George Beebe: Iran War Weakens Ukraine & Europe Remains Irrational

Welcome back. We are joined by George PV, a former CIA director for Russia Analysis and

currently the director of a grand strategy at the Quincy Institute for Responsible State

Craft. I will make sure to leave a link in the description. And yes, always thank you

for coming back on. It's my pleasure. Thank you.

I wanted to ask you, as we now see the war in Ukraine and the war in Iran is becoming

more and more interlinked, it seems, especially if you look at the reports today from I think

was Wall Street Journal, writing that because of the weapons shortage, there has to be some

difficult decisions whether or not to divert American weapons away from Ukraine and towards

the war in the Middle East. But again, the, I guess, the consequence of the Iran war on the

Ukraine war and also for Russia, it's a, it goes far beyond this. I was wondering how do you see

this? To what extent the war with Iran impacts the strategic balance between Russia and NATO in Ukraine?

Well, I think it has a number of effects. First of all, it definitely has an effect on how many

weapons we have available to provide to Ukraine. Now, of course, the United States made a change

under the Trump administration where we have been providing military aid to the Ukrainians through

Europe. So the Europeans are actually purchasing the American weapons and then in turn transferring

those to the Ukrainians. But we simply don't have enough of some key weapons systems to provide

for Ukraine's needs. And I think the most acute problem it comes in air defense. That was a

problem even prior to the Iran war. I think the, the Russians via their missile drone and glide bomb

attacks were putting extreme strains on Ukraine's air defense capabilities and drawing down

the reserves of air defense missiles that we could provide to the Ukrainians to defend themselves.

But I think with the, the operation in Iran, the longer this goes on, I think the, the result is

going to be an absolute emergency situation for Ukraine's air defense capabilities. And that,

I think, bodes very ill for Ukraine's battlefield prospects for, for very long should this work

continue. So that gives Ukraine, I think, a battlefield reason to seek an end at the negotiating

table sooner rather than later. The other thing that this war does is I think it really

interferes with the strategy that the United States and Europe and Ukraine have long had to try

to squeeze Russia's energy earnings internationally and in so doing incentivize Russia to compromise

and agree to end this war on terms that are at least perceived as equitable and reasonable

rather than, you know, a capitulation of Ukraine to Russia's terms. And because the international

energy situation is approaching a crisis point as a result of the war with Iran, that strategy

of trying to keep Russian energy off the international market is just not viable. And we're,

we're already seeing this, that the Trump administration first indicated to India that we would

not object to Indian purchases as we, we did several months ago. The Trump administration has

provided a, at least a short-term relaxation of sanctions against Russian energy sales

more generally. I think it's omnisinevitable that that one month relaxation is going to move on

to two months and three months and probably become permanent simply because the pressure on international

oil markets is so great. And the United States economic situation looks so precarious that we can't

afford to continue that old, old strategy of trying to squeeze Russia's energy earnings under

these circumstances. And that also, I think, is another reason for Ukraine to seek a compromise

sooner rather than later. So the other thing this does is because the increased oil prices,

Russia is benefiting from a short-term windfall of energy earnings. And that in turn means that

their ability to sustain this war economically is, is that much greater, at least over the short-term

as a result of the war on Iran. So the Russians aren't under any particular economic pressure right

now to, to cut this war short. I mean, it's very likely that they're not going to be for some time to

come. Well, I thought, yeah, for this reason, it could be, well, a silver lining or something positive

to come from this war. That is, if we're losing a war, it's always the way it's solved,

is usually to shift focus to something else. Often we, you know, seemed to only focus on one

thing. We had Russia gate and then it seemed to come to an end with COVID and then COVID ended when,

you know, Russia invaded Ukraine. So, you know, it seemed like this, you know, there could be an

opportunity to put an end to this war. But even as we see this massive crisis now with the shortage

of energy fertilizers, you would think this would create massive pressure, not just on Ukraine and

the US, but also on the Europeans to put an end to this war. Yet we see now that the Europeans

appear to be advising Zelensky not to take the deal presented by the American studies that they

pull out of Donbass and accept neutrality. Indeed, we even seen attacks during the night on this,

on the Russian oil facilities on the Baltic Sea, which appears to have the drones either

transiting or originating from the Baltic states. Now, again, it's a lot of uncertainty about

exactly this. I wouldn't want to say anything, you know, to sure. But at least the Europeans advised

to Zelensky not to put an end to the war. How do you explain this? Because it looks like the

