Mega Edition: Diddy Moves To Dismiss The Lawsuit Filed By Thalia Graves (Part 3-4) (3/27/26)

What's up everyone and welcome to another episode of the Diddy Diaries. In this episode we're

going to write back to Diddy's motion to dismiss the lawsuit filed against him by Talia Graves.

2. GMVL Revival Provision is preempted because it conflicts directly with the CVA and the ASA.

Staylaw preempts the GMVL Revival Provision for the separate and independent reason

that its Revival window conflicts directly with the ASA and CVA. Conflict preemption occurs when a

local law prohibits a state law explicitly allows or when a state law prohibits what a local law

explicitly allows. Matter of Schwick vs. Mulvey 81 AD 3D 161 168 Second Department 2010.

The CVA and the ASA apply to expire GMVL claims, C-E-G-C-P-L-R, section 214-G-214-J,

applying to every civil claim or cause of action for injury, suffered as a result of conduct,

which would constitute a sexual offense. SA vs. Bell, number 950279 2021-2023, New York Court,

December 14, 2023. Discussing GMVL claim brought pursuant to CVA, as such the ASA permitted previously

timebar GMVL claims to be brought only between November 24, 2022, and November 24, 2023, C-P-L-R

section 214-J, whereas the GMVL Revival Program purported to permit the revival of previously

timebar GMVL claims only between March 1, 2023, and March 1, 2025. NYC Admin, section 10-1105A,

the ASA thus is unambiguously inconsistent with the start date of the GMVL Revival window,

because the ASA specifically permits the conduct the local law does not. Bringing GMVL claims between

November 24, 2022, and March 1, 2023, Parker 2025, WL268-8436-3,

the ASA's end date is likewise inconsistent with the GMVL's Revival Provision, which purports to

permit conduct prohibited by state law by extending the GMVL claim revival period for an extra 15

months from November 2023 until March 2025. Looked at differently, the GMVL Revival Provision

can also be read to forced all claims under the ASA because the GMVL's Revival Provision

did not allow for claims to be filed before March 2023, whereas the ASA permitted such claims to be

brought as early as November 22, 2022, at 4. The inconsistency is even more pronounced between

CVA and the GMVL Revival Provision, because the CVA Revival Window closed before the GMVL Revival

Window even opened, the GMVL Revival Provision impermissibly allows the Revival of GMVL claims

by minor victims wholly outside of the Revival Window allowed by the CVA. Compare CPLR section

214G with NYC admin code section 10-1105A. As a result of the misalignment in the GMVL's Revival

Window on the one hand the ASA and CVA's Revival Windows on the other hand the GMVL Revival Provision

conflicts with the ASA and CVA's express provision that plaintiff bring claims pursuant

to those statutes temporal parameters, notwithstanding any provision of law which imposes periods

of limitation to the contrary. The conflict here between state law and local laws especially

pronounced and significant because it arises in the context of CPLR Revival. When the legislature

has intended to revive time-barred claims it is typically said so unambiguously, provided a

limited window when stale claims may be pursued. Regina Metro Company LLC vs New York State Division

of House and Community Renewal 35NY3D332371 2020. As Judge Kaplan concluded plaintiffs interpretation

which would allow local law to open and close the Revival Window without regard for the ASA

and CVA's prescribed Revival Windows we can flick with the legislature's creation

of such a limited window. Parker 2025 WL268-436 at 3. The GMVL Revival Provision, therefore,

cannot stand. As Judge Kaplan observed in Parker in black the court did not address whether the ASA

and the GMVL's Revival Window conflicted nor did it address the plain language of the CVA

and ASA both of which apply notwithstanding any provision of law which imposes a period of

limitation to the contrary. Parker 2025 WL268-436 at 4. Alteration in Original, quoting CPLR

Section 214G and 214J. In light of this language and for the reasons that

Judge Kaplan concluded that black court reasoning that the CVA and the GMVL's Revival

