Realizing the View, Part Two, Class #8

Go away for a week and everything changes.

Good evening.

Welcome back to our continuing exploration of the development and understanding of what

is the view in the Buddhist tradition.

Tonight we're concluding the Yogajara edition, section, and exploration.

It's the tradition of logic or epistemology of dignauga and dharma kirti.

So let's begin with our usual chanting in order that all sentient beings may attain

Buddhahood, may I take with you in order that all beings may enjoy.

I can't remember.

In order that all sentient beings may attain Buddhahood from my heart, I take refuge in the three jewels.

In order that all sentient beings may attain Buddhahood from my heart, I take refuge in the three jewels.

Whatever the virtues of the many fields of knowledge, all our steps in the past.

May these arise in the clear mirror of intellect.

Oh, Monjushri, please accomplish this.

Thank you, Cynthia.

I had to go so confused because we did so many different types of chanting all week long.

The meal chance.

For the meal chance, I realized I could do in order that all beings may attain Buddhahood from my heart.

I take refuge in the three jewels and I skipped all the Buddha dharma.

I was like, oh, that's saying the same thing.

Yeah.

It gets your food faster.

Exactly.

So tonight we launched, we have one little class on the Dignagadharma Kirti's exploration of what Westerners call epistemology.

I'm not convinced that's a good term for what they do, but probably good enough.

And we focused on a small little text by Dignagadharma and some excerpt from text by dharma kirti that focuses on the same topic.

Thanks to Chris for finding those.

They had a dharma kirti text and we didn't do our usual exploration of the background in western hop.

Check out this incredibly helpful.

So I wonder if people have their western hop book Andy, any chance?

I could pause for a minute.

But folks get that because I think it's really helpful.

Chris, did you check out western hop?

Sure did.

Dedicated western hop fan.

I got the big palm number one hand western hop.

Right.

We should need him sometime.

We should invite him like to give a talk or something.

Yeah, I think that would be really not.

I mean, we'd have to work with the time difference, right?

Because he's he's over at Oxford, but.

Yeah.

He's doing morning for us.

Quite a prolific guy and quite an amazing.

That presenting information on this wonderful and also wonderful insight into these traditions.

So he starts on page 216.

But I thought let's just take a quick look at the text.

Can you give something other than just a page number?

Yeah, because I'm on electronic and.

Yeah, let's see.

It's says four.

Is that part for chapter four?

It's chapter four, the school of Denaga and Darmakirti.

Thank you.

Thank you, but he much.

Chris.

So I thought maybe we could start first with.

It's the root text that we have by Dignaga.

Called the auto commentary to investigation of the percept.

So it's from a book called Dignaga's investigation of the percept.

Which itself is such an odd term.

Jane saw the book and she's like, what?

What is the percept?

Is that like, did they misspelled that?

Is it supposed to be presets?

And let's see.

We're on.

Page.

Page of the.

Page two away to the source book.

Oh, there very good.

208.

Thank you, Chris.

So page two away to the source book.

So the root text is very short.

Only a few pages.

And then here we have a slightly expanded explanation of the root text.

So to speak by Dignaga translated into English.

So it probably seems like it's still in some other foreign languages.

And it's translated by a group of people.

Also like hard to imagine how they could have agreed on the translation.

Between five people.

Imagine agreeing on anything between five people.

Anyway.

In Sanskrit, Allah al-Ambuna.

It's a very shah for it.

So for it is a type of commentary.

And peri-shah is investigation.

And Allah al-Ambuna is the percept.

It's the objects of perception.

It's been made to talk of a drill.

So many different types of commentaries.

How much do all the buddhas and buddhas offer some?

Maybe some of you.

Maybe me.

Maintain that the percept of a sensory cognition, such as vision.

It's an external object.

Most people I would say believe that.

They must suppose that it is fundamental particles because this is what causes cognition.

Or that it is a collection.

Because that is what appears to cognition.

Okay.

So I have fundamental particles.

There are the particles of the ibashikas and the satrantikas.

Particles that are the foundation of reality.

They have swallung shana true nature.

Self nature.

And they are imperceptible.

Momentary.

And they do not meet.

But they are the building blocks of reality.

Can anybody name an example of one such a creature?

I know we've never seen one.

So it's hard to come up with one.

Any ideas?

What's the part?

Let's give an example of a fundamental particle.

The word in English might be a little clunky.

For it.

Because we don't really have a good word for it.

Chris.

Yeah.

String.

Yeah.

String theory.

String theory.

Yeah.

Some of the strings are, strings are said to not have parts.

But can you, can we stay within the Buddhist tradition?

Ah, well, how about a dharma?

A dharma.

Yeah.

Sorry.

I thought you were trying to get us out of the Buddhist tradition.

I should have known that.

Oh, I never did that.

I don't know anything other than the Buddhist tradition.

So I stay far away from any other systems.

That's your bellywick.

So dharma's, fundamental particles are dharma.

And can you give me an example of one?

So it's simpler than you think.

How about red?

Since we're in the, we're in the field of vision.

Color red.

Color red.

Color red.

Well, didn't we learn about like a particle of water and a particle of earth and a particle of fire?

Totally, totally, yeah, totally.

The four elements, right?

And we said that a dharma.

It's a little bit unclear, right?

Whether a dharma is an individual element or whether a dharma is the eightfold compilation, right?

Yeah, I thought that we had been confused by this.

That they had to have all of them in together, all together.

It did seem to conclude that an atom has a minimum of eight parts, which are the four elements and four of the five cents objects.

So that's familiar.

Yes, which is why that really means that an element is at a lower level than a so-called dharma or partless particle, isn't it?

Yeah, yeah.

It breaks the definition right away.

Okay.

Just want to make sure I'm part of a partless particle.

Yeah, right.

Thank you.

Starting off in a good foot.

And what's the collection?

Can you give an example of a collection?

A heap of beans.

A heap of beans.

About one bean.

One bean also.

One bean also.

Now, Chris earlier, you came up with an example of red.

Red is a little bit tricky with these colors, right?

So it was a color of an atom, a partless particle.

You know, you're, you're the expert with the list of these.

I'm not, I'm not sure if the, if the colors made it onto the list.

I think they did.

Don't, do they not?

Don't we, isn't, isn't the idea that that color is the only thing that has perceived, but that shape is, is a conceptual.

Yeah.

You know, we, we never really ironed this out thoroughly when we went through the dharma's and this issue.

We focused sort of like on this oddity of items and conglomerates and so forth.

But so one of the eight parts of a partless particle is a visual form.

And visual forms can be of various colors.

Now, we in the West would probably say that variety is infinite.

Is that correct?

Or like how many colors can there be, are there?

Or is it just like the three primers?

There's only three colors.

