NWJ762- From Psyop to Mindwar: the Psychology of Victory

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All together especially in this current paradigm,

I do think it's worthwhile taking a read again.

But I hope you guys enjoy the show.

We'll see you in...

In this paper detail,

how the CIA's Mind Control Program in K-Ultra

was not stopped in 1973,

as the CIA had told Congress.

Let's go ahead and get into it.

Let me bring up the piece itself.

This is from Syup to Modern War,

the Psychology of Victory by Colonel Paul E. Valley,

with who is the commander of the Time Colonel Paul E. Valley

of the 7th Psychological Operations Group,

with Major Michael A. Aquino,

Syop Research and Analysis Team Leader.

So let's go ahead and get to it.

This is at the headquarters,

as I just said, the 7th Syop Group,

Psychological Operations Group.

This is in Presidio,

which they're not going to open up that can of worms,

but you guys can go look into that in your own.

That was a very notable...

notable...

I don't know,

it gets really kind of shoved

into the Satanic Panic category by many,

but obviously some of us think there was more to the story.

Let's start with the introduction.

This is by Michael Aquino himself.

At the time, now,

or at the time when he wrote this introduction,

he was a Lieutenant Colonel when he initially wrote it.

It was a major.

Most people remember him as a Lieutenant Colonel,

but that's when he was retired.

So this is an introduction in 2003,

much later after the fact,

the initial writing was in 1980.

So let's go ahead and get into this.

Now he was in the reserves retired.

So in the late 1970s,

Psychological Operations,

Syop, doctrine in the US Army,

had yet to emerge

from the disappointment and frustration

of the Vietnam War.

Thus it was that, in 1980,

Colonel Paul Valely,

commander of the seventh Syop group,

asked me, as his headquarters,

Syop Research and Analysis team leader,

to draft a paper that would encourage some future thought

within the Syop community.

He did not want a Vietnam post-mortem,

rather some fresh and innovative ideas,

concerning Syop's evolution and application.

I prepared an initial draft with Colonel Valely,

reviewed and annotated,

which resulted in revised drafts

and critiques until he was satisfied.

The result of that was this paper

from Syop to Mind War,

the Psychology of Victory.

Now I may have said earlier,

I'm going to try to present this with minimal commentary.

I'm still going to continue to try to do so.

But I did want to point out,

this is something that you confuse me initially.

You'll notice here in the introduction,

it's Colonel Valely,

V-A-L-L-E-L-Y.

And in the previous one, you can see,

like in the header or title,

or whatever,

it says Colonel Paul E. Valley.

It's the same person.

I don't know what,

if there's some other reason,

or if it's just a typo or something.

So, in the initial one,

so everywhere else, it's Valely.

For some reason,

and this one is Valley,

so it does kind of left myself,

and I think I've seen others who have kind of questioned,

like, oh, is this the same person?

Yes, it is.

It's the same person.

For some reason,

it's Valley, some places.

The only place I've seen it Valley is in the title,

but within the same exact body,

I guess it's one of the same exact assay

in the introduction and elsewhere,

you see Valely.

So, within itself,

it kind of clears that up.

So, anyways, moving back into it,

Colonel Valely sent copies of it

to various governmental offices,

agencies,

commands,

and publications involved,

they're interested in Syop.

He intended it not as an article for publication,

but simply as a talking paper,

stimulate dialogue.

In this,

it was quite successful,

judging by the extensive and lively letters.

You receive Colonel concerning it

over the next several months.

That should have been the end of Mind War,

a minor staff study,

which had done its modest job.

With the arising of the Internet

in the 1980s, however,

Mind War received an entirely

unexpected and somewhat comic resurrection.

Illusions to it gradually proliferated

with its sinister title,

quickly winning,

it the most lurid conspiracy theory reputation.

The rumor mail soon,

had it transformed

to an Aurillian blueprint

for Manchurian Candidate Mind Control

and World Domination.

My own image,

as an occult personality,

added fuel to the wildfire.