Provision did not conflict because they further the same goals and were both enacted

to further civil rights causes of action was insufficient to hold that conflict preemption

does not apply. Quoting black 2024 WL-433-5453 at 7. Further more to the extent that there's any doubt

the ASA and CVA preempts GMVL's Revival Window that doubt must be resolved in favor of preemption

because Revival is an extreme exercise of legislative power and uncertainties are resolved against

consequences so drastic. Regina Metro Company LLC 35 and Y3D at 371

To balance this extreme exercise of legislative power and its upsetting of the strong public policy

favoring finality predictability fairness and repose served by the statute of limitations

the state legislature provides only a limited window when stale claims may be pursued

ID at 371 and 72. Here the New York state legislature made the deliberate choice to revive

stale claims arising from sexual misconduct only for a limited period of time pursuant

to the CVA and ASA. A local law cannot be permitted to upset that policy determination

by creating an enlarged Revival Window for claims covered by the ASA and CVA's Revival Windows.

For these reasons the GMVL claim must be dismissed as untimely. For the reasons stated above

the courts should follow Judge Kaplan's well-reasoned decision and Parker and hold that the CVA

and the ASA preempt the GMVL's purported Revival Window on both field preemption and conflict

preemption grounds and dismissed plaintiffs GMVL claim with prejudice as time-bard.

Two, plaintiffs to revenge porn claims are time-bard. Based on her implausible and vague allegations

about a videotape she has never seen, plaintiff also seeks to recover damages pursuant

to New York City Civil Rights Law Section 52B, the State Revenge Porn Statute, and New York City

administrative code section 10-180, the NYC Revenge Porn Statute, and together with the state

Revenge Porn Statute collectively, the Revenge Porn Statutes, plaintiff came under each statute,

is time-bard, and therefore must be dismissed with prejudice. Because the NYC Revenge Porn Statute

does not provide a statute of limitations, it is subject to the default three-year statute

of limitations at 4th in CPLR Section 214-5, which as relevant here provides that an action to

recover damages for a personal injury must be commenced within three years. As the practice

commentaries to CPLR Section 214-5 may clear, the date of injury or cruel rule applied to CPLR-214-5

does not include a discovery component. That the injury suffered may not be perceived until

much later provides no escape from the statute, Vincent C. Alexander, practice commentaries McKinney

Khan's Law of NYCPLR-214-5. Similarly, claims under New York State Revenge Porn Statute

must also be brought within three years of the alleged dissemination or publication. NYC Civil Rights

Law Section 52-B-6NA. Here are plaintiff alleges falsely that Mr. Combs and Chairman made the

video in 2001, and that the video was allegedly disseminated shortly after the alleged assault

in 2001. Accordingly, her claim expired in 2004, years before she filed the lawsuit,

as such, plaintiffs claim as long since expired, and her cause of action pursuant to the NYC Revenge

Porn Statute is time-barred. While the State Revenge Porn Statute, unlike the NYC Revenge Porn Statute,

permits claims to be brought within a year of the date on which plaintiff discovers or reasonably

should have discovered the publication, plaintiff self-serving, and implausible allegation that she

learned of the purported video for the first time in November of 2023, should not operate to extend

the accrual date, because even accepting that assertion is true, plaintiff does not plead that

she actually discovered the dissemination or publication of such image at that later date or

ever. Indeed, even as of the filing of her amended complaint, she concedes she has never actually

discovered any such image. Plaintiff's allegations that the purported video was disseminated it again

on later unidentified dates in unidentified manners are two impossibly vague and

concludes read a warrant consideration for purposes of determining a later accrual date.

All right folks, we're on a wrap up right there, and in the next episode we're going to finish

this bad boy off. All of the information that goes with this episode can be found in the description

box. What's up everyone and welcome to another episode of the Diddy Diaries. In this episode,

we're going to write back to Diddy's motion to dismiss the amended lawsuit filed against him

by Ashley Parham. Three, plaintiff fails to state claim for violation of her avenge porn

statutes. The allegations in the amended complaint should also be dismissed because they failed to

state claims under the avenge porn statutes. Over roughly the past decade, so-called

revenge porn statutes have been passed in a number of states and municipalities to combat the

abuse of use of digital media and intimate partner relationships. See Declaration of Erika A. Wolf

dated March 18, 2025, Wolf Declaration, example New York City Council Committee on Public Safety