It's amazing how complicated these, you know, it's like we went through this over and over and.

And it's just not clear.

It's so funny.

Well, there again, you were, I'm not sure if you're talking about within the Buddhist framework.

I don't know if they have it.

It's in the Buddhist framework.

Yeah, I have no idea how they think about color in terms of fixed.

You know, yeah, do they limit it out?

If you get the color, color is such an oddity.

It's like infinite in some ways.

Yeah, it's this weird thing of like this color itself, a dharma.

Or do dharma possess qualities that are colors?

So we never really worked through that one.

And then like how many colors are there?

And like they debate these things.

How many colors there are?

And then there's like, there's, I think there's like four main colors in the Buddhist happy dharma.

And then they make combinations by mixing them obviously.

And then, and then things like cloudy.

You know, like, yeah, they have primary colors.

And then they have sort of aspects of color.

And then it's like cloudy.

The way that clouds have a certain sort of texture of whatever color the clouds can be.

Normally white, but they can be gray and red or whatever.

Anyway, so we have, we have a visual cognition.

And people believe that the percept of a visual cognition is an external object.

We have that as one.

They suppose it's a fun and either a fundamental particle that we directly see atoms from the Buddhist traditional point of view.

Because this is what causes cognition or that it's a collection.

The collection of atoms conglomerated together that might be in the form of a coffee bean.

Which is actually what appears to cognition because we don't see part of this particles, right?

We see conglomerate.

Okay, so that's the proposition that three things that the percept is external object.

And that that object is either a fundamental particle or conglomerate.

People looking at the notes, anything good in the notes.

Okay, so the next page is 209.

In the first case, so in the first case being what if it's a part of a particle, part of this particle.

Even if sensory cognition were caused by a fundamental particles, it would not have particles as its object.

Because they do not appear to cognition any more than the sense faculties themselves do.

So,

if sensory cognition were caused.

So, you went from the topic of what's the percept of a sensory cognition.

And he went from there to what causes a sensory cognition.

Applying that the object causes the sensory cognition.

Is that a fair assumption?

I mean, it might be one of many types of causes.

You know, we looked at different types of causes for conditions.

But let's say it's the object condition of a sense cognition.

And the causal condition, let's say it's light shines on it and comes into one's eye.

The dominant condition is the sense faculty and the immediately receiving cognition.

Thought to look at something.

So, even if sensory cognition were caused by fundamental particles,

it would not have particles as its object.

Because they do not appear to cognition any more than the sense faculties do.

So, he's using the standard heavy-darm definition that

partless particles don't appear to cognition.

Which brings the question of why did he say that they might suppose that.

It's a little bit odd that he gave that as an option early on

and that he dispenses with it.

But he's cleaving to the general consensus of the tradition about heavy-darm

that partless particles are not the object that appears to cognition.

They might be the object that causes it.

But they don't actually appear because they never see them.

And he says, Mary Beth, they're too small.

And they're too small, so you can't see them.

You can't hear them.

Meaning, I guess they're too faint.

On a single basis, you can't touch them.

Meaning that our sensory receptors of our sense of touch

is not fine enough.

You can't taste them.

The taste buds are not fine enough.

And I just can't smell.

They don't have enough smell.

Okay, now this is for a similarly our sense faculties don't appear to cognition.

We can't see our own faculties, right?

And why is that what are the sense faculties made of?

There's another thing there that is not that really clear.

These are those bizarre things that are like a blue or those.

Right.

But they're supposedly clear or trends.

They're subtle, they're like subtle matter.

They're liminal.

They're liminal.

They're that.

In between state, between mind and matter.

Yeah, they are.

It's such a weird, a weird proposition that like within matter,

there's this type of matter called subtle matter that is like in between,

as Rob says, in between matter and space or energy or something.

But I don't, I mean, there's sort of an aside,

but I don't think that that was as much of an issue for them as it is for us.

They viewed the aggregates as the psychophysical,

neither obtaining to specifically one realm or the other,

but that sort of a world that is suffused with both.

But when they classify them, they put them in a matter category.

Right.

I don't know if that matters.

Never mind.

It's amazing how hard it is to describe the simplest things,

and how easy it is to take it apart therefore, right,

which is what he does.

An object is defined as something whose identity is ascertained by cognition.

So that's a conceptual construct, and that's fairly straightforward.

So you define object as the object of a cognition.

The object is that which is cognized, right?

You know, at some point years ago,

we looked at DUDE of the collected topics,

which is like, just gives you really simple definitions of various aspects

that put us world.

An object is that which is cognized.

I just have one question on that with the,

the footnote where they are,

then the footnote 10, when on identity,

says FABAVA.

So I'm just curious that that's,

is that,

it seems like that's actually implying something even more than simple cognition,

isn't FABAVA like the nature thing?

It is self-natured,

so BABAVA is self-antity,

self-natured.

So an object is defined as something whose identity,

whose swallogsional ascertained by cognition.

So,

in the case of a coffee bean,

what is the swallogsional of a coffee bean?

That's a good point, Cynthia, you know, so,

do we,

is it the idea of swallogsional is that they are fundamental particles?

Our swallogsional is, right?

And conglomerates don't really have swallogsional.

They're sort of imaginary constructs.

So this is a bit of an odd definition

that they put in the word identity,

whose identity is ascertained by cognition,

because cognition arises with its representation.

So when we see a coffee bean,

that which our conceptual or cognitive system experiences,

is a coffee bean,

experiences the cognition of a coffee bean by definition.

We okay so far everyone, agree with that?

Mind you, particles,

may be the cause of a cognition,

because really coffee beans are native

and your particles,

so, cause has to be a real thing.

But it does not have their appearance.

You don't actually see the appearance of fundamental particles.

We see a coffee bean.

So we look at one thing.

We look at partless particles.

They're conglomeration of them.

And we see something else.

Isn't that like a hallucination?

We look around the rooms that we occupy.

I don't know what a perception.

And we see objects.

And we get we're told that there's really just atoms here.

So where do the objects come from?

Now that's something that's also,

in a sense, common to Western science,

where they tell us that there's, you know,

all this movement and waves and all this other stuff

that's going on,

where we see just a solid block, right?

Yeah, yeah.

Neurologists, neuroscientists, physicists,

they will all agree totally with this,

that we see what's not there.

Right, so that's one place where there's a common sense of illusion there.

Common locus of a view.

And as Chris said,

they believe that there's something like strings or something.

That's actually there.

And they see tables and chairs and people and so forth.

So we have a common sense of delusion

that goes on through the senses.

And we're talking about sense perception here, right?

Which,

and I've just sort of cut to the chase,

there's these two types of,

knowledge of our world, not direct,

of knowledge of our world.

And then inference.

And inference is built on perception.

