Mega Edition: Judge Hippler Makes A Ruling On The ATT Warrant And The Hyundai Warrant (9/6/26)

0:00What's up everyone and welcome back to the program. In this episode we're going to keep it rolling and take a look at some more core documents up in Moscow. And this time we're taking a look at Brian Coburger's motion to suppress and his memorandum support of that suppression of the first AT&T warrant. Case number 1 24-31665. Stated by the whole plaintiff, first Brian C. Coburger the defendant. Brian C. Coburger, by and through his attorneys of record, and hereby submits the following memorandum in support of his contemporaneously filed motion for an order suppressing all data found by law enforcement from its search of his AT&T account. Issues Mr. Coburger has a privacy interest in his AT&T account information protected by Article 1, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution, and by the Fourth Amendment. Section 2, the Affidavit Submitted, and support of the application for the issued search warrant recklessly or intentionally omitted material information and fails to provide probable

1:04cause for the requested search. 3. The search warrant fails to provide specific particularization of what law enforcement could search and seize in Mr. Coburger's AT&T account. 4. The Affidavit Submitted and Support of the Application for the issued search warrant included information that must be excised. A, all information in the Affidavit was gathered because of law enforcement's unconstitutional use of investigative, genetic genealogy, and thus nothing in the warrant should remain. Facts On December 23, 2023, Corporal Payne of the Moscow Police Department requested a warrant to search the contents of Mr. Coburger's AT&T account for information regarding his phones' whereabouts between November 12, 2023, and November 14, 2023, as well as messages and phone calls during that period. The Affidavit for the warrant was signed by Corporal Payne, the basic facts Corporal Payne used to support the search or discussed in a separate motion for Frank's hearing

2:07pursuant to Frank's first Delaware and are incorporated but not repeated here. The Affidavit requested one, all customers' subscriber information, including any listed addresses, other listed telephone numbers, social security numbers, date of birth, names and addresses, any other customer identifying information, mobile handset or device identifier serial numbers, activation date, and deactivation date, and point of purchase or location device was purchased if applicable. To device purchase information, this is specifically to include the date, time, and location of where the device or any prepaid refill cards were purchased, as well as any information maintained by the purchase to include store name, store number, terminal number, and amount of purchase. 3. Any email addresses associated with the account or with the device that is currently on file and stored in the normal course of business of the service provider.

3:074. Call detail records, including detailed information and reference to all known outgoing and incoming calls associated with the account, dates and times calls were made, and duration of all calls made or received. This is to include any other pertinent call detail, records including special feature codes or any other codes that are maintained in the normal course of business for the service provider. Of any cellular numbers identified in the course of the investigation, in addition to voice calls, this will also include any detailed records showing text messages, MMS messages, or data activity. In the event, the requested call detail records contain other service provider customer numbers, identified as either incoming or outgoing calls, the service provider will provide subscriber information to the specific numbers identified if requested. 5. Cell site information to include all known cell towers associated with outgoing and incoming calls. This information is to include any sector information as a move for each

4:09identified sector, cell site location, handoff tower and sector, time on tower information, and any other related material that would be necessary to identify the location and sector in reference to the cell site information associated with the call detail records. In the event, text messages, MMS messages, data activity including IP sessions, and destination addresses that were produced, these records are also included in this request. 6. Cell site locations for all service provider cell sites. Sector information including asmode headings in the regional market associated with the requested cell site information. 7. Location information to include any estimated or known longitude and latitude of the cellular devices current location or approximate location, information received by cell towers in reference to direction and distance from the tower a device may be located, timing, and triangulation information. Radio frequency signal strengths, direction, and transmission

5:14information. The geographical constraints of location information will be limited to the United States. 8. Location information can be in the form of the historical records. This would include any reports of device activity that would include the approximate latitude and longitude of the device at the time of the activity. Estimated margin of error, direction and distance from the tower, and other location related information, commonly referred to as real time tool, timing advance information, location database of record. This further includes any other reports similar in nature that would provide an estimate of the cellular phone on the service provider's network. 9. All text messages and or MMS messages, including message content, currently stored in the normal course of business for the service provider to include any cloud services which allow for the long term storage of both voicemails and SMS sims messages. 10. Cloud data. Any content that may have been backed up to the cloud storage

