Mega Edition: Bryan Kohberger's Motion To Suppress The Arrest Warrant And Denial (9/6/26)

0:00What's up everyone and welcome back to the program. In this episode we're going to get right back to the core documents up in Moscow, and this time we're going to take a look at Brian Coburger's motion to suppress and memorandum in support of the arrest warrant. Case number 124-31665 St. Avidaho Plaintiff vs. Brian C. Coburger the defendant Comes now, Brian C. Coburger buying through his attorneys of record, and hereby submits the following memorandum in support of his contemporaneously filed motion for an order suppressing all evidence gathered by law enforcement as a result of his arrest. Issues 1. This court should apply Idaho's exclusionary rule and law to this search, 2. Affidavits submitted in support of the application, 4. The issued search warrant recklessly or intentionally omitted material information. Mr. Coburger has filed a motion for a frank hearing and without repeating, incorporates that challenge to this search warrant.

1:013. The affidavits submitted in support for the application for the issued search warrant included information that must be excised. A. All information in the affidavit was gathered because of law enforcement's unconstitutional use of investigative genetic genealogy and thus nothing in the warrant should remain. B. Information about the client's location, taken from his phone, must also be excised due to being gathered from an invalid warrant. Facts. Due to the haphazard way in which law enforcement, including the prosecutor's office, has kept in disclose records in this matter, the following is a rough statement of facts as best the defense can tell. On December 28, 2022, Trooper Larry of Pennsylvania State Police became aware of the objective of arresting Mr. Coburger via Moscow Police Corporal Payne. On December 29, 2022, at 4.44 pm Eastern Standard Time, a magistrate in Pennsylvania issued a search warrant for 119 Lambsden Drive, Chestnut Hill Township, Monroe County, the home of Mr. Coburger's

2:05parents. On December 29, 2022, at 2.22 pm, the magistrate in this matter signed an arrest warrant for Mr. Coburger in Laita County. The affidavit for the warrant was signed by a Moscow Police Department Corporal Payne. The basic facts Corporal Payne used to support the arrest or discuss in detail in a separately file motion pursuant to Frank's Veriz del Lawyer. They're incorporated without repeating. At 2.43 pm, Pacific Standard Time on December 29, 2022, a criminal complaint and probable cause order were filed in this matter. At 10 pm Eastern Standard Time, Pennsylvania's SWAT began preparations to arrest Mr. Coburger. Despite days of constant FBI surveillance, Pennsylvania Law Enforcement did their own surveillance starting at 11.15 pm. And despite the fact that days of constant FBI surveillance showed Mr. Coburger was unarmed and tended to go for runs around his parents' neighborhood, police decided that forcefully entering Mr. Coburger's parents'

3:05home was the best option. On December 30, 2022, at 114 pm, Pennsylvania SWAT rated Mr. Coburger's parents' home. During the raid, law enforcement broke the door of the home held the entire family at gunpoint and seized Mr. Coburger. Mr. Coburger made statements to his arresting officers. He was transported to a police station in Stroudsburg, Pennsylvania and made statements during transport. At the station, Mr. Coburger was processed during which police collected information about his person. Finally, during interrogation, before requesting an attorney, Mr. Coburger made statements to interrogators from the Idaho State Police and Moscow Police Department. At 4 am Eastern Standard Time, on December 30, 2023, Pennsylvania State Police filed a criminal complaint against Mr. Coburger, the argument. One, this court should apply Idaho's exclusionary rule and law to this search. The first question this court must determine is whether there is a conflict of laws in this matter.

4:05I.e. whether Idaho law or Pennsylvania law controls the validity of the arrest warrant for Mr. Coburger. Pennsylvania courts require a warrant for a particular residence to go after a person police are aware has an arrest warrant. Commonwealth First Romero 2018. The need for a warrant for a fugitive from another state is codified in 42 Pennsylvania Code section 9128 and 9129. Without a governor's warrant, an officer can get a judicial warrant to permit entry into a home without either type of warrant and officer lacks this authority. C 42. Pennsylvania Code section 9135. This understanding also comports with Peyton, verse, New York 1980. State warrants have no extra territorial effect. State verse Bradley 106 Idaho 1983. The use of an out of state warrant is Ipsophacto a warrantless entry. The slant forcement in Pennsylvania cannot rely on the existence of the Idaho arrest warrant to enter the home. Finally, it must be said that there is very little daylight