Mind War was now touted

by the lunatic fringe,

as conclusive proofs

that the pentagon was awash

in black magic and devil worship.

Now, this absurdly comic opera

has at least somewhat subsided.

I thought that it might be interesting

to make a complete and accurate copy

of the paper available,

together with an introduction

and some historical hindsight annotations

to place it in reasonable context.

After all it did,

and perhaps still does,

have something worthwhile to say.

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Within the US military,

Syop has habitually been relegated

to a backseat as a force multiplier.

The principle's strategic decisions

are made in consideration

of traditional political

and military interests and goals.

Only then is Syop invited to the table

to help achieve already agreed upon missions

more efficiently.

Mind War reverses this sequence.

Psychological means for achieving victory,

essentially through convincing the enemy

that he really wants to bring his national policies

into harmony with ours

are fashioned in support of basic political goals.

The use of ordinary military force,

bombs, bullets, etc.

is regarded as a last resort

in circumstances where in mind war

by itself fails.

The advantage of mind war

is that it conducts wars

in non-lethal, non-injurious,

and non-destructive ways.

Essentially, you overwhelm your enemy

with argument.

You seize control of all of the means

by which his government

and populist process

information to make up their minds.

And you adjust it

so that those minds are made up

as you desire.

Everyone is happy,

no one gets hurt or killed

and nothing is destroyed.

Ordinary warfare,

on the other hand,

is characterized by its lack of reason.

The antagonist,

just maim,

or kill each other's people

and steal or destroy each other's land.

Until one side is hurt so badly

that it gives up,

or both sides are hurt so badly

that it greed to stop short of victory.

And after such a war,

there is lasting misery,

hate, and suffering.

The only loser in mind war

are the war profiteers,

companies and corporations

which grow fat orders

for helicopters, tanks,

guns, munitions, etc.

Consequently,

what President Dwight,

Dwight Eisenhower,

referred to as a military

slash industrial complex,

can be counted upon

to resist implementation

of mind war

as a governing

strategic conflict doctrine.

That's the mind war,

perspective,

and its most simplified form.

While in 1980s,

I had no reason to think

that this paper had had

any official effect

upon U.S.

side up doctrine

within or beyond the army.

It was with some fascination

that I saw specific

of its prescriptions applied

during the First Gulf War,

and recently even more,

obviously,

during the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

In both instances,

extreme siop was directed,

both against the object

of the attack,

and upon U.S.

domestic public perception

and opinion.

In 2003,

to the extent of embedding journalists

with military units

to inevitably channel

their perspectives

and perceptions.

The impact

of even these minor

techniques of mind war

was remarkable.

A psychological climb

of inexorable U.S.

victory was created

and sustained in both

the United States

and Iraq,

which accelerated

that victory on the ground,

somewhat less positively,

the failure of mind war

and since,

to be guided

by only the most rigorous

principles of truth

and ethics

had just,

as inexorably led

to substantial

post-war evaporation

of the U.S.

climate.

Therein lies

the Achilles heel

of mind war.

Invoking, as it does,

the most intense emotions

and commitments of its audiences,

it must deliver the goods

as they are judged

by the target audiences.

If the ethical values

of those audiences

are not respected,

if mind wars use only

the service

of ulterior motives

and objectives,

the resulting

dis-intoxication

can be socially shattering.

In 1997,

I wrote a more

extensive research paper

for the National Defense University,

concerning the ethics

of SIOP.

Particularly,

if mind war is actually

to be employed as a feature

of U.S. foreign policy,

I cannot stress too strongly

the need for its subordination

to the strictest

and most enlightened principles

of humanity

as discussed in that paper.

Psychological operations,

the ethical dimension

is also available

for download

at www.xepr.org-

slash

M-A-Q-U-I-N-O.

Now, let's take a look

at the 1980 Mind War paper,

itself.

In addition to the original

footnotes,

I've added a few new ones

to highlight

Sashkartik,

some of its themes,

these new footnotes

are identified

by M-A-2003

at their beginning.