6:17dates and times. If said cloud storage has been provided by a third party provider, please provide relevant contact information for that provider. In the exhibit attached to the warrant, however, law enforcement indicates only wanting historical phone records between the hours of November 12th in 2022 at 12 a.m. and November 14th, 2022 at 12 a.m. as well as prospective phone records. The argument won. Mr. Coburger has a privacy interest in his AT&T account information protected by Article 1, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution and by the Fourth Amendment. Both the Fourth Amendment and Article 1, Section 17, protect people's interest in privacy. A person challenging a search has the burden of showing that he or she had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the item or placed searched. That involves a two-part inquiry. One, did the person have a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the challenge search and two, a society willing

7:19to recognize that expectation as reasonable. Here at stake are records of a telephone account and the records the state sought included. One, identifying information about account owner and their devices. Two, device purchase information. Three, email addresses associated with the account. Four, call detail records including text messages and data activity. Five, cell site information. Six, historical location information. Seven, cloud data. The Fourth Amendment has generally refused to acknowledge a privacy interest in records held by a corporation about communications they facilitate. Every circuit to have considered the question has held that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in a phone service provider's records of the phone number he has dialed or from which he has received calls. However, in Carbender versus US 585, the Supreme Court declined to extend the Third Party doctrine to historical cell site records

8:19and cell site location information, CSLI. In this matter, Corporal Payne specified his request that the purpose for gathering the information from the AT&T records was to aid and determine the location of the A458 phone and the White Alontera in efforts to determine whether the White Alontera is the same vehicle identified in the surveillance videos. Pursuant to Carbender to the extent that information was being gathered for the movements of the vehicle, Mr. Coburger has a privacy right protected both by the Fourth Amendment and Article 1, Section 17. In the wake of Carbender in the courts recognition of the abundant records maintained on everyone in modern society, it's questionable whether the Third Party doctrine is still good law. However, this court need not consider whether the Fourth Amendment needs updating because I know who has already recognized an expectation in the privacy of whom we dial and the content of text messages we send. See State V. Thompson, 114 Idaho, 1988 State V. Branagh, 155 Idaho, 2013

9:26Therefore, to collect the records law enforcement requested in this matter, it had to have a valid warrant. 2. The affidavit submitted in support of the application for the issued search warrant, recklessly or intentionally omitted material information. The Fourth Amendment states on ambiguously that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath of affirmation and particularly describing the place to be searched, the persons or things to be seized. Grover's Ramirez, 2004 probable cause exists when given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. Illinois vs. Gates, 462 1983 For a search warrant to be valid, the judge issuing the warrant must rely on an affidavit or affidavit sworn to before the judge or by testimony under oath and recorded that established the grounds of issuing the warrant. Any discrepancy between the items for which there was probable cause and

10:30their description in the search warrant requires suppression. Criminal procedure of rights of the accused 887 2022. It's clear that the issuing magistrate himself, if he is to fulfill the constitutionally mandated function of inter-posing an independent intelligence between the law enforcement officer and the citizen, must actually and in fact draw the inferences from the evidence presented to him people vs. Batura 1979. It is for this reason that the courts have insisted that the full facts from which inferences might be drawn and information necessary to determine their reliability be placed before the issuing magistrate. Finally, a criminal defendant may challenge the veracity of an affidavit used to obtain such a search warrant, state vs. Peterson. 133 Idaho 1999. Upon a preliminary showing of a warrant's deficiency, the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that intentional or reckless falsehoods were included in the

11:31warrant affidavit and were material to the magistrate's finding of probable cause or that material exculpatory information was deliberately or recklessly omitted. Peterson 133 Idaho 981 at 1157. An omission of exculpatory facts is material only if there is a substantial probability that had the omitted information been presented it would have altered the magistrate's determination of probable cause. Whether an omission was intentional or reckless might be inferred in part from the relative importance of the information and its exculpatory power, the challenge pursuant to this section of the motion is separately laid out in Coburgers' motion for hearing under Franks. The motion and proper incorporated but not repeated herein. All right, we're going to wrap up right here and in the next episode we're going to pick up with part three. The search warrant fails to provide specific particularization of what law enforcement could search and seize in Mr. Coburgers' AT&T account. All of the information that goes with this episode can be found in the description box.

