What is the military strategy in Iran? - with Gen. David Petraeus

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Well, the president has been very clear that what he is after is regime change.

And now is the time to rise up. What is the character of those who take over? Will there be

somebody that can become the Dolce Rodriguez of Iran who will respond to direction from the

United States and say, you know what? You're exactly right. All this death to Israel and death to

the United States and nuclear program and arming proxies. What has it gotten us?

Ruin, absolute ruin in a country that should be one of the world's greatest energy superpowers.

It's 11 p.m. on Saturday, February 28th here in New York City. It is 7.30 a.m. on Sunday,

March 1st in Tehran. And it is 6 a.m. on Sunday, March 1st in Israel. As Israelis begin a new day.

Earlier this evening, the Iranian government confirmed that on Saturday during the first

hours of the joint Israeli and American strike on the Islamic Republic, the decades-long

supreme leader of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Hamani was killed. The attack reportedly targeted

Hamani during a meeting with members of his inner circle, who were also eliminated.

According to Iran's media, Hamani's daughter and grandchildren were killed as well.

Prime Minister Netanyahu was reportedly shown images of the Ayatollah's body.

Those were later shared with President Trump who declared that, quote,

evil Hamani is dead. Iran retaliated with missiles targeting Israel as well as six other

countries. Throughout the day, sirens were wailing across Israel, sending Israelis in and out of

bomb shelters in response to approximately 200 Iranian ballistic missiles. A direct hit in

Tel Aviv resulted in the death of one 40-year-old Israeli woman and dozens more were injured.

According to Emirati State media, one person had been killed in Abu Dhabi. Iran's attacks were

described as, quote, brutal Iranian aggression by Saudi leaders, who reportedly have been privately

lobbying President Trump to take action against Iran for some time now, while also publicly calling

for diplomacy. And now into today's episode. What is the state of play after the first day of

Operation Epic Fury, which is the name of the Operation for the U.S. military and Operation

Roaring Lion for the IDF campaign? What is the military strategy that is being deployed? How is it

all being coordinated between these two countries and others in the region? And what are the risks

and opportunities of this war? To answer this, we are joined by General David Petraeus. General

Petraeus is a retired four-star U.S. Army general and former director of the CIA, who also led

coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, and has widely recognized for shaping modern U.S.

counterinsurgency strategy. He was also the commander of U.S. Central Command, where he had led

U.S. military operations in the Middle East, Central Asia, and parts of South Asia. General

David Petraeus on the military strategy in Iran. This is Call Me Back.

And I'm pleased to welcome to the podcast for the first time, General David Petraeus. General

Petraeus, thanks for being here. Great to be with you, Dan. So normally in podcasts, or typically

you often hear debates about opinions and sort of abstract ideas and all sorts of analysis,

but what you rarely hear is actually an in-depth sense of the operational and tactical complexity of

a military operation. Certainly one on the scale of what we've just witnessed, which is to me still

kind of jaw-dropping. And so we thought there was no one better than you to help us think through

what actually goes into something like this that we're witnessing and then where can it potentially

go. So let me just start with asking you, if you were still a commander in the military and you

were asked by the president to pursue certain objectives or to create options for certain objectives,

how does one go about the military planning for this? Because again, it strikes me that it's not

just the US military planning. It's the US military planning in coordination with the Israelis

and in coordination with the number of allies in the region and a very ambitious operation.

So can you just paint a picture for my audience of what happens? How does one get to work?

Well, look what goes into this, Dan, is actually decades and decades generations of experience and

expertise. Aviation off a carrier deck in particular is evolved over, again, many decades. This is

a generation's long achievement. All of that has taken place. The intensive exercises that the

commanders have had decades in a number of cases for the senior leaders, many iterations of this.

Of course, we've been a nation or in many respects since 9-11, often on. Obviously it had tailed off

a bit in more recent years, but here we are. Central commander is the most experienced by far

when it comes to actually carrying out the combined joint operations that we're seeing unfolding

here today and keep in mind that it's also carried out an intimate coordination with the intelligence

agencies of multiple countries as well. In fact, this was an extraordinary intelligence success.

