Submarines and the Future of Defense Manufacturing

The real advantage that submarines bring is our stealth and access.

We can pretty much go anywhere in the world undetected.

We can carry nuclear missiles on our ballistic missile submarines,

and that ensures that we continue our decades of peace without nuclear war

that any country that tried to attack us with nuclear weapons would be destroyed.

At the end of the Cold War, we walked away from manufacturing.

The amount of work that we need now to replenish our fleet

is on the order of about 70 million hours.

The power of combining the new workforce, American Software, American Steel,

and American Spirit, is you have to get this productivity jump somehow with advanced factories.

It's not a money problem. We have to get this productivity uplift

by fusing workforce trading and software together to go a lot faster.

In the mid-1980s, the United States built four nuclear submarines a year.

Then the Cold War ended, production collapsed,

and nine out of ten manufacturing jobs vanished.

An entire generation was told to skip the factory floor.

Four decades later, the Navy needs more than five times the capacity it had a decade ago.

The Columbia class program requires roughly 70 million labor hours.

The workers who could fill them aged out and nobody replaced them.

This is not a budget problem. The money exists. The people do not.

The question is whether software-driven manufacturing can compress a decade of training

into something the country can scale.

David Yulevich speaks with Chris Power, founder and CEO at Hadrian,

and vice admiral Robert Goucher, the Pentagon's first submarine czar.

I am very, very, very, very lucky to have two incredible folks joining me on stage.

This is going to be a conversation you do not want to miss.

So in addition to having Chris Power, the founder and CEO of Hadrian,

who you heard earlier, we also have Adlo Robert Goucher,

who charge of all submarine production for the United States Navy.

Let me give you a quick background.

For those of you that are not familiar with the defense industrial base,

the Navy is an extraordinary force.

They operate across the largest domain on Earth.

They cover more than 70% of the planet,

and the Navy is responsible for projecting American power, maintaining deterrence,

and ensuring stability across that entire space.

This is a service that has been operating continuously since 1775.

That's 250 years already.

It's adapted into new technologies, new threats, new missions,

and it remains one of the most capable institutions in the world.

And that's why we're here in Cherokee.

That's why we're opening this facility.

We're putting of Hadrian's factory for a 2.25 million square foot advanced manufacturing facility

that's going to support the Columbia and Virginia class submarine programs.

So let's start out, actually, with you, Admiral,

for people that are not familiar with the real world problems,

what problems do we solve with submarines?

Why do we have a submarine program?

And why is it important that we rebuild our submarine program?

I think the real advantage that submarines bring is our stealth and access.

We can pretty much go anywhere in the world undetected,

and so that becomes a very big threat for our enemies or adversaries.

And as I look at the two biggest missions that we satisfy,

we have fast attack submarines that go out and operate,

and they make sure that our seaways and waterways remain free and open to anybody

who would try to shut them down.

And you heard Chris talk about how Australia needs to get supplies from external,

while the submarine force can make sure that those supplies make it when they need to and where they need to.

The other mission, which is our number one mission in the Department of War,

is strategic deterrence.

Larry, nuclear missiles on our ballistic missile submarines,

like the Columbia class that we're building,

that ensures that we continue our decades of peace without nuclear war,

because the submarines are unable to be found,

so that assures that any country that tried to attack us with nuclear weapons

would be destroyed.

And that's why we call them the survivable leg of our nuclear triad.

That is that second strike capability.

So nobody attacks us because they know the submarines are out there and they can attack back.

When we talk about industrial capacity, I'll start with you, Admiral.

Now I'm going to Chris.

What does it mean to say that we need industrial capacity?

Yeah, so what it means is just a quick history lesson.

At the end of the Cold War, we walked away from manufacturing.

We only built about three submarines in the 1990s until we started up the Virginia class program again.

And even when we were building at a rate of one per year,

that was only about 13 million hours of work that was required to build a single Virginia class submarine.

The amount of work that we need now to build our two plus one to replenish our fleet

and to replace our Ohio class ballistic missile submarines with Columbia

is on the order of about 70 million hours.

So that's more than five times as much as where we were just a little over a decade ago.

And so we're still on that trajectory because of the focus on shipbuilding, maritime dominance,

we're really trying to supercharge that with investments like we have here at Hadrian.

And Chris, how do you think about industrial capacity and what it is and what it means?

I think about it very similarly to the Vice Admiral.

At the end of the day, the capital equivalent can be purchased by Hadrian

and all of Hadrian's investors or the United States Navy.

But the real thing would be lost post the Cold War was the skilled workforce.

And that's what we talk about when we say hours.

And because we cut the jobs down by, you lost nine out of 10 jobs.

And then we told all the kids in the 80s and 90s that can manufacturing go get a four-year journalism degree.

