Will the Houthis join Iran in its war against the US and Israel?

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Will the Houthis join Iran in its war against the US and Israel, the Yemeni armed groups as

it's ready for any developments in the ongoing confrontation?

Given their proximity to the Red Sea, what could the Houthis involvement mean for this vital

maritime route?

I'm James Bayes and you're listening to the Inside Story podcast where we dissect, analyze,

and help define major global stories.

Let's meet our panel of guests who are joining us to discuss all of this further today on

Inside Story, joining us from London, Faria Al-Muslimi, a research fellow in the Middle

East and North Africa program at Chatham House.

In Jeddah, Khaled Batafi, a political analyst who specializes in Saudi foreign policy.

And in Medford, Massachusetts, Rockford Whites, professor of practice and director of the

Fletcher Maritime Studies program at Tufts University.

Thank you all three of you for joining us.

Khaled, if I couldn't start with you, what would it mean if the Houthis joined this

war?

If there was a third front?

Well, it means a lot of trouble because the Houthis is controlling Al-Mandab's trade

and before that, in the 12th days of the war, they attacked all the chips on the Red Sea

and it became very costly and very expensive, the same with the Swiss channel.

So right now, we only have this option to export our oil via a yellow and the Red Sea

down to Babel-Mandab and North to a Swiss channel.

And that's mean that we would be cut off, but I believe there is pressure on the Houthis

from the inside and outside, we included, not to join and they showed wisdom so far for

not joining.

Faria, I mean, for the US and for Israeli military planners, and I guess for people who

have got money invested in stock markets all around the world, the Houthis joining would

be the worst case scenario, would it not?

It would be obviously an additional nightmare to an already bloody war and costing the Middle

East.

However, the Houthis have been hesitant not to join for four to five reasons.

The first has to do with narrative, the second has to do with the economy and incentive

and another one has to do with the military, but also the added value, possibly, of them.

First, the Houthis have fought many wars internally and externally, but they always from their

own narrative have to have a domestic local reasoning for it.

And they cannot afford looking like indefense of the Persians.

They do not have the same theological and reporting relationship with Iran as Hasbullah

does or PMF for other Shiaat militias in the region, despite being an extremely, an

extremist, jihady group.

But also they are waiting for the road map and for possible road map resuming with Saudi

Arabia, which will give them huge economic incentives.

So they have a lot at stake to lose.

And number three, I think we shall not forget that they are still militarily blind because

of the last year's attacks and airstrikes by the United States of America.

They did have a lot of harm on their military and communication capabilities.

And they have a truth that they have a sponsored by Oman.

And that's another reason why they cannot throw all of that and just show up into the sea.

Should there be an airstrikes on them, I'm sure they will move on a moment or if things

go as bad in which the Gulf countries start to attack Iran back, there is a possibility

they will jump but so far.

In addition to not clear about their added value to this militarily, Iran does not need

so far a blast one into this war.

Because of all of these, they have practiced restraints and they have kind of kept themselves

in the reserves.

And I think they will do for some time at the moment, unless again, they are a strike

ahead or a GCC goes into a direct possible confrontation with Iran.

But until then, for this domestic economic military and added value reasons, they have

a practice, a strategic patience and I think they will do for that time being.

OK, Rockford.

I mean, there is a similarity, is there not between the Houthis and Iran in any potential

conflict if the Houthis would join it?

They have geography on their side.

It's a major strategic asset where they are in the world.

That's correct.

I agree with the analysis of both of my colleagues on this discussion, but I agree with you as

well that the Houthis have geography on their side and they are certainly able to use asymmetric

warfare, so non-conventional warfare in the same way that the IRGC plans to do that

in the street of Hormuz.

So they would be their goal, I think, would be to disrupt commercial shipping and I would

just add to the discussion, essentially, the implications would be on two different levels,

the regional level, especially for Saudi Arabia with those exports going through, as Holly

said, but then also for the Suez Canal and for Egypt.

So those would be the regional implications and then the global implications would be further

price pressure on oil prices going up, further disruptions of global trade, including

some passing around, decided to pass around the Cape of Good Hope on their way to Europe

instead of through the Suez Canal.

So it would be, if it happens, it would be very disruptive and it would complicate the

current war.

Khaled, there are lots of unknowns here.

We don't know, do we, exactly what the Houthis have in terms of weaponry, in terms of missiles,

in terms of drones?

They were hammered by the US last year.