And also, by the way, I'm just stunned by the extraordinary arrogance of the supreme leader

and the other senior leaders who presumably thought, well, they didn't come attack us in the middle

of last night because normally these are carried out at dark. We own the night and so forth.

In this case, we waited until the sun came up. They came out. They had meetings together. These

were clearly pinpointed and that gave the military the precise locations that were then attacked

with this stunning historical achievement of taking out the supreme leader and a number of the other

senior military and security force leaders. Noting, there obviously is a succession plan. In fact,

the Iranians even confirmed that there was a succession plan during some conversations

publicly last week. We've done this before. We've taken out senior leaders of the Revolutionary

Guards Corps quicks Force, Customs Soleimani, my most principal adversary when I was the commander.

So the question right now, having confirmed apparently that the supreme leader is dead and also

several others, is what will be the character of the individual who follows? Will it be someone who

all of a sudden proves to be a pragmatist or is it going to be another ideological hardliner

like Humanei who believes in that success is just surviving, which of course he didn't even

achieve this time. Now it was interesting to hear the president just recently a few minutes ago

put out a social media post noted that there are large numbers of the Revolutionary Guards Corps

and other security force elements that are defecting that want to lay down their weapons.

That would be very, very welcome news. The challenge here is that there is not an

Akman al-Shara figure out there. There's no opposition leader who can step forward and say rally to

me will take down this terrible regime that has taken a country with the second largest

natural gas reserves in the world and the third largest oil reserves, a civilizational society,

great education and everything else and has driven it into the dirt. I just heard a calculation

someone went back all the way to the Shah's regime and apparently the real has actually devalued

by 99 percent since that time. A stunning achievement on the part of the Iranians to take a

country with such potential and literally drive the economy into a deep ditch. You said something

a moment ago about the difference between operating at night versus during the day and just

for a listless understand that in the previous operations that Israel was in the US were involved

in with Iran when you go back to April 24, October 24, June 25 and Maduro and these strikes against

extremists and so forth. And as you mentioned, Kossum Shulamani, even that operation, these are

always done at night. So just can you paint that picture? What risk was Israel in the US taking

by conducting that part of the operation during the day versus doing it at night and why did they

take that risk? Well, because they assessed that they had mitigated sufficiently the normal risks

of operating during daylight, which is that the enemy can see you and shoot you down. But keep in

mind that during the last operation, the 12-day air campaign, the Israelis with RF35 we provided to

them took down the sophisticated Russian provided S 300 air and ballistic missile defense system

and virtually all the other air defenses that could reach an aircraft flying above say 12,500 feet

or so. So they really were defenseless. I'm sure that there were some initial strikes to confirm

that to take down anything they might have reconstituted. But normally, for example, we didn't

conduct special mission unit operations during the day very often. We did it almost always at night

because you have special aircraft circling above and you want the enemy to be able to see them and

try to shoot them down and they typically would go away in the morning. We also don't have operations

here where we're actually putting anyone on the ground with a helicopter that might be vulnerable

could be seen during the daylight, not at night. So I think this was a calculated and a brilliant move

actually if you think about it. Brilliant. I mean, move me. You got the element of surprise because

the Iranian leadership clearly didn't think that there was going to be a daytime operation. Yes,

and you had just had an announcement by the Omani Foreign Minister that there was a new offer.

Right. That they were close. Yeah. And the president was displeased, but he wasn't again rattling the

saber. So there was a tactical surprise, I think, achieved. And that proved to be sufficient

to take out a number of the senior leaders. Okay. Can you paint a picture for us in terms of

at least what we know? What is public about the US military assets that have been deployed?

Like just generally speaking, what's out there? Where and what are they doing? Because I think

it's very confusing to try to make sense of the map. Yeah. Let me come back just quickly,

but you asked about how do you develop options? Look, this plan has been in the works all the way

back to when I was the central command commander in 2009 when we were asked to develop a plan to

destroy the Iran nuclear program. So we've had these plans in existence. They've just been updated

repeatedly. By the way, when I was a central command commander, we thought we were going to carry out

the operation and we'd rehearsed it inside the United States. So that's how these plans come about.