Now, we're obviously

not going to go through

all the footnotes here.

If you guys want to,

this is easy to find

you can just Google,

you can find it all

sorts of different places.

You can look at

just a look up

from SIOP to Mind War,

you can probably

just type in Mind War.

Now, there was also,

I believe, a book

that he made later,

that kind of expanded

on these ideas,

and made it into a full

length book,

which is Mind War,

so don't get the two

confused.

But this is kind of what

started off.

The literary,

the kind of the

literary

beginnings

or genesis

of, I guess,

Michael Aquino,

you could say,

is this piece right here.

But anyways,

let's get into that.

Let me get her.

From SIOP to Mind War,

the psychology of victory,

Lieutenant Colonel

John Alexander,

his military

of you,

article in support

of psychotronics,

intelligence

and operational employment

of ESP

was decidedly provocative.

Criticism of research

in this area,

based as it is

on existing frontiers

of scientific law,

brings to mind

the laughter

that greeted

the Italian scientist,

Balon Zani,

in 1795,

when he suggested

that bats navigate

in the dark means

of what we now call

sonar.

If they see

with their ears,

then do they hear

with their eyes?

When the joke,

but I suspect

that the US Navy

is glad someone took

these ideas seriously

enough to pursue it.

Psychotronic research

is in its infancy,

but the US Army

already possesses

an operational

weapon system

designed to do

what Lieutenant Colonel

Alexander

would like ESP

to do,

except that

as weapons,

systems,

uses existing

communications media,

it seeks to map

the minds of

neutral and enemy

combatants

and then to change them

in accordance

with the US national interest.

It does this

on a wide scale,

embracing military units,

regions, nations,

and blocks,

in its present form,

it is called

psychological operations.

Does psi-op work

or is it merely

a cosmetic

with which field commanders

would rather

not be bothered?

At the question

been asked

in 1970,

the answer

would have been that

psi-op works very well

indeed.

In 1967 and

1968 alone,

a total of 29,276

armed

vietcong

slash NVA,

the equivalent of

95 enemy infantry battalions

surrendered

to ARVN

or MACV,

forces

under the Chujoy

Amnesty Program.

The major

psi-op effort

in the Vietnam War.

At the time,

MACV estimated

the elimination

of the same

number of troops

in combat

would have cost us

6,000 dead.

On the other hand,

we lost the war,

not because

we were out thought,

but because we were

out psi-op.

Our national will

to victory was attacked

more efficiently

than we attack that

of the North Vietnamese

and Vietcong.

Perception

this fact

encouraged the enemy

to hang on

into the United States,

finally broke

and ran for home.

So our

psi-op failed.

It failed not

because its principles

were unsound

as it was outmatched

by the psi-op

of the enemy.

The Army's efforts

enjoyed some impressive

successes,

but our own psi-op

did not really change

the minds of the enemy

populace,

nor to defend

the US populace

at home

against the propaganda

of the enemy.

Furthermore,

the enemy's

psi-op was so strong

that it,

not bigger armies

or better weapons,

overcame all

of the cobras

and spookies

and ACAVs

and B-52s,

we feel them.

The lesson

is not to ignore

the psi-op capability

but rather to change it

and strengthen it

so that we can do precisely

that kind of thing

to our enemy

in the next war.

Better hardware is nice,

but by itself,

it will change nothing

if we do not win

the war for the mind.

The first thing

it is necessary

to overcome is a view

of psi-op

that limits it

to routine, predictable,

over-obvious,

and hence marginally effective,

leaflet

and loudspeaker applications.

Battlefield devices

of this sort

have their place,

but it should be

that of an accessory

to the main effort.

That main effort

cannot begin

at the company

or division level.

It must originate

at the national level.

It must strengthen

our national will

to victory

and it must attack

and ultimately destroy

that of our enemy.

It both causes

and is affected

by physical combat.

But it is a type of war

which is fought

on a far more subtle basis

as well

in the minds

and the national populations

involved.