12:37What's up everyone and welcome back to the program. In this episode we're going to pick up where we left off with Brian Coburgers' motion to suppress the first AT&T search warrant. Three, the search warrant fails to provide specific particularization of what law enforcement could search and seize in Mr. Coburgers' AT&T account. The fourth amendment and article one, section 17 of the Idaho Constitution do not permit a cell phone to be searched, incident to arrest. Riley versus California 573 US 373 2014. Rather the police must seek a warrant. A warrant, however, is not a magical wand that grants access to anything a cell phone contains. As the Supreme Court found cell phones can contain enormous amounts of information that is private and may not be viewed by the government, Riley 573 US at 403. Courts have long required that warrant be sufficiently particular to allow a government agent to know what may be seized, viewed, or searched, and what may

13:40not be. See state versus yoder 96 Idaho 1975. A search warrant must be particular enough so that as to what is to be taken nothing left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant. Marin versus United States 275 US 192 48 Supreme Court 74 76 72 231 237 1927. However, this statement is not to be read literally state versus whimer 133 Idaho 2008 Wayne versus LaFave search and seizure 4.6 at 605 fourth edition 2004. Instead the warrant must enable the searcher to reasonably ascertain and identify the things which are authorized to be seized. United States vs Cook 657 F.2D 735 circuit 1981. See also United States vs. Benton Court 734 F.2D 750 11 circuit 1984.

14:43The specific evil that the particularity requirement guards against is the general warrant abhorred by the colonists and the problem is not that the intrusion per se but of a general exploratory rummaging in a person's belongings. Whimer 133 Idaho at 449. A warrant accomplishes this objective by requiring a particular description of the things to be seized. The warrant for Mr. Coburgers AT&T account lacks appropriate particularization. It lists all the following that could be found in the account. All identifying information of the account holder. All information about the creation of the account. All information about the accounts maintenance. All call records. All text messages. MMS messages or data activity. The devices historical and prospective locations. And data now in the cloud. The warrant and the affidavit are not only all-encompassing. They are duplicative, often repeating things to be searched and seized. The only limitation in scope is that the property be related to the homicides in this matter.

15:48Jurisdictions across the nation agree that such broad warrants are problematic but found that trying to fix that issue via more particularized warrants has its own issues. Still, this case presents a warrant that is overbroad under the longstanding principles of article 1, Section 17 of the Fourth Amendment. First, this court should review what Idaho courts have already held about particularity in state-versus called Dero, 109 Idaho 80, 1985. The Court of Appeals found the requirement of probable cause and particularity serve different purposes. There are two distinct constitutional protections served by the warrant requirement. First, the magistrate scrutiny is intended to eliminate altogether searches not based on probable cause. The second distinct objective is that those searches deemed necessary should be as limited as possible. Here, the specific evil is the general warrant abhorred by the colonists and the problem is not the intrusion, per se, but of a general exploratory rummaging in a person's belongings. The warrant accomplishes the

16:53second objective by requiring a particular description of the things to be seized. In our review, the particularity requirement is as important today as it was to the framers of the Fourth Amendment. It protects all citizens from unduly brought intrusions upon the privacy of their persons, houses, papers, and effects by government agents. As noted by one distinguished authority, if the police, upon obtaining entry to a house under a search warrant, were permitted to seize any item, regardless of its connection with crime and regardless of whether they knew the item was on the premises, the requirement that a warrant particularly describes the items to be seized, and that only items for which probable cause exists be seized would be meaningless. An effect will warrant to enter the premises to search would be a general warrant in actual execution, if not in form. In that case, the court considered a filing cabinet not mentioned in the warrant. The state argued that the cabinet cannot be searched under the plain view doctrine. The court disagreed

17:55holding, more fundamentally, the Fourth Amendment does not condense the seizure of a container, such as the file cabinet, which is outside the scope of any warrant, and which bears no outwardly apparent connection with any crime, simply for the purpose of searching it later. However, the court also noted in Dicta, we have considered the possibility that Caldera's personal papers inside the file cabinet might have furnished the necessary link to criminal activity. It would have been punishable for the officers to look inside the cabinet for items, such as a manuscript listed in the search warrants, had they done so the personal papers would have been discovered. To be clear, what the court held was that the warrant controlled the discretion of the officers performing the search as to what was to be seized, but not what might be searched to locate the items listed. Consider the practicalities of what the court has held. If it's not listed in the warrant, it cannot be seized, but you may search your heart's content for the things listed in the premises named, then try to compare this to searching a cell phone. In the words of the

18:59Supreme Court, that is like saying, riding on horseback is materially indistinguishable from a flight to the moon. Modern cell phones as a category implicate privacy concerns far beyond those implicated by the search of a cigarette pack, a wallet or a purse, a conclusion that inspecting the contents of an arrestees pocket's works, no substantial additional intrusion on privacy beyond the arrest itself may make sense as applied to physical items, but in any extension of that reasoning to digital data has to rest on its own bottom. In US, first comprehensive drug testing in Incorporated 579 F.3D 989 1176 9th Circuit 2009 the court found the pressing need of law enforcement for broad authorization to examine electronic records so persuasively demonstrated in the introduction to the original warrant in this case creates a serious risk that every warrant for electronic information will become in effect a general warrant rendering the Fourth Amendment