Now, what is also really important and there were reports about this is that the chairman of

the joint chiefs and the central command commander, they're the two that really matter in this case,

sent comm having come up with the plans. Of course, the joint staff supporting the chairman

going through them and then the chairman and central command presenting them to the decision makers,

the chairman apparently rightly pointed out there are serious risks here. And one of those

entails what I mentioned earlier, which is the missile math. And one of the reasons that I believe

the 12-day war was brought to a close when it was was because there were starting to be worries

in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv and also in Washington about how many more missiles and launchers do the

Iranians have relative to how many interceptors do we have? And you don't want to make too close a

call with that needless to say. In fact, a missile just did get through and hit an apartment block

in Tel Aviv. I'm sure you've seen the footage of that. And they cause enormous damage. So,

again, now let's think about the laid down. We've had the aircraft carrier task force, the Abraham

Lincoln, the honest Abe out there. They're outside the Gulf, essentially off the coast of sort of

southern Iran, southern Pakistan. There are destroyers inside the Gulf. And that's important because

they have the, it's essentially a patriot like ballistic missile defense system and radar. These

are all integrated, integrated also with the destroyers. And then you have Israel's system.

Of course, that's integrated Jordan and the rest. And you have destroyers in the eastern

Med not only to protect that aircraft carrier, the Gerald Ford, the largest in the world, but also

to network again with all of this. And if necessary, if his Bala begins to strike Israel or goes after

our assets, we have that aircraft carrier with an extraordinary amount of combat power on it that

can respond into southern Lebanon as well. Now, what is interesting here is that we have not had

access to the bases that we normally would have. If you could go right down Kuwait, Bahrain,

Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar, there are some side deals we believe it may be that air refuelers

are able to use one of the major bases that we have there, but not strike aircraft.

The Brits are flying by the way, but they're flying in defense as are some of our aircraft.

Jordan is a base that we have a substantial number of aircraft. They're F-15s and others.

But through most of the Middle East, other than Israel, it sounds like we did not have access to

the bases that we typically have access to. That is correct. They really did not want to be part

of offensive actions that would bring about the retaliation that we have actually seen, which is

another big Iranian miscalculation. Saudi Arabia, which I understand sent mixed messages. The

public message is that you can't use our bases. The private message was, if you don't do something,

you're going to look bad here. A message to the United States, the message was from the Saudis,

yeah. If you don't do something, it's destabilized. And again, presumably air space is open. I

can't imagine that again, but publicly, the presentation by the Gulf states was, we're not in this,

don't hit us. And they did get hit, which is stupid on the part of the Iranians and also a

miscalculation. And that means now they're going to be four square behind us. And we'll see as it

goes on, I wonder if they will open up some of their bases. It's obviously a lot closer. If you're

flying out of a Gulf state base right on the coast to get to Iran, although it does then introduce

some vulnerability for those aircraft, given the greater ability of Iran to strike now, then it

used to have a couple of decades ago. Okay. So you walked through what assets, US assets are out

there or in the region. Keep in mind, there's submarines as well. And submarine has very large numbers

of cruise missiles. I suspect that those have been used. You always want to use the unmanned

stuff to take down what they might have that could threaten our manned aircraft. There's also

air-launched cruise missiles that you can launch without having to get right over a target. There's

a bunch of assets here. Yeah. And I'm very confident that our forces are using them all superbly

in this operation. And in service of what strategy? Well, the president has been very clear that

what he is after is regime change. I mean, he said this. And now is the time to rise up. And they

have indeed decapitated the regime leadership to a reasonable degree. We don't know how many more

beyond the Supreme Leader. I think they got the Revolutionary Guards Corps Commander Chief. I

believe they got a defense minister. The president were not exactly sure, but a number of senior

leaders. So and that's going to have a very disruptive effect, but they have a succession plan. They

have deputy commanders and they've been through this before. So that will disrupt operations for a

while it may degrade some of the command and control capability. But again, there will be others

that will assume those roles and carry forward. And then again, the question really is what is the

character of those who take over? Will there be somebody that can become the Dolce Rodriguez

of Iran who will respond to direction from the United States and say, you know what,

you're exactly right. All this death to Israel and death to the United States and nuclear program

and army proxies. What has it gotten us? Ruined, absolute ruin in a country that should be one of