We don't know what is left, but on the other side of this, if the Houthis were to join,

and they too, then, if they were involved in a military action, would be greatly depleting

the air defenses that the US and Israel rely on, not only to protect Israel, but to protect

places like where you are and where I am in Doha.

Yeah, that's true, but on the other side, the Houthis are afraid of the other air-many

factions, Shariaia, now is controlling all the factions, and they are ready.

So they have to worry about their territory from being attacked, whether from Sharia,

or being punished by the Saudis or by other factions, like our other parties, like the

United States or Israel.

So they are in a very sensitive time right now, and they should wait and see, because Iran

is being deintegrated, and the leadership is being killed, and all the people they know

in Iran, they coordinate their actions with the Houthis, are gunned.

So if I were in their shoes, I would wait and see what happened next, if Iran survives

very closely, then I think again, but if Iran, like what we see now, is being deintegrated,

and all the leaders I know are lost in action.

So then I will choose to be with the Saudis, who are going to be the next rulers of the

game, and they are, the Saudis should, in decades, their readiness to help without conditions.

They are readiness to stabilize Yemen and to support Yemen.

So if I were Houthi, I would wait for my rewards from the winner sides.

I mean, after October the 7th, the Houthis were involved in attacks on Israel and on

global shipping, and then there was a sustained U.S. campaign, there had been earlier airstrikes

by the U.S. and Israel and the UK for that matter, a sustained air campaign last year,

which ended in May, Operation Rough Rider.

At the end of that, I mean, the Houthis seemed to have come out quite well out of that,

and the U.S. decided to give that up, because things weren't going all that well for the U.S.

They were losing, or using up a lot of munitions.

It cost them a lot of money, and they lost seven drones, I think, during that six-week campaign.

Well, the Houthis showed up to the Red Sea because to them they could not afford not showing up for Palestine.

That's a different calculation domestically-wise, but in that case, in fact,

it was another example in which Iran originally have asked them not to intervene,

not to escalate in the Red Sea, and however, they moved despite Iran's will at the moment,

because they had enough reasons domestically and regionally to project power of that.

However, what I would warn off is that while now the Iranians have a list of a command

and control over the Houthis because most of IRGC and Hizbullah commanders have left Yemen over the last year,

and the Houthis enjoy a certain level of independence.

There has been cases in the past, just like the opposite in October 7th,

there has been cases in 2015 in which the Houthis did not want to escalate,

but IRGC cells in San Ahad decided to escalate, specifically against Saudi Arabia.

So, there has been incidents in the past in which things get out of the Houthis.

Control, despite their mathematics.

However, I would not also only count as a threat coming out of the Red Sea,

exocluci, or of Yemen, exoclucifully, out of the Houthis.

Iranians have invested in a lot of different Yemeni aspects inside Yemen.

They have different cells and they have different relationships across the home of Africa,

from pirates to smugglers to different religious and militia groups.

So, I would not be surprised to see that, despite the Houthis well,

at one point that it will escalate in the longer term.

And of course, that was an uncalculated war for the Houthis,

but as a group, it does not mind functioning in a war, specifically,

because it allows it to avoid its domestic pressure and its domestic situations.

I do disagree that they are worried at the moment from the other Yemeni factions.

I think they are beyond comfortable in that side,

but what they are afraid of, which is possible, highly possible, is in the long term,

even if they are spared this round because of their choice or Iran's choice,

they are for sure aware that they will not be spared than extra round.

And I believe Israel's next target after Iran will actually be the Houthis.

By then, they will go far and beyond, and they will use that at sea again.

But also, I think they would, despite the fact that they have been weaker

in matter of technological pieces of weapons from Iran the last year.

They still manufacture a lot domestically.

They have mobilized huge amount of fighters over the last year,

and they have been collecting revenues and spending zero salaries.

So, definitely, it is a bit weaker in the communication,

in the specific, militarily, technological pieces,

but it's still, by now, it has localized its manufacturing,

and it actually has a huge financial resources,

along with a zero responsibility of spending these financial resources.

So, even if they are at the moment quite, I would not take that as a long-term strategy.

Khaled, I mean, when that ended, that US operation,

which was a really heavy bombardment by the United States operation,

rough rider, there was a truce, and when Donald Trump announced that truce

back on the 5th of May last year, he said,

we hit them very hard, and they had a great ability to withstand punishment.

You could say there was a lot of bravery there,

almost a bit of admiration from Donald Trump,

the way the Houthis acquitted themselves, wasn't there?