So the big guard is that really smart people at work and through the rest of the enterprise,

we need 10, 20 times more of them to even catch up and meet the Vice Admiral's goals.

But most of them are in their late 50s, mid 60s.

Because we lost this demographic of skilled people.

For us, the power of combining the new workforce,

that's kind of American software, American steel, and American spirit,

is you have to get this productivity jump somehow with advanced factories.

Otherwise, it's not a money problem.

We could spend $10 billion hiring this man, two million welders that he needs.

They just don't exist in the country.

We have to get this productivity uplift by fusing workforce trading and software together

to go a lot faster.

That is the main problem.

It is a people problem.

So, Admiral, you stepped into a new role.

You've served in the Navy for a long time.

But you are the Pentagon's first direct reporting portfolio manager for submarines.

That means you report directly to Deputy Defense Secretary Stephen Feinberg.

People have colloquially called you the submarines are.

What is a submarines are and why was this role created?

Can't we just order submarines and get submarines?

Yes.

So, the reason that the Deputy Secretary Award decided to create the direct report portfolio managers,

or we call them DERPoms,

submarines are as a much better title than DERPO.

So, there's three that were created,

and they are all related to strategic deterrence missions.

You have Golden Dome, which is meant to defend the country against missile attacks.

Then you have the critical major weapon systems,

which are the Air Force nuclear triad program,

so the bombers and the ground-based intercontinental ballistic missiles.

And then the third leg of the strategic triad is submarines.

You see that nuclear strategic focus,

where we said we've got to get these programs right.

And so, the Deputy wanted to make sure that they got elevated,

so that any bureaucracy that could be inserted along the way

could just be short-circuited so that we really focus on

the outcome that we want, which is to build more submarines,

to stand up Golden Dome,

and then to fix our ground-based leg and air-based leg of the triad.

So, how do you think about success over the next three to five years?

We heard about this factory being a 50-year-plus initiative,

but how do you think about success in the near term?

I look at successes being on the cadence to deliver the submarines we need to deliver.

We may not be at the rate in three years,

but we have to be closing on it,

and we have to have all the levers that we need to pull moving in the right direction.

So, obviously, a huge portion of that is this outsourced work

as we build capacity, because we don't have enough of it in our private shipyards

that traditionally build submarines.

We need to spread that throughout the rest of the country

in order to be able to get that capacity up and to be able to hit the cadence that we need.

So, this next question I'll start with Chris,

but then I'll go to you, Admiral.

What is the hardest part of working with the government,

working with the Navy, coordinating across primes,

working with all the other folks you work with, working with legislatures?

How hard is it to actually restart this industrial base?

I would say three years ago was incredibly difficult,

and now, honestly, to pull something like this off for the last six, seven months

with Deputy Secretary Feinberg, Secretary Phailin,

honestly, compared to the size and scale of something like this

if you're in the commercial sector is pretty fast.

But it's because Congress,

of the Senate and the House, the Navy, the Department of War

has really hit the Go Fast button and removed a lot of these blockers.

And secondly, it's cultural.

One of the smartest things we could be doing is,

hey, there was a single accountable person that just runs this

instead of 20 people trying to contribute.

And now that that's all getting cleaned up,

not just in submarines, but in drone dominance, in golden dome,

unfortunately, the vice-abnormal's got one of the toughest jobs at the company,

but there is now a single person in command

to control the entire enterprise.

It can make fast decisions, take risks, place multiple bets.

We're going to be successful here in Hadrian with an enterprise,

but we need to put all of the bets in the ground now

because the three or four years risk to pay off,

so let's just do multiple things.

It's not possible unless there's a single man or woman in charge,

and that's been the biggest sea change of how easy or harder it is to deal

with legislature, the Navy, the Department of War.

And Admiral Goucher, you have a lot of different stakeholders

that you're hurting together, crimes, suppliers,

other folks across the Pentagon.

What are you finding to be the most difficult parts to coordinating success?

I think you nailed it.

There are a lot of stakeholders, and I kind of joke,

when there's a law of conservation of authority,

when I get it, somebody else loses it.

So you've still got to work through all that.

And the truth is, we're really in the transition program.

I mean, I'm really about a month into the job right now.

So we want to do that in a controlled manner.

A good example is this Hadrian deal was on the cusp of being solved.

And so I went and talked to Jason Potter and the secretary,

and we said, hey, don't jump in the middle of this.

Let's get it across the goal line.

And so things like that, but as we kind of move forward

and I am starting to take things on,

we just got to make sure that we have a smooth transition.

So hopefully within a couple of months,

I'll be able to say that, hey, I'd pass that,

and I'm on the bigger problems of how do we build submarines faster,

and then we'll move in that ball down the field.