So perception is crucial.

If we unpack perception so that it doesn't hold water

then our whole system of knowledge is sort of out there in there

with some way.

This is also true of the sense faculties.

This, first of all, the new particles are not the percept.

So we don't see any new particles.

Sensory cognition,

and I have the appearance of a collection of a coffee bean.

But it does not come from that,

which it has the appearance.

The appearance of a coffee bean.

So the second part of that sense is a little linguistically complicated.

The sensory cognition does not come from that,

of which it has the appearance.

It has the appearance of a coffee bean,

in the case that we're using.

And you can't come from that because coffee bean

is a fictitious entity.

And so it can't be causally efficacious.

So cognition arises that doesn't come.

It's not caused by that, by which it experiences.

It makes sense that an object to continue on page 10,

an object is a percept if it produces an appearance of itself.

So he's saying,

let's go back to this definition of what is an object

as the identity of that is ascertained.

And the key term of swallogsional,

he's saying that definition really doesn't hold water.

It's because it's a return to this text.

We all see that the root text is involved

in the commentaries and the article.

It's because it is said to be a condition for the arising of cognition.

Which is what I just explained about it for an object

to be a causal condition for the arising of the cognition

of that object in us,

that have causally efficacies,

it has to be a dormant, a real thing.

The collection, however, is not like this

because it's not substantially real.

The coffee bean is not substantially real.

It appears, but it's not there,

just like a double moon,

which is a famous analogy in the world of Indian lore

of people who see two moons

because they have a visual defect.

So what aspect of this sort of structure of reality

has Dignaga refuted in this argument?

External objects?

Ango.

It's like the idea that we see some external object

just doesn't hold water from a logical scientific point of view.

There's got to be some internal world

that we're experiencing.

Works.

It's not that different from the West either

because depending on the mind that's perceiving

the environment is completely different.

You know, like a bats' point of view is not anything like ours.

Neither is it.

We tend to similar backgrounds,

but different species see different ones

and certain species see dramatically different

and Rob is drawing on the famous article

of what's the title, something about being a bat.

What is it like to be a bat by Thomas Nagle?

What's it like to be a bat?

They have eyes, but they barely work

and they live in a sonar world where they're constantly

admitting sonar waves

and creating a representation of the world

that's not visual around them by virtue of the sound.

It's such a cool thing to think about.

Same thing with whales and dolphins.

It's like a song carries like thousands of miles.

Thousands?

Thousands?

So like from Europe to America.

Wow, they don't even need cellular service

or whatever it is.

That is amazing.

They don't need...

So...

Is it there?

Yeah, I have to admit,

I found, I think in reading both of these things,

that I couldn't really follow the logic.

I was just wondering if you could even though we just went through it,

but the logic that says it can't be external

because it seems like,

I don't know, to me adding in all the stuff about the particles

and all of that doesn't seem to...

Somehow for me, there were too many layers

that they put into this that overcomplicated it.

I don't know whether that's just my brain not functioning.

But do you understand what I mean?

That it seems like they put extra kind of layers into this

that didn't really add up to logic for me.

Okay, so that's really a great idea.

Why don't we put it in the form of a logical syllogism

and then break it down.

Everybody game for that.

Anybody want to take a shot at what the logical syllogism

that we just went through basically is,

and it's simplest form.

And I think we can start with what Rob said.

External objects are not the cause of perception

because...

Because external objects are not what we perceive.

Therefore...

Therefore...

You cannot be external.

I actually think Dharma Curities spells this out more clearly.

I'm as a surprise to everyone.

Thank you for the win.

Even there, I was going around a little bit.

So they're not the cause.

Let's stay with the syllogism.

So external objects is the subject.

Right.

Are not the cause of perception.

It's the hypothesis.

What's it called?

Well, because partless particles can't meet each other.

So the partless particles of the perceiving organs can't meet

any kind of partless particle of an external object

because they never meet.

So on one level, they're first of all throwing out the...

Again, I don't know what level we're at in terms of

which school system we're in here.

But like the whole thing of an aspect and all that stuff

that they introduced as the kind of intermediary

between external object and consciousness being able

to see something that's where that aspect idea came in.

Right.

So is this sort of...

It seems like what you're describing is saying,

all right, we're tossing that idea out.

Also, is that right?

Or that that's not relevant?

I don't think they're making that argument yet.

So this has come before that.

That's where I'm...

Like I said, I can't tell what...

I think this is really just approaching,

imagining an argument with an Abidarmica,

who is proposing that the darmas are

the real source of perception

and saying that on their own terms

that can't possibly be true.

Well, by definition, don't even...

Abidarmas say darmas aren't seen.

So they're like the cause of perception,

but they're not actually what you see.

Isn't that what we just went through earlier?

Right, but still it's a foundationalist metaphysics

in which the darmas are the bedrock of reality.

If the darmas aren't perceived,

then perception is not grounded in them.

It's saying that the Abidarmica system is internally inconsistent.

We've got to go through the syllogism again

and break it down a little bit further.

So I'm going to write it

if I can get my computer to open a writable software.

Yeah, actually, I haven't written down,

but if you want to, you're going to do it to scroll.

I think you said external objects

are not the cause of perception

because they are not what we perceive.

And then that's what I heard.

Is that correct?

I think it's more accurate if we said

fundamental particles.

Okay, let's start again.

Well, what did you have again?

What I took down from what you had said

was that you started out with external objects

are not the cause of perception.

That was the subject and then the thesis or whatever

because they are not what we perceive.

Again, I was just taking notes on whatever was said.

I'm not saying this is good.

So I would propose that this is the proof

of the hypothesis.

The thesis is that

the object of cognition

is an external object, is external.

How's that?

Objects of cognition are not external.

Oh, it's not.

I thought you just said that it.

I didn't hear the none.

I did.

I did.

Sorry.

Are not external because.

We just say because we're perceiving our senses

not the object.

We just come to the chase.

If we know what the chase is,

we could, but I don't think we.

Not sure that's okay.

Objects of perception are not external because.

Because external objects.

The dharma's are not perceivable.

So now that seems to say that there are external objects.

Well, he's taking at least that part of the Abhidharma

argument at face value.

I guess that's what I haven't been able to figure out by these readings.

It seems like it's all quicks and but is there.

There is some ground there that is sort of being taken as common.

You're saying that.

He's taking the system of the Abhidharma that.

Dharmas are not perceptible.

So I say.

The object of perception cannot be external because.

We cannot perceive.

Dharmas.

But how do we define that is there some definition that says

Dharmas are external.

There's something that says that they are.

Yes, so external is not really the right word.

He's actually getting that.

That's because all we can perceive is really internal.

There's no ability to be outside of our own mind.

That part I can that part I can rock.