5:10between the Idaho Constitution and the Pennsylvania Constitution. Both apply exclusion to a failure to knock and announce C. State verse Roush 99 Idaho 1978. If anything, Pennsylvania appears to have stricter warrant requirements for a particularity Commonwealth First Grossman, Pennsylvania 1989. Two, the affidavit submitted in support of the application for the issue search warrant recklessly or intentionally omitted material information. The fourth amendment states on ambiguously that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath of affirmation and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. Grow verse Ramirez 540 2004 quoting US Constitution amendment 4. Probable cause exists when given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place Illinois verse gates 1983 because the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there

6:14to be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion stands at the very core of the fourth amendment Kylo vs US 535 2001 quoting Silverman United States 365 1961 courts have firmly established the basic principle of fourth amendment law that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable for a search warrant to be valid the judge issuing the warrant must rely on an affidavit or affidavits sworn to before the judge or by testimony under oath and recorded that establish the grounds for issuing the warrant any discrepancy between the items for which there was probable cause and their description in the search warrant requires suppression Criminal procedure and rights of accused section 887 2022 It's clear that the issuing magistrate himself if he is to fulfill the constitutionally mandated function of inter-opposing and independent intelligence between the law enforcement officer and the citizen

7:16must actually and in fact draw the inferences from the evidence presented to him It is for this reason that the courts have insisted that the full facts from which inferences might be drawn and information necessary to determine their reliability be placed before the issuing magistrate Finally a criminal defendant may challenge the veracity of an affidavit used to obtain such a warrant upon a preliminary showing of a warrant's deficiency the defendant must prove by a preponderance of evidence that intentional or reckless falsehoods were included in the warrant affidavit and were material to the magistrate's finding of probable cause or that material excolpatory information was deliberately or recklessly admitted An omission of excolpatory facts is material only if there is a substantial probability that the omitted information been presented it would have altered the magistrate's determination of probable cause whether an omission was intentional or reckless might be inferred in part for the relative importance of the information and its excolpatory power

8:21Idaho at 48, 981 at 1158 The challenge pursuant to this section of the motion is separately laid out in Mr. Coburger's motion for hearing under Franks the motion and prof error incorporated but not repeated herein Three the affidavit submitted and supported the application for the issued search warrant included information that must be excised Where information and a warrant was obtained via a violation of the constitution Idaho courts That information See State vs Johnson 1986 State vs. Bunting 2006 State vs. Butterball 2002 A all information in the affidavit was gathered because of law enforcement's unconstitutional use of investigative genetic genealogy and thus nothing in the warrant should remain Mr. Coburger has argued in a separate motion that the genetic genealogy investigation in this matter was done in violation of the constitution. Additionally he has argued that there

9:22would be no investigation into them without that original constitutional violation. It is not that the results of the IGG sped up the investigation. Instead they focused the investigation on Mr. Coburger, a person whose only connection to the case was his motor transportation and the shape of his eyebrows to identifications of little to no value as previously argued. As the Idaho Supreme Court has explained while the initial burden in showing a factual nexus between illegality and the evidence the state must show it would have been discovered anyway. State vs. Maws 171 2022 The state cannot make this showing. Without IGG there is no case no request for his phone records or valence of his parents home no DNA taken from his garbage out front because the IGG analysis is the origin of this matter everything in the affidavit should be excised. B. Information about the client's locations taken from his phone must also be excised due to

10:24being gathered from an invalid warrant. Separately the information gathered via the warrant from Mr. Coburger's AT&T account and the pen trap and trace device warrant should be excised for the reasons set out in the warrants. Conclusion Mr. Coburger requests this court suppress all evidence obtained by police via the warrant that permitted them to arrest Mr. Coburger. As explained above law enforcement fell to knock and announced before raiding the home and the warrant lack probable cause is written given its heavy reliance on conclusions reached by law enforcement without the details necessary for the magistrate to draw its own conclusions and because the warrant omitted excolpatory information and information that put into question the reliability of the facts upon which it relies and finally because the affidavit relied on evidence gained in violation of the Constitution all in violation of the Fourth Amendment and Article 1 Section 17. This document was dated November 13th, 2024 and it was signed by Anne Taylor. All of the information that goes with this episode

