance that every group center did encounter to be clear,

they weren't defensively deployed either. There wasn't any depth to

their deployment schema. And they, in fact, were forward deployed with a heavily armed shock element

in the lead, you know, which is one reason why our group center, especially they didn't

counter resistance, they got hit with a lot of firepower that was immediately exhausted.

And then, when counter-attacking, the Vermont immediately broke Soviet lines because there

were, again, there wasn't any depth to the deployment. You know, if you know anything,

I'm not at all like a military type person, but I do know something about the internal logic of

modern warfare, you know, in an abstract deployment sense, I mean. And if you know anything

about this, it's just not even really deep diving into the numerical data points and stuff. But

it's literally looking at the map of the deployment schema. They should jump right out at you.

It's almost like, you know, it's like allusion pictures. You used to see them a lot, like beer companies

and it's like you look at some picture and it looks like a bunch of little pictures of spudged

McKenzie or something, but then you see it and it's like a sexy girl or something. And then once

you see that, like, you can't unsee it. It's like that, okay? I mean, you look at

you look at the deployment map of the Moscow-Wedding Red Gorky

battle space on June 22nd, 1941, and you realize like what it is. And then you can't unsee it.

You know, so the fact anybody who makes an argument to the contrary, I got to assume they're

being dishonest or they're just profoundly ignorant of the subject matter.

Yeah, it looks like we've gone a little over an hour. I hope that wasn't too scatter shot, man.

Let me, let me hit you up with one question before we go. And this is a little bit off topic,

but it's a question I wanted to ask since we were talking about Stalin so much.

Yeah. Did Stalin take half of Europe at the end of the war?

Or was he given half of Europe at the end of the war?

I mean, both. That's what was decided at Yalta. If Stalin was going to be precluded from

taking Germany, that meant that Eisenhower and Montgomery would have had to assault Berlin

and had they done that, what would have happened was even accounting for the

punitive and purely ideologically motivated and additional surrender demand.

The very mocked and often assessed elements would have basically welcomed them in because that

would have prevented the literal rape of a destruction of the German Reich.

And once it was clear that Anglo-American forces intended to take Berlin,

Stalin of immediately shifted to a footing of hostility

and finally captured the United States and the UK. And even before that happened,

it's conceivable that these elements that were driving for Berlin on the Soviet side,

like, first Ukrainian shock army, which I think was under Rockefeller.

I think first Ukrainian shock army was under Timo Shinko, but whoever, whatever formation,

Konev and Ravisowski, respectively, were commanding, it's very conceivable that

they would have ordered down to company level commanders to treat the US and the UK as entities

who were literally trying to race to Berlin as a to act as a blocking element in the Soviet

view for the Germans. So America would have followed itself at war with the Soviet Union.

That's the only alternative, but I mean that's what that, like I said, the thing was decided at

Yalta. It's, I mean, I don't, you can, on the one hand, yeah, it was the new dealers who

kept the Soviet Union in the war, but like Van Manstein, I highly recommend Van Manstein's,

it's marketed as his memoirs, it's called Lost Victories, but in reality it was his debriefing

by the war department, which obviously was very interested in learning as much as they could

about fighting the Soviet Union with conventional combined arms with an emphasis on armored columns,

obviously. Van Manstein, who really was like a kind of Prussian Martinette and a very prejudice guy,

he stipulated that the the Soviet army was unbelievably tough. They could absorb catastrophic

attrition and not fall apart, and much is in the Western world is we might

view their doctrinal orientation on the battlefield as exhibiting a kind of callous disregard

for human life. It was and is highly effective, and those things are all true. You can't really take

away from the game-ness and just the raw toughness of the Red Army, you know, so I'm not going to

sit here and say that, oh, Stalin was just handed a gift by, you know, the new dealers and

generalizing power, you know, because the Soviet Union fought for every single inch of ground

that they won back, and the attrition they endured is almost unfathomable.

Yet by the time they reached Berlin, their morale was great. They were acting like they were at a

party. I'm not being flippant. They were doing utterly horrible, horrible things. By my point,

being the enemy that arrived in Berlin wasn't some broken array tag for us. It was a very game,

very aggressive, very high morale element, which is one of the reasons why they were so dangerous.

Like, it's realistic and through Untergang, we're try to young, you know, she's trying to pass

through Soviet lines, and then like the kid runs up and grabs her hand, you know, so it's a really

point in scene, but there's these Soviet infantrymen, and they're like, Goslin Vodka and like

dancing like you're at a party. You know, these guys have just been in action for these guys probably

were the last, they were probably like the last element drafted. They were probably guys who turned 18,

you know, in January of 1945, you know, and then took, you know, like 80% casualties,

you know, and they're like the surviving element and they're acting like they're at a party.

You know, most people would have fallen apart, you know, even when they had that kind of momentum

in broad strategic terms, just because it was so brutal and so catastrophic. So yeah, I'm not

I'm not getting away from the Ivans in terms of their toughness and game this, but it,

you know, I erased a Berlin between Montgomery and Eisenhower and the Soviets would have meant war.

So that's the best answer I can give.

Awesome. All right. Well, I will encourage people to go over to Thomas' substack, that's real

Thomas777.substack.com, and you can connect to him from from there to anywhere that he's at.

Check him out on Twitter and make sure to subscribe to his substacks so you can get the episodes and

hear them. So yeah, that's a Thomas. This was a this was a great series. I thought this was a

series that needed to get out there, especially after reading after reading Suvorov and

getting a little of the way through Rothman and and having to finish Hoffman, it's just vital

information that people are you you're not going to hear even if you you exit court history.

This is stuff that's hidden and there's a reason why both of those books, if you want original

copies of both of those books, you're paying two three hundred dollars. Yeah. Yeah. No, I agree on

accounts. And yeah, thanks. Thanks for including me, man, or rather for inviting me to participate and

move with somebody else. That's just great. Absolutely. Thank you, Thomas. Take care, now.

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