Well, he could have the same admiration for the Afghans.

It's the territory, it's the culture, it's who they are.

I mean, the Yemenis are inhabitants of mountains,

of traditional territory, that can be used as hidden caves,

and hidden underground, and all that, and they have history of that.

I mean, I asked the Egyptian, they tried and tried,

when they have the best army in the Arab world,

but they failed to get into this area of the world.

The Houthis right now need to join, if they join,

the fight, they need missiles,

ballistic missiles, they need mines against ships,

they need things that they cannot hide forever,

and they cannot depend on surviving only to continue the fight.

And I think this has been depleted by the Americans,

and by not allowing the outside world,

one by that, I mean Iran, to export materials to them,

and Hezbollah is not in a shape or form to support them.

Okay, let me, if I could bring in Rockford on one of the points you made there,

you say they need lots of missiles, lots of resources they don't have.

Rockford, do they?

Because in many ways, this is about the threat, is it not?

Even if they fired one missile,

then shipping companies are then going to worry about their insurance,

worry about their ships, and you get an economic and shipping double blow,

when you've already got the Strait of Hormuz closed.

Yes, you're correct.

So what the Houthis could do is just the threat,

and credible threat, a risk to shipping would cause some of those marine insurers

that sort of famously canceled their coverage for the Strait of Hormuz,

they could cancel the coverage through the Bobo Mandem.

That would probably come back as it has in the Strait of Hormuz,

but even then the commercial shipping would be reluctant to take the risk.

And one reason it might be more profound as an impact in the Red Sea,

is that there are alternatives to going through the Bobo Mandem,

where that doesn't really exist with the Strait of Hormuz,

beyond the pipelines that cross Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

So there's no maritime alternative to the Strait of Hormuz,

whereas the Bobo Mandem does have a maritime alternative.

So even though I agree with the analysis of my fellow panelists,

they're certainly degraded after Operation Rough Rider.

They certainly do need to be resupplied, and Iran is not in position to do that,

but they still have something, and they have hidden some capacity.

So they can, whether it's drones or mines or even small boat attacks,

they would have that capability even using some of the fishing vessels that would be along the coast,

and then threatening shipping, the threat is what would trigger the commercial implications.

Khaled, I mean, yes, shipping much of it could go the long way round,

round Africa, round the Cape of Good Hope.

That adds to most ships a couple of weeks, about 6,000 nautical miles,

but in terms of energy, in terms of your country, that's not going to work,

because right now you are using that pipeline to the Anbu port as your back door

to get your oil supplies out. That would be closed down, would it not, Khaled?

Well, close to Asia, maybe, but still open to hopefully Europe through the Switch channel,

but it is going to be terrible. I mean, I don't know if the world can stomach this,

if China, for example, or Japan, or those who are reluctant to intervene, can stomach this,

and maybe that's a pressure enough, they have relation, they have contact with the Houthi

and they will pressure them not to do that. Other than that, either they have to

join America in reopening the Hormus, or joining the other Europeans in protecting

Babylonmenda, but they have to do something because they are the ones who will pay for this,

I mean, China and India and the rest of the world cannot afford to close Babylonmenda.

Faria, what do you think is the main reason why the Houthis have decided not to do this?

I mean, you mentioned before that there is no domestic reason for them to get involved.

I mean, what do you think it's about the cost, too? I mean, they do not want the port of Houdeda

to be blown up again. Is it about the fact that the U.S. has much more firepower in the region

than it did even a year ago when it bombarded them? All of that to gather.

Finance, but also narrative and ideological, but I think again, it's always important to remember

that from Abdul Malik al-Houthi's point of view, Khaman, he is his proxy rather than the

other way around. He does not feel theologically committed to Iran. He's in depth, of course,

and he owns them a lot. They have a how to transform the group into a global threat,

but by the end of the day, I mean, Tuhem, Makkah and San'a are more significant than Najaf and

Khaman, Tahran. That's a quite important dynamic to remember. And because, again, there is a huge

domestic aspect in the past that covered them, which was the support for the Palestinian case.

That does not exist at the moment in Yemen, and I think they are again, it's always to remember.

They are still blind after a tram by tax, and it's not clear yet what a huge addition they will

make. Should they join now, compared to if they continue keeping their cards,

they play a poker face, keep everyone in their toes, and then they will make a judgment by the end,

but even then, it will be a Houthi judgment that actually serves more the Houthis than actually

serves Iran. I think this is a group that also, of course, always appraises for a war,

but it's very calculated about how it enters and where, even if it's extremely jihadist,

rational a group, it does have built quite a different understanding of power and of a greed

and money the last few years. That also makes it think twice before making any other decision.