And Admiral, I'm going to ask you a question about drones

and missile interceptors, because we see them in the news all the time,

and the fight in Iran.

We see lots of talk about drones and missile interceptors.

It's a pretty rare opportunity to have someone like you,

who has been a submarine commander,

who can talk about the silent fleet to a certain extent,

talk about where submarines still fit,

and even a modern conflict today,

to the extent that, give us some insight into how we should think about

the criticality of submarines beyond just the second strategic deterrence

and the nuclear triad.

Well, I think as long as we keep thinking forward

and pace in our adversary, submarines will always have a place,

I look at just today our ability to get off of another country's coast

undetected.

We can choose what we wanted to ploy from there.

I mean, I can shoot a missile or I can shoot a torpedo,

and as we look to underwater drones,

we can start to tail or those.

The real advantage there is that we can then build the payload

and whatever I wanted to deliver outside of the submarine,

and then I just have to figure out how to load it on,

and I could pick my payload.

So whatever the conflict is of the future,

that gives us an opportunity.

The other thing that we can do,

because we're self-sustaining, we have our own defense,

we have our own command and control capability,

is I could control other things,

so I could see a world where a submarine goes far forward,

it connects with the network of drones to give the signal,

so you still have the human in the loop to make the decision

or to see what's happening and provide that,

and the submarine may never have to shoot a weapon.

Amazing.

I want to shift to the factory here in Alabama.

Chris, this is more than just a factory.

It's really going to be a modern advanced manufacturing facility.

Talk to us a little bit about how a modern software driven factory works differently

than a traditional factory.

There are two big things.

A big thing number one is, we don't have enough machinists,

we don't have enough quality inspectors,

we don't have enough welders in the country.

So at that task level, we have to get them 90% more productive

and make the rest of the time human in the loop easier,

because if you want to train a Navy welder today,

it's going to take you a decade.

So we have to augment the skills with software

and also make it more accessible for training new workforce.

That's number one because if we translate the 70 million hours target into people

with software, we can make that 50% less people, 70% less people.

The second thing is the flexibility that constructing something like a submarine demands

is incredibly what we call high mix level, right?

So if you're building a Toyota Camry,

you're making 20,000 of them a year,

you can set up production lines that are just cranking out nuts, bolts,

components, assemblies in traditional kind of factory automation,

like Foxconn with Apple, right?

You can easily automate a million iPhones.

What the software enables is running at that level of factory productivity,

but with the flexibility that's something like a submarine demands,

you don't necessarily need a hundred of the same thing.

You need one and you need a slight variant,

especially with sustainment and maintenance and even submarine construction.

You don't know when you need stuff anyways,

so having this like flexible manufacturing system,

apart from the raw productivity,

it really is a speed and flexibility to reconfigure lines,

to give the yards what they need, kind of on demand,

versus, oh no, I realize that I need a spare

to keep submarine construction going

and you go back to the supply chain and it might take 12 months.

The whole thing just stalled out.

So it's really the velocity and agility

and reducing the amount of people,

because we just don't have the people in the US.

We have to get this productivity uplift with software and a new workforce.

I've seen some of your other factories and your other facilities

and people are going to come to start to recognize

the importance of being able to change out the product line,

increase throughput, have better visibility

into the entire production line.

It's really tremendous.

Admiral, when you look at a facility like this,

I know you're still ramping up to speed in your new job,

but you look at the potential of a facility like this

and you start to dive into the supply chain.

Where do you feel we can make the most impact around capacity?

Where do you feel like there's the biggest bottlenecks

in areas where we might find other opportunity

to help increase our rate of production?

There's a couple things that I'm looking at right away

for this facility.

One thing is our in-service submarine.

So submarines that have already been built

but have to go through their periodic maintenance,

maybe to repair a pump or a valve.

I think the opportunity to take obsolete parts

where the companies have gone out of business,

turn it over to Chris, have them figure out

how to manufacture or use at the facility here,

obsolete parts, and then turn them back over

so we can keep the existing submarines running

will be a huge early opportunity for us.

The other part of this is one of the big hold-as-way,

and I'm going to riff a little bit off

what Chris was just saying with the factory.

There's really three things you need to build a submarine.

You've got to have people at some point

you have to turn some wrenches.

Those people have to be productive.

What I would tell you is, in some areas today,

we are less than 50% productive.

So essentially for every two people I'm getting one hour.

That's no one's fault.

That's just where we are.

It has to do with experience.

It is an exceptionally difficult process,

and it's always been that way.

But I think even if we were operating at our peak performance

of the mid-1980s when we were pumping out

four submarines a year,

we were still only at about 0.7 or 0.8.

I mean, it's only so productive you can get with a human.

So I think by using machines,

we have an opportunity to actually get that productivity up.

