What You Know About Recessions Could Be All Wrong

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The risk is duration. If indeed this is a short conflict and normal traffic resumes through the straight of hormones, then I think this will be a temporary setback, but not a recessionary shock.

Whereas if this straight of hormones shut down does persist for a period of weeks or months, then it would be a supply shock greater than that observed in 1973 or 1979.

I'm Stephanie Flanders, Head of Government and Economics at Bloomberg, and this is Trumponomics, the podcast that looks at the economic world of Donald Trump, how he's already shaped the global economy and what on earth is going to happen next.

We've spent much of the past couple of weeks thinking about the potential impacts of the crisis in Iran on the global economy for oil prices, on trade, for inflation.

We talked through a lot of those and even some new ones like the threat to water and even food supplies in the Gulf in detail in last week's episode with two of my senior colleagues.

But lurking beneath the surface of all of these conversations is often the fear that this shot will be enough to tip the whole economy into recession.

But one reassuring lesson of a new study of recessions in the US and the UK over the past 250 years is it takes a lot to do that.

Dr Tyler Goodspeed was acting chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers at the tail end of President Trump's first term, and since 2023 has been the chief economist at ExxonMobil.

But somehow, despite doing that job, he has managed to write a book called Recession, the real reasons economy shrink and what to do about it.

He finds, in that book, as Adam Smith once said, there is a lot of ruin in a nation.

It takes a lot of overlapping shocks to tip an economic expansion into reverse.

But pretty much everything else we thought we knew about recessions, he thinks, was wrong.

Expansions don't die of old age, they don't get more likely, the longer an expansion continues.

They're not the inevitable punishment for an excessive boom, and they don't cleanse the economy either of the bad decisions taken in those booms or make it easier for businesses to undergo necessary restructuring.

Perhaps most important, we haven't really gotten any better at avoiding or shortening recessions in the past 75 years or so.

But, and this seems like an important, but the book does find that unexpected shocks can play a big role in stopping an economy, especially those involving food and energy.

So all things considered, it seemed like a good time to talk to Dr. Goodspeed about his book, Tyler.

Thank you very much for joining me. You're in London, I'm in New York, I'm sorry about that, but we appreciate you coming in.

It's great to be with you.

There's a lot of economic history in this book, and conveniently for a sort of transatlantic podcast, it's drawing on the history of both the UK and the US economy.

I can't help wondering how you even found time to do this, while you chief economist of a major global energy firm.

Fortunately, before joining Exxon, I was back in academia after a few years in government, and so that was when I did most of the grunt work for the project.

But that said, I'm very much looking forward to having my evenings and weekends back.

Yeah, I'm sure. I sort of summarized some of the hard truths for economists who thought they understood the economy that are in your book.

Just tell us briefly what you set out to do, and for you, the more surprising conclusions, and then we can unpack some of them.

So what I set out to do was to better understand economic contractions having just lived through one of the sharpest economic contractions in US and UK history with the 2020 pandemic recession.

And when I started the project, I thought that was such a unique event, such a unique shock.

As I got further into the research, I realized that actually most recessions are about adverse shocks that we could neither fully anticipate nor effectively hedge against.

One thing we often tell ourselves about recessions is that they're inherently cyclical phenomena.

That there's a boom and then a bus that there's some excess or malinvestments or error in an economic expansion to which recession is the inevitable and even necessary remedy.

And there's a certain moralizing to that story, but it's just not true.

The economic recessions has been Bernanke put it, they're murdered.

And over the past few centuries, one of the shocks that we're potentially living through right now, namely energy supply shocks, has been a serial killer or serial accomplice to the murder of otherwise healthy and innocent economic expansions.

The point of the inevitable consequence of booms, we do tend to look back, I think the 1920s or some of the financial manias that you read about from earlier centuries or even the 2008 crisis.

We tend to think that was a banking crisis caused by a lot of excess in lending in the financial sector.

What piece of that is wrong or at least is not being properly described?

When you look at the height or speed of an economic expansion as measured, for example, by the volume of bank lending or the increase in the volume of bank lending, then under the boom bus hypothesis, the height or speed of the increase in bank lending during an economic expansion should predict the depth or speed or duration of the subsequent recession and it simply doesn't.