So let us begin

with a simple name change,

we shall rid ourselves

of the self-conscious

almost embarrassed concept

of psychological operations,

and its place we shall create

mind-war.

The term is harsh

and fear-inspiring,

and so it should be

is a term of attack

and victory,

not one

of the rationalization

and coaxing

and conciliation.

The enemy may be

offended by it,

that is quite alright

as long as he is defeated

by it.

A definition is offered.

Mind-war

is the deliberate

aggressive convincing

of all participants

in a war

that we will win that war.

It is deliberate

in that it is planned, systematic,

and comprehensive effort

involving all levels

of activity

from the strategic

to the tactical.

It is aggressive

because opinions

and attitudes

must be actively changed

from those antagonistic

to us

to those supportive

of us

if we are to achieve victory.

We will not win

if we content ourselves

with countering opinions

and attitudes

and still by enemy governments.

We must reach

the people before

they resolve to support

their armies,

and we must reach those

armies before

our combat troops

ever see them

on battlefields.

Compare this definition

with that of

psychological warfare

as first offered

by General William Donovan

of the OSS

in his World War II era.

Basic estimate

of psychological warfare.

Psychological warfare

is a coordination

and use of all means,

including moral

and physical

by which the end is attained,

other than those

of recognized military operations.

But, including this psychological

exploitation of the result

of those recognized military actions,

which tend to destroy the will

of the enemy to achieve victory

into damages

political or economic capacity

to do so,

which tend to deprive the enemy

of the support, assistance,

or sympathy of his allies

or associates,

or of neutrals,

or to prevent his acquisition

of such support, assistance,

or sympathy,

or which tend to create,

maintain,

or increase the will

to victory of our own people

and allies

and to acquire, maintain,

or to increase,

the support, assistance,

and sympathy of neutrals.

If the euphemism's

psychological operations

resulted from, as one general

officer put it in a 1917 letter,

a grant need for synonym

with which would be used

in peacetime

that would not shock

the sensibilities

of a system of democracy,

that it may have succeeded

domestically.

On the other hand,

it does not seem to have reassured

the sensibilities

of the Soviets,

who in 1980 described

the U.S. Army

Syop, as including

unpardonable methods

of ideological sabotage,

including not just blackmail,

provocation,

and terror.

The reluctance

with which the Army has accepted,

even an antiseptic

Syop component,

is well-documented

in Colonel Alfred Patix,

brilliant treatise

on the history of Syop,

establishment.

And again, and again,

efforts to forge this weapon

into its most effective

configuration were frustrated

by leaders who could not,

or should not see,

that wars are fought

and won, or lost,

not on battlefields,

but in the minds of men,

as Colonel Patix,

so a aptly concludes,

in a real sense,

the manner in which

psychological and unconventional

warfare evolved

from 1941

into their union

as a formal Army capability

in 1952,

suggests a theme

that runs throughout the history

of special warfare.

The story of a hesitant

and reluctant army attempting

to cope with concepts

and organizations

of an unconventional

nature.

According to the present doctrine,

Syop is considered an accessory

to the main effort

of winning battles and wars.

The term usually uses

force more to multiplier.

It is certainly not considered

a precondition

to command decisions.

Thus, Syop cannot

pre-determine

the political

or psychological effectiveness

of a given military action.

It can be only used to point

that action

in the best possible colors

as it is taken.

Mind war cannot

be so relegated.

It is, in fact,

the strategy

to which tactical warfare

must confirm

if it is to achieve

maximum effectiveness.

The mind war scenario

must be preeminent

in the mind of the commander

and must be the principal factor

in his every field decision.

Otherwise,

he sacrifices measures

which actually contribute

to the winning of the war

to winning the war

to measures

of immediate

tangible satisfaction.

Accordingly, Syop

combat support units,

as we now know them,

must become a thing

of the past.

Mind war teams

must offer technical expertise

to the commander

from the outset

of the planning process

and at all levels

down to that of the battalion.

Such teams cannot

be composed

as they are now

of branch

immaterial officers

and NCOs,

who know simply the basics

of tactical

propaganda operations.