the world's greatest energy superpowers. And the biggest challenges. What would you like if you

just had to take off the biggest challenges and operation like this? Sure. It's the missile

net again. And by the way, keep in mind that this administration has carried out a number of

operations now that have been nearly flawless. And yet some of them much dice here, I think,

then people seem to realize then as well operation, 150 aircraft simultaneously shut off the lights,

shut down the internet dealt with all the quick reaction forces took out all the air and ballistic

missile defense systems. But at the end of the day, the individual received the mental

of honor. It is the pilot. He got hit three times landing his very large MH 47 with dozens of

special mission unit operators in the back. But at the end of the day, it's almost miraculous

to carry that out and not have somebody killed. There were some seriously wounded, but again,

no one killed. But there can be something that can happen. Somehow something miraculously

gets through defenses and sinks a ship with hundreds of soldiers on it, her sailors on it. So

that I think I'm sure that the chairman went right through all of those different challenges.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Yes. And that is his job. I think, by the way, he's been

doing a very impressive job. In terms of the Israeli role, you come at this from the American military

perspective. You've worked very closely over the years with the Israelis. Can you talk a little

bit about the Israeli role in all of this? Sure. Look, the intelligence that Israel has had

over the decades inside Iran has been stunning. Remember that Israel was not part of central command

when I was the commander. I advocated for that, but it just was still a legacy that it was with

European command. So I couldn't go to Israel myself. So the Israeli Chief of Staff would come to the

Pentagon and we would surreptitiously meet in the office that I would have. He'd just

rewonder by and, ah, come on in. And the very first time that happened, he opened up a notebook.

It was just the two of us. And he showed me photographs that had clearly been taken inside

very, very sensitive facilities in Iran. I already knew in the agency had told me how extraordinary

their intelligence was, how much they've penetrated. But we've seen that repeatedly since then.

Think about the operation that stole all the nuclear records right from downtown Tehran. Look

at the operation carried out during the 12-day air campaign where Mossad set up drone bases,

drone launch sites out in the desert inside Iran and then put those together with exquisite

intelligence to target over a dozen nuclear scientists and the other senior leaders that they

took out. So again, they are extraordinary in this particular category and many others. And the

agency works very closely with them. And then the combined product, of course, is what also

enables military and other operations. What will be curious to see is, has there been something else

of foot? Is there some kind of operation to try to help an opposition develop real capability?

The problem so far, of course, has been these hundreds and hundreds of thousands of demonstrators

have essentially been spontaneously gathering. It's almost like flash mobs, but without real

leadership and certainly without military capability. Remember what enabled Ahmed Al-Shar in Syria,

was that he had built a real force and that force proved to be overwhelming with a rotten

regime forces that were left inside Syria of the murderous Bashar al-Assad when the

his bullet forces couldn't come to the rescue where evolutionary guard scorer weren't there

and Russia air power and special operations forces weren't available. What can be the

equivalent here? Where is a force which could also perhaps attract to its ranks, the disaffected

revolutionary guards corps and other security force members, the president highlighted.

So just in terms of the synchronization of these two systems, the Israeli system and the US

system, because it's not like in the 12-day war, my understanding, the Israel was operating at

the front end. And then, you know, while the US may have been involved, it was really Israel's

show at the beginning and then the US came in. So there are big liaison teams. Dan, there's

big liaison teams with each other. Common operational picture is shared. All the air picture

is shared. There's a very elaborate system to integrate what each of us has and to provide it

to the other. In their elements of our force, quite substantial on the ground in the Syria, I'm

sure, or other locations that enable very old coordination. And I'm sure that their central

command headquarters as well, they always have been. So it's a central operation that's coordinating.

Well, there are many central operations. What you have is a system of systems. The unique aspect

of central command is that it has had a combined air operation center active doing real combat

operations on a daily and nightly basis for decades. You know, it started again with the response

to the 9-11 attacks. It kept building. It got bigger and bigger. It drew down some. It's probably

not necessarily in the old headquarters, which is a two-story temporary building above ground out

there in one of the Gulf states because of the threat now that exists. And I'm sure that a

number of our different headquarters have slimmed down, gone underground or relocated somewhere

out of range. But no, we've had a combined air operation center. It's very easy to plug that

all in. You have a terrific air picture. I mean, think of this as a regional FAA center. And

they've got enormous resources to show this and keep in mind. And in the air, we have AWACS and

other aircraft as well. So there's very, very substantial coordination of everything in this

effort. And the stick missile defense system too. That's all shared. It's all integrated.