11:28including my contact information can be found in the description box. What's up everyone and welcome back to the program. In this episode we're going to get right to those orders by Judge Hiepler and we're going to start out first with the order on defendant's motions to suppress arrest warrants, Pennsylvania warrants, apartment warrant and Idaho warrant to search person. State of Idaho plaintiff vs. Brian C. Coburger the defendant. Introduction defendant is charged with one count of burglary and four counts of murder in the first degree in connection with the stabbing desk of four University of Idaho students in the early morning hours of November 13th, 2022. On December 30th, 2022 he was arrested pursuant to a warrant at his parents home in Pennsylvania. At the time of his arrest, Pennsylvania authorities executed search warrants for defendant's person vehicle and his parents home. Around the same time a fifth warrant for a search of defendant's

12:31Pullman Washington apartment was issued by a Washington magistrate. After defendant was transported back to Idaho, law enforcement obtained the sixth warrant for a search of defendant's person. Through six different motions defendant seeks suppression of evidence gathered by law enforcement through these warrants on several grounds. His argument for emotions have largely been disposed of through the court's contemporaneously filed orders still remaining. However, is one whether suppression is warranted due to law enforcement's failure to not can announce in executing warrants at the Coburger residence and two whether defendants post arrest statements are suppressable as fruit of the poisonous tree and or due to a Miranda violation. A suppression hearing on the portion of defendant's motions that issue in this order was held on January 24th, 2025 during which the court received testimony from detective Corp. Rolbret Payne and detective Lawrence Mowry both from the Moscow Police Department. The court found both

13:34detectives to be credible and reliable. Following argument, the court took the matter under advisement. The court finds suppression is not warranted because one exigent circumstances excuse the abbreviated knock-and-announce and two defendant is not established to Miranda violation. Two standard the standard review of emotion to suppress is bifurcated. The power to assess the credibility of witnesses resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence and draw a factual inferences is in the trial court. State Valdes Molina 127 Idaho 102 106 897 p.2d 993 997 1995. Trial court's ruling on emotion to suppress evidence combines the issue of law and fact and the trial court's factual findings will not be overturned unless they are clearly erroneous. State vs. Cohnat 143 Idaho 797 799 153p.3d 477 479 2007

14:40When a decision on emotion to suppress is challenged the application of constitutional principles to the facts found will be freely reviewed. State vs. Venerozo 138 Idaho 925 928 71 p.3d 1072 1075 2003 Finding effect On November 13, 2022, an officer from the Moscow Police Department responded to a residence located at 1122 King Road in Moscow, Idaho, where he discovered the bodies of Madison Kaeligan Solviz, Ethan Chapin and Zana Kernodol. Each appeared to have been stabbed to death. The investigation that ensued was a multi-agency affair involving members of the Moscow Police Department, the Idaho State Police and the FBI, among others. Defendant who was a Ph.D. student at Washington State University in Pullman, Washington emerged as a suspect in the investigation. On or around December 16, 2022, defendant left his Pullman apartment and drove to his parents' home

15:44located at 119 Lambsden Drive in All Bridesville, Pennsylvania, where he remained. On or about December 28, 2022, the FBI and Moscow Police Department requested assistance from the Pennsylvania State Police in their investigation, specifically in obtaining and executing warrants. As part of this assistance, PSP reviewed reports and affidavits prepared by the Moscow Police Department, including a probable call statement prepared by Detective Brett Payne, outlining the circumstances of the crime and the investigation to date. On December 29, 2022, a criminal complaint and probable cause order were filed in this action and the LaTah County Magistrate issued a warrant for a defendant's arrest. See, defense exhibit B to Lambsden's Motion. The same day, PSP applied for and obtained three search warrants from a Pennsylvania Magistrate, one for 119 Lambsden Drive, two for a defendant's person, and three for a defendant's vehicle,