You know, that's that's about the only clear thing.

But it seems like when we try to establish the other stuff.

There's several steps of logic that are needed.

Like they.

I don't know somehow it seems like they kind of shortcut some of it.

And it doesn't it doesn't add up to a clear.

Definitive statement of oh, this is why it couldn't work.

Yeah, we should we should all write our filigisms down.

It's also they make this distinction of the issue of collections versus.

Non collections, which in the second reading that that drove me crazy too.

Because it seemed like they got all hung up on that.

But that's not really the essential.

Question, you know.

We need to start with one before you get into the flowing sesame seeds, right?

Should we should we get in the morning sesame seeds?

That was a tough one.

I think Neal's chat contribution works works OK.

Yeah, but it Neil give us.

The armors cannot be perceived external objects consist of darkness.

Therefore external objects cannot be perceived.

Good deduction.

So then I guess the interesting thing there is that.

Let's say that establishes that external objects cannot be perceived.

Doesn't say anything about whether they exist or not, whether they whether there are any such things.

It's just saying, even if they're where we wouldn't be able to see them.

That's right. That's right.

So instead of the.

Logic of just that that idea of like the aspect that allows something that is not mind matter.

It's just to be sort of mirrored into the mind.

That's that's the idea of an aspect, right?

It's kind of like a mirror of the seemingly.

Non mind object that's supposedly outside.

And that's what allows the consciousness to relate to it.

And so this is dispensing with all that and it's just sort of saying.

It's just no way to connect to it.

You can't get there from here.

And the same.

The same issue would apply to the aspect, right?

I mean, they don't make this argument, but you set up a regress by introducing the aspect, you know.

Yes.

And then how does how does the aspect perceive? Well, the aspect has an aspect.

That's one of those where you just kind of either have to take it at face value or on faith or something.

It's true. The aspect doesn't make a lot of sense either.

But they use it, right?

So I think let's take kneels and start from the end external objects cannot be perceived.

That cannot be the object of perception.

External objects cannot be perceived or the object of perception because external objects consist of dharmas.

And by definition, I'd be dharmas because say that dharmas can't be perceived.

So we have three elements we have.

And then you'll just added another further extension, which was.

Let's stay with the first one.

We have dharmas.

We have dharmas.

We have conglomerates, which is what is, which is experienced.

And then we have perceivers.

The perceivers perceive conglomerates.

They perceive what appears to the mind.

And conglomerates are conceptual imputations.

And have no, they're not dharmas.

They're not causally efficacious entities.

So therefore what is perceived is not an external object, but is not an external object.

You can say anything more about it.

If it's not an external object, then it's an internal or it is a mental dharma.

So then if we've cut the tie between what is thought to be external things like dharmas or whatever.

Then I guess the question is, what is perceiving conglomerates of what?

It seems like that's like taking the pieces of conglomerates are dharmas, which are not seen.

And why would we be seeing in our minds conglomerates?

How do we know their conglomerates of what?

That's what it gets to is that conglomeration is a fiction.

It's like pulling a rabbit out of a hat.

That like if you put two part of this particles together, you can't see them.

But if you put three, you can't.

At some point more of invisible things becomes visible, which is illogical.

Right.

As if we're putting a giant jigsaw puzzle together.

And we should remember that this is very similar to the type of argumentation we saw with Nagarjuna.

Using the Abhidharma goes own system to demonstrate its incomprehensibility.

They're not necessarily proposing a new system in its place.

But are demonstrating that Abhidharma makes no sense on its own terms?

That's cool.

When you say they, you mean the Madhya Madhya.

They are being dharma kirti and dignauga, the logicians.

They don't put forward the three natures, the Ali Vijana.

They don't get into any of that fun stuff, at least in this section of their texts.

And so they're not really talking about logic.

And so then again, in terms of this not positing the alternative, they're not saying what we perceive is true.

What we perceive is just mind.

They're just saying, OK, that doesn't make any sense.

And then stopping there or are they.

I don't remember it actually, even though I read it several times, I've forgotten where they go.

I suppose we could.

They don't really conclude anything.

Well, dharma kirti addresses this one.

And then on page 219.

219.

This is going to be verse 3.211.

Chapter 3, verse 211.

313.

Yes, the spatially extended appearance.

Let's just do 212.

This part of awareness, namely the one that is established such that it seems external.

Is different from internal determination, which is the part of awareness that seems to be the subjectivity that apprehends the apparently external part.

Awareness is not differentiated, but its appearance is differentiated into 2.

This being the case, that dualistic appearance must be cognitive confusion.

And he's saying that because in the previous paragraphs, he's demonstrated why externality cannot be the case.

The non-existence of one of the two in awareness eliminates the existence of both.

Therefore, the emptiness of duality is the suchness, the takva of awareness.

So we don't have an argument saying the external is unreal, therefore, almost be mined.

We have an argument demonstrating that the unreality of the external makes that whole distinction of internal, of mind matter, internal, external to be incoherent.

And so, in the case of this syllogism, as well as the earlier syllogism, there's a key aspect of the reason, or that is the reason.

So, in the prior example from Dignaga, the key aspect that became the reason is that real dharma are imperceptible.

That was the part that makes external perception of external objects unsupportable.

Here, the key feature is that awareness is not differentiable.

Mind doesn't have parts.

So, the sense of the being of appearing as two are differentiated into two is delusional.

So, when we say mind here, what do we mean?

The perceptive quality.

Like, just sort of cognition.

Well, these translators use the word awareness as a trying to be as general as possible.

And you're sort of a cognitive capability, like knowing basic knowing, right?

Basic knowing, yeah, basic know.

So, in effect, all this stuff about like mind and consciousnesses and all those different layers, that's not in this picture.

Here, we're just talking about this sort of more fundamental aspect of mind.

Or of, I guess we're calling it mind still, right?

Or awareness, I guess. Well, actually, maybe not.

We don't even call it mind here. Is that?

No, I think they're talking about consciousness.

So, this like single momentary consciousness.

Definitely.

By size.

Even though it's not different.

Maybe we can go through some endemic or these arguments, just in the interest of time.

Yeah, I found this text to be very challenging.

And I think I sent it to Derek and he responded with a one word email seriously.

But, but actually really rewarding when you, when you get, get into it.

So, let's get into it.

We're on page 216.

And I'm going to, I'm going to do my best to go fast.

We'll see.

Page 216, the first paragraph.

This is verse 194.

That which is aggregate, aggregated, right?

So, dharma's coming together is a conglomerate.

And in that sense is a universal.

Universal being a generally characterized phenomenon, right?

So, I think like a coffee bean.

Not the individual dharma's that make up the coffee bean, but the coffee bean itself.

According to Buddhists such as Vasubandhu, one has perceptions of such things, such universals, such coffee beans.