And the 1920s are actually a very interesting one, because first of all, that was actually a very short expansion that preceded the recession that began in the second half of 1929.

When you look at a lot of measures of economic activity, including building activity, including investments, there were some large increases, but it's in the context of a severe negative deviation from trend during World War One, the subsequent recession,

the subsequent pandemic, 1918, 1919, 1920 were very difficult postwar years characterized by shortages in the continued shortages in the United Kingdom, by widespread strike activity in the United States.

So what you saw in the 1920s was to a large extent catch up for the growth and increase in economic activity that didn't happen during that six-year period from 1914 to 1920.

The other thing that was interesting to me was the 30s is the classic sort of cautionary tale, especially if you're an economist and you read the Keynes General Theory and all that is all about something which you don't dispute, which is the policy makers can definitely make recessions worse, they can mismanage sort of the path into a recession.

But the conceit was that policy makers post World War Two had better at managing these things, recessions were less deep, were shorter.

I guess we've already been questioning that a little bit over recent years, but you find that's not even in the sort of post World War Two data for the UK or the US.

That's right, and just one moment on the 1930s, I think it's really important to remember just the volume of severe shocks that hit the US economy, not so much the UK economy between 1929 and 1933.

A massive increase in business taxation, you had four distinct banking crises, three of which were actually highly regional in nature, one of which at least one of which had to do with a once in a generation drought throughout much of the US.

That was succeeded by a plague of locusts of providential proportions that contributed to a wave of bank failures.

You had a tariff shock, there was just a lot going on in the US economy during that period.

So yes, you were spot on to highlight the conceit of a lot of post-war policy makers.

We saw this in the 1960s, again in the 1990s, that they thought that because of the rollout of automatic stabilizers,

a greater roll for the state in the economy that recessions would become more rare and shallower, the reality is that recession depth has been remarkably constant over time going all the way back to the 1700s.

Recession duration has been remarkably constant over time going all the way back to 1700.

Most recessions are over in about a year and the vast majority within two years.

So what has changed is that expansions have actually gotten longer over time and recessions have actually become less frequent.

However, that is a very long run trend that goes back to 1700 and probably before and you can statistically test was there a particular point in time when economic expansions transition to greater length, greater duration.

And statistically there's no clear break point. So this is a long run smooth trend that goes back to the 18th century.

I promise we will get to some sort of positive conclusions either the last part of this conversation, but if you're sort of thinking of it, you can learn about economics and get better at doing things.

It's not entirely encouraging reading your book.

One thing that you do highlight and you've already mentioned actually some of the differences between the UK and the US.

I was surprised to see such a big difference between the two economies in terms of the number of recessions having grown up in the UK.

We tend to think of it as rather crisis prone and rather unsuccessful.

And as you just point out, it has been quite unsuccessful, but it has been successful at one thing which is relative to America avoiding recessions.

What is the difference in terms of the likelihood of having a recession between the UK and the US?

You're right. One of the fascinating findings in the book is just how much more recession prone the United States has been over the past 250 years than the United Kingdom or how much less recession prone the United Kingdom has been.

And there are fundamentally two reasons for that. One is that from 1826 onward the United Kingdom had a nationwide system of branch banking.

So you could operate multiple branches across the national economy. And if you think about a large diversified economy, it's kind of like a well diversified portfolio.

So shocks in one area, one sector or one region can be offset by resilience in another in contrast in the United States for most of US history for domestic political economy reasons.

Not only could a bank not operate across state lines, they could only operate one location within a state.

And what that meant was you had tens of literally tens of thousands of small under capitalized financial institutions that were insufficiently diversified not only on the asset side.

So they're very exposed to local shocks, but also their capital base was was under diversified because all the shareholders, all the partners in the bank were also exposed to the local economy.

And that really only started to change in the 1970s and the 1980s. Now the second reason for greater UK resilience in the face of adverse recessionary shocks is that from 1926 to 1972, the UK economy went without a single word.

And during that period, the United States experienced multiple recessions that were oil induced in 1948, 1953, 1957, 1970. And during that time, instead the UK economy was just much more reliant on coal.

The UK economy had an abundant supply of coal and it was their primary source of energy.

So it was partly that and I guess we can't really congratulate ourselves on having been more efficient at avoiding recessions.