Europeans are the one who will get hammered much, much more than the Americans in this energy crisis

coming up. I agree. I think to a great degree the Europeans are the big losers in this

war in Iran because of the disproportionate impact on their energy situation that this

is having, and they don't have good alternatives. A rational actor in Europe would look at this

situation and say, you know what, we're going to have to buy Russian energy. There really is no

other way out of the circumstances that we find ourselves in right now. But I think what's actually

going on is the Europeans are looking at the situation saying, well, if we can hold on, if Ukraine

can hold on, if we can manage to get through the next several months, the political situation in

the United States is likely to change. I mean, I think their calculation is that all of this could

greatly undermine President Trump's political circumstances and lead toward growing unpopularity,

a defeat in the midterm elections in November. And my guess is that what the Europeans are saying

is rather than make what they regard as a very unwelcome compromise to end the war in Ukraine,

they're hoping they can just hold on, you know, through the next several months, and then the political

circumstances they hope will change. And Trump will not have the ability politically to drive this

peace process, see it through to its end. And then who knows what could happen, the future is

very unpredictable. So I think it's an unwise bet on their part. But I think that's what's going on.

Yeah, well, often when the Europeans look towards the US, and it's, well, at the extent to which it

engages in this war against Russia, it's always this assumption that the US have, you know, all the

capabilities it needs, the only thing missing is the will. And which is why they might go for

waiting out Trump yet again. But use the word rational. If you would, you know, be rational,

you would seek to negotiate an end to this war. Do you see the European leaders being irrational

here, though, or if so, why? Why, why are they, now, but are they, you know, is it ideology? Is it

lack of political imagination? Are they simply, you know, they don't have any other solutions?

Well, how, how do you explain this? Because I often, I often make the point I can understand

all the different actors. I understand why the US initially went very hard, hard into this war.

I didn't understand why they now want to distance themselves. I think I understand why the Russian

CCC is an existential threat. I understand why the Ukrainian CCC is, as an existential threat.

But I can't ever really make proper sense on the European position, though.

Well, you know, I do think this is largely irrational. It's driven in part by wishful thinking.

You tend to see what you want to believe. And I think in part it's a lack of imagination

and a fear that if they do compromise with Russia on big geopolitical issues on the future

of NATO enlargement, that that might undermine the entire European enterprise and

bring the European Union into disarray and lead to disunity in Europe in a profound way.

To some degree, Russia has been a unifying factor within Europe.

When you face a common enemy, that common sense of threat can bridge a lot of differences

that might otherwise be more significant. And I think to some degree, the Europeans don't want

to let go of that threat. They have a political interest in continuing to see a Russian threat.

And rather than trying to manage and mitigate the threat, I think they'd like it to continue,

because it's politically useful for them in a lot of ways. And also, I think from the airport

if you keep the United States in Europe, it keeps the United States in NATO.

Now, I think a lot of this is an accurate perception. A lot of this is seeing what you want to

believe. So there is an element of self delusion, I think, in all of this. And I think it's going to

backfire, frankly. So I think it's an unwise approach. But it's never easy to explain things that

appear irrational. That's always a challenge. Well, how do you see them? They're the possibility of how

Russia might respond to all of this, because you hear pressure in, you hear stories about

pressure mounting in Moscow that they should essentially do what the Iranians have done. That is

assert their deterrence, because they let their own deterrence slip over the past four years to

the extent, you know, in the West, we can launch missiles into Russian cities. And this does seem

to be any consequences. Again, you wrote an, no, you gave an interview. I remember back in December

of 2021, I think was for radio free Europe, when you warned that a war could come if the

Russians see in action as becoming more dangerous than action in terms of the West, you know,

cementing its position within Ukraine, that they, this would be their last chance to dislodge NATO.

How do you see the calculations in Russia now? Because on one hand, the Americans are tied up

in, in the Middle East. The Europeans appear to be willing to escalate. And again, it appears.

And you have all this pressure on the Kremlin that they should start to take a tougher line. Do you think

they could, I guess, escalate in a much greater way?

Well, I think it is possible. And I think there are those in Moscow that are making that argument

that the United States is not actually agreement capable that Trump, Trump can't be trusted.

I think they look at the performance of Trump's onvoys with Iran,

who are the same onvoys that the Russians are dealing with on the Ukraine settlement process.