They must be composed

of full-time experts

who strive to translate

the strategy

of national mind war

into tactical goals,

maximize the effective

winning of the war

and minimize

loss of life.

Such mind war teams

will win commanders

respect only

if they can deliver

on their promises.

What the army now

considers to be the most

effective Syop,

tactical Syop,

is actually the most

limited and primitive effort.

Do the difficulties

of formulating

and delivering messages

under battlefield constraints?

Such efforts must continue,

but they are properly

seen as reinforcement

of the main mind war effort.

If we do not attack

the enemy's will

until he reaches the battlefield,

his nation will

have strengthened

it as best it can.

We must attack that will

before it is locked

in place.

We must instill

in it a predisposition

to inevitable defeat.

Strategic mind war

must begin the moment

is the moment

war is considered

to be inevitable.

It must seek out

the attention of the enemy

nation through every

available medium

and it must strike

at the nation's

potential soldiers

before they put on their

uniforms.

It is in their homes

and their communities

that they are the most

vulnerable to mind war.

Was the United States

defeated in the jungles

of Vietnam

or was it defeated

in the streets

of American cities?

To this end,

mind war must be

strategic and emphasis

with tactical applications

playing a reinforcing

supplementary role.

In its strategic context,

mind war must reach out

to friends, enemies,

and neutrals alike

across the globe.

Neither through

primitive battlefield

leaflets

and loudspeakers

of SIOP,

nor through the week

imprecise, narrow,

effortless,

effortless,

effortless,

effortless,

effortless,

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Como el sol de Excalibur, tenemos que encontrarlo y creer esta tuyo.

Y puede transformar el mundo para nosotros si tenemos la currida y la integridad de la civilización.

Si no tenemos el Excalibur, tenemos que relinquir la habilidad de inspirar sus culturas con la moralidad.

Si ellos tienen la moralidad de desayunos, no hay una suerte para encontrarles en un nivel brutal.

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Mind War must target all participants if it is to be effective.

It must not only weaken the enemy, it must strengthen the United States.

It strengthens the United States by denying enemy propaganda access to our people.

By explaining and emphasizing to our people the rationale for an act of interest in a specific war.

Under existing United States law, sign up units may not target American citizens.

That prohibition is based upon the presumption that propaganda is necessarily a lie,

or at least a misleading half-truth, and that the government has no right to lie to the people.

The propaganda Ministry of Gebbles must not be a part of the American way of life.

Quite right, and so it must be axiomatic of Mind War that it always speaks the truth.

It's power lies in its ability to focus recipient's attention on the truth of the future as well as that of the present.

Mind War thus involves the stated promise of the truth.

The United States has resolved to make real if it is not already so.

I know he said not to make commentary, but let's just focus on the last sentence.

Mind War thus involves the stated promise of the truth that the United States has resolved to make real if it is not already so.

We'll basically make it reality if it's not actually reality.

Mind War is not new, nation's greatest and least costly victories have resulted from it both in time of actual combat and in time of threatened combat.

Consider the atomic attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

The physical destruction of those two cities did not destroy Japan's ability to continue fighting.

Rather, the psychological shock of the weapons destroyed what remained of Japan's national will to fight.

Surrender followed along and costly ground invasion was averted.

Mind War's effectiveness is a function of its own skillful use of communications media, but no greater error could be made than to confuse Mind War with merely a greater and more unprincipled propaganda effort.

Propaganda, as defined by Herald last well, is...

The expression of opinions or actions carried out deliberately by individuals or groups with a view to influence the opinions or actions of other individuals or groups for predetermined ends and through psychological manipulations.

Propaganda, when is recognized as such, and anything produced by a siop unit is so recognized, is automatically assumed to be a lie or at least a distortion of the truth.

Therefore, it works only to the extent that a militarily pressed enemy is willing to do what we want him to.

It does not work because we have convinced him to see the truth as we see it.

If his conclusions chapter to the army exhaustive 1976 case study of siop techniques, L. John Martin affirms this coldly and bluntly.