Furthermore, any cognition of a universal is necessarily associated with conceptuality.

Hence, it is wrong to say that perception is free of conceptuality.

And this is his, his main point that he wants to make is that, that we think of perception as a direct window to the world.

And we're perceiving reality in a transparent sense.

But the argument he's going to spell out here is that perception is inherently conceptual.

And that there is no window to the world at all.

The dharma's are not in any way perceivable.

On the terms that the Abhidarmakas themselves put forward.

Is it because there's no window or because there's no world?

It's because the things that are proposed to make up the world cannot be perceived.

So perhaps we could say the issue is the lack of a window.

But without a window, we can't necessarily speculate as to what could be on the other side of the non-window.

Cynthia.

So one of the questions that came up for me with this reading, and again, this may be really my brain being dense,

or me having the wrong understanding of universals.

So if it's that I think I used to understand that there's that, you know, a specifically characterized phenomena versus a generally characterized phenomena that a generally characterized phenomena is like a concept,

like, for example, table is one of our favorites, right?

And that there could be a million different types of table, but the notion of a table is a generally characterized phenomena.

But when I was reading this, I got the feeling that even the table that we think we see, notwithstanding all the arguments that were debating here, that even that table is a universal.

Am I?

Yeah, that seems to be how the way the term is being used.

Which I agree with you was a little funny.

So it seems like they're basically saying any conglomerate is a universal.

So the, you know, the blue gondon gondon that you're actually staring at right in front of your face, that specific one is still a universal in a universal.

So is that a different view of, you know, the general and specific, or is it I'm just curious about that it becomes a universal when you label it.

I'm not getting the.

That's what I got from the universal.

What's that?

Any conglomeration is universal.

Which is, which is a different use of the term, then like the universal table versus the specific that table.

In this case, any, any, any perception that is conceptual in nature is a universal is a, is a generally characterized phenomenon.

And, and they're determining that it's conceptual because of the fact that it's a conglomerate, right?

And because, because a conglomerate is a conceptual creation only only by the obidarmicas, only the dharma's are non-conceptual.

Conglomerating them together is a conceptual activity.

Because again, when you were talking earlier about perception that we used to, you know, in simplistic terms, think that it was sort of a straight window into something, whatever it is.

That's completely gone now.

Everything is viewed as, I guess, you know, the funny thing is that it's a, it's conceptual because of a concept that we're not even thinking about when we're looking at things.

So called things.

Right?

And nobody's looking at the gum.

I mean, most of us, I'm sorry, most of us are not looking at the computer in front of us and thinking the dharma is behind it are conglomerating to come to this.

Right.

We just, we just think computer and think that what we're proceeding is a real thing.

Right.

Or we see blue, black, green, whatever the color is, light, all of that stuff.

We see that.

Yeah.

We're not thinking, you know, so the thing that's making it into a concept is a concept we're not even thinking about.

And that's the concept is is operative on a, on an imperceptible level.

This is an automatic.

And right, the boot isn't very concerned with, you know, automatic misperception.

Right.

Yeah.

It's just this, this change in the idea of what's a universal dis, I found it a little additional complication there.

Sure.

Sure.

Let's clarify that we don't actually perceive conglomerations of imperceptible particles.

Right.

We perceive whole phenomena, whole things.

And there's no way that conglomerations can conglomerate in any way to anything that we ever perceive.

But, you know, it's like enough invisible particles cannot become physical enough.

Partless particles conglomerated can't become tables and chairs.

But isn't that what they think was happening?

I mean, I, what you're saying makes sense to me that those things can't conglomerate.

But here they seem to be saying, they didn't really aggravate things that they're called comrades.

They, they didn't really get that far.

They said there's, there's fundamental particles and they can glomerate to create.

They don't really connect that to what we perceive.

Oh, does say one has perception of such things.

Yeah.

And I think that's an important point is that, that the perception of holes that does count as perception.

And he's not trying to explain away that, you know, you're perceiving a, a can of selfs are here.

What he's trying to do is sever the link between this perception and the idea of like a, a foundational atomistic metaphysics that grounds it.

So the, what he's, it's, the argument he's setting up is that if, if aggregates are real objects of perception, then perception is conceptual.

Okay. So in next 195, due to a relation with other things, how do you, other particles, infinitesimal particles that are different than their own previous moments arise from their own previous moments such that can produce an awareness.

In that sense, they are said to be aggregated and as such, they are said to be a condition for the production of awareness.

The, the, the, in the tiny little things come together and when they come together, we're said to be able to see them.

Furthermore, I'm just going to kind of summarize these following paragraphs. Furthermore, awareness is never of a single Dharma, only of the aggregates.

That do not aggregate are not observed.

Yeah. Okay. So then we have this wonderful, there's a series of sort of interesting images here. And the first is of a, a heap of sesame seeds, which similar to our heap of coffee beans.

So we perceive the heap of coffee beans or sesame seeds as, as one distinct thing, one clump.

And, and we perceive it simultaneously. There, there's that clump altogether that I'm looking at at one moment.

And the argument that he's making here is that that that is impossible because you can only perceive one thing at a time.

You can only perceive one sesame seed at a time. The mind in the Audi Dharma system can only perceive one thing at a time and by moving very quickly, it's able to perceive holes.

So, so we think you're, you think you're seeing a heap of sesame seeds at one moment. What's happening is that your mind is darting very quickly between many, many different sesame seeds to form this aggregate.

Can you really even see one single sesame seed at once?

Sure, sure. I think the argument continues, you know, on the way down. Yeah. Yeah.

So, so again, he maintains the argument that we do experience plurality.

But based on the Audi Dharma goes, own definition of perception and that it can't, multiple things can't be perceived simultaneously.

The experience of plurality, the experience of a pile of sesame seeds is a conceptual fiction that takes place, that is based on perception that takes over time, takes place over time.

We think of it as a single moment, but the perceptions that that underlie that are durational.

So, it's, so perception is instantaneous and particular and particular non-conceptual, but cognition is synthesized, unified and generalized.

So, then we move to another image of a multi-colored phenomena, multi-colored phenomena, and this is similar to plurality.

We see, we see an object with multiple parts of the same. We could, we could see an object of multiple different parts.

We see a butterfly wing and in many different colors.

Those again are particulars that have to be perceived of separately.

They are put together into a hole, but that putting together is a conceptual fiction.

Do you remember when we went through the different subdivisions of the Eugucharans?

They have different views on like, is there one consciousness of multiple objects or are there multiple consciousnesses of multiple objects?

Or is there, is there an object? Is there a multi-colored object that's one thing?

And the equal parts, folks, were called the, I think they were called the half-agests, because the eggs are like split, right?