20:01irrelevant. This concern grew in the aftermath of Riley with a number of jurists, CEG State Vs. Mansor 421p.3D 323 345 Wheeler vs. State 135 A.3D 282 299 in the words of one, of course Riley requires that officers first get a warrant 573 US at 403 34 Supreme Court 2473, but if the facts that the arrestee was carrying a cell phone at the time of arrest is sufficient to support probable cause for a search, then the warrant requirement is merely a paperwork requirement. It cannot be Riley's holding is Sol Hollow US vs. Morton 46F 331 2022 Higginson C.J. Conkrain and State Vs. Castanola the court rejected that in the case of a computer it was enough to state the offense charged and the items to be searched for. In that case the search warrant commanded a computer to be searched for records and documents which have found will be

21:05seized and used as evidence of and provided the crimes alleged. The court found that a search warrant that includes broad categories of items to be seized may nevertheless be valid when the description is as specific as the circumstances and the nature of the activity under investigation gas vs. lease 255 F.3D 325 336 6 circuit 2001 quoting United States vs. Henson 848 F.2D 1374 through 1383 6 circuit 1988 quoting United States vs. Bloom 753 F.2D 999 111 circuit 1985 Warrant that failed to describe the items to be seized with as much specificity as the government's knowledge and the circumstances allow are invalidated by their substantial failure to specify as nearly as possible the distinguishing characteristics of the goods to be seized. United States vs. Fucilo 808 F.2D 173 1987

22:10The court then found that the warrant failed to test into respects. First it left to the discretion of the investigator what was relevant to the crimes alleged second it made no attempt to delineate the types of files the court be relevant to what the police believed they would find in that particular case. Evidence that the defendant had made an online search of his alleged victims addresses in those circumstances there was no reason to go looking at videos and pictures. Thus returning to our analogy the Ohio Supreme Court found that the warrant failed as to where category and what description of the file sought. As the court noted the where and what can be named with more specificity based on what is known to law enforcement. In this case the first thing to be seized was data, complication relating to or containing information indicating suggesting or related to violence of fight or emotive hostility for any of the same. But then it permits the entire contents i.e. every category of data on the

23:11cell phone to be searched. The limiting description of the data is not repeated in the remaining eight requests to search categories of data. Therefore in the case at bar law enforcement was certainly capable of greater specificity in both instances but instead gave itself an overbroad mandate permitting a complete access to everything from Mr. Coburger's phone. Another example of the court cracking down on overbroad digital warrants is Wheeler versus State. In Wheeler investigators used a warrant with several parts including one explaining terminology, one explaining that digital information basically never become still and one settling out the facts of the case and explaining that additional emails or text messages. The warrant however commanded law enforcement to collect any device that contained data and any data found there on. The Delaware Supreme Court found the warrants overbroad. All right folks we're going to wrap up right here and in the next episode we're going to finish this bad boy off. All of the information that goes with this episode can be found in the description

24:14box. What's up everyone and welcome back to the program. In this episode we're going to pick up where we left off with Brian Coburger's motion to suppress the first AT&T warrant. The court began by recalling the hatred of the colonists towards general warrants at 297. The court then noted that the United States Supreme Court had found that warrants for the digital contents of a cell phone gave the government access to more information than a house. The court acknowledged the difficulties in specifying what categories of data or assault when criminals are known to hide data and files. The court then reviewed both US vs. Recardi 405 F.3D at 852, 10th Circuit 2005, and Castanola noting in both cases the court's found digital warrants overbroad where no limitation was included as to what disease. The court then held we hesitate to prescribe rigid rules and instead reiterate that warrants must designate the things to be searched and seized as particularly as possible.

25:19Striking the correct balance when protecting against generality and overbreath requires vigilance on the part of judicial officers who are on the front lines of preserving constitutional rights while assisting the government officials in the legitimate pursuit of prosecuting criminal activity. Whereas here the investigators had available to them a more precise description of the alleged criminal activity. That is the subject of the warrant such information should be included in the instrument and the search and seizure should be appropriately narrowed to the relevant time period so as to mitigate the potential for unconstitutional exploratory rummaging. The court went on in Dicta to note the various other inconsistencies with that what the government knew it was looking for and its overbroad demand, ID at 306 and 07. The Wheeler case is important to this case not simply for the concept of a temporal limitation on the information to be sought, but for the principle that the government must make the warrant as particular as it knows how to make it.