Report on the governmental affairs division on proposed introductory bill number 1267-A

November 1, 2017, at 2, here and after the committee report, explaining revenge porn is often

used as a form of domestic violence where abusers use the threat of disclosure to keep their

partner under control and fulfill the threat once their partner leaves. A quintessential

example of revenge porn is an abusive domestic partner who threatens the disclosure of

intimate images to gain control over their partner. To state a claim under the state's

revenge porn statute of plaintiff must plead that one, she was depicted in a still-or-video image,

two, the image was published or disseminated by a person for the purpose of harassing annoying

or alarming the plaintiff, and three, she had reasonable expectation that the image would remain

private. Four, the image depicts unclothed or exposed intimate parts of her or her engaging in

sexual conduct, and five, the image was published for dissemination without her consent. See NYC Civil

Rights Law Section 52B1. Similarly, to state a claim under the NYC revenge porn statute,

a plaintiff must plead that one, defendant disclosed two, an intimate image, three, with the intent

to cause economic, physical, or substantial emotional harm. To the plaintiff, four, the image was

disclosed without plaintiff's consent, and five, the plaintiff is identifiable in the image.

CNYC Admin Code Section 10-180B1. Thus both statutes require one, the dissemination of visual

media in which plaintiff is identifiable, two, plaintiff is depicted in an unclothed

or sexual manner, three, the image or video is disseminated without the plaintiff's consent,

and four, the image video is disseminated for the purpose of harassing the plaintiff or causing

the plaintiff financial, physical, or emotional injury. CNYC Civil Rights Law Section 52B1

NYC Admin Code Section 10-180B1. In order to sufficiently plead such claims, a plaintiff cannot

merely assert each element, rather she must identify actual conduct that gives rise to a reasonable

inference that each element has been met. For example, in Mirrorverse Harder Evans, the plaintiff

pursuant to Section 52B alleged that the defendant disseminated intimate images of her on social media.

Mirrorverse Harder Evans 177 AD 3D 426 427 First Department 2019. In affirming the lower courts

dismissal of the complaint, the appellate division found the plaintiff's allegations on availing

because she fell to a ledge that she had personal knowledge of defendant disseminating intimate

images of her, with the intent to harass or annoy, and her allegations work in cluzary and inherently

incredible. Courts in the Second Circuit likewise routinely dismiss claims that rely solely on

concluzary and unsupported factual allegations. CEG Raderman vs. Pierre Fabre USA 651F.SUPP 3D 657 671

SDNY 2023. Dismissing privacy claim under New York Rights Civil Law, where the plaintiff

fell to a ledge, except in concluzary fashion, that the defendant was involved in any of the

impermissible uses of her likeness, SPAC vs. New York 15F4594606 Second Circuit 2021.

Affirming district courts dismissal of complaint asserting claim for intentional

inflection of emotional distress, where the complaint levels only concluzary allegations

that the plaintiff suffered emotional distress. Plaintiffs' concluzary,

implausible, and vague allegations about the existence of a tape she has never seen,

whose contents she does not describe, and whose existence was unknown to her until she became

aware of a much publicized settlement against Mr. Combs in November of 2023. Do not establish

the requisite element of the revenge porn statutes. First, the foundational element of the statutes,

that is, the existence of a video of plaintiff allegedly being sexually assaulted 24 years ago.

Rest entirely on the sole allegation that in November 2023, following the speedy settlement

of a much publicized lawsuit against Mr. Combs, plaintiff's former boyfriend,

the same one who has reported that plaintiff offered to bribe him $3 million to corroborate

her allegations, purportedly told her that he had seen a video of her being assaulted by defendants.

The amended complaint does not allege that plaintiff has ever seen a recording of any alleged

assault on her. It does not allege the length of any such recording or describe what is depicted in it.

Moreover, while plaintiff alleges concluzary in her cause of action section while reciting the

elements of the cause of action, that plaintiff was fully identifiable in the video,

ID at 81. There are no facts alleged in her pleading to support her conclusion to the contrary,

the facts alleged including that plaintiff never seen any video undermined it.

See Mark Griffin, Diddy Acuser, ex-boyfriend claims he was bribe to corroborate her story,

Vib, October 9th, 2024.

