Summa Theologica – The Sacraments by St. Thomas Aquinas | Catholic Theology & Seven Sacraments Audiobook Part 4

0:00Question 87 of Sumatheologica Terzia Paras triates on the sacraments. This is the Liebervox Recording. All Liebervox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit Liebervox.org. Question 87 of the remission of Vinylsin in four articles. We must now consider the forgiveness of Vinylsins under which had there are four points of inquiry. First, whether Vinylsin can be forgiven without penance. Second, whether it can be forgiven without the infusion of grace. Third, whether Vinylsins are forgiven by the sprinkling of holy water, a bishop's blessing, the beating of the breast, the Lord's prayer and the like. Fourth, whether a Vinylsin can be taken away without a mortal sin. First article, whether Vinylsin can be forgiven without penance.

1:09Objection 1, it would seem that Vinylsin can be forgiven without penance. For a stated above in Question 84, article 10, fourth reply, it is essential to true penance that man should not only sorrow for his past sins, but also that he should purpose to avoid them for the future. Now, Vinylsins are forgiven without any such purpose, for it is certain that man cannot lead the present life without committing Vinylsins. Therefore, Vinylsins can be forgiven without penance. Objection 2, further, there is no penance without actual displeasure at one sins, but Vinylsins can be taken away without any actual displeasure at them, as would be the case of a man were to be killed in his sleep for Christ's sake since he would go to heaven at once, which would not happen if his Vinylsins remained. Therefore, Vinylsins can be forgiven without penance.

2:11Objection 3, further, Vinylsins are contrary to the fervor of charity, as stated in the second part, in the parse secundas secundas Question 24, article 10. Now, one contrary is removed by another. Therefore, forgiveness of Vinylsins is caused by the fervor of charity, which may be without actual displeasure at Vinylsin. On the contrary, Augustine says in on penance that, there is a penance which is done for Vinylsins in the church every day, which would be useless if Vinylsins could be forgiven without penance. I answer that, forgiveness of sin as stated above in Question 86, article 2, is affected by man being united to God from whom sin separates him in some way. Now this separation is made complete by mortal sin and incomplete by Vinylsins.

3:14Because by mortal sin, the mind through acting against charity is altogether turned away from God. Whereas by Vinylsins, man's affections are clogged so that they are slow intending towards God. Consequently, both kinds of sin are taken away by penance, because by both of them, man's will is disordered through turning inordinately to a created good. For just as mortal sin cannot be forgiven so long as the will is attached to sin, so neither can Vinylsin, because while the cause remains, the affect remains. Yet a more perfect penance is requisite for the forgiveness of mortal sin, namely that man should detest actually the mortal sin which he committed, so far as lies in his power, that is to say he should endeavor to remember each single mortal sin in order to detest each one. But this is not required for the forgiveness of Vinylsins.

4:16Although it does not suffice to have habitual displeasure, which is included in the habit of charity or of penance as a virtue, since then Vinylsin would be incompatible with charity, which is evidently untrue. Consequently, it is necessary to have a certain virtual displeasure, so that, for instance, a man's affections so tend to God and divine things that whatever might happen to him to hamper that tendency would be displeasing to him and would grieve him where he to commit it, even though he were not to think of it actually. And this is not sufficient for the remission of mortal sin, except as regards those sins which he fails to remember after a careful examination. Reply to objection 1. When man is in a state of grace, he can avoid all mortal sins, and each single one. And he can avoid each single Vinylsin, but not all, as was explained in the

5:18second part, in the parts premissacunde question 74, Article 8, Second Reply, as well as in question 109, Article 8. Consequently, penance for mortal sins requires man to purpose abstaining for mortal sins, all and each, whereas penance for Vinylsins requires man to purpose abstaining from each but not from all because the weakness of this life does not allow of this. Nevertheless, he needs to have the purpose of taking steps to commit fewer Vinylsins, else he would be in danger of falling back, if he gave up the desire of going forward, or of removing the obstacles to spiritual progress, such as Vinylsins are. Reply to objection 2. Death for Christ's sake has stated above in Question 66, Article 11, obtains the power of baptism, wherefore it washes away all sin, both Vinyl and mortal,

6:20unless it finds the will attached to sin. Reply to objection 3. The fervor of charity implies virtual displeasure at Vinylsins as stated above in Question 79, Article 4. Second article. Whether infusion of grace is necessary for the remission of Vinylsins. Objection 1. It would seem that infusion of grace is necessary for the remission of Vinylsins, because in effect is not produced without its proper cause. Now the proper cause of the remission of sins is grace, for man's sins are not forgiven through his own merits. Wherefore it is written in Ephesians 2, verses 4 and 5, God, who is rich in mercy for his exceeding charity, wherewith he loved us, even when we were dead in sins, hath quickened us together in Christ by whose grace you are saved. Therefore, Vinylsins are not forgiven without the infusion of grace.

7:28Objection 2. Further. Vinylsins are not forgiven without penance. Now grace is infused in penance as in the other sacraments of the new law. Therefore, Vinylsins are not forgiven without infusion of grace. Objection 3. Further. Vinylsins produces a stain on the soul. Now a stain is not removed, saved by grace, which is the spiritual beauty of the soul. Therefore, it seems that Vinylsins are not forgiven without infusion of grace. On the contrary, the advent of Vinylsins is forgiven, neither destroys nor diminishes grace as stated in the second part. In the Parts Akunda Sakunday, Question 24, Article 10. Therefore, in like manner, an infusion of grace is not necessary in order to remove Vinylsins. I answer that, each thing is removed by its

8:31contrary, but Vinylsins is not contrary to habitual grace or charity, but hamperes its act through man being too much attached to a created good, albeit not in opposition to God as stated in the second part. In the Parts Prima Sakunday, Question 88, Article 1, and in the Parts Sakunda, Sakunday, Question 24, Article 10. Therefore, in order that Vinylsins be removed, it is not necessary that habitual grace be infused, but a movement of grace or charity suffices for its forgiveness. Nevertheless, since in those who have the use of free will, in whom alone can there be Vinylsins, there can be no infusion of grace without an actual movement of the free will towards God and against sin, consequently, whenever grace is infused a new, Vinylsins are forgiven. 1. Reply to objection 1. Even the forgiveness of Vinylsins is an effect of grace, in virtue of the

9:38act which grace produces a new, but not through any habit infused a new in the soul. 2. Reply to objection 2. Vinylsins is never forgiven without some act, explicit or implicit, of the virtue of penance as stated above an article 1. It can, however, be forgiven without the sacrament of penance, which is formally perfected by the priestly absolution as stated above in Question 87, Article 2. Hence, it does not follow that infusion of grace is required for the forgiveness of Vinylsins. For, although this infusion takes place in every sacrament, it does not occur in every act of virtue. 2. Reply to objection 3. Just as there are two kinds of bodily stain, one consisting in the privation of something required for beauty, for example, the right color or the due proportion of members, and another by the introduction of some hindrance to beauty, for example,

10:42mud or dust. So, two, a stain is put on the soul in one way, by the privation of the beauty of grace through mortal sin. In another, by the inordinate inclination of the affections to some temporal thing, and this is the result of Vinylsins. Consequently, an infusion of grace is necessary for the removal of mortal sin, but in order to remove Vinylsins, it is necessary to have a movement proceeding from grace, removing the inordinate attachment to the temporal thing. 3. Article 3. Whether Vinylsins are removed by the sprinkling of holy water and the like. Objection 1. It would seem that Vinylsins are not removed by the sprinkling of holy water, a bishop's blessing and the like. For Vinylsins are not forgiven without penance, as stated above an article 1, but penance fices by itself for the remission of Vinylsins. Therefore, the above

11:48have nothing to do with the remission of Vinylsins. Objection 2. Further, each of the above bears the same relation to one Vinylsin as to all. If therefore, by means of one of them, some Vinylsin is remitted, it follows that in like manner all are remitted, so that by beating his breast once, or by being sprinkled once with holy water, a man would be delivered from all his Vinylsins, which seems unreasonable. Objection 3. Further, Vinylsins occasion a debt of some punishment, albeit temporal. For it is written in 1 Corinthians 3 verses 12 and 15 of him that builds up wood, hay, stubble, that he shall be saved yet so as by fire. Now the above things whereby Vinylsins are said to be taken away contain either no punishment at all, or very little.