One thing that was striking to me was despite having this might be self-evident to some people, despite having much more successfully avoided recessions than the US, it has not been a more successful economy over this period.

Quite a large gap in living standards opened up in the first part of the 20th century and has got quite a lot larger in the last few years.

So you know, the other great thing that policymakers tend to say is well that one of the most important things you can do is avoid.

You should try and keep the economy running stable even if it's growing a bit more slowly because it's avoiding recessions that really helps you maintain living standards.

That doesn't seem to be born out either by your comparison between the two countries.

Not at all. In terms of the policymakers endeavor to prevent recessions, it's inevitably going to be a vain attempt because recessions will continue to happen because history continues to happen.

There has never been an immortal economic expansion. And as you note, the UK is about 30% poor per person.

I think that's actually quite a lot bigger now. I think I was looking at the data. I think it's 40 or 50% poor because of the last 20 years.

And has long been substantially poorer than the United States. I think that's an important lesson that the majority of years in which an economy expands matter much more than the minority of years in which it contracts.

And so what policymakers should be focusing on if they want to increase human prosperity and flourishing is focusing on increasing the pace of growth during the periods of expansion.

So let's sort of think more about the current moment. You obviously had a period where you were sitting in the White House and the Council of Economic Advisors just looking at the time that you were running the council was as COVID hit the economy.

So I guess as you say that was kind of a searing experience that you want to think more about the causes of recessions.

But if you were there now, how would you be thinking about the risks from this crisis in the Middle East and indeed the other potential risks on the horizon.

So I think the risk is duration. If indeed this is a short conflict and it is contained and normal traffic resumes through the straight of hormones,

then I think this will be a temporary setback, but not a recessionary shock.

But if this does persist for several weeks, then it does have a 1973, 1979 feel to it where actual physical barrels are removed from global supply.

A lot of traders on trading floors today probably don't have a memory of episodes of energy supply shocks where there was actually supply shock, physical barrels, physical cubic feet of gas that were removed from global markets.

2022, there was a fear of that, but what ended up happening was a remarkable reconfiguration of global liquids flows and global gas flows.

There were some transition costs, but there wasn't much disruption to the actual supply.

Whereas if this straight of hormones shutdown does persist for a period of weeks or months, then it would be a supply shock greater than that observed in 1973 or 1979.

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You're sitting in an oil company, but you know there has been a big shift in the administrations approach to energy transition alternative sources of energy and that could potentially set the US in terms of its kind of energy model for its economy on quite a different path from the rest of the world.

How do you think about that in terms of obviously the US has a lot of its own supply now that it didn't have in the 1970s and we've talked in the last week we were talking about how that makes the US less vulnerable in many ways.

But do you think the sort of impact of this kind of crisis in 10 or 20 years time is going to be quite different just because of the approach to their energies supplies that different economies are taking some countries may just be entirely reliant on renewables are not so susceptible to these kind of shocks in 10 or 20 years time.

Whereas the US will have its own supplies but will be reliant on kind of fixed supplies or fossil fuels at least if we continue on this path.

That's a great question. The thing about the energy industry is that it is an industry with a very long investment horizon so the company I work for we every year produce a long run global economic outlook.

We actually make it publicly available and it is our best projection of what we think the world looks like in 2050 what the world's energy demand is and how that composition changes into by 2050 from 2025 in response to this shock following on the 2022 shock following on the pandemic shock.

I suspect it will prompt both companies and countries to think more a bit more in terms of insurance.

What is the probability that supply is unavailable what is the cost to me in the event of that supply unavailability and how does the dot products of those two numbers compare to the premium I would have to pay to effectively ensure against that loss.

So for some countries for some companies that might mean investing in energy sources that would not become unavailable in the event of a geopolitical shock.

One of the big lessons that comes out of your book is that as you point out and show very clearly in the numbers expansions don't die of old age.

So we shouldn't just inevitably expect them just because an expansion is of a certain age and specifically they stop because of an unanticipated.

Stopping of key supports for the expansion we've talked about energy as one source of that we've also had quite a lot of shocks to global trade over the last year from the president's announcement of tariffs and then some of them have gone in place some of them are not when in place now the supreme court has ruled a whole chunk of them to be.

Unconstitutional but they're going to be recreated in in different ways.