Alligations like these are nothing more than formulaic recitations of the elements

of the cause of action that court routinely reject as insufficient. Bell Atlantic

Corporation 500 US at 555. Second, even if plaintiff had adequately pled plausible facts giving rise

to an inference that such a video existed, she is not. Her claims would still be deficient

because her allegations that Mr. Colmes distributed such a video with intent to harass her cause

her harm are impermissibly concluzary, including because they rely on improper group pleadings.

Plaintiff merely alleges in classic boilerplate that both defendants disclosed and disseminated

the alleged video to harass annoy alarm and humiliate plaintiff and to cause her economic physical

and or substantial emotional harm. And that they intentionally publicly humiliated plaintiff,

AC, 84, see also ID 4771 and 83. Such allegations do nothing more than recite the elements of the

cause of action and are the sort of allegations that courts in the second circuit routinely dismiss

as deficient, CEG spec'd 15 f.4 at 606, affirming a district court dismissal of complaint,

a certain claim for intentional inflection of emotional distress where the complaint levels

only concluzary allegations that the plaintiff suffered emotional distress.

They are also impermissibly lumped both defendants together, failing to identify any alleged

conduct undertaken by Mr. Colmes to support the serious accusations. See, Bardwell Industries

Incorporated vs. Kennedy. Number 19, CV 8211 NRB 2020, SDNY May 27, 2020, dismissing claim for

breach of fiduciary duty where allegations in the complaint impermissibly lumped defendants

together without providing any factual basis for distinguishing among them.

Elias vs. New York number 10, CV 5495 SLT 2010, WL, EDNY December 30, 2010.

Dismissing complaint that attributed discrimination retaliation and disparate treatment generally

to defendants without distinguishing their individualized conduct. See also Nesbith vs. New York

City Management, LLC, SDNY January 4, 2019. It's well established in this circuit that plaintiffs

cannot simply lumped defendants together for pleading purposes. Quoting canon, USA Incorporated

vs. F&E Trading, EDNY September 29, 2017. While plaintiff alleges and plausibly that

her ex-boyfriend told her in November of 2023 that he had watched her purported recording some 20

years earlier, she does not alleged that Mr. Combs disseminated it to him and while she

conclusively asserts that on unspecified dates thereafter defendants widely disseminated a video,

evidencing their apparent commission of a serious crime, the amended complaint does not

alleged where, when, to whom, or by what means such video was purportedly distributed by Mr. Combs.

Nor does plaintiff alleges Mr. Combs ever confronted plaintiff with any such video,

or otherwise look, or took any such action directed at her over the decade since the tape was purportedly

made. See, generally AC. Absent some alleged conduct purportedly reflecting Mr. Combs did

something to make plaintiff aware of such a tape, even assuming one existed, which it did not.

Plaintiff does not come close to meeting her burden of pleading facts that reasonably give rise to

an inference that Mr. Combs published any such video for the purpose of harassing, annoying,

or alarming, NY Civil Rights Law Section 52B1, or causing economic, physical, or substantial

emotional harm to the plaintiff NYC Admin Code Section 10-180B1. See, Tantaros,

First Fox News Network, SDNY May 18, 2018, dismissing claim for inflection,

of emotional distress where plaintiff is not alleged sufficient, non-concudiary facts,

showing that defendants acted with the intent to cause plaintiff severe emotional distress.

In short, there are no allegations of conduct by Mr. Combs that give rise to a reasonable inference

that a video of an alleged sexual assault on plaintiff exists let alone that Mr. Combs

was responsible for disseminating it as revenge porn or to harass or harm the plaintiff who,

according to the amended complaint, has not had any contact with Mr. Combs whatsoever

since the alleged day in question. As such, the amended complaint does not state a claim under

the NYC or state revenge porn statutes. Conclusion. For all the reasons set forth above, Mr. Combs

respectfully requests that the court dismiss the amended complaint in its entirety with prejudice

as to him and grant such other and further relief as the court deems just improper.

This document was dated March 18, 2025, and it was signed by Ericka Wolf.

All of the information that goes with this episode can be found in the description box.