Judge Graf And The Order To Bind Tyler Robinson Over For Trial On All Counts Charged (Part 4) (9/6/26)

0:00What's up everyone and welcome back to the program. In this episode we're going to pick up where he left off, which Judge Graff and the bind over order for Tyler Robinson for the alleged murder of Charlie Kirk. D, probable cause supporting the victim targeting enhancement. The state also alleges that the defendant intentionally selected Mr. Kirk because Mr. Kirk's political expression under Utah Code section 76-3-203.14. Defendant disputes, whether the evidence establishes the required motive. For the reasons set forth below in the court's analysis of the sentencing enhancements, the court concludes that the state has established probable cause as to the victim targeting allegation. The court does not rely on defendant's political associations, beliefs, or personal relationships standing alone. The relevant inquiry is whether the evidence reasonably supports an inference that defendant selected Mr. Kirk because of defendant's perception of Mr. Kirk's protected political expression.

1:01As explained below section 76-3-203.14, does not expressly identify an additional penalty consequence for a capital felony conviction. The court therefore preserves the state's notice without deciding that the allegation independently alters the penalty applicable to count one. Count two, felony discharge of a firearm causing serious bodily injury, first degree felony. To bind defendant over on count two, felony discharge of a firearm causing serious bodily injury, a first degree felony under Utah Code section 76-11, 2-10-2, and 2-3-C. The state must establish probable cause that defendant one discharged a firearm two in the direction of Charlie Kirk, three. Knowing or having reason to believe that Charlie Kirk may be endangered by the discharge, and four, the act caused serious bodily injury to Charlie Kirk. The evidence described above supports a reasonable belief that defendant positioned himself on the roof of the Losi building and discharged the Mauser

2:0330-06 rifle in the direction of Charlie Kirk. The medical examiner determined that Mr. Kirk died from a gunshot wound to the neck and classified the manner of death as homicide. The fatal gunshot wound constitutes serious bodily injury. Accordingly count two is bound over for trial. Count three, obstruction of justice, second degree felony. The bind defendant over on count three of obstruction of justice, a second degree felony under Utah Code section 76-83062. The state must demonstrate probable cause that defendant one acted with the intent to hinder, delay or prevent the investigation, apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or punishment of any person. Two, regarding conduct that constitutes a criminal offense, and three, concealed or removed the firearm allegedly used in the shooting. Under that statute, the offense is a second degree felony. If the underlying conduct constitutes a capital or first degree felony, Utah Code 76-8306-2C.

3:07The underlying charge homicide constitutes a capital or first degree felony for purpose of section 76-8306-2C. Following the shooting, the Mauser 30-06 rifle was concealed in a dense wooded area on the UVU campus, wrapped inside a dark towel. Defendant alleged intent to hinder the investigation is supported by the text messages attributed to him, in which he stated that he had concealed his rifle by leaving it in a bush where he changed outfits. The alleged concealment of the rifle in a wooded area after the shooting, together with the attributed messages concerning its concealment and possible recovery, supports a reasonable inference that defendant acted with intent to conceal physical evidence and hinder his apprehension. Count three is bound over for trial. Count four, obstruction of justice, second degree felony. The bind defendant over on count four, obstruction of justice, a second degree felony under Utah Code 76-8306-2C. The state must establish probable cause

4:09that defendant one acted with the intent to hinder the lay or prevent the investigation, apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or punishment of any person, two, regarding conduct that constitutes a criminal offense, and three, destroyed concealed or removed, the clothing allegedly worn during the shooting. The state has presented sufficient evidence to establish probable cause as to count four. The UVU surveillance video depicts the shooter wearing a specific outfit as he moved towards the rooftop of the Losi building. The communications attributed to defendant state that he changed outfits in the wooded area where the rifle was left. The clothing depicted on the alleged shooter was not recovered. Those circumstances viewed together support a reasonable inference for purposes of this prelim hearing that defendant concealed or destroyed the clothing with intent required by the statute. Count four is bound over for trial. Count five, tampering with a witness, third degree felony. The bind defendant over on count five,

5:09tampering with a witness, a third degree felony under Utah Code 76-8508. The state must demonstrate probable cause that the defendant, one, believed in official proceeding or investigation with pending or about to be instituted or intended to prevent an official proceeding or investigation, and two, attempted to induce or otherwise cause another individual to withhold testimony, information, a document or an item. An instruction to delete communication may constitute an attempt to cause another person to withhold information or a document when made with the intent required by Utah Code 76-8508. After the shooting, defendant allegedly sent twigs text messages in which he stated that he'd shot the victim and concealed the rifle. At the end of the exchange, defendant texted twigs delete this exchange. The surrounding circumstances support an inference that defendant knew law enforcement was investigating the shooting and searching for the person responsible. The instruction to delete this exchange considered in context