26:22In the case at bar the government is investigating a quadruple homicide in Idaho. Does it make sense to see if there is some hint at wanting to fight someone from two years prior, five years, ten? What if everything else that may be relevant to what police knew? The K-Bar and the Alantra. For that matter, what of the victims themselves? Their sororities and fraternities. The warrant could have specified what was to be seized, but it did not. The court and Wheeler condemns government attempts to cast two broad and net under these circumstances. Recently in Georgia, their Supreme Court determined that a warrant for digital contents of a cell phone that permits the police to seize every bit of data is on constitutionally lacking in particularization in a murder case like the one at bar. In that case, the court upheld the suppression of the fruits of a warrant where the magistrate issued a warrant that authorized a forensic search of Wilson cell phones to be completed in order to obtain any and all stored electronic information, including but not limited to user account information, stored phone

27:25information, images, text messages, videos, documents, emails, internet activity, call logs, contact information, phone book, or any deleted data. The warrant further included preprinted form language stating the foregoing described property items, articles, instruments, and persons to be searched for and seized constitute evidence, connected with the foregoing listed crimes and is R. Check all that are applicable. The swearing officer then checked four boxes on the preprinted form indicating that investigators believed the cell phones were intended for use in the commission of crimes, here in described, used in the commission of crimes, here in described, tangible or visible evidence of the commission of the crime set forth above, and intangible or invisible evidence of the commission of the crime set forth above. This code section does not reference criminal activity, instead it lists the process by which law enforcement and officers must abide when seeking a warrant. The government acknowledged the

28:27breadth of the warrant but claimed it was particularized. The court disagreed, finding that there was nothing limiting about the language in the warrant, as the state acknowledged the search warrant broadly authorizes the seizure of any and all stored electronic information on the phones, including but not limited to various kinds of electronic information. The state points to the preprinted form language following the sweeping authorization and the law enforcement, however, the language clearly states that the foregoing describe property, that is, any and all stored electronic information on the phones, constitutes evidence connected with the crimes. This language cannot plausibly be read, as the state suggests, to limit the otherwise limit list authorization to search for and seize any and all data that can be found on Wilson's cell phones. The Georgia Supreme Court went on to note that it would likely have upheld the warrant had it merely limited the search to digital evidence pertaining to the commission of murder. More noteworthy than finding a warrant that failed to limit what sort of evidence was to be seized

29:31was overbroad, was the concurrence of Justice Peterson, which five other justices joined, Georgia Supreme Court has nine justices. Justice Peterson found the Supreme Court, and Andreson, Maryland, 1976, held only that otherwise particularized warrant was not made unconstitutionally general by the presence of residual language. Instead, the residual clause had to be read in the light of the language before it, for 27 at 2737. But the inverse does not follow the logic of Andreson does not support the idea that an otherwise general warrant lacking particularity in the places to be searched or things to be seized can be saved by this sort of boilerplate language. Taking the warrant in this case as example, a warrant that fails to give any parameters for a forensic examination of cell phones is not narrowed by the empty assurances that the search will only be looking for evidence of a particular crime. Perhaps the search warrant may once have been sufficient

30:32when cell phones had a fraction of the functionality and storage capacity they do now, but today a caveat that the search is limited to evidence of a particular crime might narrow the object of the search, but it gives little or no clarity to an officer as to where to look, for what to look, or how to look for it. This misstep may have stemmed from a slight ambiguity in the wording of Reeves. We held that the residual clauses in the search warrant's at issue in this case limit the items which may be seized to evidence of cruelty to children and murder. In context, that meant that the residual clauses themselves were limited to evidence of those crimes. CID, but it's easy enough to see how one might mistakenly read the language specifically the direct object items to mean the list of items preceding the residual clauses, and indeed that seems to be what we've done in recent years. The concurrence in Wilson is worth noting in this case because the residual clause in this warrant, if it exists at all, comes in the opening paragraph. But as the concurrence notes,

31:36this residual clause does not truly do much to keep the warrant from becoming a general warrant. If anything, it merely shows how much more particular the warrant could have been had it been done correctly, most recently in people of his carcin. Michigan, 2024, the court found the warrant lacked particularization where the warrant was a general warrant that gave the police license to search everything on the defendant's cell phone in the hopes of finding anything but nothing in particular that could help with the investigation. This warrant did not place any limitations on the permissible scope of the search of defendant's phone, the only hint of specificity was the opening reference to the investigation of larceny and a building in safe breaking. But this small guardrail was negated by ensuring instruction to search for such items by searching and seizing the entirety of the phone's contents. The court went on to find that to avoid being overly broad in this case, police could have said they expected to find communications between the defendant