12:50Therefore, they do not suffice for the full remission of Vinylsins. On the contrary, Augustine says in on penance that, for our slight sins we strike our breasts and say, forgive us our trespasses, and so it seems that striking one's breast and the Lord's prayer causes the remission of Vinylsins and the same seems to apply to other things. I answer that as stated above an article 2. No infusion of fresh grace is required for the forgiveness of a Vinylsins, but it is enough to have an act proceeding from grace in detestation of that Vinylsins, either explicit or at least implicit, as one one is moved fervently to God. Hence, for three reasons, certain things cause the remission of Vinylsins. First, because they imply the infusion of grace, since the infusion of grace removes Vinylsins as

13:50stated above an article 2. And so, by the Eucharist, extreme action, and by all the sacraments of the new law without exception, wherein grace is conferred, Vinylsins are emitted. Secondly, because they would imply a movement of detestation for sin, and in this way the general confession, the beating of one's breast and the Lord's prayer, conduce to the remission of Vinylsins, for we ask in the Lord's prayer, forgive us our trespasses. Thirdly, because they include a movement of reverence for God and divine things. And in this way, Abyssal's blessing, the sprinkling of holy water, any sacramental anointing, a prayer said in a dedicated church, and anything else of the kind, conduce to the remission of Vinylsins. Reply to objection 1. All these things cause the remission of Vinylsins in so far as they incline

14:55the soul to the movement of penance, namely, the implicit or explicit detestation of one's sins. Reply to objection 2. All these things, so far as they are concerned, conduce to the remission of all Vinylsins, but the remission may be hindered as regards certain Vinylsins, to which the mind is still actually attached, even as in sincerity sometimes impedes the effect of baptism. Reply to objection 3. By the above things, Vinylsins are indeed taken away as regards the guilt, both because those things are a kind of satisfaction, and through the virtue of charity whose movement is aroused by such things. Yet it does not always happen that, by means of each one, the whole guilt of punishment is taken away, because in that case, whoever was entirely free from mortal sin would

15:56go straight to heaven if sprinkled with holy water. But the dead of punishment is remitted by means of the above, according to the movement of fervor towards God, which fervor is aroused by such things, sometimes more, sometimes less. 4. Article 4. Whether Vinylsins can be taken away without mortal sin. Objection 1. It would seem that Vinylsins can be taken away without mortal sin. For on John 8 verse 7, he that is without sin among you, let him first cast a stone at her. A gloss says that, all those men were in a state of mortal sin, for Vinyl offenses were forgiven them through the legal ceremonies. Therefore, Vinylsins can be taken away without mortal sin. Objection 2. No infusion of grace is required for the remission of Vinylsins, but is required for

17:01the forgiveness of mortal sin. Therefore, Vinylsins can be taken away without mortal sin. Objection 3. A Vinylsins differs from a mortal sin more than from another Vinylsins. But one Vinylsins can be pardoned without another as stated above an Article 3 second reply, as well as in Question 87 Article 3. Therefore, a Vinylsins can be taken away without a mortal sin. Objection 5. On the contrary, it is written in Matthew chapter 5 verse 26. Amen, I say to thee, thou shalt not go out from thence, namely from the prison into which a man is cast for mortal sin, till thou repay the last farthing by which Vinylsins is denoted. Objection 5. Therefore, a Vinylsins is not forgiven without mortal sin. I answer that as stated above in Question 87 Article 3. There is no remission of any sin

18:06whatever, except by the power of grace, because, as the Apostle declares in Romans 4 verse 8, it is owing to God's grace that he does not impute sin to a man, which a gloss on that passage expounds as referring to Vinylsins. Now he that is in a state of mortal sin is without the grace of God. Therefore, no Vinylsins is forgiven him. Reply to objection 1. Vinyl offenses, in the passage quoted, denote the irregularities or uncleannesses which men contracted in accordance with the law. Reply to objection 2. Although no new infusion of habitual grace is requisite for the remission of Vinylsins, yet it is necessary to exercise some act of grace, which cannot be in one who is a subject of mortal sin. Reply to objection 3. Vinylsins does not preclude every act of grace whereby

19:12all Vinylsins can be removed, whereas mortal sin excludes altogether the habit of grace, without which no sin either mortal or Vinyl is remitted. Hence the comparison fails. End of Question 87. Read by Michael Schenkrich Lambert, LC 18. Question 88. Of sumatheologica terzia pares, triates on the sacraments. This is the Liebervox recording. All Liebervox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit Liebervox.org. Question 88. Of the return of sins which have been taken away by penance in four articles. We must now consider the return of sins which have been taken away by penance, under which had there are four points of inquiry. First, whether sins which have been taken

20:17away by penance return simply through a subsequent sin. Second, whether more specially as regards certain sins they return in a way on account of ingratitude. Third, whether the debt of punishment remains the same for sins thus returned. Fourth, whether this ingratitude on account of which sins return is a special sin. First article, whether sins once forgiven return through a subsequent sin. Objection 1. You would seem that sins once forgiven return through a subsequent sin. For Augustine says, on baptism against the donatists, 112, are Lord teachers most explicitly in the gospel, that sins which have been forgiven return when fraternal charity ceases, in the example of the servant from whom his master exacted the payment of the debt already forgiven, because he had

21:21refused to forgive the debt of his fellow servant. Now fraternal charity is destroyed through each mortal sin. Therefore, sins already taken away through penance return through each subsequent mortal sin. Objection 2. Further, on Luke 11.24, I will return into my house when I came out. Beade says, this verse should make us tremble. We should not endeavour to explain it away, less through carelessness we give place to the sin which we thought to have been taken away and become its slave once more. Now this would not be so unless it returned. Therefore, a sin returns after once being taken away by penance. Objection 3. Further, the Lord said in Ezekiel 1824, if the just man turn himself away from his justice and do a niquity, all his justices which he

22:24have done shall not be remembered. Now among the other justices which he had done is also his previous penance, since it was said above in question 85 Article 3, that penance is a part of justice. Therefore, when one who has done penance sins, his previous penance whereby he received forgiveness of his sins is not imputed to him. Therefore, his sins return. Objection 4. Further, past sins are covered by grace as the Apostle Declares in Romans 4.7, where he quotes Psalm 31 verse 1, blessed are they whose iniquities are forgiven and whose sins are covered. But a subsequent mortal sin takes away grace. Therefore, the sins committed previously become uncovered and so seemingly they return. On the contrary, the Apostle says in Romans 11 verse 29,

23:27the gifts and the calling of God are without repentance. Now the penitence sins are taken away by a gift of God. Therefore, the sins which have been taken away do not return through a subsequent sin as though God repented his gift of forgiveness. Moreover, Augustine says in his replies to Prosper and the Gallic chapter 2, when he that turns away from Christ comes to the end of this life a stranger to grace. Wither does he go except to perdition. Yet he does not fall back into that which had been forgiven nor will he be condemned for original sin. I answer that as stated above in question 86 article 4, mortal sin contains two things, a version from God and adherence to a created good. Now in mortal sin, whatever attaches to the aversion is considered in itself,