If you're looking at the sort of broad range of shocks facing the economy we're also looking at a very hard to predict potential revolution in business practices thanks to AI.

Thinking about this work of your book how concerned are you what are the key things that you're focused on and what do you think the administration should be doing to help sustain the expansion or avoid that kind of unexpected shot.

So in terms of the conventional subjects suspects that you hear a lot of in the financial press an AI boom gone bus.

I think that on the basis of history that an AI expansion is more likely to be a casualty of a recessionary shock than it caused thereof.

Everyone calls the 2001 recession the dot com recession the decline in Nasdaq stocks was just one of at least four shocks impacting the US economy in 2001.

And I argue is the least important the most important were the terrorist attacks of September 11th.

And in fact all of the output decline during that 2001 recession was in the quarter that included those devastating attacks when there was widespread fear we grounded the entire US air fleet we closed US air space.

There was a sharp fall and consumer spending because everyone was afraid rightfully so.

Without the 911 attacks the US economy probably would have continued to almost certainly would have continued to expand during that roughly eight month to quarter recession.

And in fact over the whole of that recession the US economy did expand by about 0.6.7 percentage points in terms of today's environment.

And one of the things that you learn studying historic recessions is that oftentimes a shock to a specific sector is more important than big macro shocks because some sectors have very high linkages to the rest of the economy and it's very difficult for producers and households to find substitutes for that product.

So energy is of course the one we've talked a lot about but another one today would probably be rare earth elements those 17 elements on your periodic table China last year threatened to impose strict export restrictions on their exports of rare earth elements that is currently suspended until November.

I think if something like that were to be imposed and really enforced that would potentially be a recessionary shock.

Another one is there's currently a bill in Congress I think it has a very low probability of passage but it would impose an interest rate cap on credit cards.

What would probably happen in that event would be that credit card companies would cancel accounts and massively curtail the extension of credit to consumers.

We observed just such a shock in 1948 almost observed the shock it was the threat of the imposition in 1970 and then in 1980 president Carter did indeed invoke his authority to impose credit controls and those were accomplices to the murder of the expansions that were then underway in all three instances.

So it's interesting because that bill obviously is inspired by the president focusing on that as an aspect of the affordability crisis.

So you would have been sitting in the White House saying this is really not and you would be you would have I think 95% of economists on your side in saying this is not a good idea.

The things that you've listed you say we should be worried about I think you're quite right and we are now much more focused on our reliance on these quite obscure rare earths and how that could feed into any number of bits of the global supply chain.

You've also highlighted how a terrorist attack is obviously by definition can be an unexpected and widespread shock to the economy.

The other one that comes through very strongly in your book the frequent references to locusts is climate shocks and particularly food shocks which we've obviously seen a lot of in the last few years.

And actually you do remind me I mean that in the law wringles wilder books the book that is that it features the locusts just descending onto their crop it's heartbreaking but I recommend that to anyone because it just feels very real.

Those kind of climate shocks a climate related shocks are becoming more frequent if you looked at the world today it does seem like all three of those things.

These shocks to unexpected commodities potential for terrorist attacks even on US foil and a rising number of extreme weather climate shocks.

Do you think the administration is do you think this second Trump administration is doing their best to reduce the risk of those things or prepare for them for that matter.

It really surprised me in the course of the research which is the number of occasions on which the eighth plague of Egypt really disrupted the American economy so 1857 1873 and 1931 during the Great Depression locust plagues of providential proportions.

And everyone talked in 1873 about a railroad boom gone bust but really that was a devastating plague of locust once swarm in 1875 was the saw was greater in size than the state of California.

If you look historically adverse wind weather events particularly winter weather events but also drought were major contributors to recessions on both sides of the Atlantic particularly in the 18th century but extending into the well into the 19th century.

And even the UK recession one of their longest their actually their longest in history was a very protracted recession from 1943 to 1947.

It probably would have been a year shorter or not for an extreme winter weather event in 1946-47.

Cold was frozen at the pits the trains couldn't move and then come spring the ground was still frozen so then there were torrential rains you had widespread catastrophic flooding.

The administration currently it is something that they are having to deal with because we just had severe winter weather events multiple severe winter weather events in the United States.