And look at what appears to them to be bad faith negotiations on the part of those

negotiators with Iran. And they wonder, can we trust Trump and his onvoys to negotiate in good

faith with us? So that's one of those elements of doubt that opponents of a compromise in Russia,

people that are saying, look, we should just go all out and win this war and reestablish

deterrence. I think that's part of what they're arguing right now. And I think they are also

saying we've got a window of opportunity. The United States is distracted. It doesn't have the

capacity to both wage the war in Iran and supply Ukraine with its needs.

Europe doesn't have the economic wherewithal to support the Ukrainians under these circumstances.

And let's seize this window of opportunity. Now, although there is that view, I think,

in Moscow, that is I don't believe the unanimous opinion. And as far as I can tell, Putin is not

yet there at that point. And I think the reason is, I don't think he wants to give up the

possibility of day-taught with the United States, of normalizing the relationship with the United

States, of entering into negotiations over European security, over strategic stability. These are

all very important goals for Russia. It advances Russia's position in the world to have a normalized

relationship with the United States. It allows Russia a lot more geopolitical room from

maneuver, vis-a-vis China, helps ensure that China is not simply going to become the dominant

partner of Russia. And Russia is left as a subordinate junior. And a lot of those big European

security issues for Russia can't be resolved just by taking the rest of the Donbass or even

seizing Odessa and turning Ukraine into a landlocked rump state. So I don't think Putin wants to give up

on the possibility of a deal to end the war in Ukraine. And all of the improvements in the

U.S.-Russian relationship that he expects would flow from that. Now, what would change his mind,

I think, would be a belief that an improved U.S.-Russian relationship is simply not going to happen

regardless that Trump is so weakened or that Trump really is not intent on a real normalization

of the bilateral relationship. In that circumstance, then I could see the Russians saying, well,

we're only giving up something that isn't going to happen anyway. So let's win this war and

really use the military capabilities that we have but have been reluctant to bring to bear in this

war because we didn't want to close the door on a normalization with the United States.

And I don't think Putin is there yet, but could he get there? Sure. I could see that happening.

And I think we're going to find out the answer to that in the next few months.

Yeah, I don't think there's necessarily any pressure to pick one path or the other just yet because

even if Trump is a bad faith and negotiator, it doesn't, as long as Russia doesn't

let the diplomacy influence its strategy on the battlefield, it could still pursue the diplomatic path

even if it continues to make advancements on the battlefield. But another way, though,

it seems that this war in Iran could affect the war in Europe would be that NATO itself is coming

on the great pressure. You probably saw the press conference that Trump was giving, at least

he was answering questions in which he was making the point. More or less that NATO will regret

and not joining in on the campaign against Iran. And it almost sounded like an announcement

of a divorce coming in the future because he was just waiting a few months. You will see,

remember this. What do you think this could be used as a way to untangle the US from NATO or

is that not really in his interest? It's more just to put the pressure.

Well, I think there is, there already was in the transatlantic relationship

growing distrust and tension between Washington and its European allies to varying degrees.

But I think the Iran war has really exacerbated these pre-existing tensions. And I think we're

in a situation where Trump turned to the NATO allies and said, we need your help. You benefit

disproportionately from oil that is shipped through the state of Hormuz. You should come help us

open the strait. And the answer that he got from our allies was, you know, no, not our problem.

And so I think the perception in the White House is what good are these allies? Why are we providing

all this security support to them, which has underwritten their security for so many decades?

And in our time of need, they're not coming to our assistance. This is a one-way relationship,

and we're not benefiting. Now, I think from the European perspective, I think they look at the

situation and come to almost the opposite conclusion. They look at what the President has done

vis-a-vis Iran as putting Europe in peril. They believe that Trump has to, to a large degree,

created a crisis over the state of Hormuz because of a lack of foresight, a lack of adequate

planning, a lack of envisioning things that were obvious to a lot of experts for a long time,

mispotential consequences. And having created the crisis then turns to Europe and says, you know,

help bail us out of this situation, put your ships and your soldiers in peril instead of doing.

And by the way, you've created an extraordinary energy crisis and economic crisis for Europe.