What was interesting during my time as central command commanders, I couldn't get the Gulf states

to share with each other. So what we did is we had them share with us and then we pumped it back

to them. So we were the integrators. We called it bilateral multilateralism. And that is on

going as well. That's how all of this keep in mind all the different elements that are part of

the air and ballistic missile defense architecture, the early warning, the radars, the tracking of

these missiles, determining who's going to take it and all the rest that ends happening very quickly.

Some of it at machine speed with certain of the capabilities because you do not quick enough,

you're hitting a bullet with a bullet. The physics of this are astonishing. But the tragedy is,

as we saw with the strike that actually hit in Tel Aviv, during the 12-day war, I think it was

roughly five to seven percent of the missiles did get through. And of course, avoided any

catastrophic. But that's something you can't always count on happening. And then, of course,

there's a coordinated division of labor just as it was during the 12-day campaign. Although in

that case, these rallies really did the first 10, 11 days. And we piled on massively with the B-2

bombers, which again, we haven't yet seen. And I'm sure they'll materialize. At some point here,

they'll fly out of US bases and be refilled in the air all the way out there until they drop

their massive ordinance. They can go all the way up to the 30,000-pound precision munition that

is called the massive ordinance penetrator, which is what pile-drived its way through the deeply

buried site at Fort O. But in this case, the Israelis very likely were the ones that said,

we'll do the regime seek leader targets. We've got the precise intelligence real-time,

we've done this before. We have the aircraft that can do it. You focus on this. Sometimes you

have a geographic division. Sometimes you have other ways. You're essentially doing, again,

aircraft command and control, just like aircraft controllers do in the FAA towers. There are

airlines, except on a very broad and regional scale. And as I mentioned earlier, I suspect there

are other than the British that are flying right now as well to help with the ballistic missile

defense effort. During the President's State of the Union Dress last week, General Petraeus,

and then also the statement he issued over once the operation was underway, the statement he made,

he framed everything about this operation. I've been struck by this. In the context of

America's interest, America's national security, for instance, the State of the Union,

he talked about Iran's ballistic missile capabilities, being able to breach US bases in Europe,

maybe someday in the US. And about how the Iranian regime had so much American blood on its hands.

This is the legal underpinning for this operation. This is self-defense. Keep in mind the

President's powers versus Congress's powers. And the President has very broad authority if it

is self-defense. This is how they cast the operation to kill Customs Soleimani in Trump 1.0.

They said that he was planning imminent attacks. So we had to take action. We couldn't

consult with Congress. We needed to go at the time where we had that fleeting target identified.

And so I think that's part of what is going on. I suspect he will actually then notify Congress

the way that war powers act requires. But I think they just didn't want to get into it with Congress

ahead of time. And of course, let's acknowledge that if you control both houses of Congress,

things are a little bit easier than certainly if you do not. And operation like this, you were

obviously very involved in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan very involved in the central command.

We had separate operations during that time outside of those Yemen, Somali pirates,

maritime freedom of navigation, and so forth. But take Iraq 2003, which I think actually is when

you and I first met. My understanding is what the US deployed to the region now for this operation.

In terms of naval assets and air assets, not ground forces, obviously, but in terms of naval

and air assets, what the US has deployed in recent months to the region is comparable to what was

deployed to the region and the lead up to the Iraq war. Is that roughly accurate? I just don't know,