16:48which was believed to be parked in the garage of 1119 Lambsden Drive. The search warrants were supported by the affidavit of probable cause of Trooper Justin Larry, to which was attached Detective Payne's probable call statement. See, defense exhibit A to Lambsden Motion. Later that day, PSP received the signed arrest warrant issued by the LaTah County Magistrate. Late in the evening on December 29, 2022, PSP ended special emergency response team cert prepared for the execution of the warrants. Detective Payne was present briefly to observe the final preparations, but then departed to prepare for defendant's arrival at the PSP police station. It was Detective Payne's understanding that PSP and cert were preparing for a knock and an ounce entry. During their final preparation, cert snipers set an umbrella around the residents to monitor any activity they're in while the helicopter monitored from overhead in the event defendant exited

17:49the residents. At 12.33 a.m. snipers observed a kitchen light turn on and saw a taller, young, white male wearing a black hoodie standing near the glass sliding door, leading out to the deck. At 12.40 a.m. the same person was seen again. This time officers were able to positively identify the person as defendant. At 12.55 a.m. the light turned on in the garage where defendant's vehicle was believed to be part. At 103 a.m. lights flashed in the garage as if the vehicle was being locked or unlocked by a key fob. At 109 a.m. the defendant was seen in the kitchen at of the home this time wearing rubber gloves and handling a plastic baggy. Based on these observations, law enforcement believed defendant was potentially destroying evidence from the vehicle that was related to the homicides. Law enforcement was also aware that defendant possessed a lock handgun, prompting a concern over officer safety due to the defendant's heightened mental state of awareness or threat level of police possibly tracking them. Thus law enforcement made the decision to

18:54shorten the knock and announce when executing the warrants. At approximately 114 a.m. cert made announcements from a bearcat parked in the driveway of the residents. Immediately following announcements cert effectuated a forced entry into the residents. Defendant was arrested without incident in a bedroom. His vehicle was located and secured in the garage. Once apprehended defendant was handcuffed and placed in a police vehicle. See state exhibit S6 to Lamb's in objection. He was notified that he was in a police vehicle and being audio and video recorded which he acknowledged. While awaiting transport defendant informed law enforcement that he unloaded the lock 22 handgun in the residence by his bed. During transport defendant engaged in small talk with the accompanying officers. When defendant expressed at one point that he wanted to know what was going on with his arrest, law enforcement told them investigators were going to speak with them at the station about the situation. The details of the investigation were not discussed

19:56with defendant. Once they arrived at the station defendant was escorted into the processing room to await interviews with detective pain which occurred ten minutes later. Defendant was then informed of his Miranda rights and an interview subsequently began. Conclusions of law. There are two issues before the court. One, whether law enforcement felt a comply with the knock-and-announce rule in executing the warrants at 119 Lambsdon and two, whether defendants post arrest statements are suppressable as fruit of the poison is tree and or due to a Miranda violation. The state contends law enforcement abbreviated knock-and-announce was justified by exigen circumstances and further defendant statements are not suppressable since there is no poison is tree and because he has not demonstrated any incriminating statements were made while under interrogation the state is correct. A law enforcement did not violate defendant's rights and executing the Pennsylvania warrant. A applicable law.

20:58Defendant contends that law enforcement's failure to fully comply with a knock-and-announce rule and executing the Pennsylvania warrants violated his rights under the Pennsylvania and or Idaho constitutions. While he contends Idaho law should be applied to law enforcement's actions under a conflict of law analysis he recognizes at the same time that there is very little daylight between Idaho and Pennsylvania law on the issue. Likewise the state notes that there is little difference between the two on knock-and-announce and therefore does not take a position on what law should apply. The court finds it unnecessary to choose what law should apply given their virtual identity. Defendant is not asserting his Fourth Amendment rights were violated, though not cited by either party this is likely because the United States Supreme Court has held that violation of the Fourth Amendment's knock-and-announce requirement does not require suppression of evidence. Huts in verse Michigan 547 US 586 2006. All right we're going to wrap up right here and in the next episode we're