So what good is America's protection and all of this, if you're not actually enhancing European

security, you're undermining it. So to me, this has the makings of some very, very serious strains

in the alliance. There aren't going to go away. I'm wondering if probably we'll get more so

good. I'm wondering if Trump would have asked, well, would have informed the Europeans before that

hack whether or not they would join in that they would have got more commitment because you

saw in the early days of the bombing that the Europeans were, you know, lining up to support,

especially people like Chancellor Merz. You know, when they thought it would be more successful

than it was. But by not getting their commitment early on, they could wait and see until it began

to run into problems. And then asking, once it seemed like a, well, dangerous proposition, then,

you know, they would decline. I think this could have been a mistake if we would have consulted

them early on and get their commitments then before this all went south. I think you would have

been able, especially Merz, to get him on board. But what does this mean, you think, for the

possibility of peace now, not just in Middle East, but with Ukraine, because last time we spoke,

you said there's still a window opportunity to end this at the negotiating table, but this window's

closing. Or is it opening up? No, I think the window opportunity is still there, but I do think it

is closing. I don't think it's going to extend much beyond this summer, quite honestly, because at

that point, the political calendar changes things. And I'm sure that the, the window for compromise

is going to be open much beyond, you know, early fall of this year. I still think the sides have

incentives. The Ukrainians have a very strong battlefield incentive to get what they can right now

before the situation gets much worse. I think the Russians have an incentive to try to get a deal

while Trump is still agreement capable. I think Trump needs a win. Iran operation has been very bad

news for him politically and in his foreign policy more generally. In this kind of situation,

it makes a lot of sense to try to get a win by bringing the Ukraine negotiations to a successful

close. And my guess is that the Trump administration is likely to tell the Ukrainians just that,

now is at the time. You've gotten everything you needed. You're not going to get more. This is as good

a deal as you're going to get. Take it now, because the alternatives are going to be much worse.

But why does it have to close then? What are the main reasons why I think the window

opportunity for a diplomatic settlement would be over after summer? Well, I think the Russians will

become disillusioned with the Trump administration's ability to bring this across the finish line.

And I think they're going to have growing doubts about whether the United States actually is

serious about a normalized relationship and whether the Trump administration is even capable

of normalizing the relationship with Russia going for it. I think the longer this war goes on,

unresolved, and the longer the war in Iran goes on, the more doubts the Russians are going to have

about those things. So that's a part of this. And then the other part of this is patience

on Trump's part. I think we could reach a point where he becomes disillusioned and thinks we're

just not going to get the sides to come together. So if or when he reaches that point, I don't know,

nobody can predict that sort of thing, but I don't think the patience in Moscow and Washington

will be infinite. And then on the Ukrainian side, the dilemma that they have is whether they want to

play a waiting game and hope that the circumstances in Washington will be more favorable for them

six months from now. And that also is the issue with the Europeans.

Yeah, this is a last question. There's been some media reports that the Russians are

aiding the Iranians. And well, I just assume that's the case. It would make sense. But it's all

something that Zelensky has been pushing very hard to direct Trump's fury towards Russia as

opposed to spending using all these weapons only against Iran. To what extent do you think this

could impact relations? Because so far, Trump has seen him with dismissive. He probably knows

this is correct, but he doesn't want to disrupt the possibility of the diplomatic process. Do you

see this possibly escalating out of control or that the Russians would start to send more heavy

weapons? I'm not sure what possible cards the Russians could play, I guess, to return their

favor after all the past four years, especially against probably not so much the Americans anymore,

about the more against the Europeans, the Germans and the British, especially.

Well, it would be very difficult for the United States to argue that Russian intelligence

provided to Iran that might be used to kill Americans and target our forces is wrong in principle.

As the Russians would quite quickly say, this is exactly what you've been doing to us

since early 2022, and I think Trump understands that. The real question is, do the opponents of

a compromised deal in Washington and in Europe? He is on this question and hype it in ways that

create big political problems, big obstacles to a deal and create an environment in which Trump

has much less room from maneuver vis-à-vis Russia and vis-à-vis the end game of a Ukrainian peace

deal. And that's possible. I think it's already clear that there's an awful lot of media attention

to this issue, and I don't think that's accidental. I think the people that are trying to focus

attention on this are doing so because they see this as a means of making a deal a compromise in

Ukraine less likely and putting obstacles in the path of a normalization of the US-Russian bilateral

relationship. Well, there's a lot of pessimism this day, so I'm very happy to at least hear some

optimism from your side in terms of the possibility, still lingering and possibility, to have some

diplomatic path still forward. So thank you very much for taking the time, and yes,

enjoy your days in Geneva. Great. Thank you very much.