Well, this all boils down to is that if our persuasive communication ends up with a near positive effect, we must attribute it to luck, not science.

The effectiveness of propaganda may be even less predictable and controllable than the effectiveness of mere persuasive communication.

Correspondingly, propagandists are assumed to be liars and hypocrites willing to paint anything attractive colors to dupe the gullible.

As Jacques Alloul puts it, the propagandist is not and cannot be a believer. Moreover, he cannot believe in the ideology he must use in his propaganda.

He is merely a man at the service of a party, a state or some other organization. His task is to ensure the efficiency of that organization.

If the propagandist has any political conviction, he must put it aside in order to be able to use some popular mass ideology.

He cannot even share that ideology for he must use it as an object and manipulate it without the respect that he would have for it.

For if he believed in it, for if he believed in it, he quickly attempt acquires contempt for these popular images and beliefs.

Unlike Siop, mind war has nothing to do with deception or even with selected and therefore misleading truth.

Rather, it states a whole truth that if it does not now exist, will be forced into existence by the will of the United States.

The examples of Kennedy's ultimatum to Khrushchev during the Kube and Missile Crisis and Hitler's stance at Munich might be cited.

A mind war message does not have to fit conditions of abstract credibility to do Siop themes.

Its source makes it credible. As Levy once said,

The terror of the Roman name will be such the world shall know that once a Roman army has laid siege to city, nothing will move it.

Not the rigors or winter nor the weariness of months and years, that it knows no end but victory and it's ready and is ready if a swift and sudden stroke will not serve to preserve until that victory is achieved.

Unlike a little cynical propagandist, the mind war operative must know that he speaks the truth and he must be personally committed to it.

What he says is only part of mind war. The rest and its the test of its effectiveness lies in the conviction he projects to his audience in the rapport he establishes with it.

And this is nothing that can be easily faked if in fact it can be faked at all.

Report which the comprehensive dictionary of psychological and psychoanalytical terms defines as the unconstrained relations of mutual confidence approaches the subliminal.

Some researchers have suggested that it is itself a subconscious and perhaps even ESP based accent to an overt exchange of information.

Why does one believe one television newsman more than the other and another even though both may report the same headlines?

The answer is that there is rapport in the former case and it is a rapport which has been recognized and cultivated by the most successful broadcasters.

We have covered the statement of inevitable truth and the conviction behind that statement. These are qualities in the mind war operative himself.

The recipient of the statement will judge such messages not only by its conscious understanding of them but also by the mental conditions under which he receives them.

The theory behind brainwashing was that physical torture and deprivation will weaken the mind's resistance to suggestion.

And this was true to a point but the long run brainwashing does not work because intelligent minds later realize there's such a suggestibility under such conditions and therefore discount impressions and options inculcated accordingly.

For the mind to believe in its own decisions it must feel that it made those decisions without coercion.

Coercive measures used by the operative consequently must not be detectable by ordinary means.

There is no need to resort to mind weakening drugs such as those explored by CIA.

In fact the exposure of a single such method would do unacceptable damage to mind wars reputation for truth.

Existing psi op identifies purely sociological factors which suggest appropriate idioms for messages.

Doctrine in this area is highly developed and the task is basically one of assembling and maintaining individuals and teams with enough expertise and experience to apply the doctrine effectively.

This however is only the sociological dimension of target receptiveness measures.

There are some purely natural conditions under which minds may become more or less receptive to ideas and mind wars should take full advantage of such phenomena as atmospheric, electromagnetic activity, air ionization and extremely low frequency waves.

At the root of any decision to institute mind war in the US defense establishment is a very simple question.

Do we wish to win the next war in which we choose to become involved or do we wish to do so with minimum loss of human life at minimum expense and the least amount of time?

If the answer is yes then mind war is a necessity.

If we wish to trade that kind of victory for more American lives, economic disaster and negotiated stalemates then mind war is inappropriate and if used superficially will actually contribute to our defeat.

In mind war there is no substitute for victory.

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