22:02going to finish this bad boy off. All of the information that goes with this episode can be found in the description box. What's up everyone and welcome back to the program in this episode we're picking up where we left off with Judge Hibblers order on the motion to suppress warrants from Pennsylvania and other searches. Idaho's knock-and-announce statute requires police to announce their presence, purpose and authority before entering someone's home. I see section 19-4409 and 19-611. These requirements are also imposed by Article 1, section 17 of the Idaho Constitution, State Verse Rouch 99, Idaho 586 593 586p.2d 671 678 1978. In Rouch however the Idaho Supreme Court adopted an exception to the rule for exigent circumstances. While the court caution that such exigencies are to be determined on a case-by-case basis, it did set forth general circumstances

23:06under which exigent circumstances may be found, including one reasonable belief that compliance with a knock-and-announce statute would result in destruction of evidence or two a reasonable relief that compliance would place the officer in peril. In addition the court said fourth six factors to consider when determining whether exigent circumstances exist. One, the gravity or violent nature of the offense with which the suspect is to be charged. Two, whether the suspect is reasonably believed to be armed. Three, a clear showing of probable cause. Four, a strong reason to believe the suspect is in the premises to be entered. Five, the likelihood that the suspect will escape if not swiftly apprehended. And six, the peaceful circumstances of the entry. The court further explained that exigent circumstances could include those immediate circumstances where a defendant may be armed, where evidence may be easily and immediately destroyed, where a defendant may escape, or where a defendant has engaged in furtive conduct.

24:12Once it is determined, defendant's rights have been violated by police entry into a residence, suppression of evidence resulting from the entry is required under Idaho's exclusionary rule. Pennsylvania's knock-and-announce rule is set forth in its criminal rules and is imposed under Article 1, Section 8 of Pennsylvania's Constitution, prohibiting unreasonable searches. The officer may break open an outer or inner door or window of the house, or any part of the house, or anything therein to execute the warrant if, after notice of his authority and purpose, he has refused admittance. I see Section 19-611. To make an arrest, if the offense is a felony, a private person, if any public offense a peace officer may break open the door or window of the house in which the person is to be arrested, or in which there is reasonable grounds for believing him to be, after having demanded admittance and explain the purpose for which admittance is desired. Rule 207-P-A-R-Crim-P

25:15A law enforcement officer executing a search warrant, shall before entry, give or make reasonable effort to give a notice of the officer's identity, authority, and purpose for any occupant of the premises specified in the warrant, unless exigent circumstances require the officer's immediate forcible entry. Pennsylvania courts recognize four exigent circumstances justifying dispensing with the rule. One, the occupants remain silent after repeated knocking and announcing, two, the police are virtually certain that the occupants of the premises already know their purpose, three, the police have reason to believe that an announcement prior to entry would imperil their safety, or four, the police have reason to believe that evidence is about to be destroyed. Commonwealth vs. Frederick P.A. Supreme Court 2015. These circumstances are viewed under an objective standard, looking only to the facts and circumstances with which the officers are faced at the time, they act on their decision to dispense with the knock and announce.

26:18Commonwealth vs. Walker 874-A.2-D 667-673. Pennsylvania Supreme Court 2005. As an Idaho, a violation of Pennsylvania's knock and announce requirements results in suppression. As applied to the facts here, there are no substantive differences between the knock and the announced standards under Idaho law and Pennsylvania law. Consequently, the court need not determine what choice of law applies. It is undisputed that law enforcement executed and abbreviated knock and announce prior to entry into 119 Lamston. According to the state, however, compliance was excused by exigent circumstances, namely law enforcement's belief defendant was destroying evidence of the crime and that compliance with knock and announce would have placed officers' safety in jeopardy. The defendant argues that these are not true exigencies. He notes that he was surveilled by law enforcement prior to the execution of the warrant and that there is no evidence he

27:18is seen with weapons. Such officers shall wait or response for a reasonable period of time after his announcement of identity, authority, and purpose unless exigent circumstances require the officer immediate forcible entry. If the officer is not admitted after such reasonable period, the officer may forcibly enter the premises and may use as much physical force as to affect entry therein as is necessary to execute the search. Defendant contends that in the days prior to the execution of the warrants, law enforcement had seen defendant go for runs around his parents' neighborhood, given these observations, defendant posits that there is no reason to arrest him inside the house. Lambsden motion page 10. However, defendant cited to know evidence of law enforcement's observation in this regard. The only evidence this court could locate is from the search warrant application for the Pennsylvania warrants, where a PSP trooper Larry states that the investigators began