32:36and co-defendant and therefore look at the SMS messages and other messaging applications. The court found many states have joined in our conclusion that the particularity requirement disallows the issuance of warrant's authorizing police to search the entirety of a person's cell phone contents for evidence of a particular crime. The massive scale of the personal information people store on their mobile device means that there must be some limits to the scope of the search. To conclude, the warrant issued for Mr. Coburgers' AT&T account was unconstitutionally overbroad. Law enforcement had the ability to be more specific, both as to the content and the category of data it sought, and it chose not to be specific because what it wanted and what it got was a general warrant. Therefore, everything found in the search of the AT&T account must be suppressed. For, the Affidavit submitted in support of the application for the issued search warrant, included information that must be excised. Where information in a warrant was obtained via

33:37violation of the Constitution, Idaho Courts excised that information. See Johnson 1986, Bunting 2006, Butterball 2002. All information in the Affidavit was gathered because of law enforcement's unconstitutional use of investigative genetic genealogy and thus nothing in the warrant should remain. Mr. Coburger has argued in a separate motion that the genetic genealogy investigation in this matter was done in violation of the Constitution. Additionally, he has argued there would be no investigation into him without that original constitutional violation. It's not that the results of the IGG sped up the investigation. Instead, they focused the investigation on Mr. Coburger, a person whose only connection to the case was his motor transportation and the shape of his eyebrows to identifications of little to no value as previously argued. As the Idaho Supreme Court has explained while the initial burden in showing a factual nexus between the illegal and the evidence the state must show it would have been discovered anyway.

34:43The state cannot make the showing. Without IGG there is no case. No request for his phone records, surveillance of his parents' home, no DNA taken from the garbage out front. Because the IGG analysis in the origin of this matter, everything in the affidavit should be excised. Conclusion. Mr. Coburger requests his court suppress all evidence obtained by police via the warrant for his AT&T phone records. As explained above this warrant, lack probable cause. As written, given its heavy reliance on conclusions reached by law enforcement without the details necessary for the magistrate to draw its own conclusions, because the warrant omitted its culpatory information and information that put into question the reliability of the facts upon which it relies. And finally, because the affidavit and warrant do not specify what data could be searched and seized, all in violation of the Fourth Amendment, Article 1, Section 17. This document was dated November 13th of 2024 and it was signed by

35:44J. Weston and ANSI Taylor. All of the information that goes with this episode, including my contact information, can be found in the description box. What's up everyone and welcome back to the program. In this episode we're headed right back to Moscow and this time we're going to take a look at the motion to suppress and memorandum in support of the Pennsylvania search warrant for the white Hyundai Alontera bearing VIN number 5NPDH4A E6 FH 579 860. State of Idaho plaintiff, First Brian C. Coburger, the defendant, comes now. Brian C. Coburger, buy and throw his attorneys of record and hereby submits the following memorandum in support of his contemporaneously filed motion for an order, suppressing all evidence gathered by law enforcement as a result of the entry into the search of Mr. Coburger's vehicle. Issues 1. The court should apply Idaho's exclusionary rule and law to this search,

36:452. Pennsylvania law enforcement violated Mr. Coburger's Fourth Amendment, rights by entering and searching his vehicle without a valid warrant. 3. The affidavit submitted in support of the application for the issued search warrant, recklessly or intentionally omitted material information, 4. The affidavit submitted in support of the application for the issued search warrant included information that must be excised. All information in the affidavit was gathered because of law enforcement's unconstitutional use of investigative genetic genealogy and thus nothing in the warrant should remain. Information about the client's locations taken from his phone must also be excised due to being gathered from an invalid warrant. Thanks. Due to the haphazard way in which law enforcement is kept and disclosed records in this matter, the following or the facts is best the defense can tell. On December 28, 2022, Trooper Larry of Pennsylvania State Police became aware of the objective of arresting Mr. Coburger via Moscow Police Corporal Payne.