24:30common to all mortal sins, since man turns away from God by every mortal sin so that in consequence the stain resulting from the privation of grace and the debt of everlasting punishment are common to all mortal sins. This is what is meant by what is written in James 2 verse 10, whosoever shall offend in one point is become guilty of all. On the other hand, as regards their adherence, they are different from and sometimes contrary to one another. Hence it is evident that on the part of the adherence a subsequent mortal sin does not cause the return of mortal sins previously dispelled. Else it would follow that by a sin of wastefulness a man would be brought back to the habit or disposition of averse previously dispelled so that one contrary would be the cause of another which is impossible. But if in mortal sins we consider that which attaches to the aversion absolutely,

25:33then a subsequent mortal sin causes the return of that which was comprised in the mortal sins before they were pardoned in so far as the subsequent mortal sin deprives a man of grace and makes him deserving of everlasting punishment just as he was before. Nevertheless, since the aversion of mortal sin is, in a way, caused by the adherence, those things which attach to the aversion are diversified somewhat in relation to various adherences as it were to various causes so that there would be a different aversion, a different stain, a different debt of punishment according to the different acts of mortal sin from which they arise. Hence the question is moved whether the stain and the debt of eternal punishment has caused by acts of sin previously pardoned return through a subsequent mortal sin. Accordingly, some have maintained that they return simply even in this way, but this is impossible because what God has done cannot be undone by the

26:38work of man. Now the pardon of the previous sins was a work of divine mercy so that it cannot be undone by man's subsequent sin according to Romans 3-3. Shall their unbelief make the faith of God without effect? Wherefore others who maintained the possibility of sins returning said that God partens the sins of a penitent who will afterwards sin again, not according to his foreknowledge, but only according to his present justice. Since he foresees that he will punish such a man eternally for his sins, and yet by his grace he makes him righteous for the present. But this cannot stand because if a cause be placed absolutely, its effect is placed absolutely, so that if the remission of sins were affected by grace and the sacraments of grace, not absolutely but under some condition dependent on some future event, he would follow that grace and the sacraments of grace are not

27:40the sufficient causes of the remission of sins which is erroneous as being derogatory to God's grace. Consequently, it is in no way possible for the stain of past sins and the debt of punishment incurred thereby to return as caused by those acts. Yet it may happen that a subsequent sinful act virtually contains the debt of punishment due to the previous sin, insofar as one man's sins a second time, for this very reason he seems to sin more grievously than before, as stated in Romans 2 verse 5, according to thy hardness and impenetent heart, thou treasurest up to thyself wrath against the day of wrath. From the mere fact that, namely, God's goodness which waits for us to repent, is despised. And so much the more is God's goodness despised, if the first sin is committed a second time, after having been forgiven, as it is a greater favor for the sin to be forgiven than for the

28:44sinner to be endured. Accordingly, the sin which follows repentance brings back, in a sense, the debt of punishment due to the sins previously forgiven, not as caused by those sins already forgiven, but as caused by this last sin being committed on account of its being aggravated in view of those previous sins. This means that those sins return not simply, but in a restricted sense, namely, insofar as they are virtually contained in the subsequent sin. Reply to objection 1, this saying of Augustine seems to refer to the return of sins as to the debt of eternal punishment considered in itself, namely, that he who sins after doing penance incurs a debt of eternal punishment, just as before, but not altogether for the same reason. Wherefore Augustine, after saying that he does not fall back into that which was forgiven,

29:47nor will he be condemned for original sin, adds, nevertheless, for these last sins, he will be condemned to the same death which he deserved to suffer for the former, because he incurs the punishment of eternal death which he deserved for his previous sins. Reply to objection 2, by these words, be it means that the guilt already forgiven and slave's man not by the return of his former debt of punishment, but by the repetition of his act. Reply to objection 3, the effect of a subsequent sin is that the former justices are not remembered insofar as they were deserving of eternal life, but not insofar as they were a hindrance to sin. Consequently, if a man sins mortally after making restitution, he does not become guilty as though he had not paid back what he owed,

30:49and much less is penance previously done forgotten as to the pardon of guilt, since this is the work of God rather than of man. Reply to objection 4, grace removes the stain and the debt of eternal punishment simply, but it covers the past sinful acts, lest on their account, God deprive man of grace, and judge him deserving of eternal punishment, and what grace has once done injures forever. 2, article, whether sins that have been forgiven return through ingratitude which are shown especially in four kinds of sin. Objection 1, you would seem that sins do not return through ingratitude which are shown especially in four kinds of sin, namely hatred of one's neighbor, apostasy from faith,

31:50contempt of confession, and regret for past repentance, and which have been expressed in the following verse. For the more grievous the sin committed against God after one has received the grace of pardon, the greater the ingratitude, but there are sins more grievous than these, such as blasphemy against God and the sin against the Holy Ghost. Therefore it seems that sins already pardoned do not return through ingratitude as manifested in these sins, any more than a shown in other sins. Objection 2, rather, Rabenus says, God delivered the wicked servant to the torturers until he should pay the whole debt, because a man will be deemed punishable not only for the sins he commits after baptism, but also for original sin which was taken away when he was baptized.

32:56Now venial sins are reckoned among our debts, since we pray in their regard, forgive us our trespasses, Debbie Town. Therefore they too return through ingratitude, and in like manner seemingly, sins already pardoned return through venial sins and not only through those sins mentioned above. Objection 3 further, ingratitude is all the greater according as one sins after receiving a greater favor. Now innocence whereby one avoids sin is a divine favor for Augustine says in confessions too, whatever sins I have avoided committing I owe it to thy grace. Now innocence is a greater gift than even the forgiveness of all sins. Therefore the first sin committed after innocence is no less an ingratitude to God than a sin committed after repentance, so that seemingly ingratitude and respect of the aforesaid sins is not the chief cause of sins returning.

34:03On the contrary, Gregory says, it is evident from the words of the gospel that if we do not forgive from our hearts the offenses committed against us, we become once more accountable for what we rejoiced in as forgiven through penance, so that ingratitude implied in the hatred of one's brother is a special cause of the return of sins already forgiven and the same seems to apply to the others. I answer that as stated above in article 1, sins pardoned through penance are said to return in so far as their debt of punishment by reason of ingratitude is virtually contained in the subsequent sin. Now one may be guilty of ingratitude in two ways. First by doing something against the favor received, and in this way man is ungrateful to God in every mortal sin whereby he offends God who forgave his sins, so that by every subsequent mortal sin the sins previously pardoned return on account of the ingratitude.

35:06Secondly, one is guilty of ingratitude by doing something not only against the favor itself, but also against the form of the favor received. If this form be considered on the part of the benefactor, it is the remission of something due to him, wherefore he who does not forgive his brother when he asks pardon and persists in his hatred acts against this form. If however this form be taken in regard to the penitent who receives this favor we find on his part a twofold movement of the free will. The first is the movement of the free will towards God and is an act of faith quickened by charity, and against this a man acts by aposticizing from the faith. The second is a movement of the free will against sin and is the act of penance. This act consists first, as we have stated above in question 85 articles 2 and 5, in man's detestation of his past sins. And against this a man acts when he regrets having done penance.