Half is perception, half is object, but sorry, Chris, go on. You got a role.

Well, so...

So we have some examples of, let's see, in those cases where one sees a single color and not multi-color, one is just seeing the color that is a part of the hole.

So there's the idea that you could break the perception down into smaller little units, so you just see the blue part of the wing.

The wing is still multi-colored and trying to separate it into a, you know, you're artificially trying to slice up your perception in a way that it doesn't actually appear to you.

If after eliminating the constituent color such as blue, you can still see some multi-color that is other than the constituent colors, then what you see is indeed psychedelic.

It's indeed unreal if you can separate it from the constituents and have it still exist.

You know, that idea is incoherent, is what he's saying.

You can't remove the particulars that the general is still dependent on all of them.

So then he has this...

He's responding, I think, in this next part, where he brings a fake butterfly into the real butterfly and they look the same.

He's sort of saying that he's anticipating a naturalistic response to this argument that like, yeah, yeah, well, surely we all agree that butterflies exist and are real things.

You know, you're perceiving a real butterfly, therefore there must be something foundational in them.

Even though these arguments you make are valid, there must be something real there.

And he said, no, because you can have a fake butterfly that is just as convincing at the same visual perception.

The idea is that he's trying, again, to sever the idea of holes and parts.

You may want to say that the butterfly must be a hole because we perceive it. It must be a real thing.

But a fake butterfly has can have the same perception, Cynthia.

Actually, what happened for me going through this whole thing and I read through it many, many times.

It just seemed like all of these little extra details that he added to me actually sort of threw me off.

It seemed like, I guess the question is, what is the core argument they're trying to make?

Because if the core argument is, it's not outside, it's inside.

Or there's no duality of mind and matter.

If that's the core argument that they're trying to make, all these other things seem to me like slight diversions.

The one and the many, the multicolor, all of those seemed like diversions from the core issue of,

we're just trying to figure out whether what we're experiencing is all kind of a projection or creation of our consciousness as opposed to being a perception of some thing.

That's what I thought the essential, but I'm not sure.

Well, I found myself getting lost in these things because it didn't seem like it was clear what's the main argument they are trying to make.

I think the main argument that's being made is against the idea of real holes, real aggregates coming together that are perceivable.

And it's against that, and it's for the perception of particulars.

And that perception is in order for the system to make sense.

Perception needs to be non-conceptual, but perception is always conceptual.

So he's really just taking apart, in a way, similar to Nagarjuna, taking apart the Abhidharma's system.

And really from a first person point of view.

Okay, that's helpful.

And I guess that's the problem for me is that I am maybe looking for an answer to a different question, which is this difference of inside outside, which is something that, you know, because I spend my,

some of my spare time reading the profound inner topics, as I've said a few times, you know, trying to understand that other view of reality.

Of that it's more of a projection that's created from our mind.

And yet they keep coming back and grounding all the arguments in perceptional arguments.

Which, he seems like, okay, fine, let's, if we want to sever the notion of perceiving external things, let's look at the, but they seem to stay with it, but just are tearing apart the logic of it, I guess is what.

Well, he does get into the external internal distinction later, as we, as we talked about earlier.

And I'll just kind of do this last bit and wrap it up.

The, well, one thing first is that the, he has this wonderful example of the, of the painting, which, which seems to be proposing the idea of the unity is constructed that you, you could have an image in a painting of a, of a person portrait.

And, and maybe we could even say it's a digital painting, and it's made out of pixels.

And, you know, we all accept that, that the, the unifying image of the, the pixel, the painted person made of pixels is a, is a conceptual projection.

Only the pixels are what is actually being perceived.

But then he wants to have this, make this argument about, about space, spatial perception.

This is going to be 211 on page 219.

Therefore, neither, neither the objects nor the awareness has a spatially extended experience.

Since that kind of property, swabava, namely, spatial extension, has already been disproved in the case of a single entity.

It is also not possible in the case of what is many.

So, because as we've been discussing, dharma's are dimensionless, partless particles.

They, and this is an argument we've seen before, because, because they're dimensionless, aggregating them together will not create dimension.

Things without, you know, no matter how many things without mass you add, you're never going to get mass.

Therefore, the perception of spatial extension is necessarily a conceptual invention, conceptual, conceptually added to the dharma's.

And so, if spatial extension is not a real thing, is a conceptual creation, we really have no way of differentiating between what is internal and what is external.

You know, spatial extension is sort of the hallmark of externality.

You know, things are external because they exist in space, unlike our thoughts, which are somehow, you know, immaterial.

But if, if, if, if ext, spatial extension of externality, if dimensionality is a conceptual fiction, then there's, and not ultimately real, there's no way that we can distinguish between those things.

And with that distinction being dissolved, internal reality also is, is not comprehensible.

Going forward a little bit to 15, there is no definition of things outside of the definition of them as either subjects or objects.

Those definitions do not ultimately make sense. Therefore, since things are empty of any definition, is explained that they are essencelessness.

Essenceless.

So, I think that's probably good on that.

Derek.

Thank you, Chris, very best.

I think that's probably way off here, like in another field, but like, when we learn about, um, yogic direct perception.

Is that something that like fits into this scheme?

And, yeah, because I'm, I'm pretty sure that, that yogic direct perception is without conceptuality, like somehow that that's what makes it a special.

But is it part of this scheme, or does it come, did we lose it already, or does it come later?

That's the big question, isn't it?

I think that, in a certain sense, what he's done here is demolished the possibility of dualistic perception.

So, if we define direct yogic perception as non-dual perception, there's all the room in the world for it in this scheme.

So, all he's shown is what, what can't be that, that, that, that dualistic perception is mistaken.

He, so far, has nothing to say about non-dual perception.

This, that seems to raise the question of, what is the definition of perception?

Right.

Because it's, I imagine some definitions would be inherently making it a dualistic process.

But, you know, what's the point of perception, if there's not a perceiver and a perceived, and so therefore perhaps the whole notion of using that word no longer makes sense that we would need a different word to talk about what non-dual experience is.

Yeah, not only a different word, but, I mean, I would, I would go as far as to say, like language itself doesn't seem to be up for the task.

And even if we, I mean, understanding that yes, language is always imperfect.

And let's just say we're pointing at the moon and all that. But, I mean, I, I'll even go for non-dual experience is probably preferable to non-dual perception.

Because, although you could say experience implies a experience, or I'm not sure if it does, but perception certainly seems like it implies two parts.

Anyway, just throwing it out there that it does require kind of a different, maybe even set of terms to.

You could say that it's non-conceptual experience, whereas inference is conceptual valid, valid experience perception is said to be non-conceptual valid experience and inference is non is conceptual valid experience.

You're saying this is going back to the idea that these perception and inference are the two ways we know things.