28:18physical surveillance of the property and area of 119 Lambsden Drive, Chestnut Hill Township, and in the early morning hours of Tuesday, December 27, 2022, observed Brian Colberger walking near his residence. In furtherance of this argument, defendant cites to state-versromos, where the Idaho Court of Appeals held that the executing officers' belief that the home contain large amounts of marijuana was not alone sufficient to justify the officer's breaking down the door five seconds after knocking and announcing. Such a rule the court observed would impermissibly create a blanket exception to the knock-and-announce rule which Roush sought to avoid. The court further found that the officer's exposure in approaching the home did not justify the violation, observing that nearly all residential homes have exposed front aspects. Defendant also relies on Commonwealth first-kitchner, where a Pennsylvania court found exigent circumstances where officers were executing an arrest warrant, upon a fugitive with a history of

29:19violence, a propensity for fleeing from police, and who was reputed to like guns, machine guns in particular. The officers knocked and announced herd-running footsteps within the residence, and believe the man was trying to escape or harm himself, forcibly entered the home. The court found that given everything the officers knew prior to executing the warrant, the forceful entry was justified. The defendant points out that unlike in Kitchener, law enforcement had no knowledge that defendant had a prior criminal history, a reputation for violence, or was a gun officiant auto. They did not see him with a weapon, and therefore there was no reasonable basis to fear for their safety. At most he argues law enforcement had non-descript fears such as those presented in Ramos. There are two infirmities in defendant's argument, however, first he entirely ignores the destruction of evidence, which is what law enforcement relied upon greatly in dispensing with the knock-and-announce requirement here. The evidence demonstrates that while preparing to execute the warrants, law enforcement identified the defendant in the early morning hours

30:22as he turned on a light in the kitchen, and then proceeded into the garage, where his vehicle was believed to be parked. Law enforcement was aware that defendant was suspected of having driven that vehicle during the commission of the homicides, and knew it could contain evidence. Law enforcement then saw the vehicle lights flash in the garage as if a vehicle was being unlocked or locked. Immediately afterwards they saw a defendant again in the kitchen wearing rubber gloves and handling a plastic baggy. Further it was 109 AM in the morning, a time when most people would not be removing items from their car with rubber gloves. These observations gave rise to the reasonable belief that perhaps aware of law enforcement surveillance defendant was destroying or secreting evidence of the crimes. Second, compounding the concern of the potential destruction of evidence, there was an equally compelling concern that a knock-and-announce could pose the serious danger to law enforcement. Law enforcement had reviewed the investigation reports and probable cost statements provided by Idaho detectives. The executing officers knew defendant based on

31:27compelling evidence was believed to have orchestrated and unprovoked and exceptionally brutal quadruple homicide with a knife. They had information he was in possession of a blockhand gun. They knew he was in the residence awake potentially aware of law enforcement's presence and potentially destroying evidence or perhaps retrieving his gun or a weapon from the vehicle. His vehicle was in the garage nearby, thus giving him means of a quick escape, while prior to allegedly killing four people defendant may not have had an extensive criminal history or general reputation for violence as did the defendant and kitchener. It does not mean law enforcement's safety concerns were unreasonable given what they knew. When these circumstances are collectively considered the court finds law enforcement was well justified in making an abbreviated announcement and forced entry, thus suppression is not warranted. Be, defendant has not established he was interrogated when he made unidentified statements. Defended next argues any statements he made the

32:29law enforcement prior to being maran diced must be suppressed either as fruits of the poisonous tree or as Miranda violations. Having determined the execution of the warrants at 119 Lambsden was valid the question is whether there was a Miranda violation. The court finds that there was not. Pursuant to Miranda and its progeny to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, police must inform individuals of their right to remain silent and their right to counsel either retained or appointed before undertaking a custodial interrogation. The term interrogation includes not only expressed questioning but also its functional equivalent. The functional equivalent of interrogation includes any words or actions on the part of the police other than those normally attendant to arrest in custody. That the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. Custody is determined by whether there is a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.