Not only are we able to run it around the clock,

we're able to be more effective in doing it.

And then the last thing that you need is you need

the actual parts that you've been talking about.

And the biggest thing that we find

is you walk around our yards.

It slows them down and stops them

is what's called sequence critical material, right?

You get to the point where I've got one more part I've got to have

and I can't finish the step.

And I've got to get to that and be able to manufacture it.

As we get spun up past the first articles

and we really show the capability of this plant,

I think those will be the types of things that we push down here.

And Chris and I have already talked about things.

It's things like air flasks.

It's things like our hatches for escape trunks and things like that.

That he's very confident we'll be able to do here in this plant.

That's fantastic.

I think having software, as Chris mentioned, play a role

on making sure that if you only have 95% of the parts,

that's not enough to make a summary.

You need a hundred percent.

And having software help drive some of that production line

and provide visibility is really key.

So Chris, turning it back over to you,

how are you going to prove to the Navy

that you can bring up this capability and deliver quickly?

Honestly, we've already proven it,

but I will say this is a like

generational, huge lift, right?

This is going to be six, seven hundred people

just set it up.

You know, what I think is we've got a really good plan.

We've got really good partners in the Navy.

We've got really good partners in the primes that own the designs.

And I think everyone understands that we're going to go super fast

and shove things through the qualification system

as fast as possible to make sure we're de-risking it as fast as possible.

And then building a submarine is complicated.

Some of this is going to come online fast in seven months

and some of it's going to take two years.

The other thing, frankly, is that we're dedicated to

is the way we've structured this is basically

we can't be successful out of the Navy,

but we're also capital or risk.

So we are strongly incentivized to basic,

I'm sorry, it comes down to culture, sweat bullets until we pull this off,

not just because of the mission,

because of that we've structured this entire enterprise.

Okay, so we're going to wrap up here in a few minutes.

I want to talk about a couple last questions.

The first, we talk about a Columbia class submarine,

cost $16 billion, takes almost a decade to build,

carries the nuclear deterrent.

And then in my world, in the venture capital world,

we talk about companies like Seronic and Andral

that are building very small, much more lower cost,

autonomous vessels, underwater drones.

They cost a fraction of that,

and they're designed to be attributable, to be expendable.

How do these things fit together, Admiral?

I think that the process of manufacturing some of those drones

has some similar corollaries,

because you're having to build an integrated system.

And so when you build a submarine,

that's a similar process.

You'd actually, some of the experience that companies

like Andral get from building these unmanned systems

can translate to building modules for submarines.

To be honest, I had that conversation two days ago

with Andral and how we get to that end state.

I do think there are some corollaries,

but you also have to remember that those drone capabilities

are typically a single mission,

and part of the value of whether it's a submarine

or a surface ship with humans on board

is that they are multi-mission systems.

They're not just a niche tool.

They're a responsive, versatile tool

that can do any number of things.

I liked your comment earlier about it.

Also, the submarines can be the command and control

for a whole fleet of autonomous systems.

That was very cool.

Chris, or kind of start to wrap up with you here.

This is factory four.

You're endeavoring to have factories five, six, seven, eight,

and beyond.

What has to go right to make this model repeatable

across the country?

And what's one misconception that you want to make sure

that everyone here today and everyone who's listening at home

when we release this?

What's one misconception that you want to correct for them

so that they know about building

and manufacturing here in the US?

I think the biggest misconception is,

hey, it's all automated.

We don't need the people.

Like the amount of software engineers who had a smart people

from Tesla and SpaceX and GE

that we need to set the things up

and the amount of workforce development,

it has to be a national mission.

And it's all about the people and the productivity combined.

We've already proven that we can do this in different states.

I think people do not understand how complicated a submarine

is to construct and design.

And secondly, if you think about easy manufacturing

and difficult manufacturing,

and maybe you put Starship at the top of the list,

submarines in terms of tolerancing your precision

and quality and welding are easily number one.

So to do something like this for the first time ever

that's not the private shipyards of the Navy itself

and do that knowledge transfer is a huge deal.

Because it's not just making this stuff,

the level of precision and quality we have to operate here

is as hard if not more difficult

as building a rocket or something like that.

And this is like a very, very serious endeavor

because this man has to send a bunch of sails on the water

and like this thing has to go 100% right for 30, 40 years.

It's huge.

Admiral Goucher, we are very, very lucky to have you here.

I believe these are your first sort of public remarks

that you've taken on this new role.

You've been a submarine commander.

We are just incredibly fortunate to have you here.

We're incredibly fortunate to have you serving our country.

Both of you gentlemen, I want to thank you for being here

for everything you're doing for our country.

And thanks for doing this.

Thank you David, appreciate it.

Yeah, thanks very much.

Thank you for listening and I'll see you in the next episode.

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