36:13Secondly, the act of penance consists in the penitent proposing to subject himself to the keys of the church by confession according to Psalm 31 verse 5. I said, I will confess against myself my injustice to the Lord, and thou hast forgiven the wickedness of my sin. And against this a man acts when he scorns to confess as he had purposed to do. Accordingly, it is said that the ingratitude of sinners is a special cause of the return of sins previously forgiven. Reply to objection 1. This is not said of these sins as though they were more grievous than others, but because they are more directly opposed to the favor of the forgiveness of sin. Reply to objection 2. Even venial sins and original sin return in the way explained above, just as mortal sins do, insofar as the favor conferred by God and forgiving those

37:15sins is despised. A man does not, however, incur ingratitude by committing a venial sin, because by sinning venially, man does not act against God but apart from him, wherefore, venial sins no wise cause the return of sins already forgiven. Reply to objection 3. A favor can be weighed in two ways. First, by the quantity of the favor itself, and in this way, innocence is a greater favor from God than penance, which is called Second Plank after Sheperech, confer question 84, Article 6. Secondly, a favor may be weighed with regard to the recipient, who is less worthy, wherefore, a greater favor is bestowed on him, so that he is the more ungrateful if he scorns it. In this way, the favor of the part and of sins is greater when bestowed on one who is altogether unworthy, so that the ingratitude which follows is all the greater. Third Article. Whether the debt of punishment that arises through

38:25ingratitude in respect of a subsequent sin is as great as that of the sins previously pardoned. Objection 1. It would seem that the debt of punishment arising through ingratitude in respect of a subsequent sin is as great as that of the sins previously pardoned, because the greatness of the favor of the pardon of sins is according to the greatness of the sin pardoned, and so too, in consequence, is the greatness of the ingratitude whereby this favor is scorned. But the greatness of the consequent debt of punishment is an accord with the greatness of the ingratitude, therefore the debt of punishment arising through ingratitude in respect of a subsequent sin is as great as the debt of punishment due for all the previous sins. Objection 2. It is a greater sin to offend God than to offend man, but a slave who is freed by his master returns to the same state of slavery from which he was freed or even to a worse state.

39:29Much more therefore he that sins against God after being freed from sin returns to the debt of as great a punishment as he had incurred before. Objection 3. It is written in Matthew 18 verse 34 that his Lord being angry delivered him, whose sins returned to him on account of his ingratitude to the torturers until he paid all the debt. But this would not be so unless the debt of punishment incurred through ingratitude was great as that incurred through all previous sins. Therefore an equal debt of punishment returns through ingratitude. On the contrary it is written in Deuteronomy 25 verse 2, according to the measure of the sin shall the measure also of the Stripe's speed. Once it is evident that a great debt of punishment does not arise from a slight sin. But sometimes a subsequent mortal sin is much less

40:32grievous than any one of those previously pardoned. Therefore the debt of punishment incurred through subsequent sins is not equal to that of sins previously forgiven. I answer that some have maintained that the debt of punishment incurred through ingratitude and respect of a subsequent sin is equal to that of the sins previously pardoned, in addition to the debt proper to the subsequent sin. But there is no need for this, because as stated above an article 1, the debt of punishment incurred by previous sins does not return on account of a subsequent sin as resulting from the acts of the subsequent sin. Wherefore the amount of the debt that returns must be according to the gravity of the subsequent sin. It is possible, however, for the gravity of the subsequent sin to equal the gravity of all previous sins. But it need not always be so, whether we speak of the gravity which a sin has from its species, since the subsequent sin may be one of simple fornication while the previous sins were

41:37adulteries, murders or sacrilegias, or of the gravity which it incurs through the ingratitude connected with it. For it is not necessary that the measure of ingratitude should be exactly equal to the measure of the favor received, which latter is measured according to the greatness of the sins previously pardoned. Because it may happen that in respect of the same favor, one man is very ungrateful, either an account of the intensity of his scorn for the favor received, or on account of the gravity of the offences committed against the benefactor, while another man is slightly ungrateful, either because his scorn is less intense, or because his offense against the benefactor is less grave. But the measure of ingratitude is proportionately equal to the measure of the favor received. For supposing an equal contempt of the favor, or an equal offense against the benefactor, the ingratitude will be so much the greater as the favor received is greater.

42:38Hence it is evident that the debt of punishment incurred by a subsequent sin need not always be equal to that of previous sins, but it must be in proportion there too, so that the more numerous, or the greater the sins previously pardoned, the greater must be the debt of punishment incurred by any subsequent mortal sin, whatever. Reply to objection 1 The favor of the pardon of sins takes its absolute quantity from the quantity of the sins previously pardoned, but the sin of ingratitude does not take its absolute quantity from the measure of this favor bestowed, but from the measure of the contempt or of the offense as stated above, and so the objection does not prove. Reply to objection 2 A slave who had been given his freedom is not brought back to his previous state of slavery for any kind of ingratitude, but only when this is grave. Reply to objection 3

43:41He who's forgiven sins return to him on account of subsequent ingratitude incurs the debt for all in so far as the measure of his previous sins is contained proportionately in his subsequent ingratitude, but not absolutely as stated above. 4th article Whether the ingratitude whereby a subsequent sin causes the return of previous sins is a special sin. Objection 1 It would seem that the ingratitude whereby a subsequent sin causes the return of sins previously forgiven is a special sin. For the giving of thanks belongs to counter-passion, which is a necessary condition of justice as the philosopher shows in ethics 5.5. But justice is a special virtue, therefore this ingratitude is a special sin. Objection 2 further Tully says that thanksgiving is a special virtue, but ingratitude is opposed to thanksgiving.

44:48Therefore ingratitude is a special sin. Objection 3 further A special effect proceeds from a special cause. Now ingratitude has a special effect, namely the return after a fashion of sins already forgiven. Therefore ingratitude is a special sin. On the contrary, that which is a sequel to every sin is not a special sin. Now by any mortal sin whatever a man becomes ungrateful to God as evidenced from what has been said above in article 1. Therefore ingratitude is not a special sin. I answer that the ingratitude of the sinner is sometimes a special sin and sometimes it is not. But a circumstance arising from all mortal sins in common committed against God. For a sin takes its species according to the sinner's intention.

45:52Wherefore the philosopher says in ethics 5 too that, he who commits adultery in order to steal is a thief rather than an adulterer. If therefore a sinner commits a sin in contempt of God and of the favor received from him, that sin is drawn to the species of ingratitude and in this way a sinner's ingratitude is a special sin. If however a man while intending to commit a sin, for example murder or adultery, is not withheld from it on account of its implying contempt of God, his ingratitude will not be a special sin but will be drawn to the species of the other sin as a circumstance thereof. And as Augustine observes in on nature and grace 29, not every sin implies contempt of God in his commandments. Therefore it is evident that the sinners in gratitude is sometimes a special sin, sometimes not.

46:58This suffices for the replies to the objections. For the first two objections proved that ingratitude is in itself a special sin, while the last objection proves that ingratitude as included in every sin is not a special sin. End of Question 88. Read by Michael Schenkrig Lambert, LC. Question 89. Of sumitheologica terzia pars, triates on the sacraments. This is the Lieberwach's recording. All Lieberwach's recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit Lieberwach's.org. Question 89. Of the recovery of virtue by means of penance in six articles. We must now consider the recovery of virtues by means of penance,

48:00under which had there are six points of inquiry. First, whether virtues are restored through penance. Second, whether they are restored in equal measure. Third, whether equal dignity is restored to the penitent. Fourth, whether works of virtue are deadened by subsequent sin. Fifth, whether works deadened by sin revive through penance. Sixth, whether dead works that is works that are done without charity are quickened by penance. First article, whether the virtues are restored through penance. Objection 1, it would seem that the virtues are not restored through penance, because lost virtue cannot be restored by penance, unless penance be the cause of virtue.

49:01But since penance is itself a virtue, it cannot be the cause of all the virtues, and although more since some virtues naturally precede penance, namely, faith, hope, and charity, as stated above in question 85 article 6. Therefore, the virtues are not restored through penance. Objection 2, further, penance consists in certain acts of the penitent. But the gratuitous virtues are not caused through any act of ours. For Augustine says, in On the free will that, God forms the virtues in us without us. Therefore, it seems that the virtues are not restored through penance. Objection 3, further, he that has virtue performs works of virtue with ease and pleasure, where for the philosopher says in ethics 1, 8 that, a man is not just if he does not rejoice in just deeds.