37:49On December 29, 2022 at 4.44 pm, a magistrate in Pennsylvania issued a search warrant for Mr. Coburger's vehicle. On December 29, 2022 at 2.22 pm, the magistrate in this matter signed an arrest warrant for Mr. Coburger in Leittaw County. The affidavit for the warrant was signed by Moscow Police Department Detective Payne. The basic facts Payne used to support the search are described in a separately file motion pursuant to Franksville's Delaware, 438 US and 1978. The facts and issues are incorporated herein without repeating them. At 2.43 pm, on December 29, 2022, a criminal complaint probable cause order were filed in this matter. At 10 pm, Eastern Standard Time, Pennsylvania SWAT began preparations to arrest Mr. Coburger. Despite weeks of constant FBI surveillance, Pennsylvania law enforcement did their own surveillance starting at 11.15 pm. And despite the fact that weeks of constant FBI surveillance showed Mr. Coburger was unarmed

38:52and tended to go for runs around his parents' neighborhood, police decided attacking Mr. Coburger within his parents' home was the best option. On December 30, 2022 at 1.14 pm, Pennsylvania SWAT and federal agents rated Mr. Coburger's parents home. During the raid, law enforcement found Mr. Coburger's vehicle in the garage seized and later searched it, argument. This court should apply Idaho's exclusionary rule and law to this search. The first question this court must determine is whether there is a conflict of laws in this matter. Whether Idaho law or Pennsylvania law controls the validity of the search warrant for Mr. Coburger's automobile and the necessary relief. Unlike the issue of arrest warrant cases involving multi-state investigations have produced far less case law. In fact, the defense cannot find precise case on point for the state of Idaho. The issue, however, has received some attention in academia. Professor Kerr argued in his article for the Harvard Law Review

39:53that the jurisdiction where the crime occurred should control how the investigation is done. But the state's and or federal government should provide some form of authorization to each other to participate in each other's criminal investigations. See or incur cross enforcement of the Fourth Amendment 132 Harvard Law Review 2018. As it stands, there are at least five different approaches to this increasingly common situation. See Megan McGlin competing exclusionary rules and multi-state investigations. Fortunately for this court, Idaho and Pennsylvania do not differ in their approaches to the enforcement of the Fourth Amendment analog provisions. Both do not accept the good faith exception. See state for his Guzman 122 Idaho 1992 Commonwealth vs. Edmonds 526 1991. Thus this court can likely afford to leave as an open question which forums exclusionary rules apply. However, it's also clear from the grounding of the exclusionary

40:54rules and article one section 17 that evidence obtained and violation of the Constitution must be excluded. See Guzman at 992 and 93. Thus Mr. Coburger argues that the Idaho Constitution's exclusionary rule must apply as its basis lies not only on deterring police misconduct, but because exclusion is constitutionally mandated and judicial integrity demands it. However, it remains to be determined whether the actions of the FBI and Pennsylvania state troops should be viewed through the lens of article one section 17 or its analogs. It is not at all clear that whether a search should be judged by Idaho standards of reasonableness or that of Pennsylvania or in the case of the FBI agents by the Fourth Amendment. As noted, Professor Kerr would have Idaho's reasonableness apply in that the FBI and the Pennsylvania state troopers were acting under its authorization. See Kerr 132 Harvard Law revised at 531. This approach will also mesh well with

41:56older cases such as US vs. Deree 332 1948. Looking to the laws of the state where the defendant was arrested in absence of a federal law permitting the arrest by federal agent for a federal law violation, Johnson vs. US 333, US 10 1948. It also goes a long way with the legal framework of agency, see generally restatement, third of agency American Law Institute 2024. In this matter, Idaho authorities requested assistance from the FBI and the Pennsylvania state police. Thus this court should be required to apply Idaho's search and seizure law to their actions in Pennsylvania. However, this concept has its detractors. McGlin argues that when the siteus officer is performing the search, they should only be held to upholding their own laws. McGlin 127, Yale Law Review 447 and 48. While that position has merit, as it does not require a siteus officer to get a rundown

42:58of the differences between their law and the trial state's laws, it remains that Idaho's constitution is not merely concerned with deterrence to officers who misbehave. Moreover, it is the concern that such a rule would permit form shopping. After all, if Idaho's law enforcement may take advantage of laxer restrictions in a different state, they may simply pause their investigation until their suspect is in that new jurisdiction, or, in the case of the FBI state law enforcement, could at any point, even with an Idaho, call upon federal agents with their far laxer rules of the Fourth Amendment. Finally, it must be said that there is very little daylight between the Idaho Constitution and the Pennsylvania Constitution. If anything, Pennsylvania appears to have stricter warrant requirements for particularity. Two, Pennsylvania law enforcement violated Mr. Coburgers for the amendment rights by entering and searching his vehicle without a valid warrant. Police cannot search a vehicle within the curtailage of a home without a warrant. Collins,