6:12supports a reasonable inference that defendant attempted to cause twigs to withhold those communications from investigators by deleting them. Count five is bound over for trial. Count six, tampering with a witness, third degree felony. To bind defendant over on count six, tampering with a witness, a third degree felony under Utah Code section 76-8508. The state must demonstrate probable cause that the defendant, one, believed in official proceeding or investigation was pending or about to be instituted or intended to prevent an official proceeding or investigation and two, attempted to induce or otherwise cause another individual to withhold testimony information, a document or an item. The state alleges that defendant committed this offense by directing his roommate to stay silent if police questioned them, information at three. The evidence shows that on September 11th, 2025, defendant sent a text message, lance twigs stating, if any police ask you questions, ask for a lawyer and stay silent.

7:15Defendant argues that count six must be stricken as a matter of law. He contends that this message was merely advising a loved one to exercise constitutional rights to remain silent and see counsel, which cannot standing alone constitute a criminal offense. Defendant therefore argues that the record does not support the required obstructive intent. The court considers this a meaningful distinction because the words ask for a lawyer and stay silent. Viewed nice elation, describe lawful advice concerning constitutional rights and do not themselves establish criminal intent, standing alone, advising another person to request counsel and remain silent is lawful and does not establish witness tampering. The state relies however on the context of the communication, including defendant's earlier alleged instruction to delete this exchange. Viewed together and in the light most favorable to the state, those communications permit a reasonable inference that defendant intended to cause twigs to withhold information from investigators.

8:15The court does not determine at this stage whether that inference is ultimately more persuasive than defendant's lawful advice explanation and it does not treat the exercise of legal rights or advice concerning those rights as criminal conduct standing alone. Although defendants lawful advice interpretation remains a reasonable competing interpretation, the surrounding communications permit the state proposed inference as well. Because the court may not choose between reasonable competing inferences at the prelim stage, probable cause supports count six, count six is bound over for trial. Count number seven, violin offense is committed in the presence of a child. Class B, misdemeanor, reclassified as class A. The bind defendant over on count seven, violin offense committed in the presence of a child, a class B misdemeanor under Utah Code section 76-3203.102 and two. The state must demonstrate probable cause that defendant one committed criminal homicide,

9:16two in the physical presence of a child younger than 14 years old and three with knowledge that the child was present and may have seen or heard the commission of the criminal homicide. The state further alleges that the offense is reclassified as a class A misdemeanor under section 76-3203.143A2 because the victim targeting allegation. The first two elements are supported by evidence of the charged homicide and evidence that children younger than 14 were physically present at the event. The disputed and closer issue is knowledge. Defendant argues that the state has not shown that from a distance of approximately 415 feet, he knew a child younger than 14 was present and might see or hear the offense. Knowledge may be established circumstantially, but it cannot rest solely on the general proposition that children sometimes attend public events. The relevant question is whether the circumstances described in the record permit a reasonable inference that defendant knew a child was present.

10:17The state relies on several circumstances specific to the event. Defendant allegedly planned the shooting for more than a week. He visited the event area twice before the shooting and had an opportunity to observe the venue and preparations. The state's evidence places him at an elevated location with a clear line of sight toward the event area where thousands of participants were present and the rifle contained an optical scope. The event video also depicts young children and infants within the event area. The court recognizes the force of defendant's argument that an opportunity to observe a large crowd does not necessarily establish knowledge that a child younger than 14 was present. The court therefore does not infer knowledge from crowd size alone. The combined circumstances permit do not compel an inference that defendant knew a child was present and might see or hear the shooting. The court does not equate being familiar with the venue and opportunity to observe the crowd. Or the presence of an optical scope with actual knowledge.

11:19Rather, the court considers the circumstances collectively and under the prelim hearing requirement that reasonable inferences be drawn in the state's favor taken together, these circumstances are sufficient at this stage to establish probable cause as to the knowledge element. Whether defendant actually observed the child and whether the state's inference is ultimately persuasive remain questions for the trial effect. Count seven is bound over for trial. Analysis of merger double jeopardy objections. Defendant argues that count two must merge with count one because both arise from a single gunshot directed at a single victim. Utah Code Section 76-1402 limits multiple convictions when one offense is included within another. But merger or narrowly concerns convictions and punishment. And the fact dependent merger determination may be premature before the charges have been presented to the trial effect. At this stage, the court determines only whether probable cause independently supports the charge defenses.