50:06Now many penitents find difficulty in performing deeds of virtue. Therefore, the virtues are not restored through penance. Objection 5, further, he that has virtue, which is not a virtue, but a virtue of virtue. On the contrary, we read in the Gospel of Luke chapter 15 verse 22 that the father commanded his penitent son to be clothed in the first robe, which according to Ambrose is the mantle of wisdom, from which all the virtues flow together. According to wisdom chapter 8 verse 7, the imprudence and justice and fortitude, which are such things as men, can have nothing more profitable in life. Therefore, all the virtues are restored through penance. I answer that, sins are pardoned through penance as stated above in question 86 article 1. But there can be no remission of sins except for the infusion of grace. Wherefore it follows the grace is infused into man through penance.

51:12Now all the gratuitous virtues flow from grace, even as all the powers result from the essence of the soul. As stated in the second part, the powers premise Acune de Question 110 article 4 first reply. Therefore, all the virtues are restored through penance. Reply to objection 1 penance restores the virtues in the same way as it causes grace, as stated above in question 86 article 1. Now it is a cause of grace in so far as it is a sacrament, because in so far as it is a virtue, it is rather an affect of grace. Consequently, it does not follow that penance as a virtue needs to be the cause of all the other virtues, but that the habit of penance together with the habits of the other virtues is caused through the sacrament of penance.

52:12Reply to objection 2 In the sacrament of penance, human acts stand as matter while the formal power of the sacrament is derived from the power of the keys. Consequently, the power of the keys causes grace and virtue effectively indeed, but instrumentally, and the first act of the penitent, namely, contrition, stands as ultimate disposition to the reception of grace, while the subsequent acts of penance proceed from the grace and virtues which are already there. Reply to objection 3 As stated above in question 86 article 5, sometimes after the first act of penance, which is contrition, certain remnants of sin remain, namely, dispositions caused by previous acts, the result being that the penitent finds difficulty in doing deeds of virtue.

53:14Nevertheless, so far as the inclination itself of charity and of the other virtues is concerned, the penitent performs works of virtue with pleasure and ease, even as a virtuous man may accidentally find it hard to do an act of virtue, on account of sleepiness or some indisposition of the body. Second article Whether after penance man rises again to equal virtue Objection 1 It would seem that after penance man rises again to equal virtue. For the Apostle says in Romans 8 verse 28, For them that love God, all things work together unto good. Whereupon a gloss of Augustine says that, this is so true that, if any such man goes astray and wanders from the path, God makes even this conduce to his good, but this would not be true if he rose again to lesser virtue.

54:19Therefore, it seems that a penitent never rises again to lesser virtue. Objection 2 further Ambrose says that penance is a very good thing for it restores every defect to a state of perfection, but this would not be true unless virtues were recovered in equal measure, therefore, equal virtue is always recovered through penance. Objection 3 further On Genesis 1 5, there was evening and morning one day. A gloss says, the evening light is that from which we fall. The morning light is that to which we rise again. Now the morning light is greater than the evening light. Therefore, a man rises to greater grace or charity than that which he had before, which is confirmed by the Apostles' words in Romans 5 verse 20,

55:23where sin abounded, grace did more abound. On the contrary, charity, whether proficient or perfect, is greater than incipient charity, but sometimes a man falls from proficient charity. And rises again to incipient charity. Therefore, man always rises again to less virtue. I answer that as stated above in question 86, article 6, third reply, and in question 89, article 1, second reply. The movement of the free will in the justification of the endgardly is the ultimate disposition to grace, so that in the same instant there is infusion of grace together with the aforesaid movement of the free will, as stated in the second part. In the Parasprimisakundi question 113, articles 5 and 7, which movement includes an act of penance as stated above in question 86, article 2.

56:29But it is evident that forms which admit of being more or less become intense or remiss, according to the different dispositions of the subject, as stated in the second part, the Parasprimisakundi question 52, articles 1 and 2, in question 66, article 1. Hence it is that in penance, according to the degree of intensity or remissness in the movement of the free will, the penitent receives greater or lesser grace. Now the intensity of the penitent's movement may be proportionate, sometimes to a greater grace than that from which man fell by sinning, sometimes to an equal grace, sometimes to a lesser, where for the penitent sometimes rises to a greater grace than that which he had before, sometimes to an equal, sometimes to a lesser grace, and the same applies to the virtues which flow

57:29from grace. Reply to objection 1. The very fact of falling away from the love of God by sin does not work unto the good of all those who love God, which is evident in the case of those who fall and never rise again, or who rise and fall yet again. But only to the good of such as according to his purpose are called to be saints, namely the predestined, who, however often they may fall yet rise again finally. Consequently, good comes of their falling, not that they always rise again to greater grace, but that they rise to more abiding grace, not indeed on the part of grace itself, because the greater the grace the more abiding it is, but on the part of man who, the more careful and humble he is, abides the more steadfastly and grace. Hence the same gloss adds that

58:33their fall can doces to their good because they rise more humble and more enlightened. Reply to objection 2. Penance, considered in itself, has the power to bring all defects back to perfection, and even to advance man to a higher state. But this is sometimes hindered on the part of man whose movement towards God and in detestation of sin is to remiss, just as in baptism, adults receive a greater or lesser grace according to the various ways in which they prepare themselves. Reply to objection 3. This comparison of the two graces to the evening and morning light is made on account of a likeness of order, since the darkness of night follows after the evening and the light of day after the light of morning, but not on account of a likeness of greater or lesser

59:36quantity. Again, this saying of the Apostle refers to the grace of Christ, which abounds more than any number of man's sins. Nor is it true of all that the more their sins abound, the more abundant grace they receive if we measure habitual grace by the quantity. Graces, however, more abundant as regards the very notion of grace, because to him who sins more, a more gratuitous favor is vouchsafed by his pardon. Although sometimes those who sins abound also in sorrow, so that they receive a more abundant habit of grace and virtue, as was the case with Magdalene. To the argument advanced in the contrary sense, it must be replied that in one and the same man, proficient grace is greater than incipient grace, but this is not necessarily the case in different men, for one begins with a greater grace than another has in the state of proficiency.

1:00:42The Sgrigry says, let all, both now and hereafter, acknowledge how perfectly the boy Benedict turned to the life of grace from the very beginning. Third article, whether by penance man is restored to his former dignity. Objection 1, you would seem that man is not restored by penance to his former dignity. Because a gloss on Amos, chapter 5 verse 2, the Virgin of Israel is cast down, observes. It is not said that she cannot rise up, but that the Virgin of Israel shall not rise, because the sheep that has once strayed, although the shepherd bring it back on his shoulder, has not the same glory as if it had never strayed. Therefore, man does not, through penance, recover his former dignity.