43:58V. Virginia, 584 U.S., 2018. Mr. Coburgers vehicle was in his parents' garage in a home where he was an overnight guest. Overnight guests have an expectation of privacy in the home where they stay, see Minnesota vs. Olsen, 495 U.S. 1990. Therefore, he had an expectation of privacy in the contents of his vehicle and the warrant is required. Three, Pennsylvania law enforcement search warrant, lack probable cause. The Fourth Amendment states, unambiguously, that no warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath of affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. Grover's Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 2004, quoting U.S. Constitution Amendment 4. Probable cause exists when given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit, there is a fairer probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place, Illinois vs. Gates 462, 1983. For a search warrant to be valid,

45:05the judge issuing the warrant must rely on an affidavit or affidavits sworn to before the judge, or by testimony under oath, and recorded that established the grounds for issuing the warrant. State for his Nunez, 138 Idaho, 2003. Any discrepancy between the items for which there was probable cause and their description in the search warrant requires suppression. 23. CJS criminal procedure and rights of the accused section 887-2022. It's clear that the issuing magistrate himself, if he is to fulfill the constitutionally mandated function of inter-opposing and independent intelligence between the law enforcement officer and the citizen, must actually and in fact draw the inferences from the evidence presented to him. People vs. Batuara, 48 and Y2D, 1979. It is for this reason that the courts have insisted that the full facts from which inferences might be drawn and information necessary to determine their reliability be placed before the issuing

46:11magistrate. Finally, a criminal defendant may challenge the veracity of an affidavit used to obtain a search warrant, state vs. Peterson, 133 Idaho, 1999. Upon a preliminary showing of a warrant's deficiency, the defendant must prove by a preponderance of evidence that intentional or reckless falsies were included in the warrant affidavit and were material to the magistrate's finding of probable cause or that material exculpatory information was deliberately or recklessly omitted. Peterson, 133 Idaho, 981, at 1157. An omission of exculpatory facts is material only if there is a substantial probability that had the omitted information been presented, it would have altered the magistrate's determination of probable cause. Whether an omission was intentional or reckless might be inferred, in part, from the relative importance of the information and its exculpatory power. Idea 133 Idaho, 48, at 1158. The challenge pursuant to this action of the motion

47:15is separately laid out and Mr. Coburger's motion for a hearing under Franks vs. Delaware. 438 US 154 1978. The motion and the proffer are incorporated but not repeated herein. 5. The affidavit submitted in support of the application for the issued search warrant included information that must be excised. Where information in a warrant was obtained via a violation of the Constitution, Idaho courts excised that information. A. All information in the affidavit was gathered because of law enforcement's unconstitutional use of investigative genetic genealogy and thus nothing in the warrant should remain. 5. Mr. Coburger is argued in a separate motion that the genetic genealogy investigation in this matter was done in violation of the Constitution. Additionally, he is argued there would be no investigation into him without that original constitutional violation. It's not that the results of the IGG sped up the investigation. Instead, they focused the investigation on Mr. Coburger,

48:18a person whose only connection to the case was his motor transportation and the shape of his eyebrows to identifications of little to no value as previously argued. As the Idaho Supreme Court has explained while the initial burden in showing a factual nexus between the illegalality and the evidence, the state must show it would have been discovered anyway. State vs. Moss 171 Idaho 2022. The state cannot make this showing. Without IGG, there is no case, no request for his phone records, serve valence of his parents' home, no DNA taken from the garbage out front. Because the IGG analysis is the origin of this matter, everything in the affidavit should be excised. B. Information about the client's locations taken from his phone must also be excised due to being gathered from an invalid warrant. Separately, the information gathered via the warrant for Mr. Coburger's AT&T account and the pen trap and trace device warrant should be excised for the reason set out in those warrants. Conclusion. Mr. Coburger requests his court suppress all evidence obtained by police

49:22via the warrant that permitted them to search his car. As explained above, this warrant lacked probable cause as written given its heavy reliance on conclusions reached by law enforcement without the details necessary for the magistrate to draw its own conclusions. And because the warrant omitted ex-culpatory information and information that put into question, the reliability of the facts upon which it relies, and finally because the affidavit relied on evidence gained in violation of the Constitution, all in violation of the Fourth Amendment and Article 1, Section 17. This document was dated November 13th of 2024 and it was signed by Anne Taylor. All of the information including my contact information can be found in the description box.