So we're referring a coffee bean rather than just like experiencing or perceiving a coffee bean, we're inferring that that's what that is.

Well, somebody told me that's what they look like. So, or I tasted the coffee that got made from it. So, but that's all, that's all inferring.

Yeah, that's all inference.

Everything is inference. I mean, because I'm not a Buddha, I'm going to, you know, I think that the Buddha did not infer somehow.

He has a really, sorry, I said I was done. He's got a really good one here, and maybe Derek can help explain the metaphor.

This is verse 219.

Therefore, the Buddha's ignoring the ultimate, close one eye like an elephant and propagate theories that involve external objects merely in a court accord with worldly perceptions.

I liked that line too.

At least it explained one thing.

The idea is that there's going a lot, they just go a lot, the Buddha just go along with what all of us are, you know, saying and seeing as a convention.

Yeah, but they're not, they're not participating in this illusory game of realism, but they, you know, close one eye and, you know, kind of talk like they are.

Well, they have to.

Yeah, because they got to talk to us who are, you know, totally confused.

Inferring all the time.

Inferring all sorts of things.

Mostly furry.

What I'm really, my takeaway from this chapter is by demolishing the idea of dual perception, duality.

In what I think to be actually a pretty good way.

He's actually pointing out, you know, that reality that.

Nondual reality is for real.

And that this path is like the real deal.

You know, I mean, this is like, this is like a, like a big neon sign saying, yeah, keep going this way.

You know, so that's, that's my takeaway.

I mean, I was like really happy to jump in on this class and like land on this.

This is like, wow, this is great.

It's pretty cool.

So how does it differ from the Garsena?

They both sort of end up in a similar place, right?

Chris, Chris hit it on the head when he said it's a first person.

This is a first person deconstruction.

Persexual deconstruction.

Whereas the Garsena doesn't talk a lot about perception.

Morgan, what's your take on it?

How does it, how does it veer from the purity of the caracas?

Um, not, I mean, I think you're right.

That the inner Garsena doesn't talk about perception because that's all still dual from his perspective, or from the caracas perspective.

I think as I understand them is, you know, there are any act of perception, even if it's purely internal.

There's a perceiver and a percept.

And that's not something that the caracas allows for.

Or it's something that the caracas shows, shows is internally and consistent.

But, but, you know, Dharma can just apply devil's ed to hear.

Dharma Kirti also shows that it's, it's inconsistent.

Perception, yeah.

But he still leads up to the possibility that there is a kind of perception.

No.

I mean, yeah, it's a really perception that there's no object.

Uh, not the way most people use that term, no.

Interesting little scheme here.

So I thought there were many minutes we could just skip through briefly the right up in golden age.

But it's philosophy on page, which is the sea chapter four.

As Chris said, the School of Dignaga in Dharma Kirti, page 217.

Just give a like little context for what we just went through.

He gives the, so we got Dignaga.

Dignaga is around 480 to 540.

He is a student, he's a student of Vasubandu, supposedly the brother of Asanga.

He is disciple Ishwaray Sena, is then the teacher of Dharma Kirti.

And who supposedly is like 550 to 610 or somewhere in those ranges, you know.

So 5th to 6th century, quick little synopsis of Dignaga's life, he starts out as it.

Put go the bottom of all things.

And he goes, he's dissatisfied with that studies with Vasubandu.

And sides are composed.

He, after interacting with Vasubandu, he writes various texts on Pramana.

Pramana being translated here as epistemic instruments, I think, is the term.

And he writes famously seven texts, I think, or six texts.

And then finally, he sets out to write one that summarizes them all.

And there's this little legend about how he starts writing it.

And starts by saying that the Buddha is the embodiment, which turns out to me,

is sort of very essence or outflow of Pramana, which he says, epistemic instruments.

Pramana Bhutaya, praising the Buddha as being the entity or essence.

What we're going to sort of result of valid knowing.

And then, and from that develops a whole system of the importance of knowing validly

that your nature of reality is what actually is liberty.

And without, and thereby focusing on, well, what is genuine, true understanding or knowing?

What we bring that about.

Let's see.

He debates Krishna, Muniraja, and he's defeated by his magical power.

He defeats him in debate, but then the guy has magical powers.

He gives up and he throws his chalk.

Let's suppose live in there and resolve it when it comes down.

He'll gaze.

Now, Majushri enters the scheme.

And that's a famous scenario that is repeated later in the life of Rurupo.

He gets the solution that he tosses his mala in the tree.

And I think it's also Majushri that fishes it out beforehand that catches it.

Dharmakirti has similar scheme.

He studies Dignaga's text with his student, Ishwara Ashwara Ashwara.

So, page 218, the second page of chapter 4.

And surpasses that gentleman, that student of Dignaga, and equals Dignaga,

if not surpasses him, and introduces additional aspects of the scheme of Pramana.

And then he debates a number of other great non-buddhist philosophers,

who he wins against, and they either join the Buddhist fold,

or they kill themselves in the case of Shankar, or supposedly,

who comes back, is reborn three times in a repeat,

and the third time, the Buddhist people have cute little stories.

And basically, he concludes onto 19 Buddhist interesting about the content of these,

is they've revealed the intellectual background.

There's an increasing importance put on the ability to defend Buddhism against outsiders, non-buddhist in debate.

They don't focus on meditation or teaching accomplishment, but on debate.

And they're not between other Buddhists, as we saw earlier in the tradition,

where like Nagarjuna, Bidarmas, Yogacharas, they're all fighting or debating internally.

Other Buddhists here, they're not starting to, but they're very much engaged in defending Buddhism against non-buddhist philosophers.

And for that reason, they focus on what are some common ground that we can use at starting points for a debate.

It's not the scriptures of teachings of the Buddha, because you don't accept those,

and I don't accept your teachers' scriptures.

And so let's start with their experience, so to speak,

and so they come up with perception, non-conceptual experience, and inference.

And so, two-twenty, the fifth page, or whatever, is a section fourth page.

The epistemology section two, Dignaga, begins his Pramata-Sama Chai with a chapter on perception,

setting out the key aspects, and addresses the Buddha by the term Pramana-Buddha,

embodying the Pramata, the means of undervalid, knowing.

And this doesn't mean the Buddha should be regarded as authoritative simply because of his line-size,

but rather his enlightenment is the fruition of therefore flowing its nature from the correct application of Pramana.

Two types mentioned there, two-twenty-one, oh sorry, bottom of two-twenty.

This distinction between two types of knowing, Pramana is nicely mirrored on the ontological level

by distinction between two types of objects, kinds of objects, soil, auction, self-mark,

and samanya, auction, a generally marked, commonly interpreted as momentary particles,

or the former, and the latter are general objects, generalized objects.