1:01:43Objection 2 further, Jerome says, whoever fail to preserve the dignity of the sacred order, must be content with saving their souls, for it is a difficult thing to return to their former degree. Again, Pope Innocent 1st says that, the cannons framed at the Council of Nysea exclude penitents from even the lowest orders of clerics. Therefore, man does not, through penance, recover his former dignity. Objection 3 further, before sinning, a man can advance to a higher sacred order, but this is not permitted to a penitent after his sin, for it is written in Ezekiel 44 verses 10 and 13, the Levites that went away from me shall never come near to me to do the office of Greece, and is laid down in distinction 1 chapter 52, and taken from the Council of Lerida,

1:02:46if those who serve at the Holy altar fall suddenly into some deplorable weakness of the flesh, and by God's mercy do proper penance, let them return to their duties yet so as not to receive further promotion. Therefore, penance does not restore man to his former dignity. On the contrary, as we read in the same distinction, Gregory, writing to 2nd Dinos, says, We consider that when a man has made proper satisfaction, he may return to his honorable position, and moreover we read in the Acts of the Council of Agda, contumacious clerics so far as their position allows should be corrected by their bishops, so that when penance has reformed them, they may recover their degree and dignity. I answer that, by sin, man loses a truthful dignity, one in respect of God, the other in respect of the

1:03:53church, in respect of God, he again loses a truthful dignity. One is his principal dignity, whereby he was counted among the children of God, and this he recovers by penance, which is signified in Luke 15 in the Prodigal Son, for when he repented, his father commanded that the first garment should be restored to him, together with a ring and shoes. The other is his secondary dignity, namely innocence of which, as we read in the same chapter, the elder son boasted, saying, Behold, for so many years do I serve thee, and I have never transgress thy commandments, and this dignity the penitent cannot recover. Nevertheless, he recover something greater sometimes, because as Gregory says, those who acknowledge themselves to have strayed away from God make up for their past losses by subsequent gains,

1:04:56so that there is more joy in heaven on their account, even as in battle, the commanding officer thinks more of the soldier who, after running away, returns and bravely attacks the foe, than of one who has never turned his back, but has done nothing brave. By sin, man loses his ecclesiastical dignity, because thereby he becomes unworthy of those things which appertain to the exercise of the ecclesiastical dignity. Thus he is debarred from recovering, first because he fails to repent, wherefore is it or wrote to the bishop, Maso, as we read in the distinction quoted above in objection three, the cannons order those to be restored to their former degree, who by repentance have made satisfaction for their sins, or have made worthy confession of them. On the other hand, those who do not mend their corrupt and wicked ways are neither allowed to exercise

1:05:56their order nor received to the grace of communion. Secondly, because he does penance negligently, wherefore it is written in the same distinction, we can be sure that those who show no signs of humble compunction or of earnest prayer, who avoid fasting or study, would exercise their former duties with great negligence if they were restored to them. Thirdly, if he has committed a sin to which an irregularity is attached, wherefore it is said in the same distinction, quoting the counsel of Pope Martin, if a man marry a widow or the relict of another, he must not be admitted to the ranks of the clergy, and if he has succeeded in creeping in, he must be turned out, in like manner, if anyone after baptism be guilty of homicide, whether by deed or by command or by counsel or

1:06:59in self-defense. But this is in consequence not of sin but of irregularity. Fourthly, on a count of scandal, wherefore it is said in the same distinction, those who have been publicly convicted or caught in the act of perjury, robbery, fornication, and of such like crimes, according to the prescription of the sacred canons, must be deprived of the exercise of their respective orders, because it is a scandal to God's people that such persons should be placed over them. But those who commit such sins occultly and confess them secretly to a priest, may be retained in the exercise of their respective orders, with the assurance of God's merciful forgiveness, provided they be careful to expiate their sins by fasts and alms, vigils, and holy deeds. The same is expressed, if the aforesaid crimes

1:08:02are not proved by a judicial process, or in some other way made by notorious, those who are guilty of them must not be hindered, after they have done penance from exercising the orders they have received, or from receiving further orders except in cases of homicide. Reply to objection one. The same is to be said of the recovery of virginity, as of the recovery of innocence which belongs to man's secondary dignity in the sight of God. Reply to objection two. In these words, Jerome does not say that it is impossible, but that it is difficult for man to recover his former dignity after having sinned, because this is allowed to known but those who repent perfectly as stated above. To those canonical statutes which seem to forbid this, Augustine replies in his letter to Boniface, if the law of the church forbids anyone,

1:09:07after doing penance for a crime to become a cleric or to return to his clerical duties or to retain them, the intention was not to deprive him of the hope of pardon, but to preserve the rigor of discipline, else we should have to deny the keys given to the church of which it was said, whatsoever you shall loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven. And further on he adds, for holy David did penance for his deadly crimes, and yet he retained his dignity, and blessed Peter by shedding most bitter tears did indeed repent him of having denied his Lord, and yet he remained an apostle. Nevertheless, we must not deem the care of later teacher's excessive who without endangering a man's salvation exacted more from his humility, having in my opinion found by experience that some assumed a pretended repentance through hankering after honors and power.

1:10:12Reply to objection three, this statute is to be understood as applying to those who do public penance for these cannot be promoted to a higher order. For Peter after his denial was made shepherd of Christ's sheep as appears from John 21 21, where Chrysostom comments as follows, after his denial and repentance, Peter gives proof of greater confidence in Christ, for whereas at the supper he dursed not to ask him, but deputed John to ask in his stead, afterwards he was placed at the head of his brethren, and not only did not depute another to ask for him what concerned him, but henceforth asks the master instead of John. Fourth article, whether virtuous deeds done in charity can be debt-end. And objection one, it would seem that virtuous deeds done in charity cannot be debt-end,

1:11:17for that which is cannot be changed, but to be debt-end is to be changed from life to death. Since therefore virtuous deeds, after being done are no more, it seems that they cannot afterwards be debt-end. Objection two further, by virtuous deeds done in charity, man merits eternal life, but to take away the reward from one who has merit-ed it is an injustice which cannot be ascribed to God. Therefore it is not possible for virtuous deeds done in charity to be debt-end by a subsequent sin. Objection three further, the strong is not corrupted by the weak. Now works of charity are stronger than any sins, because as it is written in Proverbs 10 verse 12, charity covereth all sins. Therefore it seems that dead deeds done in charity cannot be debt-end by a subsequent mortal sin.

1:12:26On the contrary, it is written in Ezekiel 18 verse 24, if the just man turn himself away from his justice, all his justices which he have done shall not be remembered. I answer that. A living thing by dying ceases to have vital operations, for which reason by a kind of metaphor a thing is said to be debt-end when it is hindered from producing its proper effect or operation. Now the effect of virtuous works which are done in charity is to bring man to eternal life, and this is hindered by a subsequent mortal sin, inasmuch as it takes away grace. Wherefore, deeds done in charity are said to be debt-end by a subsequent mortal sin. Replay to objection 1 Just as sinful deeds pass as to the act but remain as to guilt, so deeds done in charity after

1:13:30passing as to the act remain as to merit, insofar as they are acceptable to God. It is in this respect that they are debt-end inasmuch as man is hindered from receiving his reward, Replay to objection 2 There is no injustice in withdrawing the reward from him who has deserved it, if he has made himself unworthy by his subsequent fault, since at times a man justly forfeits through his own fault, even that which he has already received. Replay to objection 3 Replay to objection 3 It is not on account of the strength of sinful deeds that deeds previously done in charity are debt-end but on account of the freedom of the will which can be turned away from good to evil. 5th article

1:14:31Whether deeds debt-end by sin are revived by penance Replay to objection 1 Replay to objection 1 It would seem that deeds debt-end by sin are not revived by penance because just as passed sins are remitted by subsequent penance, so are deeds previously done in charity debt-end by subsequent sin. But sins remitted by penance do not return as stated above in question 88 articles 1 and 2. Therefore it seems that neither are dead deeds revived by charity. Objection 2 further Deeds are said to be debt-end by comparison with animals who die as stated above in article 4. But dead animals cannot be revived. Therefore neither can dead works be revived by penance. Objection 3 further Deeds done in charity are deserving of glory according to the quantity of grace or charity.