33:32The state does not dispute defendant was in custody when first detained. However, there is no evidence before the court that defendant was interrogated at any point from his arrest at the time he was formally interviewed by Detective Payne at which point he was maran diced. The sole evidence that the defendant engaged in small talk with officers with the only exception being when he was briefly asked about his arrest and was told that investigators were going to speak to him at the station about the situation. Voluntary or spontaneous statements or questions unprompted by interrogation fall outside the scope of Miranda. Consequently, there is no basis for suppression. Conclusion based on the foregoing, the court denies the following. Defendant's motion to suppress Pennsylvania warrant for 119 Lambsden Drive. Defendant's motion to suppress arrest warrant November 14, 2024. Motion to suppress Pennsylvania search warrant for White Hyundai Alontera bearing Vin number 5 NP DH 4 AE 6 F H 7 9 8 6 0 November 14, 2024.

34:41Defendant's motion to suppress Pennsylvania search warrant for Mr. Coburger's person. Defendant's motion to suppress search warrant for defendant's apartment. It's so ordered, dated this 19th day of February 2025, and this was signed by Judge Hippler. And like I was saying earlier, we have several more orders to dive into, so we're going to get cracking on that as well. All of the information that goes with this episode can be found in the description box. What's up everyone and welcome back to the program. In this episode, we're headed back up to Moscow and we're going to take a look at a few motions that were filed in Lemanay by the defense. And all of these motions have to do with inflammatory evidence. Case number CR01-24-31665 state Idaho plaintiff, first Brian C. Coburger the defendant. Motion in Lemanay number 1. Inflammatory evidence comes now Brian C. Coburger buy and through his attorneys of record

35:43and hereby moves the court for an order preventing the prosecution from introducing irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial photographs, testimony, and other exhibits and violation of his right to a fair trial protected through the 5th, 6th and 14th amendments of the United States Constitution and Section 1 Article 13 of the Idaho Constitution. Such rights are protected through application of Idaho criminal rules and Idaho rules of evidence. Mr. Coburger respectfully requests this court, order the state to not try the case through eliciting testimony and other evidence that is exceptionally inflammatory. Presenting the case in an emotional and inflammatory way is unfairly prejudicial. Any probative value is less than the danger. Additionally, the prosecution should not present the same information in a variety of ways, which is misleading or accumulative and a waste of time. IRA 403 states, although relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is

36:44substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. The case contains over 68 terabytes of data. This data contains thousands of photographs. Many depict roughly the same content. There are photographs that depict the deceased as well as the same location without the deceased. Multiple officers took photographs of the same areas. Additionally, there are many hours of body-worn camera footage. Body-worn footage depicts the officer is moving throughout the house. There are hundreds of photographs of autopsy proceedings. In addition to this evidence, over 100 officers and investigators have been involved. In the case, and hundreds of people that have been interviewed. Mr. Colberger seeks to protect the integrity of this trial, and requests an order preventing inflammatory evidence, including testimonial

37:45evidence to be excluded. Appeals to emotion, passion, or prejudice of the jury through use of inflammatory tactics are impermissible. State Vs. Phillips 144 Idaho 82 87 156 p.3 d 583 5588 See also State Vs. Bab 125 Idaho 934 942 877 p.2 d 905 913 1994 State Vs. Ellington 151 Idaho 53 253 p.3 d 727 2011 Mr. Colberger acknowledges the Idaho Supreme Court, has held that a photograph cannot be excluded, merely on the basis of being gruesome State Vs. 121 Idaho 850 1992 However, Mr. Colberger is not making that motion. Rather, he is requesting that the state be prevented from introducing inflammatory evidence. Multiple studies have found that mock jurors are

38:46more likely to convict when exposed to graphic photos. Kevin S. Douglas, the impact of photographic evidence on mock jurors' decisions in a murder trial, probative or prejudicial, 21 law, and human behavior 45 through 501 1997. Groose of evidence and emotion, anger blame and jury decision making. Other studies have shown that judicial instructions to ignore such evidence are ineffective, while some have actually found such instructions, cause jurors to place more emphasis on that evidence. Joel Lieberman and Jamie Amt, understanding the limits of limiting instructions, social psychological explanations for the failures of instructions to disregard pretrial publicity and other inadmissible evidence. David A. Sklansky, evidentiary instructions and the jury as others 65 standard review 407 2013. Michelle Cox and Sarah Tantford, effects of evidence and instructions in civil trials and experimental investigation or rules