I don't think that those will be of of recessionary magnitude but as you pointed out the one thing that the book demonstrates is that sometimes economic expansions can die execution by a thousand cuts.

So there will probably be will have been a material impact on employment and output in January and February with those with winter weather events.

I can't forecast the future frequency or severity of adverse winter weather events but I can say historically they they were contributors.

This is not about climate change and I'm not particularly focused on it in this podcast but it's just it's a very striking lesson of your book.

We forget often the role of of climate and those kind of basic conditions for life in different economies how that can feed change sudden changes in that due to climate or weather.

We can put economies on very bad trajectories and it just sort of seems odd everything that you said is quite consistent with what the administration is doing except for that piece of actually giving up on any effort really to slow the pace of climate change.

You know by sort of doubling down on fossil fuels I accept that you are in yours to the goal is to vex on do you feel at all uncomfortable about that having done your having done your study.

That we're just deciding it's all going to be an act of God rather than something that we could potentially at least slow the pace of energy companies as I said are making investments for the long run.

And so in our latest global outlook we still have wind and solar growing the fastest in U.S. power gen in power gen globally and also in U.S. power gen.

So if you look at the global energy stack 2025 was a nice round number year for us to look back on how we did forecasting back in 2015 and when you think about everything that happened to global energy market since 2015.

We had the climate accords and then subsequent regional climate initiatives we had major technological improvements as certain technologies came down their cost curves we had a pandemic we had the Russian invasion of Ukraine and yet if you look at that global energy stack.

It shows remarkable fidelity to trend people often don't understand just how massive the energy system is it moves slowly and it adheres to long run trend pretty faithfully.

So whatever the trend that we saw of greater diversification you think in general you expect that to continue and not be subject to short term changes in individual countries policies.

So I'm just trying to understand what you were saying the global energy mix will look more diversified in 2050 than in 2025 it will have a greater role for a variable renewable energy.

What's interesting in terms of the long sweep of history is I would actually assemble some of these shocks in a broader environmental bucket.

So you mentioned the providential plague of locust several of them but there are also shocks like one we just went through which is a pandemic which was a contributor to recessions on both sides of the Atlantic in 1918.

And I would add one more shock that was a contributor to recessions on both sides of the Atlantic in 1815 16 and then again in the 1880s namely the eruption of Mount Tambora and the eruption of Mount Krakatoa.

Both of those resulted in pretty devastating weather effects across the globe 1816 was known as the year without a summer because it's so devastated crop yields and in terms of tail risk events one thing that was on my mind after writing this book was it's been a while since we've had one of those eruptions.

But hang on does that you're going to have to do another book about whether or not there are inevitable cycles in those kind of events having established that there aren't inevitable cycles and in recessions do you think maybe we should be looking for patterns on the in earthquakes and volcanoes.

You'd have to consult a geologist whether they occur with a periodicity but it just was something that struck me was that those were major global recessionary events we've had pinnitude bow we've had the Icelandic volcano.

But nothing on the scale of an 1815 Mount Tambora or 1880s Krakatoa.

Okay, so I'm not sure if we should be reassured by this conversation or not you as long as this particular energy crisis doesn't last too long we shouldn't be too worried about whether that's going to cause by itself recession and we shouldn't worry according to you about the AI boom inevitably sewing the seeds of it.

Destruction but there's still wide range of pandemics volcanoes earthquakes and other shocking events that we could think about and could happen at any time.

I would conclude on an optimistic note that as I observed we have gradually steadily over time gotten better at absorbing the kinds of shocks that historically would have resulted in recession.

Harvest failures were perennial contributors to economic recession in the 18th century the 19th century now we have my more diversified global supplies.

So we've been learning how to better deal with recessionary shocks and expansions have been getting longer so I would end on an optimistic note and also again remind folks that what ultimately matters more for long term prosperity is raising that pace of growth during economic expansions.

Doctor Tyler Goodspeed that's a great note on which to end thank you very much thank you.

Thanks for listening to Trumponomics from Bloomberg it was hosted by me Stephanie Flanders and I was joined by the economist and author Doctor Tyler Goodspeed.

Trumponomics was produced by Samasadi and Moses and with help this week from Amy Keane and Kale Brooks sound designers by Blake Maples to help others find the show please rate and review as highly wherever you listen to podcasts.

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