1:15:35But sometimes man arises through penance to lesser grace or charity. Therefore he does not receive glory according to the merit of his previous works so that it seems that deeds debt-end by sin are not revived. Objection 2 further On the contrary, on Joel 2 verse 25, I will restore you to the years which the locust hath eaten, a gloss says. Objection 2 verse 25 I will not suffer to perish the fruit which you lost when your soul was disturbed. Objection 2 verse 25 But this fruit is the merit of good works which was lost through sin. Objection 2 verse 25 Therefore meritorious deeds done before are revived by penance. I answer that some have said that meritorious works debt-end by subsequent sin are not revived by the ensuing penance because they deemed such works to have passed away

1:16:36so that they could not be revived. But that is no reason why they should not be revived because they are conducive to eternal life wherein their life consists. Not only as actually existing but also after they cease to exist actually and as abiding in the divine acceptance. Now they abide thus so far as they are concerned even after they have been dead and by sin because those works according as they were done will ever be acceptable to God and give joy to the saints according to Apocalypse 3 verse 11. Hold fast that which thou hast that no man take thy crown. That they fail in their efficacy to bring the man who did them to eternal life is due to the impediment of the supervening sin whereby he has become unworthy of eternal life.

1:17:37But this impediment is removed by penance in as much as sins are taken away thereby. Hence it follows that deeds previously debted recover through penance, their efficacy in bringing him who did them to eternal life and in other words they are revived. It is therefore evident that debt and works are revived by penance. Reply to objection 1. The very works themselves of sin are removed by penance so that by God's mercy no further stain or debt of punishment is incurred on their account. On the other hand works done in charity are not removed by God since they abide in his acceptance but they are hindered on the part of the man who does them. Wherefore if this hindrance on the part of the man who does these works be removed God on his side

1:18:38fulfills what those works deserved. Reply to objection 2. Deeds done in charity are not in themselves debted as explained above but only with regard to a supervening impediment on the part of the man who does them. On the other hand an animal dies in itself through being deprived of the principle of life so that the comparison fails. Reply to objection 3. He who through penance arises to lesser charity will receive the essential reward according to the degree of charity in which he has found. Yet he will have greater joy for the works he had done in his former charity than for those which he did in his subsequent charity and this joy belongs to the accidental reward.

1:19:386. Article Whether the effect of subsequent penance is to quicken even dead works. Objection 1. It would seem that the effect of subsequent penance is to quicken even dead works, namely those that were not done in charity. For it seems more difficult to bring to life that which has been deadened since this has never done naturally than to quicken that which never had life since certain living things are engendered naturally from things without life. Now dead in works are revived by penance stated above an article 5. Much more therefore are dead works revived. Objection 2 further. If the cause be removed, the effect is removed. But the cause of the lack of life and works generically good done without charity was the lack of charity in grace which lack is removed by penance. Therefore dead works are quickened by charity.

1:20:45Objection 3 further. Jerome in commenting on Hagias 16. You have so much says, if at any time you find a sinner among his many evil deeds doing that which is right, God is not so unjust as to forget the few good deeds on account of his many evil deeds. Now this seems to be the case chiefly when past evil deeds are removed by penance. Therefore it seems that through penance God rewards the former deeds done in the state of sin which implies that they are quickened. On the contrary, the Apostle says in 1 Corinthians 13 verse 3, If I should distribute all my goods to feed the poor and if I should deliver my body to be burned and have not charity, it profitates me nothing. But this would not be true if at least

1:21:47by subsequent penance they were quickened. Therefore penance does not quicken works which before were dead. I answer that a work is said to be dead in two ways, first effectively because to wit it is a cause of death in which since sinful works are said to be dead according to Hebrews 9 verse 14, the blood of Christ shall cleanse our conscience from dead works. These dead works are not quickened but removed by penance according to Hebrews 6 verse 1, not laying again the foundation of penance from dead works. Secondly works are said to be dead privately because to wit the lack spiritual life which is founded on charity whereby the soul is united to God, the result being that it is quickened as the body by the soul in which sense to faith

1:22:51if it lack charity is said to be dead according to James 2 verse 20, faith without works is dead. In this way also all works that are generically good are said to be dead if they be done without charity in as much as they fail to proceed from the principle of life even as we might call the sound of a harp a dead voice. Accordingly the difference of life and death in works is in relation to the principle from which they proceed but works cannot proceed a second time from a principle because they are transitory and the same identical deed cannot be resumed. Therefore it is impossible for dead works to be quickened by penance. Reply to objection 1 In the physical order things whether dead or deadened lack the principle of life

1:23:51but works are said to be deadened not in relation to the principle once they proceeded but in relation to an extrinsic impediment while they are said to be dead in relation to a principle. Consequently there is no comparison. Reply to objection 2 works generically good done without charity are said to be dead on account of the lack of grace and charity as principles. Now the subsequent penance does not supply that want so as to make them proceed from such a principle. Hence the argument does not prove that the penance is not a good deed. Reply to objection 3 God remembers the good deeds a man does when in the state of sin not by rewarding them in eternal life which is due only to living works that is those done from charity but by a temporal reward.

1:24:54Thus Gregory declares that unless that rich man had done some good deed and had received his reward in this world Abraham would certainly not have said to him that he did just receive good things in their lifetime. Or again this may mean that he will be judged less severely wherefor a gustan says we cannot say that it would be better for the schismatic that by denying Christ he should suffer none of those things which he suffered by confessing him but we must believe that he will be judged with less severity than if by denying Christ he had suffered none of those things. Thus the words of the Apostle if I should deliver my body to be burned and not have charity it profiteth me nothing. Referred to the obtaining of the kingdom of heaven and do not exclude the possibility of being sentenced with less severity at the last judgment.

1:25:55End of Question 89 read by Michael Schenkrich Lambert LC Question 90 of summa theologica terzia paras triates on the sacraments this is a levervox recording all levervox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit levervox.org Question 90 on the parts of penance in general in four articles we must now consider the parts of penance one in general two each one in particular under the first head there are four points of inquiry first whether penance has any parts second of the number of its parts third what kinds of parts are they

1:27:00fourth of its division into subjective parts first article whether penance should be assigned any parts objection one you would seem that parts should not be assigned to penance for it is the divine power that works our salvation most secretly in the sacraments now the divine power is one and simple therefore penance being a sacrament should have no parts assigned to it objection to further penance is both a virtue and a sacrament now no parts were assigned to it as a virtue since virtue is a habit which is a simple quality of the mind in like manner it seems that parts should not be assigned to penance as a sacrament because no parts are assigned to baptism and the other sacraments therefore no parts at all should

1:28:04be assigned to penance objection three further the matter of penance is seen as stated above in question 84 article two but no parts are assigned to sin neither therefore should parts be assigned to penance on the contrary the parts of a thing are those out of which the whole is composed now the perfection of penance is composed of several things namely contrition confession and satisfaction therefore penance has parts I answer that the parts of a thing are those into which the whole is divided materially for the parts of a thing are to the whole what matter is to the form where for the parts are reckoned as a kind of material cause and the whole as a kind of formal cause according to physics two accordingly

1:29:09wherever on the part of matter we find a kind of plurality there we shall find a reason for assigning parts now it has been stated above in question 84 articles two and three that in the sacrament of penance human actions stand as matter and so since several actions are requisite for the perfection of penance namely contrition confession and satisfaction as we shall show further on in article two it follows that the sacrament of penance has parts reply to objection one every sacrament is something simple by reason of the divine power which operates therein but the divine power is so great that it can operate both through one and through many and by reason of these many parts may be assigned to a particular sacrament

1:30:12reply to objection two parts are not assigned to penance as a virtue because the human acts of which there are several in penance are related to the habit of virtue not as its parts but as its effects it follows therefore that parts are assigned to penance as a sacrament to which the human acts are related as matter whereas in the other sacraments the matter does not consist of human acts but of some one external thing either simple as water or oil or compound as chrysum and so parts are not assigned to the other sacraments reply to objection three since are the remote matter of penance in as much to wit as they are the matter or object of the human acts which are the proper matter of penance as a sacrament second article whether contrition confession and satisfaction