Khaled, back in August last year, Israel attacked one of many attacks, killing ministers of the

Houthis governing body. Clearly, we've seen not just in this war, but in the last couple of years,

the Israeli tactic of decapitation, war by assassination, taking place in Iran, in Lebanon,

in Gaza. I mean, I assume Houthi leaders themselves are worried about their own personal safety,

if they went to war. I expect so, but of course, Israel does not have the same intelligence.

They do in Lebanon or in Iran, and they don't have the same access to

where they are. I mean, they were about of the Houthi leaders, like they do in the other places.

Still, they could, I mean, and they did before. And this has to be a factor in their calculation,

I mean, the Houthis.

Rockford, in terms of the global economy, we're mentioning, obviously, energy supplies,

and the fact that there's Yambu port and the pipeline from Saudi Arabia means Saudi Arabia can

use this away to get stuff out. But I mean, the difference between the state of Hormuz and

the Red Sea is that the state of Hormuz is one way in, one way out. The Red Sea is such an

important conduit for so much shipping, is it not? That's right. It's one of the most important,

if not the most important route to connect the Asian markets to the European markets,

in addition to also being important for oil flows, now both ways, because the pipeline across

Saudi Arabia is being so used. And I would say, one point I want to make is that we have seen

the beginning of an international coalition with European nations as well as Japan and South

Korea, even Canada, agreeing to play some role in that as well as regional partners.

And I think that it's important to remember that just right outside the Bab al-Mandeb,

in Djibouti, there are four bases there. There's a U.S. base, a French base, a Chinese base,

and a Japanese base. So that coalition, if it does form, which I think is likely, to help secure

the commercial ship and going through the strait of Hormuz, it could also help secure the ship

going through the Bab al-Mandeb. Faria, I've seen some suggestions that Iran doesn't actually want

the Houthis to get involved. Now, it wants to keep them in reserve, a last resort. I've even seen

the suggestion that there may be some in the revolution regards who'd like to keep it as a potential

refuge if they had to flee. Do you make anything of that? I mean, there's a lot of nuts people

throughout history who have found or flirted with the idea to find Yemen as a refuge from Osama

Billadeh and to IRGC, to former Mahatists, to former Hezbollah, to former Hamas. I would not be

surprised with that thinking, keeping in mind Yemen's geography. But Yemen is far and Yemen is also

unwelcoming for the Iranians overall and the demographics so that support IRGC, even within the

Houthis, is extremely limited to the group. I have no doubt that the Iranians hope and the

pray that they can use the Houthis as much as they can, and they will always try that as much as

they can. But I think at the moment, it is less of a capability to do that also, because again,

they are the post-October 7 Iran and Hezbollah have with the drew a significant number of their

experts who were with the Houthis, and they moved after that. And I think rather the game right

now is not just from IRGC, but also from the Houthis themselves, whom in their growing, never-stopping

ambition are looking for the right moment to even replace Iran in the longer term, after they

feel they have replaced Hezbollah in the region as a new leader of the access of resistance,

whether that's a factually correct or possible or objectively something one can imagine is a

different story. But the Houthis are in that set of mind in which they believe in fact that they

can, at one point, take a huge leadership position within the access of resistance,

the way from Lebanon to Iraq to Iran. And I think that's quite a possibility in the long term,

even though they do not have the necessary political and military capabilities to inherit what

they think they actually can inherit and manage. Thank you, Faria. Thank you to our guests today,

Faria Al-Muslimi, Khaled Batafi, and Rockford Weiss. This episode was produced by Muhammad Ali,

Shi, Imajin, Kimber, Lahorem, Peter, and Gemma Harries. Studio Sound was by Alvaro Galan Madrid,

the program was edited by Anib Ansaka, Yasmin El-Tahan, and Joseph Frius. For continuing coverage of

the war in Iran, catch every episode of the Inside Story podcast. Don't forget to subscribe on

the podcast app you use that way you'll get us every day. Leave us a comment too, we'd love to

hear your thoughts. Thanks for making time to listen. I'll be back on Sunday, John Asden, for the next edition.

Coming up on the take, the global energy crisis deepens as the Israel-Aran war enters a new phase,

targeting gas. That's the take by Al Jazeera. Find it wherever you get your podcasts.