And particulars are exclusively accessed by sense perception initially,

and in the scheme initially, and objects in general are apprehended by inference.

And later, they refine that and point out that there's a aspect of the first of a six-sense mind cautiousness

that also is of small auctiones.

The cannot-good describes the small auction entities, two-twenty-one,

is free from conceptual construction and indescribable, not associated with any name,

perception yields a total but non-conceptualized pre-linguistic image of this object,

does not determine or ascertain anything.

If we read his theories virtually, at the Dharma Project, we consider this small auction

that entities be the fundamental darkness and perception as a route that gives us access to them.

His starmas can be useful, it can conceptualize, which is sort of contradictory,

but he thought about as particularized properties or tropes.

Like, as we said, Earth has solidity and water as moisture and so forth.

Conceptual construction, on the other hand,

only works in groups of darkness, assembling them together as a property,

disregarding their stinctions between different but very similar blue tropes, for example,

where an individual object is putting together a blue trope,

a shaped trope, and so on.

So did you have a blue shaped thing of a jig?

Technical term, perception is therefore never a perception of the kind of medium-sized dry goods

that the famous philosophical term of our everyday acquaintance,

such as tables and chairs and potatoes, on this interpretation, this small auction entities

are sometimes compared to the sense data of 20th century Western epistemology.

Let's see.

The next paragraph is a theory of perception that this school defends,

faces the following apparent difficulty in the one hand.

Perception is understood as non-conceptual, non-ironious, and directed at what is ultimately real.

Namely, the swallection entities or darkness, it also can only perceive aggregates

of those ultimately real objects, such as infinite, infinitesimable particles,

or the ultimately real particles that can only be perceived and aggregate.

Can you give an example of, it sounds like they're saying there's something that we're seeing

that is not at the level of dharma's and is not at the level of tables and chairs,

but what, is there an example of what that is?

A collection of parlors particles that we call a table in a chair.

But I thought, maybe I misunderstood the thing where he says the medium-sized dry goods

of our everyday acquaintance, such as tables and chairs.

Those are tables and chairs.

But I thought that's what he's saying that we're not seeing.

There's a difference between tables and chairs and the conglomeration of part of this particles

that makes up tables and chairs.

And that's the area that he's attacking.

This idea that the tables and chairs which are conceptualized entities

are the, they have as their referent conglomeration of.

But is he still thinking of it as a direct perception that's non-conceptual?

Well, he's working their system, and as we know from the text we just read,

he's eventually tearing those systems apart, showing that they're not logical.

But he's, he's picking on this gray area that, as we found out earlier,

in the avid armor world, they leave bigs out from parlors particles to tables and chairs.

What's the intermediate area there?

Okay, somehow it seems like this didn't, it seemed like it was slightly contradicting

what we saw in the other readings, but that may be a wrong interpretation.

I think that's correct.

He's, he's sort of, this is sort of the avid armor.

It's like their chromana system starts from the avid armor world.

It's like they apply chromana to the avid armor scheme,

and then they apply, they apply the types of cognition,

perceptual and inferential to the avid armor scheme,

and then using logic they show that it doesn't hold on.

And focusing on this area of like, basically,

how do you get from infinitesimal to conglomerates that are perceivable,

and how do you get from many, sorry, many individuals do a single perception

and similar inconsistencies,

and experience in reality, going between.

It's like, maybe it's like going from general,

special relativity to general relativity, something like that,

where there's like this divide between these levels of description

that they just don't jive together.

And that's sort of what you have here, you have our world of experience

of tables and chairs, and the avid armor world of this refined,

this trope world, where there's just these qualities.

And how do you get from one to the other?

Chris, do you want to add anything?

It's just thinking of...

Anyone remember the underpants noms from South Park?

So the underpants noms are the noms that steal your underwear,

right, and that's why your underwear is always missing.

And then eventually the gang goes to the subterranean place

and meets the underpants noms, and like, why are you stealing the underwear?

And they pull down the big chart,

and it's like, step one, collect underwear, step two,

step three, profit.

It feels like that's the avid dharma.

It's like, okay, we got the infinitesimal particles,

and then...

And then in there?

Presto, change, pulling the rabbit out of the head.

And that's why we keep tripping up,

because they leave that part out.

They don't clarify that part, and that's what he's focusing on.

They've created a nice little system when you only focus on one level.

But if you try to reconcile the two, it just doesn't work.

And to create any viable explanation for reality,

you have to reconcile the two.

So the whole thing that falls apart.

And just on the next page, he talked about the examples

that we went through on 222.

Later authors tried to solve this difficulty by arguing

that the image does not correspond to a single infinitesimal particle,

or to a whole native many such particles,

but to the fact that many particles together produced the effect of being perceived.

So another attempt to explain the inexplicable and inexplicable

by just rearranging the furniture.

So to speak.

And then he talks about the case of the phenomenologically variegated butterfly

in a way called a psychedelic object in the text.

So a nice little explanation here.

And he goes into the inference in a helpful way.

So a little glimpse into the world of Buddhist logic of Dignaga

and Dharmakirti, which ends up infiltrating all the later traditions

in India to the extent that there are any, and primarily in Tibet,

we'll see this scheme come up over and over.

And we saw that with Bobby Vega, right?

Yeah.

The attempt to apply their system of Pramana to Madhyamaka.

And as we all know, that's not the move.

So for him, it was more like an ontological basis.

Like we have to agree on an established phenomenon in order to show its emptiness.

We have to put forward the things of our conventional world.

And so these guys, and he was doing it in like the world of the ontology

and the tenet systems.

And these guys are doing a similar project on deconstructing.

On the epistemological level.

And Nagarjuna started in his text, his reference in this western half

to Nagarjuna text, where he touches on sort of begins the whole tradition of logic that develops into this.

So let's conclude and dedicate on merit.

By this merit, my all the ten omissions made to feed the enemy wrong

doing from the stronger waves of birth, old age, sickness, and death,

omissions, those are, may I free all beings.

By the confidence that we go into the center of the greed,

he's middle-low-scorn, and the rigthens with some blue.

May the dark ignorance of sentient beings be to spell.

May all beings enjoy profound brilliant glory.

So the same Neil left us some nice notes here.

All of which is simply to reiterate, or even force it,

and he was perception of reality is grossly imperfect,

inaccurate, and widely buried, but perceived.

Thank you, everyone.

Thank you, Chris.

Thank you very much.

Thank you, Peter.

You're welcome.

Thank you.

See you next week.

And next week, we'll, uh, I think we, we encounter Shanturok Shita, is that right?

I think so, yeah.

The first attempt to, uh, we've been kind of pairing these traditions against each other

and attempt to bring them together.

So we'll see how that goes.

Thanks, everyone.

Thank you.