1:31:18are fittingly assigned as parts of penance objection one you would seem that contrition confession and satisfaction are not fittingly assigned as parts of penance for contrition is in the heart and so belongs to interior penance while confession consists of words and satisfaction indeed so that the latter two belong to interior penance now interior penance is not a sacrament but only exterior penance which is perceptible by the senses therefore these three parts are not fittingly assigned to the sacrament of penance objection two further grace is conferred in the sacraments of the new law as stated above in question 62 articles one and three but no grace is conferred in satisfaction therefore satisfaction is not part of the sacrament objection three further

1:32:19the fruit of a thing is not the same as its part but satisfaction is a fruit of penance according to Luke three verse eight bring forth fruit worthy of penance therefore it is not a part of penance objection four further penance is ordained against sin but sin can be completed merely in the thought by consent has stated in the second part in the parse-premise accrued a question 72 article seven therefore penance can also therefore confession in word and satisfaction indeed should not be reckoned as parts of penance on the contrary it seems that yet more parts should be assigned to penance for not only is the body assigned as a part of man as being the matter but also the soul which is his form but the aforesaid three being the acts of the penitent stand as matter while the priestly

1:33:24absolution stands as form therefore the priestly absolution should be assigned as a fourth part of penance I answer that a part is twofold essential and quantitative the essential parts are naturally the form and the matter and logically the genus and the difference in this way each sacrament is divided into matter and form as its essential parts hence it was said above in question 60 articles five and six that sacraments consist of things and words but since quantity is on the part of matter quantitative parts are parts of matter and in this way as stated above in article one parts are assigned especially to the sacrament of penance as regards the acts of the penitent which are the matter of this sacrament now it has been said above in question 85 article three third reply

1:34:28that an offense is atoned otherwise in penance then in vindictive justice because in vindictive justice the atonement is made according to the judge's decision and not according to the discretion of the offender or of the person offended whereas in penance the offense is atoned according to the will of the sinner and the judgment of God against whom the sin was committed because in the latter case we seek not only the restoration of the equality of justice as in vindictive justice but also and still more the reconciliation of friendship which is accomplished by the offender making atonement according to the will of the person offended accordingly the first requisite on the part of the penitent is the will to atone and this is done by contrition the second is that he submit to the judgment of the priest standing in God's place and this is done in confession

1:35:36and the third is that he atoned according to the decision of God's minister and this is done in satisfaction and so contrition confession and satisfaction are assigned as parts of penance reply to objection one contrition as to its essence is in the heart and belongs to interior penance yet virtually it belongs to exterior penance in as much as it implies the purpose of confessing and making satisfaction reply to objection two satisfaction confers grace in so far as it is in man's purpose and it increases grace according as it is accomplished just as baptism does in adults as stated above in question 68 article two and in question 69 article eight

1:36:36reply to objection three satisfaction is a part of penance as a sacrament and a fruit of penance as a virtue reply to objection four more things are required for good which proceeds from a cause that is entire then for evil which results from each single defect as Dionysius states in on the divine names four and thus although sin is completed in the consent of the heart yet the perfection of penance requires contrition of the heart together with confession in word and satisfaction indeed the reply to the fifth objection is clear from what has been stated third article whether these three are integral parts of penance objection one it would seem that these three are not integral parts

1:37:40of penance for as stated above in question 84 article three penance is ordained against sin but sins of thought word and deed are the subjective and not integral parts of sin because sin is predicated of each one of them therefore in penance also contrition and thought confession and word and satisfaction indeed are not integral parts objection two further no integral part includes within itself another that is con divided with it but contrition includes both confession and satisfaction in the purpose of amendment therefore they are not integral parts objection three further a whole is composed of its integral parts taken at the same time and equally just as a line is made up of its parts but such is not the case here therefore these are not integral parts

1:38:44of penance on the contrary integral parts are those by which the perfection of the whole is integrated but the perfection of penance is integrated by these three therefore they are integral parts of penance I answer that some have said that these three are subjective parts of penance but this is impossible because the entire power of the whole is present in each subjective part at the same time and equally just as the entire power of an animal as such is assured to each animal species all of which species divide the animal genus at the same time and equally which does not apply to the point in question where for others have said that these are potential parts yet neither can this be true since the whole is present as to the entire essence in each potential part

1:39:47just as the entire essence of the soul is present in each of its powers which does not apply to the case in point therefore it follows that these three are integral parts of penance the nature of which is that the whole is not present in each of the parts either as to its entire power or as to its entire essence but that it is present to all of them together at the same time reply to objection one sin for as much as it is an evil can be completed in one single point as stated above an article two fourth reply and so the sin which is completed in thought alone is a special kind of sin another species is the sin that is completed in thought and word and yet a third species is the sin that is completed in thought, word and deed and the quasi

1:40:48integral parts of this last sin are that which is in thought that which is in word and that which is indeed where for these three are the integral parts of penance which is completed in them reply to objection two one integral part can include the whole though not as to its essence because the foundation in a way contains virtually the whole building in this way contrician includes virtually the whole of penance reply to objection three all integral parts have a certain relation of order to one another but some are only related as to position whether in sequence as the parts of an army or by contact as the parts of a heap or by being fitted together as the parts of a house or by continuation as the parts of a line while some are related in addition

1:41:52as to power as the parts of an animal the first of which is the heart the others in a certain order being dependent on one another and thirdly some are related in the order of time as the parts of time and movement accordingly the parts of penance are related to one another in the order of power and time since they are actions but not in the order of position since they do not occupy a place fourth article whether penance is fittingly divided into penance before baptism penance for mortal sins and penance for venial sins objection one you would seem that penance is unfittingly divided into penance before baptism penance for mortal and penance for venial sins for penance is the

1:42:53second plank after shipwreck has stated above in question 84 article six while baptism is the first therefore that which precedes baptism should not be called a species of penance objection to further that which can destroy the greater can destroy the lesser now mortal sin is greater than venial and penance which regards mortal sins regards also venial sins therefore they should not be considered as different species of penance objection three further just as after baptism man commits venial and mortal sins so does he before baptism if therefore penance for venial sins is distinct from penance for mortal sins after baptism in like manner they should be distinguished before baptism therefore penance is not fittingly divided into these species on the contrary Augustine says in on penance that these three are species of

1:44:02penance i answer that this is a division of penance as a virtue now it must be observed that every virtue acts in accordance with the time being as also in keeping with other do circumstances where for the virtue of penance has its act at this time according to the requirements of the new law now it belongs to penance to detest one's past sins and to purpose at the same time to change one's life for the better which is the end so to speak of penance and since moral matters take their species from the end has stated in the second part in the par's premissakunde question one article three as well as in question eighteen articles four and six it is reasonable to distinguish various species of penance according to the various changes intended by the penitent accordingly there is a threefold change intended by the penitent the first is by regeneration

1:45:08onto a new life and this belongs to that penance which precedes baptism the second is by reforming one's past life after it has already been destroyed and this belongs to penance for mortal sins committed after baptism the third is by changing to a more perfect operation of life and this belongs to penance for venial sins which are omitted through a fervent act of charity as stated above in question eighty seven articles two and three reply to objection one the penance which precedes baptism is not a sacrament but an act of virtue disposing one to that sacrament reply to objection two the penance which washes away mortal sins washes away venial sins also but the converse does not hold wherefor these two species of penance

1:46:09are related one another as perfect and imperfect reply to objection three before baptism there are no venial sins without mortal sins and since a venial sin cannot be remitted without mortal sin as stated above in question eighty seven article four before baptism penance for mortal sins is not distinct from penance for venial sins end of question ninety read by Michael Shane Craig Lambert LC after a mystical experience on December 6th 1273 Thomas Aquinas abandoned all for the writing theological and philosophical end of what Thomas Aquinas had written of the triates on the sacraments end of what Thomas Aquinas completed of the summa theological