Dan. We had an awful lot of aircraft all up and down the Gulf at that time. We had 2.0 aircraft

carriers and so forth. There were an awful lot of strikes that went in. And we had a lot of

naval forces inside the Gulf. So they're much closer at that time to the target than we have

comparably now. So again, I just don't know. What I do know is that when I took command of US

central command, there were 250,000 soldier sailors, airmen, Marines in the theater, another 250,000

contractors. And we always had two aircraft carrier test forces and the airfields were full

of planes and how you did encounter an Abu Dhabi in Kuwait, even off and on in Bahrain in some

of the other countries. So no question. This is a very substantial force. And I don't think it's

fully at strength yet. I am waiting for the B2 bombers to enter this. I'm waiting for the B52

bombers to do what? What would those do that hasn't been done? Well, we want to go back and certainly

pulverize Esfahan if they actually have underground stocks of 60% uranium. We want to do a way

as much of their, not just the missile launchers and missiles, but their manufacturing capacity

because they were trying to rebuild this. That's why many of us expected it a month or two from

now. Israel was going to go back anyway. We want to really set them back in all the areas that

are most worrisome and most threatening to US national interests and our allies and partners

in the region, especially Israel, given the death to Israel, which always follows death to America.

In terms of now going forward, just wrapping up this conversation, what do you think is at stake

right now? I'm going to say this is incredibly impressive what the US and Israel have done here.

So from a military standpoint, a future of Iran and so say more about that. Say more about that

because Iran is not just about the future of Iran. It's Iran's role in the region.

A future of a huge country, which has incredible potential and has not realized it remotely,

which has sowed the winds of its own demise here by arming these proxies, all of which now are

dramatically degraded, possible exception of the Houthis, but even they have been taken down a

few pegs. Syria is no longer an ally for them. His bull is a shadow of its former capability.

Hamas not destroyed by any means, and that is a challenge to be sure, but dramatically degraded

and encircled. So it's about what decision does the future leader decide to take? What trajectory?

Does he want to continue? Does he double down on again, death to America, death to Israel,

and be a religious hardliner? If so, then they're in for a tough time and we may be as well.

Or do they want to be pragmatic and see what an alternative approach might provide?

You'll see how that goes, but could be one that sees that its potential would be vastly greater.

If they just tried to get along in the region, as opposed to being this ideological hardline

regime in a country, which by the way is one of the more secular and educated in the entire region.

But do you think you can get stability? If we're saying are we headed for a period of chaos,

a period of stability? You're painting a picture of a path, possibly the stability.

You can only answer this by starting with it depends, just like any economist answers,

any question on the one hand on the other hand. Yes. Yeah. Yeah. There's a number of factors

that will determine whether they're civil war. I mean, could this be the moment when the

Azarees rise up or the Kurds or the Turkmen or the Sunni or what have you? We just really don't know.

Can this be the Syrian civil war for a decade before someone pulls it back together? Or could there

be some leader who steps forward? It depends absolutely on who the leader emerges and then does that

leader have the most guys with the most guns? It's not normally in this kind of situation,

regime being toppled that the good guys come forward. It's not necessarily the person the people

would have elected. It's the person that can actually galvanize the most force and then go forward

and establish control. And that's what we're going to have to see. And that's where, as I mentioned

earlier, it would be really interesting if Mossad and maybe my old great organization, the CIA,

had been doing something behind the scenes to set the stage for someone to emerge. I mean,

you hear the Shah's son and so forth, but it hasn't been in runs since 1978, I believe it is.

You know, there's no pan-shear valley here with Ahmad Shah Masood ready to lead the Northern

Alliance, although tragically you got assassinated right before that happened. Last question for you.

You wrote this terrific history, military history book with Andrew Roberts, which we'll link to in

the show notes. You know, Hamas launches this attack on October 7th. And here we are two and a half

years later, as you're laying out here, a region, the Middle East being transformed before our eyes,

in ways that no one from Yehya Sinwar or the Supreme Leader of Iran possibly could have imagined

that this is where we would be today. Is there anything in modern military history that is

comparable to this, the extent to which, you know, this sort of own goal by Hamas that then

catalyzes this kind of military response that transforms the circumstances and the geopolitics

of an entire region like this. I'm just hard pressed to find anything like it.

Well, the 9-11 attack certainly spurred quite a number of actions, not all of which turned out

as quickly and as easily and as nicely as we hope needless to say. The Arab Spring comes to mind as

well, but it seems to me that the scale of this and the significance of this that the pariah of the

region and its proxies have just done themselves in so substantially is a bit unprecedented. But

with that, Dan, it's really been great to be with you and I thank you for the invitation.

Thank you General Pradesh. I appreciate it. Thank you. You bet.

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