39:52of admissibility Emily R. Edwards and Karen E. Motorella, preserving the right to a fair trial and examination of prejudicial value of visual and auditory evidence. Saul M. Casson and David A. Garfield, blood and guts, general and trial specific effects of videotape crime scenes on mock juror verdicts. Mr. Coburgers, right to a fair trial free from irrelevant, cumulative and unfairly prejudicial evidence, as guaranteed by the Constitution of the state of Idaho and the United States of America would be violated to allow exhibits depicting gruesome details or the emotional reactions of the police officers at the scene or during their testimony during trial. This document was dated February 24th, 2025 and it was signed by Aunt Taylor. Alright, moving on to the next document, this one is motion in lemon A number three, the user of the term murder. Case number 0124-31665. State of Idaho plaintiff,

40:58first Brian C. Coburger, the defendant. Comes now, Brian C. Coburger, by and through his attorneys of record and hereby moves the court for an order, prohibiting the use of the words murder, murderer, murdered, murder weapon, and similar forms of the word murder applied to Brian Coburger during the trial of this matter. This motion is not seeking a prohibition on the use of the word murder or its varying forms in the charging document or jury instructions. This motion is made pursuant ICR 47-IR-403-701-702, the 5-6, and 14th amendments to the United States Constitution and Article 1 Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution. Whether the killing at issue are murder as allegedly committed by Brian Coburger or by an alternate suspect or someone still unknown is the ultimate issue. Each side will present this very argument of the jury. It's a matter of fact to be found by the jury after the court instructs the jury with the

42:00applicable instructions to label Mr. Coburger as a murderer, the alleged weapon consistent with an empty sheath as a murder weapon, or to assert that any of the four decedents was murdered by Mr. Coburger denies his right to a fair trial and the right to be presumed innocent. IRE 403 allows exclusion of evidence that is unfairly prejudicial to a party by analogy the same principle should apply to terminology that is unfairly prejudicial. The use of the word murder during the course of the trial is unfairly prejudicial in that it asserts a factual and legal conclusion of the evidence of determination which is left to the jury. The prosecutor, law enforcement and medical examiner are viewed with authority and respect by most jurors. When person with authority speak, lay people tend to believe their statements and conclusions. If the prosecution and or its witnesses use these words in its case in chief, it would improperly imply to the jury that it's the prosecutor or witnesses believe or opinion that the defendant is guilty of murder. This is in proper

43:07opinion testimony under IRE 701 through 704. It's improper for the prosecution to express a personal belief unless the comment is based solely on inference. Expert testimony that concerns conclusions or opinions that the average jurors qualified to draw from, the facts utilizing the jurors' common sense and normal experiences inadmissible. State V. Ellington 151 Idaho 53 66 253 P.3 D727 740 2011 Mr. Coburger requests an order prohibiting the lawyers and witnesses from using the words murder, murderer, murdered, murder weapon as well as a derivative form of the word murder. This document was dated February 24th, 2025 and this was also signed by Anteiler. All right moving on to our final document for this episode, we have the motion in Lemonae number four using the term psychopath or sociopath.

44:10Case number CR01-24-31665 state Idaho plaintiff versus Brian C. Coburger the defendant. Comes now, Brian C. Coburger buy through his attorneys of record and hereby moves the court for an order prohibiting the state from name calling. Specifically this motion seeks to bar the use of the terms psychopath and sociopath. This motion is made pursuant to ICR 47-IR-403701 through 704, the fifth, sixth and 14th amendments to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution. IR-403 allows exclusion of evidence that is unfairly prejudicial to a party. By analogy the same principle should apply to the terminology that is unfairly prejudicial. These are the words psychopath or sociopath during the course of the trial is unfairly prejudicial. See attached to affidavit of John Edens. This is in proper opinion testimony under IR-701 through

45:16704, neither term is a proper diagnosis and is unequivocally unfairly prejudicial. Mr. Coburger requests in order prohibiting the lawyers and witnesses from using the word psychopath and sociopath. This document was dated February 24th, 2025, and this document was signed by Ann Taylor. All right folks that's going to do it for this one. All of the information including my contact information can be found in the description box.