12:20The court does not decide whether either offense is ultimately a lesser included offense of the other. If convictions are returned on both counts, the merger issue may be addressed at the time under Section 76-1402. Analysis of the sentencing enhancements. The information presents three related but legally distinct matters. The separate offense, charging count seven under Utah Code 76-320310, the presence of a child sentencing, consideration under Section 76-3203.9, and the victim targeting allegation under 76-3203.14. Because these provisions have different legal effects, the court addresses them separately. Because the victim targeting allegation would reclassify count seven from a class B to a class A, Mr. Meener, under Section 76-3203.143A2, that allegation is subject to the probable cause determination. See a friend I, first New Jersey, 530US 2000.

13:23The court also considers whether the remaining sentencing allegations have factual support without deciding that each constitutes a separate element of an offense, a presence of a child allegation. For the reason stated in the analysis of count seven, the record provides probable cause for the factual allegation that the charge conduct occurred in the presence of a child under 76-3203.9. That circumstance operates as a sentencing consideration, rather than a reclassification of the underlying felony. B, victim targeting allegations, Utah rule of evidence 417 limits the use of defendants expressions or associations in proving a victim targeting allegation. The evidence must otherwise be admissible and must specifically relate to the defendant selection of the victim. Pastor Engelhart's statement may establish the nature of Mr. Kirk's public expression, but it does not independently establish defendants' motive, knowledge, or state of mind. Defendant argues that the state is not established

14:24probable cause that he selected Mr. Kirk because of a qualifying personal attribute identified here as political expression. Utah Code, section 76-3203-141K2. The court therefore considers Engelhart's statement, only for the limited purpose described above and looks to other evidence to determine defendant's alleged reason for selecting Mr. Kirk. When asked why he shot Mr. Kirk, defendant alleged response, I had enough of his hatred. Some hate can't be negotiated out. The word hatred standing alone is ambiguous and does not establish the statutory motive. The state also presented evidence that defendant identified Mr. Kirk by name in communications concerning the plan that shooting, allegedly plan the shooting in advance and carried it out during a public event associated with Mr. Kirk's political expression. Viewed together in the light most favorable to the state, those circumstances support a reasonable, though not compelled, inference that defendant selected Mr. Kirk

15:26because of perception of Mr. Kirk's political expression. The court does not determine whether that inference will ultimately prove more persuasive than other interpretations of defendant's statement. At this stage, the targeting allegation satisfies the probable cause standard. Its legal consequence is differed by count. For count seven, section 76-3203.143A2, reclassify the offense from a class B to a class A misdemeanor. For count two, a first degree felony, the statute makes the victim selection in aggravating sentencing consideration rather than reclassifying the offense. Section 76-3203.14 does not expressly identify a penalty consequence for a capital felony. The court therefore does not decide that the statute authorizes an additional penalty for count one. The state's notice remains preserved, but any asserted consequence for a capital felony conviction must rest on separately identified legal authority.

16:27This ruling does not affect the targeting allegation as applied to counts two and seven, ruling in order. For the four going reasons and based on the record and the party's submissions, it's hereby order that defendant Tyler James Robinson is bound over for trial in the fourth judicial district court on the following counts and sentencing allegations. A, count one, aggravated murder, a capital felony, and violation of Utah Code, section 76-5202, including the capital aggravating circumstance under section 76-5202A3, B, count two, felony discharge of a firearm causing serious bodily injury, a first-degree felony, a violation of Utah Code, section 76-11, 210, 2, and 3C, including the victim targeting allegation, under 76-3203.142, subject to the sentencing treatment described in 76-3203.143.B,

17:28and the presence of a child aggravating factor, under section 76-3203.9, count three of obstruction of justice, second-degree felony and violation of Utah Code, 76-83062, D, count four, obstruction of justice, a second-degree felony, and violation of Utah Code, section 76-83062, count five, tampering with a witness, a third-degree felony, and violation of Utah Code, 76-8508, count six, tampering with a witness, third-degree felony, and violation of Utah Code, 76-8508, count seven, violent offenses committed in the presence of a child, a class B misdemeanor, under Utah Code, section 76-3203.10, reclassified as a class A misdemeanor, under 76-3203.143.A2, based on the victim targeting allegation, under section 76-3203.142, all evidentiary determinations

18:29in this order are limited to the prelim hearing and do not determine an admissibility or the ultimate weight of the evidence at trial. Nothing in this order constitutes a final determination of defendant's guilt or witness's credibility. Defendant remains presumed innocent and the state bears the burden at trial of proving each charge of defense beyond a reasonable doubt. It's so ordered dated this first day of September 2026, and this order was signed by Judge Graff. All the information that goes with this episode can be found in the description box.